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Abstract	  
This	   thesis	   positions	   the	  World	   Bank	   Inspection	   Panel	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   a	  World	  
Bank	   legal	   system.	   International	   legal	   positivism	   can	   no	   longer	   explain	   the	  
governance	   role	   and	   actions	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   is	   undertaking	   and,	   instead,	  
systems	  theory	  is	  put	  forward	  as	  an	  alternative	  tool	  of	  legal	  understanding.	  
The	   conceptual	   tool	   of	   systems	   theory,	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   legal	   understanding,	   is	  
analysed	  and	  constructed	  to	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  via	  which	  the	  Bank's	  behaviour	  
can	   be	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   law.	   The	   essentialist	   analysis	   of	   systems	   theory	  
identifies,	   inter	   alia,	   the	   need	   for	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   ruling	   upon	   the	   legal/illegal	  
binary	  communication	  divide	  as	  being	  a	   required	  element	   for	   the	  evolution	  of	  a	  
normative	   system	   into	   a	   legal	   system.	   The	  World	   Bank	   Inspection	   Panel	   is	   put	  
forward	   as	   this	   Court-­‐like	   body	   and	   its	   evolution	   identified	   as	   triggering	   a	  
formative	  change	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  World	  Bank	  operates.	  
This	   thesis	   concludes	   that	   this	   shift	   into	   a	   legal	   system	   demands	   a	   new	  
understanding	  of	   the	  problems	  and	   issues	   that	   confront	   the	  Bank	   today.	  Rather	  
than	   framing	   its	   issues	   in	   terms	   of	   legal	   positivism,	   issues	   such	   as	   the	   Bank's	  
democratic	   accountability,	   conditionality	   and	   mission	   creep	   should	   instead	   be	  
framed	  in	  terms	  of	  systems	  theory.	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Introduction	  Chapter	  
0.1	  Introduction	  
This	   thesis	   examines	   the	  work	   of	   the	   International	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	  
Development	  and	  provides	  an	  answer	  in	  law	  to	  explain	  the	  governance	  role	  that	  it	  
occupies.	   The	   international	   law	   of	   positivism	   no	   longer	   adequately	   explains	   the	  
international	  organisation’s	  work	  and,	   instead,	  systems	  theory	   is	  proposed	  as	  an	  
alternative	   to	   understand	   the	   World	   Bank’s	   actions	   within	   law.	   This	   theory	   is	  




In	  the	  summer	  of	  1944,	  730	  delegates	  representing	  44	  countries	  convened	  at	  the	  
Mount	  Washington	  Hotel	  in	  New	  Hampshire,	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  Although	  
the	   Second	   World	   War	   was	   not	   yet	   over,	   governments	   were	   planning	   for	   the	  
future	   in	  an	  effort	  to	  prevent	  further	  outbreaks	  of	  hostilities	  and	  to	  ensure	  their	  
own	   economic	   prosperity.	   	   Amongst	   the	  multitude	   of	   causes	   of	   the	  war,	   States	  
believed	  that	  the	  financial	  instability	  in	  the	  years	  between	  wars,	  and	  especially	  the	  
financial	  shocks	  suffered	  in	  the	  1930s,	  contributed	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  war	  across	  
the	  globe	  for	  the	  second	  time	  within	  their	  lives.	  The	  policy	  makers	  at	  the	  time	  had	  
the	  ardent	  belief	   that	   free	   trade	  not	  only	   led	   to	   increased	  prosperity	   for	   all	   but	  
also	  international	  peace.1	  The	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  had	  seen	  States	  
exploit	  the	  financial	  system	  to	  gain	  trade	  advantages	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  pull	  their	  own	  
economies	  out	  of	  recession	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others.	  The	  resulting	  instability	  and	  
ensuing	  economic	  warfare	  was	  viewed	  by	  all	  sides	  at	  the	  conference	  as	  a	  danger	  
to	  the	  world’s	  peace.	  
Upon	   arrival	   at	   the	   conference,	   the	   delegates	   were	   split	   into	   three	   separate	  
Technical	   Commissions.	   Commission	   I	   would	   consider	   a	   potential	   International	  
Monetary	   Fund;	   its	   purpose,	   operations,	   organisation	   and	   form,	   whilst	  
Commission	   III	  was	   tasked	  with	  exploring	  other	  potential	  means	  of	   international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   For	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America	   government	   perspective,	   see:	  
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-­‐1945/BrettonWoods	  accessed	  July	  2013.	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financial	  cooperation.	  Commission	   II	  was	  tasked	  with	  creating	  a	  framework	  for	  a	  
Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	   Development.	   This	   included	   four	   committees	   to	  
examine	   the	   purposes,	   policies	   and	   capital	   of	   the	   Bank,	   the	   operations	   of	   the	  
Bank,	   the	   organisation	   and	  management	   and	   finally	   the	   form	   and	   status	   of	   the	  
Bank.2	  
Commission	   II	  heard	  a	  number	  of	  proposals	  but	  settled	  upon	  a	  Bank	  with	  a	  dual	  
aim	   of	   helping	   to	   rebuild	   war	   torn	   Europe	   and	   development.	   The	   notion	   of	  
development	  was	  primarily	   included	  due	   to	   the	   Latin	  American	  delegations	   that	  
represented	   States	   who	   were	   not	   in	   need	   of	   rebuilding	   but	   were	   in	   need	   of	  
development	  lending.3	  The	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  left	  the	  question	  over	  which	  aim	  
was	  primary	  to	  the	  Bank	  itself	  yet	  included	  a	  provision	  that	  the	  Bank	  ‘pay	  special	  
regard	   to	   lightening	   the	   financial	  burden’	  on	  members	   that	   ‘have	  suffered	  great	  
devastation	   from	   enemy	   occupation	   or	   hostilities’.4	   The	  members	   who	  were	   to	  
hold	  the	  highest	  share	  of	  stock	  and,	  therefore,	  make	  the	  largest	  contribution	  were	  
primarily	  concerned	  with	  reconstruction.5	  
Three	  weeks	  after	  the	  conference	  began	  the	  delegates	  signed	  the	  Final	  Act	  of	  the	  
United	  Nations	  Monetary	  and	  Financial	  Conference	  6	  and	  put	  an	  end	  to	  a	  meeting	  
that	  would	  after	  be	  known	  as	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  Conference.	  On	  27	  December	  
1945,	  the	  World	  Bank	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  entered	  into	  force.	  
States	  came	  together	  to	  create	  a	  new	  regime,	  but	  relied	  upon	  old	  legal	  principles	  
to	  do	   so.	  The	  ability	  of	   States	   to	   create	   formal	  agreements	  between	  each	  other	  
had	  been	   recognised	   for	   thousands	  of	   years7	  and	  whilst	  public	   international	   law	  
had	  developed	  to	  encapsulate	  more	  than	  treaties,	  the	  primary	  legal	  source	  in	  the	  
international	  forum	  was	  and	  remains	  a	  written	  agreement	  between	  nations.	  The	  
predominant	  modern	   understanding	   of	   public	   international	   law	   stems	   from	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Final	  Act	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Monetary	  and	  Financial	  Conference	  (22	  July	  1944)	  
3	   http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,content	  
MDK:64054691~menuPK:64319211~pagePK:36726~piPK:36092~theSitePK:29506,00.html	  
accessed	  August	  2013.	  
4	  International	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  (hereafter	  
IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement),	  Article	  III	  (Section	  1)(b)	  
5	   Edward	  Mason	  &	   Robert	   Asher,	   The	  World	   Bank	   Since	   Bretton	  Woods	   (The	   Brookings	  
Institution	  1973)	  pg.	  23	  
6	  22	  July	  1944	  
7	  The	  peace	  treaty	  between	  Egypt	  and	  Hittite	  Empire	  dates	  back	  to	  1280	  BC.	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positivist	   school	  of	   thought8	   and	   it	   is	   from	   this	  positivist	   analytical	   tool	   that	   this	  
thesis	  commences.	  
This	   thesis	   examines	   the	  work	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   against	   the	   legal	   paradigm	   in	  
which	   it	  was	   created.	   The	  World	  Bank	   today	   is	   acting	   in	   a	   governance	   role,	   and	  
requires	  that	  its	  member	  States	  conform	  to	  certain	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  access	  its	  
assistance.	   The	   Bank	   was	   created	   using	   public	   international	   law	   that	   is	   itself	  
traditionally	   seen	   as	   based	   upon	   the	   widely	   accepted	   positivist	   theory	   that	   an	  
international	  law	  is	  only	  valid	  if	  it	  is	  created	  by	  sovereign	  States	  as	  an	  expression	  
of	   sovereign	   will;	   international	   legal	   positivism.	   In	   international	   law,	   the	   State	  
accepted	  rules	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  State	  and	  an	   international	  
organisation	  are	  usually	  seen	  as	  ones	  of	  delegated	  authority;	  an	  organisation	  can	  
only	  work	  within	  either	   the	  explicit	  or	   implied	  powers	  given	   to	   it	  by	   its	  member	  
States.	  To	  act	  otherwise	  would	  be	  for	  the	   international	  organisation	  to	  encroach	  
upon	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  members.	  The	  thesis	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  actions	  
of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  although	  accepted	  by	  States	  as	  valid	  in	  law,	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  
accurately	  traced	  to	  these	  accepted	  rules	  within	  the	  international	  community.	  	  
The	   thesis	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   have	   moved	   the	  
understanding	  of	   its	  actions	   in	   law	  beyond	  this	  theory.	  The	  governance	  role	  that	  
the	   Bank	   is	   undertaking	   is	   not	   reflected	   in	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement.	   States	   are	  
accepting	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  as	  within	  the	  law	  yet	  the	  accepted	  legal	  
theory	   offers	   no	   explanation	   as	   to	   why.	   This	   thesis	   posits	   that	   a	   change	   in	   the	  
theory	   in	   this	   narrow	   area	   is	   required	   and	   proposes	   systems	   theory	   as	   an	  
alternative	   tool	   of	   understanding.	   The	   work	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   will	   then	   be	  
analysed	   against	   systems	   theory	   to	   demonstrate	   for	   the	   first	   time	   that	   an	  
autonomous	   legal	  system	  has	  been	  created.	   In	  particular,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank	  Inspection	  Panel	  will	  be	  closely	  examined	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  this	  Court-­‐like	  
structure	   has	   moved	   the	   World	   Bank	   from	   a	   normative	   regime	   involving	   a	  
governance	  function	  into	  a	  fully	  autonomous	  legal	  system.	  The	  value	  of	  this	  work	  
is	   to	  allow	  a	  more	   thorough	  understanding	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	  and	   to	   frame	   the	  
challenging	   questions	   that	   are	   raised	   about	   the	   Bank’s	   conduct	   within	   an	  
alternative	  setting	  and,	  therefore,	  allow	  alternative	  answers	  to	  the	  questions	  that	  
challenge	  the	  Bank	  today.	  Analysis	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Bank	  is	  still	  framed	  in	  terms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Which	   itself	   replaced	   the	   natural	   school	   of	   law.	   This	   issue	  will	   be	   further	   examined	   in	  
Chapter	  One.	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of	  State	  consent.	  This	  thesis	  will	  add	  to	  knowledge	  by	  framing	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  
Bank	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system,	  and	  allow	  a	  reconceptualization	  of	  
the	   issues	  challenging	   the	  Bank	   to	  allow	   for	  alternative	  unconsidered	  options	   to	  
be	  explored.	  
There	  is	  significant	  debate	  existing	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  authors,	  both	  legal	  and	  non-­‐
legal,	  on	  whether	  the	  World	  Bank	  should	  be	  acting	  the	  way	  that	  it	   is.9	  The	  thesis	  
will	   take	   no	   position	   on	   the	  morality	   of	   the	   governance	   being	   exercised	   by	   the	  
World	  Bank.	  There	  will	  be	  no	  debate	  on	  the	  normative	  position	  it	  should	  adopt	  in	  
relation	  to	  its	  governance	  in	  both	  what	  is	  being	  governed	  and	  how	  it	  is	  governed.	  
Instead	   the	   thesis	   will	   prescriptively	   focus	   upon	   the	   legal	   reality	   that	   presents	  
itself	  and	  consider	  the	  position	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  legal	  paradigm	  
that	  exists.	  Whether	  the	  World	  Bank	  should	  be	  acting	  in	  the	  fashion	  that	  it	  does	  is	  
a	   separate	   debate.	   This	   thesis	   takes	   the	   position	   that	   States	   are	   accepting	   the	  
World	  Bank	  actions	  and	  tries	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  in	  law.	  	  
	  
0.3	  Subject	  Area	  Chosen	  
The	  World	  Bank	  is	  not	  the	  only	  international	  financial	  organisation	  whose	  role	  and	  
mandate	  have	  been	  questioned.	   In	  other	   instances	  the	  attempt	  by	  organisations	  
to	  expand	  their	  mandate	  has	  been	  rejected10	  which	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  why	  the	  
World	   Bank’s	   actions,	   despite	   drawing	   criticism,	   are	   readily	   accepted	   by	   States.	  
The	  quantity	  of	   international	  organisations	   increases	  yearly,	  yet,	  even	   in	  a	  scope	  
limited	   to	   the	   three	   main	   international	   economic	   organisations,	   the	   level	   of	  
criticism	   regarding	   breaching	   their	   respective	   treaties	   is	   profound.	   Whilst	   the	  
works	  of	   the	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	   (IMF)	  and	   the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  
Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  (GATT),	  subsequently	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO),	  also	  
have	  the	  potential	  to	  raise	  issues	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  their	  work	  against	  the	  positivist	  
international	   law	   theory,	   both	   will	   be	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis.	   Much	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	   For	   a	   legal	   position,	   see	   Bhupinder	   Chimni,	   ‘IFIs	   and	   International	   Law:	   A	   Third	  World	  
Perspective’,	   in	  Daniel	  Bradlow	  &	  David	  Hunter	  (eds.),	   International	  Financial	   Institutions	  
and	   International	   Law	   (Kluwer	   Law	   International	   2010).	   For	   a	   non-­‐legal	   position,	   see	  
Catherine	  Weaver,	  Hypocrisy	  Trap:	  The	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Poverty	  of	  Reform	  (Princeton	  
University	  Press	  2009)	  
10	  Legality	  of	  the	  Use	  by	  a	  State	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  in	  Armed	  Conflict,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  
1996	   ICJREP.	   The	   ICJ	   rejected	   the	   request	   of	   review	   by	   the	  World	   Health	   Organization	  
(WHO)	  as	  the	  WHO	  was	  acting	  outside	  of	  its	  mandate.	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scholarship	  has	  been	  written	  upon	  the	   legal	  position	  of	  the	  WTO,	  particularly	   its	  
Dispute	   Settlement	   Body,11	   and	   the	   potential	   constitutional	   nature	   that	   it	   could	  
now	  hold.12	  Yet	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  organisation	  against	  the	  positivist	  
theory,	  the	  WTO	  is	  in	  a	  different	  legal	  position	  to	  the	  World	  Bank.	  	  
The	  GATT	  was	  replaced	  comparatively	  recently	  with	  the	  WTO	  in	  1995	  and	  whilst	  
this	   does	   not	   preclude	   the	   organisation	   developing	   upon	   its	   agreed	   upon	   role	  
away	   from	   what	   was	   consented	   by	   States,	   the	   potential	   for	   it	   to	   do	   so	   is	  
correspondingly	   less.	   The	   GATT	   and	   the	   WTO	   also	   embark	   on	   regular	   trade	  
negotiation	   rounds	   that	   involve	   discussions	   over	   the	   role	   of	   the	   organisation	  
allowing	  States	  a	  regular	  opportunity	  to	  update	  the	  agreements	  and	  agree	  a	  role	  
for	   the	  organisation.	   The	  practice	   in	  negotiations	   is	   to	   reach	  a	   consensus	   rather	  
than	  using	  a	  voting	  system,	  which	  is	  a	  key	  reason	  why	  some	  rounds	  of	  negotiation	  
have	   lasted	   considerable	   lengths	   of	   time.	   Since	   2001,	   the	   Doha	   Development	  
Agenda	  has	  been	  on	  going	  as	  key	  issues	  are	  negotiated	  over	  and,	  whilst	  this	  is	  not	  
ideal	   in	  moving	  the	  agenda	  forward,	   it	  does	  provide	  States	  with	  a	  constant	   legal	  
opinion	  over	  the	  work	  of	  the	  WTO	  grounding	  its	  work	  in	  State	  consent.	  
The	   area	   of	   the	   WTO	   that	   has	   drawn	   the	   most	   scholarship	   is	   the	   Dispute	  
Settlement	  Body.	  The	  Dispute	  Settlement	  Body	  applies	   the	   laws	  agreed	  upon	  by	  
States	   in	   the	   founding	   articles	   in	   its	   proceedings.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   World	   Bank	  
Inspection	  Panel,	   as	  will	   be	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	   Five	  applies	   the	   “law”	   that	   the	  
World	   Bank	   has	   created	   itself.	   Although	   the	   Dispute	   Settlement	   Body	   could	   be	  
examined	   by	   reference	   to	   systems	   theory,	   the	   developed	   nature	   of	   the	   legal	  
arguments	  already	  published	  on	  the	  WTO	  preclude	  its	  inclusion	  within	  this	  thesis.	  
The	  IMF	  conversely	  is	  regularly	  seen	  as	  a	  sister	  organisation	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  
legal	   scholarship.13	   As	   they	   were	   both	   created	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   have	  
headquarters	   situated	   geographically	   adjacent	   and	   have	   historically	   become	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   For	   example,	   Jeffrey	   Lagomarsino,	   ‘WTO	   Dispute	   Settlement	   and	   Sustainable	  
Development:	   Legitimacy	   through	   Holistic	   Treaty	   Interpretation’	   (2011)	   28(2)	   Pace	  
Environmental	  Law	  Rev.	  545	  
12	  Deborah	  Cass,	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (OUP	  2005)	  
13	   See	   for	   example:	  Ngaire	  Woods,	  The	  Globalizers:	   The	   IMF,	   The	  World	   Bank	   and	   Their	  
Borrowers	   (Cornell	   University	   Press	   2006),	   Stephen	   Zamora,	   ‘Regulating	   the	   Global	  
Banking	   Network	   –	  What	   Role	   (if	   any)	   for	   the	   IMF?’	   (1994)	   62(7)	   Fordham	   Law	   Review	  
1953,	   1954	   and	  Ms.	   N.	   Sachdev,	   Applicant	   v.	   International	  Monetary	   Fund,	   Respondent	  
(2012)	  Administrative	  Tribunal	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  Judgment	  No.	  2012-­‐1,	  
Para.	  35	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involved	   in	   similar	   and	   even	   shared	   competencies,	   the	   temptation	   has	   been	   to	  
deal	  with	  the	  two	  organisations	  together	  rather	  than	  separately.	  Especially	  since	  
the	   1980s	   where	   countries	   pushed	   both	   organisations	   to	   cooperate	   on	  
conditionality	   to	   ensure	   that	   adjustment	   lending	   programs	  were	   consistent,14	   it	  
has	  become	  the	  norm	  to	  refer	  to	  both	  organisations	  together.	  	  Criticism	  regarding	  
the	   organisations	   has	   also	   become	   interlinked	  with	   the	  main	   non-­‐governmental	  
organisation	   (NGO)	   criticism	   involving	   the	   use	   of	   conditionality	   by	   both	  
organisations15	   or	   has	   now	   become	   vogue,	   the	   lack	   of	   conditionality16	   or	   more	  
nuanced,	   that	   the	   organisations	   are	   not	   using	   the	   “right”	   conditionality.17	   Yet	  
despite	   this,	   they	   are	   and	   remain	   separate	   organisations	   with	   different	   staff,	  
agendas	  and	  legal	  personalities.	  	  
As	  will	  be	  shown,	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  consistently	  changed	  its	  mandate	  and	  focus	  
as	  one	  core	  of	  its	  raison	  d’être	  has	  disappeared.	  This	  has	  not	  been	  the	  case	  for	  the	  
IMF	  and	  although	  many	  of	  the	  arguments	  that	  are	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis	  could	  
be	  applied	  to	  the	  Fund,	  the	   IMF	   is	  not	   in	  the	  same	  legal	  position	  that	  the	  World	  
Bank	   has	   now	   come	   to	   occupy.	   The	   modern	   day	   work	   of	   the	   IMF	   can	   still	   be	  
readily	   traced	  back	   to	   its	   purposes	  within	   its	  Articles	   of	  Agreement,	  which	  have	  
changed	   multiple	   times	   to	   incorporate	   updates	   to	   the	   IMF’s	   mission.	   Although	  
there	  exist	   similar	   legal	  disputes	   to	   the	  ones	   levied	  against	   the	  World	  Bank	   that	  
may	   incur	  a	   similar	   analysis	   to	   the	  one	   that	   is	  presented	   in	   this	   thesis	   (over	   the	  
effect	   of	   its	   work,18	   its	   effect	   on	   national	   sovereignty,19	   its	   organisational	  
structure20	   and	   disputes	   over	   its	   expansion	   of	   its	  mandate,21	  mission	   creep)	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Domenico	  Lombardi	  &	  Bessma	  Momani,	   ‘Explaining	   IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  Relationship’	  
prepared	   for	   The	   Political	   Economy	  of	   International	  Organizations,	   January	   28-­‐30,	   2010,	  
pg.	  10	  
15	  For	  example,	  Oxfam’s	  position	  is	  outlined	  in	  Hetty	  Kovach	  &	  Sebastien	  Fourmy,	  Kicking	  
the	  Habit:	  How	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IMF	  are	  still	  Addicted	  to	  Attaching	  Economic	  Policy	  
Conditions	  to	  Aid	  (Oxfam	  International	  2006)	  
16	   This	   has	   come	   about	   due	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Program	   for	   Results	   initiative	   in	  
2012.	  
17	  Korinna	  Horta,	  ‘Rhetoric	  and	  Reality:	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  World	  Bank’	  (2002)	  15	  Harv.	  
Hum.	  Rts.	  J.	  227	  
18	   Axel	   Dreher	   &	   Roland	   Vauber,	   ‘The	   Causes	   and	   Consequences	   of	   IMF	   Conditionality’	  
(2004)	  40(3)	  Emerging	  Markets	  Finance	  and	  Trade	  26	  
19	   Phillip	   Trimble,	   ‘Globalization,	   International	   Institutions	   and	   the	   Erosion	   of	   National	  
Sovereignty	  and	  Democracy’	  (1997)	  95(6)	  Michigan	  Law	  Rev.	  1944	  
20	   Murilo	   Portugal,	   ‘Improving	   the	   IMF	   Governance	   and	   Increasing	   the	   Influence	   of	  
Developing	  Countries	  in	  IMF	  Decision-­‐Making’	  prepared	  for	  G24	  Technical	  Group	  Meeting,	  
March	  17-­‐18,	  2005	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IMF	   is	   a	   separate	   organisation,	   with	   a	   separate	   mission,	   that	   is	   designed	   to	  
operate	   independently	  of	   the	  World	  Bank.	  Crucially,	   the	   internal	   rules	   that	  both	  
organisations	   apply	   are	   fundamentally	   different22	   due	   to	   both	   organisations	  
seeking	  separate	  goals	  and,	  therefore,	  although	  parts	  of	  this	  analysis	  might	  be	  of	  
relevance	   to	   the	   IMF,	   similar	   to	   how	   they	   might	   be	   of	   relevance	   to	   any	   other	  
international	  organisation,	  this	  thesis	  will	  exclusively	  focus	  upon	  the	  development	  
and	  work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
	  
0.4	  What	  the	  World	  Bank	  Does	  and	  How	  it	  Operates	  
The	  World	  Bank	  of	  today	  is	  a	  fundamentally	  different	  organisation	  to	  the	  one	  that	  
the	   founders	   envisioned	   at	   Bretton	   Woods.	   Today	   there	   are	   five	   arms	   to	   the	  
World	   Bank	   Group;	   the	   original	   International	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	  
Development	   (IBRD),	   the	   International	   Development	   Association	   (IDA),	  
International	   Finance	   Corporation	   (IFC),	   Multilateral	   Investment	   Guarantee	  
Agency	   (MIGA)	   and	   the	   International	   Centre	   for	   Settlement	   of	   Investment	  
Disputes	  (ICSID).	  The	  term	  ‘World	  Bank’,	  as	  used	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group,	  refers	  
to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  IBRD	  and	  the	  IDA.	  
The	   IDA	  was	   created	   in	  1960	  with	   the	  aim	   ‘to	  promote	  economic	  development,	  
increase	  productivity	  and	  thus	  raise	  standards	  of	  living	  in	  the	  less-­‐developed	  areas	  
of	   the	   world’.23	   It	   does	   this	   by	   providing	   interest	   free	   loans	   to	   the	   world’s	   82	  
poorest	  countries24	  on	  a	  long	  repayment	  plan,	  25	  or	  40	  years,	  with	  a	  5	  or	  10-­‐year	  
grace	  period25	   or	   pure	   grants	   for	   specific	   projects.	   The	   IDA	   is	   financed	  primarily	  
through	  contributions	  from	  richer	  members	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  on	  a	  three	  
yearly	  basis	  known	  as	  IDA	  Replenishments.	  
The	   IFC	   is	   the	  private	   sector	   arm	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  established	   in	   1956.	  
Unlike	  the	  IBRD,	  which	  can	  only	  lend	  directly	  to	  States,	  the	  IFC	  can	  lend	  to	  private	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	   Robert	   Hockett,	   ‘From	   Macro	   to	   Micro	   to	   “Mission-­‐Creep”:	   Defending	   the	   IMF’s	  
Emerging	   Concern	   with	   the	   Infrastructural	   Prerequisites	   to	   Global	   Financial	   Stability’	  
(2002)	  41	  Columbia	  Journal	  of	  Transnational	  Law	  62	  
22	   See	   the	   World	   Bank	   Operational	   Manual	   contrasted	   with	   the	   By-­‐Laws	   Rules	   and	  
Regulations	  of	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF	  2011).	  
23	  International	  Development	  Association	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  Article	  I	  
24	  http://www.worldbank.org/ida/what-­‐is-­‐ida.html	  accessed	  September	  2013.	  
25	  IDA	  Terms	  (Effective	  July	  1,	  2011),	  available	  at	  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/	  
Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/734491271341193277/IDATermsFY12.pdf	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enterprises	   within	   member	   States	   without	   guarantee	   of	   repayment	   by	   the	  
member	  government	  concerned26	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  further	  economic	  development.	  
The	  IFC	  borrows	  upon	  capital	  markets	  and	  lends	  on	  a	  commercial	  basis	  to	  private	  
enterprises	  that	  cannot	  raise	  sufficient	  private	  capital	  on	  reasonable	  terms.27	  
The	  MIGA,	   founded	   in	   1988,	   encourages	   the	   flow	   of	   investments	   to	   developing	  
countries	   that	   are	   members28	   by	   offering	   political	   risk	   insurance	   guarantees	   to	  
private	   sector	   investors	   and	   lenders.29	   It	   aims	   to	   attract	   investors	   into	   difficult	  
environments	  to	  promote	  development	  by	  removing	  the	  risk	  that	  external	  factors	  
could	  damage	  the	  financial	  benefits	  of	  a	  project.	  
The	   ICSID	   is	   the	  dispute	   settlement	   arm	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  and	  provides	  
‘facilities	   for	   conciliation	   and	   arbitration	   of	   investment	   disputes	   between	  
Contracting	   States	   and	   nationals	   of	   other	   Contracting	   States’.30	   The	   Convention	  
establishing	   the	   ICSID	  entered	   into	   force	   in	  1966	  due	   to	   the	  need	   to	  establish	  a	  
specialised	   investment	   dispute	   settlement	   body	   that	   could	   provide	   facilities	   for	  
the	  resolution	  of	   legal	  disputes	  between	  contracting	  parties	   through	  conciliation	  
or	  arbitration.31	  
Although	  the	  World	  Bank	  as	  originally	  envisioned	  has	  grown	  to	  encompass	  more	  
than	   just	   the	   original	   IBRD,	   throughout	   the	   thesis,	   the	   terms	   ‘World	   Bank’	   or	  
‘Bank’	  will	   refer	  only	   to	   the	  work	  of	   the	   IBRD.	  The	   IBRD	   is	   legally	  and	   financially	  
independent	  of	  the	  other	  arms	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  and	  so	  can	  be	  analysed	  
in	  its	  own	  right	  rather	  than	  as	  part	  of	  the	  whole.	  Any	  reference	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  will	  be	  explicitly	  acknowledged.	  
The	  initial	  aim	  of	  the	  IBRD	  was	  to	  provide	  finance	  to	  Europe	  post-­‐World	  War	  II32	  
with	  its	  reconstruction	  needs	  caused	  by	  the	  war,	  yet	  the	  Bank	  was	  clearly	  given	  a	  
mandate	  for	  development	  as	  witnessed	  by	  its	  name	  as	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  
Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  and	   its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  The	  World	  Bank	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  International	  Finance	  Corporation	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  Article	  I	  (i)	  
27	  Ibid.	  Article	  III	  (Section	  3)	  (i)	  
28	  Convention	  Establishing	  the	  Multilateral	  Investment	  Guarantee	  Agency,	  Article	  2	  
29	   Ibid.	   Article	   11	   and	   http://www.miga.org/whoweare/index.cfm?stid=1786	   accessed	  
September	  2013.	  
30	  Convention	  on	  the	  Settlement	  of	  Investment	  Disputes	  between	  States	  and	  Nationals	  of	  
other	  States,	  Article	  1	  (2)	  
31	   https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=Show	  
Home&pageName=AboutICSID_Home	  accessed	  July	  2013.	  
32	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  (Second	  Edition,	  IBRD	  2007)	  pg.	  1	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today	   has	   focused	   heavily	   upon	   this	   second	   aim	   and	   operates	   to	   end	   extreme	  
poverty	   in	   middle-­‐income	   and	   creditworthy	   poorer	   countries.33	   It	   does	   this	   by	  
providing	  finance	  at	  favourable	  terms	  to	  countries	  that	  struggle	  to	  raise	  capital	  at	  
acceptable	   rates	   on	   capital	   markets.	   The	   Bank	   raises	   money	   on	   international	  
capital	  markets	  using	  its	  AAA	  rating,34	  adds	  a	  premium	  to	  cover	  costs,	  and	  lends	  to	  
member	   States	   at	   rates	   favourable	   in	   comparison	   to	   what	   the	   member	   could	  
achieve	  independently	  on	  the	  capital	  markets.	  One	  reason	  that	  the	  IBRD	  enjoys	  its	  
AAA	   status	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   has	   never	   written	   off	   a	   loan	   since	   its	   inception35	  
which	   combined	   with	   its	   preferred	   creditor	   status36	   and	   large	   capital	   structure	  
(both	   called	   up	   and	   subscribed)	   allow	   it	   to	   borrow	   at	   an	   extremely	   favourable	  
yield.	  	  
There	  are	  two	  basic	  types	  of	  lending	  that	  the	  IBRD	  uses:	  investment	  project	  loans	  
and	  development	  policy	  loans.	  Investment	  loans	  are	  to	  finance	  infrastructure	  that	  
is	  necessary	   for	  poverty	   reduction	  and	   sustainable	  development.37	  Development	  
policy	   loans	   in	   contrast	   are	   used	   to	   support	   structural	   reforms	   in	   an	   economy	  
through	   a	   program	   of	   policy	   and	   institutional	   actions	   that	   promote	   growth	   and	  
enhance	  the	  well-­‐being	  and	  increase	  the	  incomes	  of	  poor	  people.38	  Outside	  of	  its	  
lending	  operations,	  the	  Bank	  uses	  technical	  assistance	  to	  advise	  members	  on	  how	  
to	  make	  their	  economies	  more	  efficient.	  All	  loans	  are	  either	  made	  directly	  to	  the	  
member	   government	   or	   with	   a	   government	   guarantee.	   In	   the	   financial	   year	  
2012/13,	  the	  World	  Bank	  lent	  a	  total	  of	  US$15.2	  billion.39	  
From	  the	  initial	  membership	  of	  41	  States,	  the	  IBRD	  has	  grown	  to	  a	  membership	  of	  
188	  States	   so	   is	  one	  of	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  organisations	   to	  enjoy	  near	  worldwide	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-­‐we-­‐do	  accessed	  August	  2013.	  
34	  The	  three	  largest	  credit	  rating	  agencies	  have	  all	  given	  the	  World	  Bank	  the	  highest	  credit	  
rating.	  Fitch:	  AAA,	  Standard	  and	  Poor:	  AAA,	  Moody’s:	  Aaa.	  
35	   Standard	   and	   Poor’s	   International	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	   Development	   Credit	  
Report,	  June	  17	  2011,	  page	  12.	  One	  reason	  for	  this,	  however,	  is	  due	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  
the	  Heavily	   Indebted	  Poor	  Countries	   Initiative	   that	  cancelled	  the	  debt	  of	  some	  countries	  
who	  were	  unable	  to	  pay,	  therefore,	  avoiding	  the	  need	  to	  write	  down	  the	  loan	  as	  unpaid.	  
36	  Preferred	  creditor	  status	  prevents	  the	  debts	  owed	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  being	  restructured	  
by	  its	  member	  States.	  For	  an	  analysis	  of	  preferred	  creditor	  status	  under	  international	  law,	  
see	   Rustel	  Martha,	   ‘Preferred	   Creditor	   Status	   under	   International	   Law:	   The	   Case	   of	   the	  
International	   Monetary	   Fund’	   (1990)	   39(4)	   The	   International	   and	   Comparative	   Law	  
Quarterly	  801	  
37	  Supra	  Note.	  32	  pg.	  67	  
38	  Operational	  Policy	  8.60	  –	  Development	  Policy	  Lending,	  2	  
39	  IBRD	  Management’s	  Discussion	  &	  Analysis	  and	  Financial	  Statements,	  June	  30,	  2013,	  pg.	  
12	  
	   10	  
membership.40	  Not	  all	  members	  are,	  however,	  eligible	  to	  borrow	  from	  the	   IBRD.	  
The	   World	   Bank	   Group	   classifies	   countries	   by	   the	   gross	   national	   income	   per	  
capita.	   Lower	   income	   $1035	   or	   less;	   lower	   middle	   income	   $1036-­‐$4085;	   upper	  
middle	   income	   $4086-­‐$12,615;	   and	   high	   income	   $12,616	   or	   above.41	   Middle	  
income	  States	  and	  credit	  worthy	  lower	  income	  members	  are	  eligible	  to	  apply	  for	  
IBRD	  funding.42	  Blend	  countries	  are	  members	  that	  are	  eligible	  to	  apply	  for	  funding	  
from	   both	   the	   IDA	   and	   the	   IBRD	   due	   to	   being	   lower	   income	   countries	   that	   are	  
creditworthy.	   Including	   blend	   countries,	   80	   members	   are	   currently	   eligible	   to	  
apply	  for	  IBRD	  funding.43	  
Each	  member	   appoints	   a	   governor	   as	   a	   representative	  who	   is	   assigned	   a	   voting	  
share	  dependent	  upon	  the	  size	  of	  the	  member’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  
capital.	   In	   2010,	   the	   Bank	   changed	   the	   voting	   structure	   to	   increase	   the	   voting	  
share	  of	  developing	  nations	  by	  an	  extra	  3.13%.	  The	  United	  States	  (15.14%),	  Japan	  
(8.45%),	  Germany	  (4.48%),	  France	  (4.00%)	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (4.00%)	  hold	  
the	  largest	  quotas	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  largest	  votes.44	  
This	   large	  American	   share,	   that	  historically	  was	   larger,	   has	   led	  political	   theorists	  
and	  international	  relations	  experts	  to	  explain	  the	  history	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  using	  
the	   term	   “Washington	   consensus”.	   The	   original	   usage	   of	   the	   term	  was	   by	   John	  
Williamson,	  an	  economist,	   in	  relation	  to	  ten	  broad	  economic	  conditions	  that	  the	  
World	   Bank,	   IMF	   and	   United	   States	   Treasury	   recommended	   that	   borrowing	  
nations	  adopt,	  specifically	   in	  Latin	  America,	  to	  recover	  from	  the	  1980s	  economic	  
crises.45	  Yet	  despite	  this	  narrow	  interpretation,	  the	  term	  evolved	  to	  encompass	  a	  
wider	   definition	   that	   was	   a	   ‘synonym	   for	   neoliberalism	   or	   market	  
fundamentalism’.46	   The	   original	   author	   was	   against	   the	   adoption	   of	   this	   new	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Notable	  absentees	  from	  membership	  include	  North	  Korea	  and	  Cuba.	  
41	  Figures	  are	  accurate	  as	  of	  September	  2013.	  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS	  
42	  Non-­‐credit	  worthy	  lower	  income	  members	  are	  eligible	  for	  IDA	  funding.	  
43	   http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-­‐classifications/country-­‐and-­‐lending-­‐groups	  
accessed	  August	  2013.	  
44	   International	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	   Development	   Voting	   Power	   of	   Executive	  
Directors	  August	  30,	  2013	  
45	   John	   Williamson,	  What	   Washington	   Means	   by	   Policy	   Reform,	   in:	   John	   Williamson	  
(ed.),	  Latin	  American	  Readjustment:	  How	  Much	  has	  Happened	   (Institute	  for	   International	  
Economics	  1989)	  
46	  John	  Williamson,	  ‘A	  Short	  History	  of	  the	  Washington	  Consensus’	  for	  a	  Conference	  'From	  
the	  Washington	   Consensus	   to	   a	   new	   Global	   Governance',	   Barcelona,	   September	   24-­‐25,	  
2004,	  pg.	  7	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term47	  yet	  despite	  this	  it	  has	  evolved	  in	  popular	  media	  to	  encompass	  this	  second	  
meaning.	  
The	   notion	   of	   a	   Washington	   consensus	   among	   the	   leading	   lending	   institutions	  
stems	  from	  a	  concept	  of	  American	  hegemony.	  This	  assumes	  that	  the	  United	  States	  
as	  the	  largest	  funder,	  its	  share	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  which	  gave	  the	  United	  States	  an	  
effective	  veto	  over	  changes	  to	  the	  World	  Bank,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  States	  
has	  always	  been	  allowed	  to	  nominate	  the	  President	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  allows	  the	  
United	   States	   to	   shape	   or	   influence	   World	   Bank	   policies	   to	   further	   the	   United	  
States’	   interests.	  These	  theories	  were	  particularly	  prevalent	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  
when	  the	  World	  Bank	  funded	  Western	  allies	  to	  shore	  up	  sympathetic	  regimes	  and	  
to	  limit	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  developing	  world.48	  	  
The	   notions	   of	   a	   Washington	   consensus,	   narrow	   or	   broad,	   or	   an	   American	  
hegemony	  affecting	  the	  World	  Bank	  are,	  however,	  not	   legal	  positions.	  The	  value	  
of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  of	  how	  the	  World	  Bank	  is	  behaving	  in	  law,	  not	  
in	  political	  theory	  or	  international	  relations	  theory.	  
	  
0.5	  Methodology	  
The	   research	  methodology	   employed	   is	   founded	   in	   a	   doctrinal	   literature	   survey	  
and	   on	   legal	   analysis	   from	   primarily	   two	   schools	   of	   thought,	   the	   positive	  
philosophical	  school	  and	  the	  systems	  theory	  school,	  to	  ascertain	  an	  understanding	  
in	  law	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  This	  research	  is	  undertaken	  by	  an	  analysis	  
of	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Bank	   against	   the	   positive	   philosophical	   school	   that	   is	  
prevalent	   within	   public	   international	   law	   that	   would	   inform	   that	   the	   Bank	   is	  
bound	  by	  its	  constituent	  document	  agreed	  by	  States.	  	  Subsequently,	  the	  systems	  
theory	  school	  is	  employed	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  to	  explain	  subsequent	  practice	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank	  and	  to	  ground	  its	  actions	  within	  legal	  philosophy	  once	  the	  positive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Ibid.	  
48	   On	   this	   point	   particularly,	   Ngaire	  Woods,	   ‘The	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   and	   the	  
World	   Bank’	   (2002)	   http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-­‐
content/uploads/Woods%20for%20Routledge.pdf	   accessed	   August	   2013.	   For	   further	  
information	   on	   these	   theories	   generally,	   see:	   Robert	   Gilpin,	   “The	   Rise	   of	   American	  
Hegemony”,	   in	   Patrick	   Karl	   O’Brien	   &	   Armand	   Clesse	   (eds.),	   Two	   Hegemonies:	   Britain	  
1846-­‐1914	  and	  the	  United	  States	  1941-­‐2001	  (Ashgate	  Publishing,	  Ltd.	  2002)	  pg.	  165-­‐182;	  
Robert	   Wade,	   “US	   Hegemony	   and	   the	   World	   Bank:	   the	   Fight	   over	   People	   and	   Ideas”	  
(2002)	  9(2)	  Rev.	  of	   Int’l	  Political	  Economy	  201	  and	  Richard	  Peet,	  Unholy	  Trinity:	  The	  IMF,	  
World	  Bank	  and	  WTO	  (Zed	  Books	  Ltd.	  2003)	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philosophical	  school	  is	  rejected	  within	  this	  context.	  As	  the	  systems	  theory	  school	  
of	   legal	   philosophy	   focuses	   heavily	   upon	   the	   internal	   structure	   of	   a	   system,	   a	  
detailed	   examination	   of	   the	   modern	  World	   Bank	   structure	   will	   take	   place	   with	  
particular	  emphasis	  upon	  the	   Inspection	  Panel	  as	  a	  decision	  maker	  upon	  actions	  
occurring	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  system.	  
Although	  other	  philosophical	  schools	  of	  thought	  are	  considered,49	  the	  focus	  upon	  
positive	  law	  as	  the	  dominant	  format	  for	  understanding	  public	  international	  law	  is	  
used	  due	  to	  the	  general	  acceptance	  of	  its	  main	  arguments	  by	  States,	  international	  
organisations	   and	   other	   non-­‐State	   actors.	   Historically	   the	   natural	   philosophical	  
approach	  has	  had	  relevance	  towards	  an	  understanding	  of	  public	  international	  law,	  
however,	  due	  to	  the	  thesis	  being	  concerned	  with	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  treaty	  
establishing	  it,	  natural	  law	  is	  not	  considered	  due	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  treaties	  being	  
considered	  a	  primarily	   positivist	   action	  by	   States.	   Systems	   theory	   is	   chosen	  as	   a	  
subsequent	   tool	   of	   analysis	   due	   to	   the	   rejection	   of	   other	   major	   schools	   and	  
systems	  theory	  best	  explaining	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Bank	  within	  a	  legal	  framework.	  
The	  thesis	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  replace	  the	  positivist	  school	  of	  thought	  within	  wider	  
public	   international	   law	   for	   the	   legal	  position	  of	   international	  organisations.	  The	  
focus	  of	   the	  thesis	   is	  exclusively	  upon	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	   its	  development	  and,	  
although	   parts	   can	   have	   relevance	   for	   analysis	   of	   other	   international	  
organisations,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  author	  within	  this	  work	  to	  extrapolate	  
this	  example	  into	  a	  wider	  context.	  
Within	   the	   current	   literature,	   this	   thesis	   develops	   an	   alternative	   approach	   and	  
analysis	   regarding	   the	   work	   of	   the	   World	   Bank.	   There	   is	   considerable	  
consideration	  of	   the	   legal	   status	  of	  other	   international	   organisations	   yet	   for	   the	  
Bank	  the	  analysis	  has	  been	  lacking.	  Specifically	  on	  the	  Bank	  the	  legal	  literature	  has	  
focused	   on	   two	   key	   areas.	   Firstly,	   the	   development	   and	   use	   of	   conditionality,	  
including	   analysis	   of	   the	   legal	   context	   in	   which	   it	   resides.	   Secondly,	   the	  
development	  of	   the	   Inspection	  Panel	  has	  been	   considered,	  but	  primarily	   from	  a	  
descriptive	   perspective	   rather	   than	   analytical	   of	   the	   implications	   for	   the	  World	  
Bank	   system.	   This	   thesis	   provides	   a	   contribution	   between	   the	   two	   areas,	   by	  
considering	   the	   normative	   framework	   that	   the	  World	   Bank	   has	   developed	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  See	  Chapter	  Two	  for	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  administrative,	  constitutional,	   institutional	  
and	  progressive	  positive	  schools	  of	  thought.	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charting	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   this	  
normative	  framework	  has	  developed	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  
	  
0.6	  Chapter	  synopsis	  
0.6.1	  Chapter	  One	  
The	   governance	   role	   that	   international	   organisations	   undertake	   has	   been	   a	  
subject	  of	   controversy	   in	  academic	   literature.	   In	  attempting	   to	   identify	   the	   legal	  
basis	   for	   this	   governance	   role,	   the	   thesis	   begins	   by	   outlining	   the	   current	  widely	  
accepted	   understanding	   of	   public	   international	   law	   and	   applying	   it	   against	   the	  
World	  Bank.	  Although	  positivism	  has	  come	  into	  criticism	  over	  the	  last	  number	  of	  
decades,	   it	   still	   remains	   as	   the	   principle	   mechanism	   for	   understanding	   public	  
international	   law	   due	   to	   its	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   State	   consent	   that	   is	  
reflected	   in	  State	  practice.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  positivist	  tool	  creates	  a	  benchmark	  
for	  the	  understanding	  of	  how	  an	  international	  organisation	  should	  act	  under	  the	  
theory.	   As	   this	   theory	   is	   premised	   upon	   the	   principle	   of	   State	   consent,	   treaty	  
interpretation	   is	   examined	   as	   a	   central	   core	   of	   the	   paradigm	  on	   the	   foundation	  
that	   an	   international	   organisation	   can	   only	   act	   in	   the	   fashion	   that	   States	   have	  
consented	  to	  and,	   therefore,	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	   limits	  of	  consent	  within	  a	  
treaty	  are	  central.	  	  
Once	  this	  benchmark	  is	  developed	  and	  set,	  a	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  
will	  occur	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  Bank	  has	  moved	  beyond	  its	  mandate	  and	  is	  no	  
longer	   readily	   understood	   by	   conceptualising	   its	   behaviour	   by	   reference	   to	   the	  
positive	  theory.	  The	  positive	  theory,	  based	  upon	  State	  consent	  and	  organisations	  
only	   acting	   in	   a	   fashion	   that	   is	   proscribed	   by	   States,	   does	   not	   explain	   the	  
introduction	  of	  various	  mechanisms	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  process	  through	  either	  
express	  or	  implied	  powers.	  Crucially	  however,	  whilst	  the	  World	  Bank	  would	  seem	  
to	  be	  acting	  outside	  of	  its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  States	  have	  readily	  accepted	  this	  
and	  whilst	   there	   is	   criticism	   from	  NGOs	  of	  mission	   creep,	   States	   themselves	   are	  
allowing	  the	  Bank	  to	  act	  in	  this	  fashion	  with	  apparent	  acceptance	  that	  this	  is	  legal.	  
It	  is	  from	  this	  point	  that	  the	  thesis	  moves	  forward	  to	  examine	  alternative	  tools	  of	  
analysis	  to	  explain	  in	  law	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	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0.6.2	  Chapter	  Two	  
The	  positive	   theory	  of	   international	   law	  has	  been	  under	   attack	   for	   a	   number	  of	  
decades.	  The	  governance	   role	  being	  exercised	  by	   the	  World	  Bank	  has	  also	  been	  
alleged	   to	   occur	   with	   other	   international	   organisations.	   A	   number	   of	   dominant	  
theories	  have	  emerged	  to	  explain	  these	  actions	   in	   law.	  Alternative	  theories	  have	  
been	   proposed,	   largely	   drawn	   from	   national	   law,	   to	   explain	   the	   new	   behaviour	  
that	  is	  exhibited	  in	  the	  international	  law	  arena.	  This	  chapter	  critically	  evaluates	  a	  
number	  of	  the	  key	  theories	  that	  are	  present	  that	  may	  be	  mechanisms	  via	  which	  to	  
understand	   the	   Bank	   and	   explains	   why	   they	   are	   not	   readily	   applicable	   to	   an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
Four	   main	   theories	   are	   evaluated;	   international	   administrative	   law,	  
constitutionalisation	  of	  international	  organisations,	  international	  institutional	  law	  
and,	  what	   is	  being	  termed,	  “progressive	  positivism”.	   International	  administrative	  
law,	   international	   institutional	   law	   and	   constitutionalisation	   of	   international	  
organisations	   are	   theories	   that	   have	   been	   applied	   to	   other	   international	  
organisations	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   garner	   legal	   insights	   into	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  
organisations.	   They	   will	   be	   examined	   and	   applied	   against	   the	   World	   Bank	   to	  
demonstrate	   that	   none	   adequately	   explains	   the	  World	  Bank’s	   actions	   that	  were	  
discussed	  in	  Chapter	  One.	  Progressive	  positivism	  is	  a	  new	  concept	  stemming	  from	  
the	   work	   of	   the	   International	   Law	   Commission	   on	   the	   Articles	   on	   the	  
Responsibility	   of	   International	   Organizations50	   that	   seeks	   to	   bind	   international	  
organisations	  to	  customary	  international	  law.	  This	  theory	  is	  created	  for	  this	  thesis,	  
based	   upon	   recent	   developments	   in	   international	   law,	   and	  whilst	  much	   of	   such	  
work	  is	  still	  in	  a	  formative	  stage,	  it	  is	  examined	  to	  seek	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  
under	  the	  positivist	  theory	  that	  might	  explain	  within	  law	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank.	  
Although	  all	   four	   theories	  are	  ultimately	   rejected	  as	   the	  actions	  of	   the	  Bank	  are	  
incompatible	  with	  an	  understanding	  under	  each	  theory,	  this	  analysis	  is	  required	  to	  
demonstrate	   that	   the	   theories	   that	  academics	  have	  utilised	   in	  other	   contexts	   to	  
explain	   international	   organisations'	   actions	   in	   legal	   terms	   do	   not	   adequately	  
explain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	   Available	   at	   http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/	  
9_11_2011.pdf	  accessed	  September	  2013.	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0.6.3	  Chapter	  Three	  
Reflecting	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  the	  prevalent	  theories	  used	  in	  other	  contexts,	  the	  
focus	  of	  Chapter	  Three	  turns	  the	  thesis	  towards	  the	  tool	  that	  this	  thesis	  will	  use	  to	  
examine	   the	  work	  of	   the	  World	  Bank,	   systems	   theory.	   The	   chapter	   charters	   the	  
progress	   of	   systems	   theory	   from	   its	   creation	   within	   biology	   to	   its	   modern	  
application	  to	   law.	  Crucial	  elements	  are	   identified	   from	  the	  systems	  theory	   legal	  
school	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system	  and	  are	  examined	  in	  
detail	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  of	  application.	  	  
In	   contrast	   to	   Luhmann's	   systems	   theory,	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	   Court	   within	   a	  
legal	   system	   is	   identified	   and	   requires	   special	   examination	   for	   its	   fundamental	  
importance	   on	   ruling	   upon	   the	   legal/illegal	   communication	   divide.	   This	   work	  
posits	  that	  the	  formative	  stage	  of	  a	  legal	  system,	  the	  evolution	  from	  a	  normative	  
system	   to	  a	   legal	   system,	   requires	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	   to	   stabilise	  
normative	   expectations.	   Having	   identified	   the	   framework	   of	   analysis,	   its	  
application	   to	   the	   Bank,	   and	   particularly	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel,	   are	  
discussed.	  
0.6.4	  Chapter	  Four	  
For	   a	   legal	   system	   to	   develop	   there	  must	   be	   a	   normative	   system	   in	   place.	   The	  
work	  of	  systems	  theory	  provides	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  normative	  system	  to	  a	  
legal	   system.	   The	   focus	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   analyse	   the	   construction	   of	   a	  
normative	   system	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   has	   created	   through	   its	   work,	   that	   is	  
required	   for	   the	   Bank’s	   development	   into	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system	   under	  
systems	  theory.	  This	  development	  has	  been	  ad	  hoc	  and	  inconsistent	  through	  the	  
use	  of	  conditions	  but	  has	  stabilised	  through	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  
of	  Operational	  Policies	  and	  Bank	  Procedures.	  
The	   legal	   status	  of	  World	  Bank	   loans,	   including	   the	   loan	  documentation	  and	   the	  
attached	   conditions,	   is	   examined	   from	   both	   the	  World	   Bank’s	   view	   and	   from	   a	  
systems	  theory	  perspective.	  The	  creation	  and	  use	  of	  Operational	  Policies	  and	  Bank	  
Procedures	   is	   key	   in	   the	   normative	   system	   that	   is	   constructed.	   The	  Operational	  
Policies	  and	  Bank	  Procedures	  contained	  in	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  Operational	  Manual	  
are	  considered	   from	  a	   systems	   theory	  perspective	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   they	  are	  
amounting	   to	  norms	   and	  provide	   a	   normative	   framework	   for	   application	  by	   the	  
Bank	  against	  its	  borrowing	  member	  States.	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0.6.5	  Chapter	  Five	  
The	   identification	   of	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   as	   a	   mechanism	   via	   which	   normative	  
systems	  evolve	  into	  legal	  systems	  is	  considered	  against	  the	  Inspection	  Panel.	  The	  
introduction	  of	  the	  Panel	  sparked	  the	  change	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  into	  a	  legal	  
system	   by	   allowing	   for	   the	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	   expectations.	   The	  
development	  of	   the	   Inspection	  Panel	   is	   seen,	  via	   systems	   theory,	   to	  be	  a	  crucial	  
stage	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   legal	   system	   and	   so	   an	   examination	   occurs	  
regarding	   how	   the	   World	   Bank	   created	   the	   Inspection	   Panel,	   what	   the	   Panel	  
actually	  rules	  upon	  and	  what	  powers	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  assigned	  to	  it.	  
A	   case	   analysis	   demonstrates	   the	   shift	   from	   an	   advisory	   body	   into	   a	   Court-­‐like	  
structure	  by	  highlighting	  specific	  cases	  that	  have	  pushed	  the	  Panel	  into	  a	  systems	  
theory	  Court	  ruling	  upon	  a	  legal/illegal	  divide.	  In	  this	  regard,	  six	  specific	  cases	  are	  
chosen	  and	  analysed	   to	  demonstrate	   this	  development.	  The	  Panel	   is	  highlighted	  
as	  occupying	  a	  role	  via	  which	  it	  rules	  upon	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide	  and,	  therefore,	  
has	  both	  placed	   itself	   in	   the	  centre	  of	   the	  Bank’s	   legal	  system	  as	   it	  stands	  today	  
but	  also	  been	  the	  catalyst	  that	  moved	  the	  World	  Bank	  towards	  an	  understanding	  
of	  its	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  law.	  	  
0.6.6	  Chapter	  Six	  
The	   final	   chapter	  examines	   the	   implications	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	  World	  Bank	  
has	  developed	  into	  a	   legal	  system	  will	  have.	  Firstly,	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank	   legal	  system	  are	  explored	  before	  the	   implications	  of	  this	  understanding	  for	  
the	  Bank	  are	  examined.	  This	   includes	  an	  examination	  of	   the	  accountability	  of	  an	  
international	  organisation	  outside	  of	  the	  positivist	  theory	  and	  offers	  a	  new	  way	  of	  
understanding	   the	   conditionality	   conundrum.	   Secondly,	   the	   implications	   for	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   its	   membership	   are	   examined	   and	  
subsequently	  reforms	  are	  considered	  based	  on	  this	  new	  understanding.	  	  
The	   final	   conclusion	   is	   of	   a	   need	   for	   reflection.	   Systems	   theory	   offers	   an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Bank	  in	  law,	  yet	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  to	  all	  actors;	  
the	  Bank	   itself,	   the	  member	   States	   and	   the	  people	  whose	   lives	   the	  work	  of	   the	  
Bank	  affects,	  what	  exactly	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Bank.	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Chapter	  One:	  The	  Positive	  International	  Law	  Theorem	  and	  its	  
Application	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  
	  
1.1	  Introduction	  
International	   organisations,	   such	   as	   the	  World	   Bank,	   are	   actors	   created	   by	   and	  
bound	   by	   public	   international	   law.	   As	   actors	   of	   international	   law,	   their	   actions	  
must	  be	  explainable	  by	  reference	  to	  law.	  The	  World	  Bank	  of	  today	  is	  alleged	  to	  be	  
exercising	   a	   governance	   function:1	   it	   instructs	   its	   member	   States	   on	   how	   to	  
behave	  and	  governs	  both	   the	  actions	  of	   the	   governments	   and	  how	   it	   affects	   its	  
citizens.	   A	   theory	   of	   law	   that	   explains	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   should	   be	  
able	  to	  explain	  the	  role	  that	  it	  is	  acting	  today.	  
As	   creations	   of	   public	   international	   law,	   it	   is	   the	   theory	   of	   law	   most	   readily	  
identified	  and	  used	  to	  explain	  public	  international	  law	  that	  is	  most	  readily	  applied	  
to	  international	  organisations,	  positivism.	  
The	  modern	  day	  incarnation	  of	  public	  international	  law	  is	  often	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  
Treaty	   of	   Westphalia	   and	   the	   work	   of	   Emmerich	   de	   Vattel.	   Since	   that	   date,	  
although	   the	   substance	   and	   style	   of	   international	   law	   has	   changed,	   the	  
fundamental	  principles	  upholding	  the	  system	  have	  remained	  in	  essence	  the	  same.	  
Vattel	   outlined	   the	   positive	   theory	   of	   public	   international	   law,	  which	   since	   that	  
time	  has	  remained	  the	  dominant,	  although	  not	  sole,	  theory	  of	  public	  international	  
law.	   Sovereignty	   and	   the	   equality	   of	   States	   with	   the	   forthcoming	   consequence	  
that	  a	  State	  cannot	  be	  legally	  bound	  by	  a	  rule	  that	  it	  has	  not	  agreed	  to	  have	  been	  
the	   cornerstone	   that	   the	  modern	  understanding	  of	   international	   law	  have	  been	  
built	   upon.	   	   This	   chapter	   argues	   that	   for	   a	   particular	   area,	   the	   relationship	  
between	   international	   organisations	   and	   States,	   this	   understanding	   no	   longer	  
holds	   true	   in	   all	   contexts.	   Specifically,	   this	   chapter	   will	   compare	   the	   modern	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   See	   for	   example;	   Joseph	   Stiglitz,	   ‘Democratizing	   the	   International	  Monetary	   Fund	   and	  
the	   World	   Bank:	   Governance	   and	   Accountability’	   (2003)	   16(1)	   Governance:	   An	  
International	   Journal	  of	  Policy,	  Administration,	  and	   Institutions	  111;	  Ngaire	  Woods,	   ‘The	  
Challenge	  of	  Good	  Governance	  for	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  Themselves’	  (2000)	  28(5)	  
World	   Development	   823;	   and	   Benedict	   Kingsbury,	   Nico	   Krisch	   &	   Richard	   Stewart,	   ‘The	  
Emergence	  of	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’	  (2005)	  68	  Law	  and	  Contemporary	  Problems	  15,	  
27	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fundamental	  understanding	  of	   international	   law,	  which	  arises	   from	  and	   is	  based	  
upon	   positivism,	   against	   the	   history	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   to	   establish	   that	   the	  
actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  do	  not	  fit	  the	  widely	  used	  legal	  model.	  	  
The	   chapter	   will	   begin	   by	   examining	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Bank,	   examining	   its	  
reason	   for	   creation	   and	   what	   its	   founders	   sought	   it	   to	   achieve.	   The	   positive	  
international	  law	  theory,	  as	  the	  mostly	  widely	  used	  legal	  tool	  for	  analysis	  of	  public	  
international	   law	   actions,	   will	   be	   examined	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   how	   it	   has	  
developed	  and	  how	  it	  moved	  understanding	  away	  from	  natural	  Grotian	  concepts	  
to	   the	   modern	   positivism	   paradigm.	   As	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   international	  
law,	  sovereignty	  and	  sovereign	  equality	  are	  examined	  to	  outline	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
positivist	  application	  to	  international	  law.	  The	  exact	  model	  that	  is	  widely	  accepted	  
will	   be	   articulated	   upon	   before	   being	   utilised	   in	   the	   context	   of	   international	  
organisations	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   to	  not	  conflict	  with	  sovereignty,	   international	  
organisations	   can	   only	   perform	   functions	   allocated	   to	   them	   via	   their	   treaty.2	   In	  
turn,	   treaty	   interpretation	   is	   examined	   as	   a	   subject	   matter,	   from	   treaty,	  
customary	  international	  law	  and	  World	  Bank	  perspectives.	  
Once	   the	   model	   and	   the	   proposed	   theoretical	   behaviour	   are	   developed,	   the	  
chapter	  will	  move	  on	  to	  a	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  since	  its	  creation	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  the	  legal	  behaviour	  of	  the	  Bank	  does	  not	  match	  the	  behaviour	  
that	  the	  widely	  accepted	  model	  would	  suggest.	  The	  powers	  assigned	  to	  the	  Bank	  
by	  its	  members	  are	  assessed	  against	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  mandate	  in	  order	  
to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	   legal	   link	  between	  the	  Bank’s	  actions	  and	   its	  Articles	  of	  
Agreement	  is	  broken.	  
	  
1.2	  The	  Creation	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  
“We,	   the	   Delegates	   of	   the	   Conference,	   have	   been	   trying	   to	  
accomplish	   something	   very	   difficult	   to	   accomplish.	  We	   have	   been	  
operating,	   moreover,	   in	   a	   field	   of	   great	   intellectual	   and	   technical	  
difficulty.	  We	  have	  had	   to	   perform	  at	   one	   and	   the	   same	   time	   the	  
tasks	   appropriate	   to	   the	   economist,	   to	   the	   financier,	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	   Excluding	   the	   application	   of	   a	   peremptory	   norm	   of	   general	   international	   law	   under	  
Article	  53	  VCLT.	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politician,	   to	   the	   journalist,	   to	   the	   propagandist,	   to	   the	   lawyer,	   to	  
the	   statesmen	   –	   even,	   I	   think,	   to	   the	   prophet	   and	   to	   the	  
soothsayer…	  
And	  I	  make	  bold	  to	  say…we	  have	  been	  successful.”3	  
A	   thorough	   history	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   could	   amount	   to	   a	   thesis	   in	   itself,	   yet	   a	  
short	  history	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  its	  work	  since	  its	  inception	  is	  crucial	  
to	   assess	   whether	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Bank	   have	   complied	   with	   the	   positivist	  
understanding	  of	  international	   law	  by	  keeping	  within	  its	  founding	  treaty	  and	  any	  
subsequent	   amendments.	   The	   quote	   by	   John	  Maynard	   Keynes	   is	   one	   indication	  
that	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  Bank	  believed	  that	  they	  had	  been	  successful	  in	  their	  aims	  
and	  had	  provided	  an	  organisation	  suited	  to	  its	  goals;	  a	  history	  of	  the	  Bank	  since	  its	  
inception	  will	  determine	  whether	  the	  Bank	  has	  agreed.	  	  
The	   section	  will	   examine	   the	  circumstances	   that	   led	   to	   the	  creation	  of	   the	  Bank	  
and	  how	  and	  why	   its	  competence	  was	  shaped	  as	   it	  originally	  was	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  
provide	   a	   baseline	   for	   analysis.	   If	   it	   can	   be	   shown	   what	   the	   World	   Bank	   was	  
originally	   intended	   for,	   an	   objective	  measure	   can	  be	  used	   to	   see	  how	   far	   it	   has	  
shifted	  from	  this	  baseline.	  
1.2.1	  Events	  Leading	  up	  to	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  Conference	  
The	   path	   that	   led	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   at	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	  
Conference	  began	  long	  before	  1944	  when	  the	  Bank	  was	  established.	  Although	  the	  
events	   of	   the	   Conference	   have	   reached	   an	   almost	   infamous	   level	   within	  
international	  economic	  law	  for	  the	  profound	  effect	  they	  have	  had	  on	  the	  world’s	  
economic	   development,	   it	   was	   the	   events	   that	   led	   up	   to	   the	   Conference	   that	  
shaped	   the	   aims	   and	   directions	   of	   the	  World	   Bank,	   the	   International	  Monetary	  
Fund	  and	  the	  GATT/WTO.	  
The	  Bretton	  Woods	  Conference,	  and	  the	  three	  organisations	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  
it,	  was	  held	  to	  prevent	  the	  reoccurrence	  of	  events	  that	  led	  to	  the	  great	  depression	  
in	  1929,4	  the	  events	  that	  stemmed	  from	  it	  and	  to	  attempt	  to	  revive	  international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	   John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	  quoted	   in	  Roy	  Harrod,	  The	  Life	  of	   John	  Maynard	  Keynes	   (W.	  W.	  
Norton	  and	  Company	  1951)	  Pg.	  582-­‐84	  
4	  John	  Horsefield,	  The	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  1945-­‐1965	  Vol.1	  (IMF	  1969)	  Pg.	  33	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trade	  after	  World	  War	  II.5	  The	  Conference	  itself	  was	  in	  this	  sense	  reactive	  to	  past	  
events	   in	   an	  effort	   to	  eliminate	  what	  was	  perceived	  at	   the	   time	  as	  harmful	   and	  
predatory	  practices	  prevalent	  during	  the	  1930s.6	  
The	  great	  depression	  began	   in	  1929	   in	  the	  United	  States	  with	  what	  has	  come	  to	  
be	   known	   as	   Black	   Tuesday	   and	   rapidly	   spread	   throughout	   the	  world	   to	   cripple	  
economies	  both	  large	  and	  small.	  Industrial	  States	  had	  increasingly	  come	  to	  rely	  on	  
the	  stock	  market	  as	  a	  source	  of	  funding.	  Market	  rules	  allowed	  buyers	  to	  purchase	  
shares	  with	  only	  a	  small	  down	  payment	  and	  to	  borrow	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  capital	  
required	   to	   fund	   the	   acquisitions.	   Low	   interest	   rates	   and	   sharply	   rising	   prices	  
allowed	   buyers	   to	   purchase	   shares	  with	   a	   small	   down	   payment	   and	   large	   loan,	  
then	  sell	  at	  a	  later	  date	  for	  a	  high	  price	  and	  repay	  back	  the	  loan	  whilst	  making	  a	  
large	   profit	   in	   the	   process.	   This	   approach	   led	   to	   artificially	   high	   prices	   whilst	  
individuals	  and	  companies	  became	  increasingly	  reliant	  upon	  the	  stock	  market.	  
In	  the	  month	  leading	  up	  to	  Black	  Tuesday	  investors	  became	  increasingly	  nervous	  
at	  the	  amount	  borrowed	  and	  the	  slow	  down	  in	  price	  rises.7	  As	  the	  market	  began	  
to	   turn	   an	   increasing	   amount	   of	   panic	   selling	   occurred	   that	   led	   to	   the	   Black	  
Tuesday	  collapse.	  Banks	   that	  had	   lent	  money	  could	  no	   longer	   continue	  as	  going	  
concerns	  as	   loans	  turned	  to	  non-­‐performing;	   individuals	   lost	  their	   life	  savings	  on	  
the	   market	   but	   still	   had	   to	   repay	   the	   loans	   they	   used	   to	   fund	   their	   portfolios;	  
companies	  that	  were	  exposed	  could	  no	  longer	  afford	  to	  finance	  their	  activities	  so	  
either	   declared	   bankruptcy	   or	   were	   forced	   to	   issue	   mass	   redundancies;	   even	  
businesses	  that	  were	  not	  heavily	   invested	  were	  paralysed	  due	  to	  their	  savings	   in	  
banks	  being	  lost	  when	  banks	  collapsed.	  
The	  depression	  led	  States	  to	  devalue	  their	  currencies	  and	  to	  place	  restrictions	  on	  
trade	   in	  order	   to	  maintain	  domestic	   income.8	  As	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  countries	  
exercised	  their	  traditional	  sovereign	  right	  to	  follow	  these	  procedures	  and	  protect	  
their	  own	  economy,	   the	   result	  was	  a	   reduction	   in	   trade	  and	  employment	   for	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Rajesh	  Swaminathan,	  ‘Regulating	  Development:	  Structural	  Adjustment	  and	  the	  Case	  for	  
National	  Enforcement	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Rights’	  (1998)	  37	  Colum.	  J.	  Transnat’l	  L.	  161,	  
164	  
6	  Michael	  Malloy,	   ‘Shifting	  Paradigms:	   Institutional	  Roles	   in	  a	  Changing	  World’	   (1994)	  62	  
Fordham	  L.	  Rev.	  1911,	  1912	  
7	  More	  than	  $8.5	  billion	  was	  on	  loan;	  more	  than	  the	  entire	  amount	  of	  money	  in	  circulation	  
in	  the	  United	  States.	  
8	  Kim	  Reisman,	  ‘The	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IMF:	  At	  the	  Forefront	  of	  World	  Transformation’	  
(1992)	  60	  Fordham	  L.	  Rev.	  S349,	  S351	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States	   concerned.9	   Protectionist	   measures	   became	   the	   norm	   in	   an	   effort	   for	  
States	   to	   protect	   their	   own	  producers	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   foreign	   products10	   and	  
retaliatory	  measures	  were	   used	   on	   a	   regular	   basis.	   Even	   between	   close	   allies	   it	  
was	   seen	   as	  more	   important	   to	   pursue	   a	   protectionist	   agenda,	   especially	  when	  
raw	  materials	  were	  concerned,	  than	  it	  was	  to	  keep	  an	  open	  market.11	  
The	   imposition	  of	   tariffs,	   import	  quotas	  and	  other	   restrictive	  measures	   imposed	  
by	  States	  can	  all	  be	  seen	  as	  evidence	  of	  an	  increased	  exercise	  and	  affirmation	  of	  
State	  economic	  sovereignty	   throughout	   the	  period.	  States	  were	  exercising	  rights	  
in	   what	   they	   felt	   was	   their	   sovereign	   duty	   to	   protect	   their	   citizens	   and	   even	  
though	   these	  measures	   had	   a	   negative	   effect	   on	   a	   global	   level,	   it	   was	   still	   the	  
States’	  prerogative	  to	  do	  so.	  In	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  Conference	  States	  realised	  that	  
something	  had	  to	  be	  done	  to	  prevent	  a	  repeat	  of	  the	  crisis,	  yet	  State	  sovereignty	  
was	  still	  rigidly	  protected.	  
1.2.2	  The	  Effect	  of	  World	  War	  II	  
Some	  State	  economies	  began	  to	  recover	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	  but	  many	  did	  not	  
recover	  until	  World	  War	  II.	  Although	  the	  economic	  effects	  of	  the	  depression	  were	  
profound,	   the	   effects	   on	   international	   peace	   and	   security	   were	   also	   of	   grave	  
concern.	   In	   the	   lead	   up	   to	   and	   at	   the	   Conference	   it	   was	   believed	   that	   the	  
economic	  conditions	  in	  Germany	  were	  a	  factor	  in	  Hitler’s	  rise	  to	  power.	  European	  
States	   were	   hit	   particularly	   hard	   by	   the	   depression,	   as	   they	   had	   not	   yet	   fully	  
recovered	   from	   the	   spending	   both	   during	   World	   War	   I	   and	   in	   the	   process	   of	  
redevelopment	  post	  war.12	  The	  German	  economy	  recovered	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1930s	  as	  
the	   Nazis,	   membership	   boosted	   by	   massive	   unemployment,	   focused	   upon	   the	  
expansion	  of	  Germany’s	  ammunition	  production	  facilities.13	  
As	  World	  War	  II	  began,	  the	  United	  States	  economy	  began	  to	  come	  out	  of	  a	  post-­‐
great	   depression	   recession.	   The	   Allied	   forces	   continuous	   orders	   for	   supplies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Ibid.	  
10	  For	  example,	  see	  the	  Smoot-­‐Hawley	  Tariff	  Act	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Pub.	  L.	  71-­‐361.	  This	  
act	  alone	  raised	  tariffs	  on	  over	  20,000	  foreign	  products.	  
11	  Geoffrey	  Malcolm	  Gathorne-­‐Hardy,	  A	  Short	  History	  of	   International	  Affairs,	  1920-­‐1939	  
(OUP	  1968)	  pg.	  75	  
12	  John	  Jackson,	  Legal	  Problems	  of	  International	  Economic	  Relations:	  Cases,	  Materials,	  and	  
Text	   on	   the	   National	   and	   International	   Regulation	   of	   Transnational	   Economic	   Relations	  
(West	  Group	  1977)	  pg.	  396-­‐398	  
13	   Francis	   Snyder	   &	   Peter	   Slinn,	   International	   Law	   of	   Development:	   Comparative	  
Perspectives	  (Professional	  Books	  1987)	  pg.	  3	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helped	   boost	   the	   United	   States	   economy	   and	   with	   America	   joining	   the	   war	   in	  
1941	   the	   economy	   thrived.	   As	   the	   war	   continued	   the	   fall	   in	   the	   price	   of	   raw	  
materials	  was	  a	  direct	  cause	  of	  the	  devaluation	  of	  exchange	  rates	  that	  benefited	  
all	  global	  economies.14	  
Commentators	   from	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   could	   view	   events	   at	   the	   end	   of	  
World	  War	  I	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  causes	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  could	  recognise	  the	  
need	  not	  to	  repeat	  the	  same	  mistakes.	  The	  Great	  Depression	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
actions	  by	  States	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  citizens	  had	  been	  a	  major	  contributor	  to	  the	  
war	   and	   the	   links	   between	   trade	   and	  world	   peace	  were	  made.	   Two	  plans	  were	  
drawn	  up	  by	  the	  Allied	  powers	  as	  early	  as	  1941	  for	  a	  post-­‐war	  strategy	  to	  prevent	  
a	   reoccurrence	  of	   the	  proceeding	   events.	   The	  United	   States	   drew	  up	   the	  White	  
Plan:	  named	  after	  Harry	  Dexter	  White.	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  drew	  up	  the	  Keynes	  
Plan:	  named	  after	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes.	  
The	  plans	  had	  to	  walk	  a	  careful	  line	  between	  what	  States	  had	  traditionally	  seen	  as	  
their	  own	  sovereignty	  and	  would,	  therefore,	  seek	  to	  protect	  on	  one	  side	  and	  the	  
need	  to	  prevent	  a	   further	  mass	  economic	  recession	  and	  any	  further	  outbreak	  of	  
war	   on	   the	   other	   side.	   States	   had	   shown	   a	   particular	   value	   to	   their	   economic	  
sovereignty	  during	  the	  preceding	  period	  and	  though	  compromises	  would	  have	  to	  
be	  given	  up	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  lofty	  aims,	  States	  would	  only	  be	  willing	  to	  go	  
so	  far	  and	  had	  a	  clear	  interest	  in	  limiting	  exactly	  what	  was	  delegated.	  
It	   is	   in	   this	   combined	   economic	   and	   security	   conscious	   background	   that	   the	  
Bretton	  Woods	  Conference	  was	  called.	  	  
1.2.3	  The	  Conference	  
The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  Conference,	  at	  least	  when	  it	  was	  called,	  was	  to	  create	  the	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund.	  The	   invitations	  sent	  out	  to	  the	  Allied	  States	  stated	  
the	   purpose	   of	   the	   Conference	   was	   to	   'formulate	   definite	   proposals	   for	   an	  
International	   Monetary	   Fund,	   and	   possibly	   a	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   and	  
Development'.15	   As	   such,	   the	   Bank	   received	   only	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	   scrutiny	   that	  
States	  assigned	  to	  the	  IMF.	  The	  sovereign	  debate	  at	  the	  Conference	  surrounding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	   J.	   Keith	   Horsefield,	   The	   International	   Monetary	   Fund,	   1945-­‐1965:	   Twenty	   Years	   of	  
International	  Monetary	  Cooperation	  Vol.	  III	  (IMF	  1969)	  pg.	  119	  
15	   Sandra	   Blanco	   &	   Enrique	   Carrasco,	   ‘The	   Functions	   of	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	   World	   Bank’	  
(1999)	  9	  Transnatl’l	  L.	  &	  Contemp.	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the	   IMF	   does,	   however,	   provide	   valuable	   context	   for	   decisions	   that	  were	  made	  
regarding	  the	  Bank.	  
Both	   the	   White	   Plan	   and	   Keynes	   Plan	   agreed	   that	   an	   organisation	   had	   to	   be	  
formed	   to	   remedy	   balance	   of	   payments	   issues	   that	   States	   might	   experience.	  
Balance	  of	  payments	  problems	  occur	  when	   the	   current	  account	   for	  a	   State	   is	   in	  
deficit	  as	  it	  results	  in	  a	  State	  building	  up	  an	  increasing	  deficit	  or	  foreign	  ownership	  
of	  assets.	  A	  balance	  of	  payments	  crisis	  occurs	  when	  a	  State	  can	  no	  longer	  service	  
this	  debt.	  	  
Each	   plan,	   shaped	   by	   their	   respective	   nations,	   had	   vastly	   different	   means	   of	  
fulfilling	   this	   role.	   Keynes	   Plan	   allowed	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   International	  
Clearing	   Union	   that	   would	   allow	   States	   to	   borrow	   directly	   from	   each	   other	   to	  
rectify	   balance	   of	   payment	   deficits.	   The	   United	   States,	   as	   the	   only	   State	   after	  
World	  War	   II	  with	   the	   potential	   to	   offer	   credit,	   objected	   to	   placing	   so	  much	   of	  
their	   currency	   at	   risk	   in	   such	   a	   system.16	   The	   United	   States	   negotiators	   were	  
conscious	   of	   Congress’	   probable	   objections	   to	   placing	   so	   much	   of	   the	   United	  
States	   security	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   foreign	   nationals.	   This	   was	   essentially	   a	  
protectionist	  measure	  to	  ensure	  that	  Congress	  was	  always	  in	  control	  of	  the	  United	  
States	   financial	   position.	   In	   these	   terms,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   reluctance	   of	   the	  
negotiators	  was	  linked	  to	  protecting	  United	  States	  sovereignty.	  
The	  White	   Plan	   called	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   Stabilization	   Fund	   where	  members	  
would	   contribute	   gold	   as	  well	   as	   their	   own	   respective	   currency.	   The	   Fund	   itself	  
would	  then	  lend	  to	  members	  rather	  than	  direct	  state-­‐to-­‐state	  borrowing	  but	  this	  
was	  foreseen	  to	  require	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  system	  to	  operate.17	  
The	  British	  Parliament	  was	  not	  prepared	   to	  accept	   the	  White	  Plan	   in	   relation	   to	  
the	  Stabilization	  Fund	  as	  of	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  system.	  They	  
wanted	   to	   retain	   the	   sovereign	   right	   to	   control	  monetary	   policy	   to	   protect	   the	  
British	   economy.18	   Although	   protectionist	   behaviour	   had	   caused	   many	   of	   the	  
problems	  that	  the	  Conference	  was	  trying	  to	  eradicate,	  the	  British	  government	  still	  
felt	  that	  an	  element	  of	  control	  had	  to	  be	  maintained.	  Recognising	  that	  the	  system	  
would	  not	  work	  without	   the	  approval	  of	  both	   the	  United	  States	  and	   the	  United	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Ibid.	  pg.	  71	  
17	  Ibid.	  pg.	  71	  
18	  Ibid.	  pg.	  72	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Kingdom,	   compromises	   were	   reached	   to	   assuage	   each	   side.	   The	   length	   of	   the	  
debates	  from	  all	  sides	  surrounding	  this	  subject	  provides	  evidence	  to	  how	  careful	  
and	  wary	  States	  were	  in	  delegating	  traditional	  sovereign	  powers	  to	  the	  respective	  
international	   organisations.	   Any	   transfer	   would	   happen	   on	   the	   express	   terms	  
outlined	  and	  agreed	  upon	  by	  States	  with	  a	  clear	  demarcation	  of	  what	  was	  to	  be	  
considered	   the	   respective	  areas	  of	   competence	  between	  State	  and	  organisation	  
and,	  in	  light	  of	  events	  at	  the	  conference,	  between	  organisations.	  
It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  of	  a	  careful	  protection	  of	  sovereignty	  in	  relation	  to	  transfer	  to	  
organisations	  that	  focus	  was	  upon	  establishing	  the	  Bank.	  
When	   discussions	   revolved	   around	   the	   Bank,	   the	   main	   issue	   of	   contention	  
concerned	   what	   was	   the	   primary	   objective	   of	   the	   Bank:	   development	   or	  
reconstruction.19	   As	  would	   be	   expected,	   European	   nations	   that	  were	   coming	   to	  
the	  end	  of	   a	  war	  were	  eager	   to	  push	   the	  Bank	   as	   an	   avenue	   for	   reconstruction	  
whilst	  developing	  nations	  without	  reconstruction	  needs	  sought	  to	  move	  the	  Bank	  
towards	   a	   development	   agenda.	   Perhaps	  not	   surprisingly,	   the	  developing	   States	  
failed	   in	   a	   bid	   to	   make	   development	   the	   Banks	   main	   agenda.	   Mexico’s	   tabled	  
amendments	   to	   these	   affects	   were	   turned	   down	   but	   a	   compromise	   led	   to	   the	  
amendment	  of	  Article	  III	  of	  the	  agreement	  to	  include	  the	  phrase	  that	  resources	  of	  
the	  Bank	  will	  be	  used	   'with	  equitable	  consideration	   to	  projects	   for	  development	  
and	   projects	   for	   reconstruction	   alike'.20	   Although	   European	   States	   won	   the	  
argument	  and	  the	  central	  focus	  of	  the	  Bank	  was	  reconstruction,	  in	  a	  twist	  of	  fate	  
the	  developing	  States’	  vision	  has	  prevailed.21	  
As	   of	   the	   sovereignty	   issues	   that	   were	   encountered	   during	   the	   IMF	   debates,	  
States	  were	  eager	   to	  prevent	   the	  World	  Bank	   infringing	  beyond	   its	  mandate.	  To	  
this	  end,	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes	  pushed	  for	  the	  inclusion22	  of	  Article	  IV	  Section	  10	  
(with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  principally	  in	  mind23)	  detailing	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Ibid.	  pg.	  72	  
20	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  III,	  Section	  1(a)	  	  
21	   Berta	   Hernandez-­‐Truyol,	   ‘Cuba	   and	   Good	   Governance’	   (2004)	   14(2)	   Transnat’l	   L.	   &	  
Contemp.	  Probs.	  655	  
22	  Interview	  with	  Abram	  Chayes,	  Harvard	  Law	  School,	  in	  Cambridge	  (April.	  10,	  1998)	  
23	   Edward	   Mason	   &	   Robert	   Asher,	   The	   World	   Bank	   Since	   Bretton	   Woods:	   The	   Origins,	  
Policies,	  Operations,	   and	   Impact	   of	   the	   International	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   (Brookings	  
Institution	  Press	  1973)	  pg.	  27	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'The	  Bank	  and	  its	  officers	  shall	  not	  interfere	  in	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  
any	  member;	  nor	  shall	   they	  be	   influenced	   in	  their	  decisions	  by	  the	  
political	   character	   of	   the	   member	   or	   members	   concerned.	   Only	  
economic	   considerations	   shall	   be	   relevant	   to	   their	   decisions,	   and	  
these	   considerations	   shall	   be	   weighed	   impartially	   in	   order	   to	  
achieve	  the	  purposes	  states	  in	  Article	  1.'24	  
This	  Article	   should	  be	   seen	   in	   the	   light	  of	   the	  uniqueness	  of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  
institutions.	  States	  were	  taking	  the	  unprecedented	  steps	  of	  relinquishing	  control	  
of	   financial	   activities	   that	   had	   always	   been	   considered	   part	   of	   the	   States’	  
sovereign	  powers.	  The	  run	  up	  to	  World	  War	  II	  saw	  an	  increased	  use	  of	  economic	  
sovereign	  options	  by	  States	   in	  order	   to	  protect	   their	  citizens	  and	  even	  though	   it	  
was	   recognised	   that	   compromises	   had	   to	   be	  made,	   even	   during	   negotiations	   it	  
was	  seen	  that	  States	  were	  only	  willing	  to	  give	  up	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  sovereignty	  
and	  not	   transfer	   full	   economic	   sovereignty	   to	   the	  World	  Bank	  or	   IMF.	  Article	   IV	  
Section	   10	   should	   therefore	   be	   seen	   in	   its	   context	   as	   a	   limit	   on	   the	   sovereign	  
powers	  that	  the	  State	  was	  transferring	  to	  the	  World	  Bank.	  	  
In	  this	  context	  with	  States	  seeking	  to	  limit	  the	  sovereignty	  they	  were	  transferring,	  
it	   was	   of	   essential	   importance	   that	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   exact	  
function	   it	  was	  to	  perform	  were	  clearly	  articulated	   in	   the	  treaty	  establishing	  the	  
World	  Bank,	  the	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  	  
1.2.4	  Powers	  Assigned	  by	  the	  Treaty	  
The	   purposes	   of	   the	   Bank	   were	   clearly	   set	   out	   in	   Article	   1	   of	   its	   Article	   of	  
Agreements.	  
(i) To	   assist	   in	   the	   reconstruction	   and	   development	   of	   territories	   of	  
members	   by	   facilitating	   the	   investment	   of	   capital	   for	   productive	  
purposes,	   including	   the	   restoration	   of	   economies	   destroyed	   or	  
disrupted	   by	   war,	   the	   reconversion	   of	   productive	   facilities	   to	  
peacetime	   needs	   and	   the	   encouragement	   of	   the	   development	   of	  
productive	  facilities	  and	  resources	  in	  less	  developed	  countries.	  
(ii) To	   promote	   private	   foreign	   investment	   by	   means	   of	   guarantees	   or	  
participations	   in	   loans	   and	   when	   private	   capital	   is	   not	   available	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  IV,	  Section	  10,	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reasonable	   terms,	   to	   supplement	   private	   investment	   by	   providing	  
finance	  for	  productive	  purposes	  out	  of	  its	  own	  capital.	  
(iii) To	  promote	  the	  long-­‐range	  balanced	  growth	  of	  international	  trade	  
(iv) To	   arrange	   the	   loans	   made	   or	   guaranteed	   by	   it	   in	   relation	   to	  
international	   loans	   through	   other	   channels	   so	   that	   the	  more	   useful	  
and	  urgent	  projects	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  first.	  
(v) To	   conduct	   its	   operations	   with	   due	   regard	   to	   the	   effect	   of	  
international	  investment	  on	  business	  conditions.25	  
	  
The	  final	  qualifying	  statement	  of	  Article	  I	  is	  that	  'The	  Bank	  shall	  be	  guided	  in	  all	  its	  
decisions	   by	   the	   purposes	   set	   forth	   above'.	   This	   is	   a	   limiting	   statement	   for	   the	  
purposes	  of	  the	  Bank:	  any	  purpose	  not	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  mentioned	  purposes	  of	  the	  
Bank	   is	   not	   a	   purpose	   the	   founders	   sought	   the	   Bank	   to	   undertake	   and	   not	   a	  
purpose	   that	   States	   consented	   too.	   If	   a	   new	   purpose	   should	   develop	   that	   the	  
member	  States	  should	  seek	  to	  use	  the	  Bank	  for,	  the	  process	  of	  amendment	  exists	  
to	  modify	  the	  existing	  purposes.	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  Bank	  is	  outlined	  in	  the	  Articles.	  Members	  are	  limited	  to	  those	  
who	   are	   members	   of	   the	   IMF;26	   voting	   for	   these	   members	   is	   assigned	   in	  
comparison	   to	   the	   value	   of	   shares	   given	   to	   the	   Bank;27	   voting	   is	   decided	   by	   a	  
simple	  majority	  of	  voting	  share	  cast	  by	  the	  Board	  of	  Governors28	  except	  on	  issues	  
that	   modify	   the	  World	   Bank	   through	  modifying	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   that	  
requires	   four-­‐fifths	   of	   the	   voting	   share.29	   The	   Executive	   Directors	   sit	   below	   the	  
Board	   of	   Governors	   and	   contains	   twenty-­‐five	   directors	   who	   are	   responsible	   for	  
the	  general	  operations	  of	  the	  Bank.30	  Importantly	  in	  this	  analysis,	  as	  noted	  earlier	  
the	  Executive	  Directors	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  initial	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Articles	  
of	  Agreement.31	  The	  President	  is	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  is	  officially	  elected	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  I	  (i)-­‐(v)	  
26	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  II,	  Section	  1(b)	  	  
27	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  V,	  Section	  3(a)	  
28	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  V,	  Section	  3(b)	  
29	   See	   1.8.3	   World	   Bank	   Usage	   (Treaty	   Interpretation).	   The	   original	   Articles	   required	  
eighty-­‐five	  percent	  for	  an	  amendment	  to	  be	  effective.	  
30	  Originally	  there	  were	  twelve,	  as	  outlined	  in	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  V,	  Section	  
4(a),	  however,	  in	  November	  2010,	  the	  number,	  which	  had	  previously	  been	  increased,	  was	  
increased	  to	  the	  current	  number	  of	  twenty-­‐five.	  
31	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  IX	  (a)	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the	   Executive	   Directors.32	   In	   practice,	   however,	   the	   President	   has	   always	   been	  
decided	  upon	  by	  the	  United	  States	  who	  nominates	  a	  candidate	  for	  the	  Executive	  
Directors	  to	  approve.	  	  
Originally	   in	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   negotiations	   the	   United	   States	   sought	   and	  
obtained	  the	  informal	  right	  to	  nominate	  the	  head	  of	  the	  IMF,	  which	  was	  seen	  as	  
vastly	  more	   important	   to	   the	  American	   government	   than	   the	  Bank,	   and	   Europe	  
collectively	  was	  allowed	  to	  nominate	  the	  head	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  However,	   the	  
first	  American	  nominee	  to	  be	  an	  Executive	  Director	  was	  Harry	  Dexter	  White,	  who	  
had	  been	  the	  key	  American	  representative	  at	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  conference	  and,	  
along	  with	   John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	   a	   visionary	   of	   the	  post-­‐World	  War	   II	   financial	  
order.	  White	  was	  due	  to	  be	  nominated	  for	  the	  position	  of	  Managing	  Director	  yet	  
after	  being	  nominated	  to	  be	  the	  American	  Executive	  Director,	  the	  Federal	  Bureau	  
of	   Investigation	  director,	   J.	  Edgar	  Hoover,	  alleged	  to	   the	  United	  States	  President	  
Harry	  Truman	  that	  White	  was	  a	  Soviet	  spy.	  Rather	  than	  risk	  raising	  questions	  over	  
why	   they	  were	  passing	  over	  White	   to	   nominate	   someone	  else	   to	   the	  Managing	  
Director	  position,	  the	  American	  government	  announced	  they	  would	  instead	  back	  
a	   candidate	   for	   President	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   Europe	   could	   choose	   the	  
Managing	  Director	  of	  the	  IMF.33	  	  
As	   discussed	  earlier,	   amendments	   to	   the	  Articles	   are	  presented	   to	   the	  Board	  of	  
Governors	  for	  consideration.	  Three-­‐fifths	  of	  members,	  with	  four-­‐fifths	  of	  the	  total	  
voting	   power,	   must	   accept	   proposed	   amendments	   for	   the	   Board	   to	   confirm	  
them.34	  Amendments	  enter	   into	   force	   for	  all	  members	  of	   the	  Bank.	  This	  area	  of	  
law	  has	  been	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  controversy	  as	  it	  could	  be	  seen	  to	  
deviate	   from	  the	  positive	   international	   law	  theory	  that	  a	  State	  cannot	  be	  bound	  
without	  their	  consent.35	  Whilst	  traditionally	  this	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  limitation	  on	  
State	   sovereignty,	   as	   States	   consented	   to	   this	   provision	   when	   they	   signed	   the	  
treaty	  the	  argument	  is	  circular	  and	  can	  merely	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  affirmation	  of	  State	  
consent.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  V,	  Section	  5(a)	  
33	   New	   York	   Times,	   “Banker,	   Tailor,	   Soldier,	   Spy”	   April	   8th	   2012,	   available	   at	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/opinion/banker-­‐tailor-­‐soldier-­‐spy.html	  
34	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  VIII	  (a)	  
35	   See	   for	  example;	  Dennis	   Leech,	   ‘Voting	  Power	   in	   the	  Governance	  of	   the	   International	  
Monetary	  Fund’	  (2002)	  109	  Annals	  of	  Operations	  Research	  373	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At	   this	   point	   in	   the	   analysis	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   note	   that	  members	   have	   the	   right	   to	  
withdraw	   from	   the	   Bank36	   or	   suspend	   their	   membership.37	   If	   the	   Bank’s	  
membership	   ever	   has	   a	   problem	   with	   the	   legal	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   Bank	   is	  
behaving,	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  Bank	  gave	  States,	  at	  least	  in	  legal	  theory,	  the	  option	  
to	  withdraw	  from	  their	  obligations	  under	  the	  Agreement.	  
The	  Bank	  was	  given	  a	  clear	  purpose	  by	   its	   founders,	  enshrined	  within	   its	   treaty,	  
and,	  as	  a	  subject	  of	  public	  international	  law,	  its	  actions	  since	  that	  time	  should	  be	  
able	   to	   be	   explained	   and	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   law.	   The	   positive	   theory	   of	   public	  
international	  law	  is	  the	  most	  commonly	  utilised	  tool	  via	  which	  international	  law	  is	  
understood.	  As	  such,	  the	  Bank’s	  actions	  should	  conform	  to	  this	  model.	  It	  has	  been	  
seen	  that	  the	  founders	  had	  a	  clear	  vision	  for	  the	  Bank.	  The	  time	  and	  setting	  of	  the	  
creation	  ensured	  this.	  Yet	  the	  legal	  requirements	  for	  the	  Bank	  to	  conform	  to	  this	  
vision	  would	   depend	   upon	   the	   theory	   used	   to	   explain	   both	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  
Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Bank	  since.	  	  
The	   dominant	   theory,	   that	   has	   traditionally	   been	   utilised	   to	   explain	   the	   actions	  
taken	  in	  an	  international	  law	  setting,	  will	  be	  examined	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  
actions	   of	   the	   Bank	   can	   be	   explained	   in	   law	   by	   this	   theory.	   This	   requires	   a	   full	  
elucidation	  of	  the	  theory,	  with	  its	  basis	  and	  development	  being	  understood	  so	  as	  
to	  attempt	  to	  frame	  in	  law	  both	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Bank	  but	  also	  its	  actions	  since.	  
	  
1.3	  The	  Positivist	  Theory	  from	  State	  Law	  
When	  viewing	  modern	  public	  international	  law,	  there	  is	  a	  sizeable	  disconnect	  with	  
the	   original	   theories	   of	   a	   positive	   law	   taken	   from	   a	   nationalist	   setting	   to	   the	  
theory	  of	  positive	  law	  that	  is	  utilised	  today.	  Positive	  law	  developed	  as	  a	  rejection	  
of	  the	  natural	  law	  paradigm	  that	  law	  should	  concern	  itself	  with	  the	  application	  of	  
universal	  principles	  of	  morality	  that	  could	  constrain	  what	  was	  considered	  “law”	  on	  
a	  basis	  of	  morality.38	  Instead	  positive	  law	  asserted	  that	  the	  morality	  of	  a	  law	  was	  
irrelevant	   and	   its	   legal	   nature	   developed	   from	   its	   creation	   by	   a	   sovereign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  VI,	  Section	  1	  
37	  Ibid.	  Section	  2	  
38	   “The	   existence	   of	   a	   law	   is	   one	   thing,	   its	   merits	   or	   demerits	   are	   another	   thing”	   John	  
Austin,	  The	  Province	  of	  Jurisprudence	  Determined,	  W	  Rumble	  (ed)	  (CUP	  1995)	  pg.	  157	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authority.	  Significantly,	  positive	  law	  rejected	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  law	  as	  invalid	  and	  
not	  true	  "law".	  	  
Although	   a	   number	   of	   legal	   philosophers	   had	   already	   articulated	   upon	   of	   the	  
separation	   between	   natural	   law	   and	   positive	   law,39	   it	   is	   the	   work	   of	   Austin,	  
influenced	  by	  Bentham,40	  which	  readily	  articulates	  the	  classic	  position	  of	  positive	  
law:	  
‘Every	  positive	  law,	  or	  every	  law	  simply	  and	  strictly	  so	  called,	  is	  
set	   by	   a	   sovereign,	   or	   a	   sovereign	   body	   of	   persons,	   to	   a	  
member	   or	   members	   of	   the	   independent	   political	   society	  
wherein	  that	  person	  or	  body	  is	  sovereign	  or	  supreme.’41	  
This	   encapsulates	   the	   position	   that	   law	   is	   set	   by	   a	   person	   or	   body	  who	   society	  
obeys:	   the	   law	   is	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   sovereign	   will.	   Law	   is	   commands	   by	   a	  
sovereign	  backed	  by	   a	   sanction	   yet	  morality	   and	   customs	  without	   sanctions	   are	  
merely	  habit	  or	  opinion.	  In	  contrast	  to	  its	  forerunners,	  this	  focus	  upon	  sovereign	  
will	   was	   not	   concerned	   with	   a	   prescriptive	   analysis	   of	   what	   the	   law	   should	   be	  
based	   upon	   absolute	   principles.	   Instead,	   it	   sought	   to	   create	   theory	   based	   upon	  
observable	  events.42	  
The	   concept	   of	   positive	   law	   has	   however	   evolved	   from	   such	   beginnings43.	   Hart	  
disagreed	  with	  the	  position	  of	  Austin’s	  that	  laws	  could	  only	  be	  commands	  of	  the	  
sovereign	  backed	  by	  sanction	  as	  modern	  democracies	  no	  longer	  worked	  in	  such	  a	  
fashion	  of	  one	  supreme	  ruler	  that	  created	  all	  of	  the	  law.44	  Hart	  instead	  articulated	  
upon	   a	   theory	   that	   a	   legal	   system	   could	   exist	  when	   there	   are	   a	   combination	   of	  
primary	   rules	   of	   obligation	   and	   secondary	   rules	   of	   recognition.	   Primary	   rules	  
require	   citizens	   ‘to	   do	   or	   abstain	   from	   certain	   actions,	  whether	   they	  wish	   to	   or	  
not’.45	   Austin	   had	   recognised	   this	   and	   focused	   upon	   this	   rule.	   Hart,	   however,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	   See	   Thomas	   Hobbes,	   Leviathan,	   J.	   Gaskin	   (ed.)	   (OUP	   2009),	   Richard	   Zouche,	   Iuris	   et	  
Iudicii	  Faecialis,	  sive,	   Iuris	   Inter	  Gentes	   (Oxford	  1650)	  and	  Cornelius	  van	  Bynkershoek,	  De	  
Dominio	  Maris	  (1702)	  
40	  Brian	  Tamanaha,	  A	  General	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Law	  and	  Society	  (OUP	  2001)	  pg.	  24	  
41	  Supra.	  Note.	  38	  
42	  Malcolm	  Shaw,	  International	  Law	  (Sixth	  Edition,	  CUP	  2008)	  pg.	  25	  
43	  For	  modern	  criticisms	  of	   the	  application	  of	  Austin’s	  positive	   law	  see	   for	  example	   Infra	  
Note.	  44,	  Ronald	  Dworkin,	  Law’s	  Empire	  (Harvard	  University	  Press	  1986)	  and	  John	  Finnis,	  
Natural	  Law	  and	  Natural	  Rights	  (Clarendon	  Press,	  1980).	  
44	  H.L.A.	  Hart,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Law	  (Second	  Edition,	  Clarendon	  Press	  1994)	  
45	  Ibid.	  pg.	  81	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claimed	  that	  for	  a	  legal	  system	  to	  exist	  secondary	  rules	  must	  be	  present	  that	  ‘are	  
all	  concerned	  with	  the	  primary	  rules	  themselves’.46	  	  
These	   secondary	   rules	   can	   exist	   in	   three	   forms	   and	   all	   three	   must	   be	   present.	  
Firstly,	  the	  rule	  of	  recognition	  requires	  that	  a	  rule	  exists	  which	  determines	  which	  
rules	  are	  binding.47	  Secondly,	  the	  rule	  of	  change	  that	  allows	  the	  society	  subject	  to	  
the	   primary	   rules	   to	   add,	   remove	   and	   modify	   valid	   rules.	   Thirdly,	   the	   rule	   of	  
adjudication	  that	  allows	  society	  to	  determine	  when	  a	  valid	  rule	  has	  been	  violated.	  
As	  well	   as	   the	   existence	   of	   primary	   and	   secondary	   rules,	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
legal	  system	  the	  society	  must	  generally	  accept	  the	  application	  of	  the	  primary	  rules	  
and	  officials	  must	  accept	  the	  legal	  validity	  of	  the	  secondary	  rules.48	  
These	   writings	   on	   sovereign	   will,	   particularly	   the	   early	   work	   that	   was	   primarily	  
concerned	   with	   national	   law,	   have	   underpinned	   its	   application	   to	   international	  
law	   and	   the	   positivist	   school	   of	   thought	   that	   has	   developed	   in	   regards	   to	   law	  
beyond	  the	  State.	  
	  
1.4	  The	  Application	  of	  Positive	  Theory	  to	  International	  Law	  
The	   foundation	   of	   modern	   international	   law	   is	   often	   traced	   to	   the	   Treaty	   of	  
Westphalia49	   yet	   it	   was	   the	   work	   of	   the	   ‘father	   of	   international	   law’50	   Hugo	  
Grotius,	  published	  twenty	  three	  years	  previously,	  that	  created	  the	  legal	  principles	  
used	   in	   the	   Treaty.51	   Although	   international	   law	   had	   existed	   previously,	   Grotius	  
transformed	   the	   jus	   gentium	   (law	   of	   peoples)	   that	   had	   dominated	   previous	  
thinking	   on	   international	   law	   into	   a	   different	   concept	   called	   the	   law	  of	   nations.	  
Unlike	  the	   jus	  gentium,	  which	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  application	  of	  natural	   law	  
to	  peoples,	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  was	  a	  distinct	  body	  of	  law	  outside	  the	  law	  of	  nature	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Ibid.	  pg.	  92	  
47	  This	  has	  been	  the	  most	  controversial	  aspect	  of	  Hart’s	  theory.	  See	  for	  example,	  Jeremy	  
Waldron,	   ‘Who	  Needs	  Rules	  of	  Recognition?’	   in	  Matthew	  Adler	  &	  Kenneth	  Himma	  (eds),	  
The	   Rule	   of	   Recognition	   and	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution	   (OUP	   2009)	   and	   Joseph	   Raz,	   The	  
Authority	  of	  Law	  (Clarendon	  Press	  1979)	  
48	  Supra	  Note.	  44	  pg.	  113	  
49	   Treaty	   of	   Munster	   and	   Treaty	   of	   Osnabruck	   (concluded	   24	   October	   1648)	   that	   are	  
referred	  to	  collectively	  as	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Westphalia.	  See	  for	  example,	  Harold	  Koh,	  ‘Why	  do	  
Nations	  Obey	  International	  Law?’	  (1997)	  106(8)	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  2599;	  Stephen	  Krasner,	  
‘Compromising	  Westphalia’	  (1995-­‐6)	  20(3)	  International	  Security	  115	  and	  Leo	  Gross,	  ‘The	  
Peace	  of	  Westphalia,	  1648-­‐1948’	  (1948)	  42	  AJIL	  20.	  
50	  Supra	  Note.	  42	  pg.	  23	  
51	  Hugo	  Grotius,	  On	  the	  Law	  of	  War	  and	  Peace,	  Stephen	  Neff	  (eds.)	  (CUP	  2012)	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that	  applied	  only	   to	   the	  rulers	  of	  States.52	  Grotius	  was	  a	  naturalist	  and	  although	  
the	   law	  of	  nations	  was	  outside	  of	  natural	   law,	   it	  was	   intended	   to	   coexist	   rather	  
than	  act	  as	  a	  replacement.	  
If	   Grotius	   was	   the	   legal	   philosopher	   who	   created	   the	   paradigm,	   the	   Treaty	   of	  
Westphalia	   provided	   the	   blueprint	   of	   its	   use	   by	   dividing	   competence	   between	  
national	   and	   international	   spheres.	   The	   law	   of	   nations	   would	   deal	   solely	   with	  
areas	  in	  the	  international	  sphere,	  whilst	  sovereigns	  were	  free	  to	  deal	  with	  areas	  in	  
a	   national	   sphere.	   This	   law	   of	   nations	   was	   further	   divided	   up	   by	   Vattel,	   who	  
expressly	   linked	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  to	  sovereign	  consent,	  or	  as	  national	  positivist	  
theory	  would	  have	  stated	  it,	  sovereign	  will.	  Vattel	  split	  up	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  into	  
four	  distinct	  areas;	  the	  necessary	  law	  of	  nations,	  based	  upon	  natural	  law	  but	  not	  
binding	   between	   States;	   the	   voluntary	   law	   of	   nations,	   the	   rules	   of	   conduct	  
between	   States	  based	  on	  presumed	   consent;	   the	   conventional	   law	  of	   nationals,	  
the	   law	  of	  treaties	  based	  on	  express	  consent;	  and	  the	  customary	   law	  of	  nations,	  
based	  on	  tacit	  consent.53	  These	  three	  areas	  combined	  to	  provide	  the	  “positive	  law	  
of	  nations”.54	  
In	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   however,	   arose	   a	   ‘positive	   philosophy’55	   within	  
international	  jurisprudence	  that	  rejected	  all	  previous	  thinking	  on	  natural	  law	  and	  
applied	   positive	   law	   to	   the	   international	   sphere.	   This	   built	   upon	   and	   based	   its	  
theories	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  Vattel.	  Instead	  of	  law	  that	  was	  constrained	  by	  natural	  
philosophies,	   law	  was	  constrained	  by	   the	  will	  of	   the	   sovereign.	   If	   sovereigns	  did	  
not	  express	  a	  will	  on	  a	  subject,	  there	  was	  no	  law	  on	  the	  subject.	  International	  law	  
was	  now	  ‘law	  between	  States	  and	  not	  law	  above	  States’56	  with	  States	  having	  sole	  
law	   creating	   responsibility.57	   Law	   could,	   therefore,	   only	   be	   evidenced	   by	   State	  
behaviour	   rather	   than	   induced	   from	   naturalist	   writings.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   19th	  
century	  positivism	  had	  replaced	  natural	  law	  as	  the	  principle	  analytical	  tool	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	   Stephen	   Neff,	   ‘A	   Short	   History	   of	   International	   Law’	   in	   Malcolm	   Evans	   (ed.),	  
International	  Law	  (OUP	  2003)	  pg.	  40	  
53	  Emmerich	  de	  Vattel,	  The	  Law	  of	  Nations	  or	  the	  Principles	  of	  Natural	  Law	  Applied	  to	  the	  
Conduct	  and	  to	  the	  Affairs	  of	  Nations	  and	  of	  Sovereigns,	  with	  an	  introduction	  by	  Albert	  De	  
Lapradelle	  (Carnegie	  Institution	  of	  Washington	  1916)	  Preliminaries	  paras.	  21-­‐26	  	  
54	  Ibid.	  para.	  27	  
55	  This	  positive	  philosophy	  was	  primarily	  created	  by	  August	  Comte	  who	  envisioned	  a	  world	  
governed	   by	   objective	   thought	   rather	   than	   speculative	   or	   religious	   modes	   of	   thought.	  
Supra	  Note.	  52,	  pg.	  13	  
56	  Ibid.	  pg.	  15	  
57	   Christiana	  Ochoa,	   ‘The	   Individual	   and	   Customary	   International	   Law	   Formation’	   (2007)	  
48(1)	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  119	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examination	   of	   law.58	   This	   positivist	   system	   was	   based	   upon	   three	   central	  
assertions:	   the	   existence	   of	   sovereigns	   who	   had	   exclusive	   jurisdiction	   within	  
States,	   that	   international	   law	   was	   only	   created	   by	   sovereigns	   consent	   and	   the	  
equality	  of	  all	  States	  in	  law.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  application	  to	  the	  World	  Bank,	  these	  three	  areas	  are	  of	  fundamental	  
concern	   as	   to	   both	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Bank,	   and	   the	   limitations	   that	   the	   Bank	  
must	  act	  under	  going	  forward.	  If	  sovereigns	  have	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  in	  a	  State,	  
the	   World	   Bank’s	   governance	   role	   that	   has	   been	   asserted	   can	   be	   rejected.	   If	  
international	   law	  is	  only	  created	  by	  sovereign	  consent,	  then	  the	  World	  Bank	  can	  
only	  act	  within	  the	  framework	  that	  States	  have	  consented	  to.	  Whilst	   if	  all	  States	  
were	   equal	   in	   law,	   it	   would	   follow	   that	   some	   member	   States	   cannot	   use	   the	  
World	  Bank	  to	  legally	  control	  other	  member	  States.	  Each	  of	  these	  three	  areas	  will	  
briefly	  be	  examined	  in	  turn	  to	  establish	  their	  exact	  meaning,	  before	  attention	  can	  
turn	  to	  the	  application	  to	  international	  organisations.	  
1.4.1	  Sovereignty	  
‘[T]here	  exists	  perhaps	  no	  conception	  the	  meaning	  of	  which	   is	  
more	   controversial	   than	   that	   of	   sovereignty.	   It	   is	   an	  
indisputable	  fact	  that	  this	  conception,	  from	  the	  moment	  when	  
it	   was	   introduced	   into	   political	   science	   until	   the	   present	   day,	  
has	  never	  had	  a	  meaning	  which	  was	  universally	  agreed	  upon.’59	  
The	  term	  ‘sovereignty’	  and	  its	  exact	  meaning	  are	  heavily	  debated.60	  Whilst	  there	  
is	   a	   general	   acceptance	   that	   international	   law	   is	  based	  upon,	  or	   at	   least	   started	  
from,	   a	   base	   of	   sovereignty,	   the	   continuing	   evolution	   of	   the	   term	   has	   offered	  
differing	   conclusions	   to	  exactly	  what	   the	   term	  entails.	   Sovereignty	  encompasses	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   Prabhakar	   Singh,	   ‘From	   ‘Narcissistic’	   Positive	   International	   Law	   to	   ‘Universal’	   Natural	  
International	  Law:	  The	  Dialectics	  of	  ‘Absentee	  Colonialism’’	  (2008)	  16(1)	  African	  Journal	  of	  
International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  56,	  58	  	  
59	  Lassa	  Oppenheim,	  International	  Law:	  A	  Treatise	  Vol.	  I	  Peace	  (Third	  Edition,	  The	  Lawbook	  
Exchange	  1928)	  
60	  See	  generally,	  Stephen	  Krasner,	  Sovereignty	  Organized	  Hypocrisy	   (Princeton	  University	  
Press	  1999);	  Georg	  Nolte,	  ‘Sovereignty	  as	  Responsibility?’	  (2005)	  99	  Am.	  Soc’y	  Int’l.	  L.	  Proc	  
389;	  Jack	  Goldsmith,	   ‘Sovereignty,	   International	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  International	  Law’	  
(2000)	   52(4)	   Stanford	   Law	   Review	   959	   and	   Daniel	   Drezner,	   'On	   the	   Balance	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International	  Law	  and	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the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   in	   the	   affairs	   of	   another	   State,61	   the	   ability	   to	  
enter	   into	   agreements	   on	   the	   international	   stage,62	   the	   non-­‐dependence	   on	  
another	   authority	   to	   control	   a	   territory63	   and,	   through	   its	   evolving	   usage,	   a	  
potential	  multitude	  of	  other	  factors	  depending	  on	  how	  one	  defines	  it.	  
An	   understanding	   of	   exactly	  what	   sovereignty	   entails	   is	   required	   to	   understand	  
exactly	  what	  member	  States	  were	  concerned	  to	  protect	  during	  the	  negotiations	  at	  
Bretton	  Woods.	  
Sovereignty	  was	  originally	  a	  national	  concept	   in	  place	  to	  protect	  the	  sovereign.64	  
At	   this	   time	   it	   involved	   absolute	   authority	   being	   vested	   in	   one	   individual,	   the	  
sovereign,	  who	  had	  authority	  to	  make	  decisions	  for	  the	  territory	  of	  which	  he	  was	  
in	   command.	   With	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   treaty	   of	   Westphalia	   it	   became	   an	  
international	   concept	   where	   by	   States	   had	   the	   right	   to	   exclude	   external	   actors	  
from	   their	  domestic	  affairs,	   as	  all	   States	  were	   seen	  as	   independent	  and	  equal.65	  
Throughout	   the	   adjoining	   years	   the	   concept	   has	   come	   to	   involve	   a	   number	   of	  
different	   facets	  and	  has	  been	  used	   in	  different	  ways.66	   It	   is	   this	  evolution	  of	   the	  
term	  that	  has	  made	  sovereignty	  so	  difficult	  to	  define.	  
Brownlie	   defines	   sovereignty	   by	   its	   consequences.	   Sovereignty	   implies	   an	  
exclusive	   control	   over	   a	   permanent	   population,	   a	   duty	   of	   non-­‐intervention	   for	  
areas	  that	  are	  within	  the	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  of	  States	  and	  the	  dependence	  upon	  
obligations	  arising	  from	  treaty	  law	  and	  customary	  international	  law	  that	  the	  State	  
has	   consented	   to.67	   Brownlie’s	   definition,	   whilst	   useful	   for	   seeing	   the	   effect	   of	  
sovereignty,	   does	   not	   consider	   which	   specific	   powers	   attributed	   to	   sovereignty	  
cause	   these	   consequences	   and	   does	   not	   consider	   whether	   these	   consequences	  
are	   responsible	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   sovereignty	   rather	   than	   a	   power	   of	   it.	   For	  
example,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  an	  exclusive	  control	  over	  a	  permanent	  population	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	   Jianming	  Shen,	   ‘The	  Non-­‐Intervention	  Principle	  and	  Humanitarian	   Interventions	  Under	  
International	  Law’	  (2001)	  7	  Int’l	  Legal	  Theory	  1	  and	  Georg	  Sørensen,	  ‘Sovereignty:	  Change	  
and	  Continuity	  in	  a	  Fundamental	  Institution’	  (1999)	  47(3)	  Political	  Studies	  590	  
62	  Wimbledon	  Case	  (1923),	  PCIJ,	  Ser.	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  25	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  Edition,	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  122	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  Meaning	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(2008)	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  Chi.	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  L.	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  Stephen	  Krasner,	  ‘Compromising	  Westphalia’	  (1995-­‐1996)	  International	  Security	  20,	  115	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  Supra	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  60	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  pg.	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  Ian	  Brownlie,	  Principles	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  Public	  International	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  Edition,	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is	  a	  requirement	  of	  Statehood	  that	  gives	  an	  area	  sovereignty68	  rather	  than	  being	  a	  
result	  and	  use	  of	  sovereign	  power.	  
Simpson	   takes	   an	   alternative	   different	   approach	   to	   Brownlie	   in	   his	   attempts	   to	  
define	  the	  term.	  He	  begins	  by	  describing	  all	  definitions	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  'shallow	  
and	  ahistorical'69	  due	  to	  its	  'ceaseless	  modification	  and	  re-­‐negotiation	  in	  the	  face	  
of	  material	  forces	  in	  world	  politics	  (e.g.	  war),	  institution	  building,	  inter-­‐disciplinary	  
struggle	  and	  theoretical	  contestation'.70	  Whilst	  this	  point	  is	  useful	  to	  demonstrate	  
the	  development	  that	  sovereignty	  has	  undergone,	  the	  term	  sovereignty	  is	  used	  to	  
describe	  the	  powers	  that	  a	  State	  has,	  not	  what	  they	  previously	  had.	  Although	  the	  
powers	  a	  State	  has	  might	  be	  constantly	  in	  flux,	  and	  therefore	  the	  term	  constantly	  
changing,	  at	  any	  one	  time	  there	  is	  a	  set	  amount	  of	  powers	  given	  to	  a	  State	  and	  so	  
at	  any	  one	  time,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  a	  correct	  definition	  of	  sovereignty	  can	  exist.	  
Although	  the	  principle	  of	   ‘absolute	  sovereignty’71	  has	   fallen	  out	  of	   favour	  by	  the	  
international	  community,	  Simpson	  argues	  that	  it	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  theory	  
of	   ‘relative	   sovereignty’,	   with	   ‘absolute	   sovereignty’	   no	   longer	   being	   desired	   by	  
States	  or	  even	  possible.72	  Relative	  sovereignty	  is	  a	  theory	  that	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  
States	  is	  subordinate	  to	  international	  law	  but	  equal	  with	  all	  other	  States.73	  Whilst	  
‘absolute	  sovereignty’	  has	   indeed	  fallen	  out	  of	   favour,	  as	  States	  acknowledge	  an	  
international	   legal	  community	  and	  act	  as	   if	   they	  are	  bound	  by	   international	   law,	  
the	   theory	   of	   ‘relative	   sovereignty’	   that	   Simpson	   advocates	   is	   not	   the	   correct	  
theory	  to	  replace	   it.	  Even	  though	  all	  States	  are	   legally	  equal,	   international	   law	   is	  
not	   on	   a	   level	   above	   these	   States.	   Except	   potentially	   in	   limited	   circumstances,74	  
States	  must	  give	  consent	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  international	   law	  and	  it	   is	  the	  ability	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	   Christian	   Hillgruber	   ‘The	   Admission	   of	   New	   States	   to	   the	   International	   Community’	  
(1998)	  9	  EJIL	  491,	  493	  
69	   Gerry	   Simpson,	   Great	   Powers	   and	   Outlaw	   States:	   Unequal	   Sovereigns	   in	   the	  
International	  Legal	  Order	  (CUP	  2004)	  pg.	  11	  
70	  Ibid.	  
71	  The	  principle	  that	  States	  are	  bound	  by	  neither	  international	  law	  nor	  any	  conception	  of	  
an	  international	  legal	  community	  –	  Ibid.	  pg.	  40	  
72	   Gerry	   Simpson,	   ‘The	   Diffusion	   of	   Sovereignty:	   Self-­‐Determination	   in	   the	   Postcolonial	  
Age’	  (1996)	  32	  Stan.	  J.	  Int’l	  L.	  255,	  263	  
73	  Supra	  Note.	  69	  pg.	  41	  
74	   Jus	   cogens	   and	  a	  new	  State	  being	  bound	  by	  all	   existing	   customary	   law.	  Both	  of	   these	  
circumstances	  can,	  however,	  potentially	  be	  traced	  to	  consent.	  Jus	  cogens	  are	  traditionally	  
seen	  as	  a	  natural	   law	  concept	  as	   they	  presuppose	   that	   there	  are	  natural	   standards	   that	  
override	  the	  consent	  of	  States.	  Yet	  for	  a	  jus	  cogen	  to	  exist,	  it	  must	  have	  acceptance	  by	  the	  
international	   community	   as	   a	  whole	   (Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	  of	   Treaties,	   Article	  
53),	  therefore,	  requiring	  their	  consent.	  The	  binding	  of	  a	  new	  State	  to	  all	  previous	  existing	  
customary	  law	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  term	  of	  consenting	  to	  join	  the	  international	  community.	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States	  to	  give,	  withhold	  or	  withdraw	  this	  consent	  that	  prevents	  international	  law	  
being	  placed	  above	  all	  States.	  
Koskenniemi,	  although	  agreeing	  with	  Simpson	  that	  seeking	  a	  fixed	  meaning	  of	  the	  
term	   sovereignty	   is	   futile,75	   instead	   of	   seeking	   to	   define	   sovereignty	   by	   the	  
relationship	  between	  States	  and	  international	  law,	  he	  seeks	  to	  examine	  the	  ways	  
that	   sovereignty	  has	   previously	  been	  considered	  and	  highlight	   the	  way	   in	  which	  
he	  believes	  it	  should	  be	  considered.	  	  
1. Legal	  Approach	  –	  Sovereignty	  is	  only	  a	  description	  of	  the	  rights,	   liberties	  
and	   competences	   that	   are	   attributed	   to	   each	   State.	   Each	   of	   these	  
individual	  benefits	  must	  be	  grounded	  in	  a	  distinct	  legislative	  source.76	  
2. Pure	   Fact	   Approach	   –	   State	   sovereignty	   is	   the	   starting	   point	   of	  
international	  law	  and	  can	  only	  be	  restricted	  by	  a	  law	  that	  is	  enacted	  in	  the	  
correct	  procedure.77	  This	  was	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  Permanent	  Court	  
of	  International	  Justice	  in	  the	  Lotus	  case.78	  
3. Constructivism	   –	   Sovereignty	   involves	   a	   balancing	   of	   contradictory	  
principles	   and	   it	   is	   only	   through	   this	   balancing	   that	   a	   State’s	   obligations	  
and	   rights	   can	   be	   defined.79	   This	   is	   the	   approach	   that	   Koskenniemi	  
advocates	  should	  be	  used	  to	  define	  sovereignty	  and	  believes	  that	  it	  is	  the	  
only	  approach	  to	  use	  as	  it	  can	  solve	  issues	  of	  conflict	  between	  two	  validly	  
created	  restrictions.	  
	  
Koskenniemi	  asserts	  that	  the	  modern	  discourse	  on	  sovereignty	  shifts	  between	  the	  
legal	   and	  pure	   fact	   approaches	  but	   argues	   that	  neither	   can	  adequately	  describe	  
the	   ‘real’	   situation.80	   Perhaps	   it	   is	   not	   then	   possible	   to	   describe	   all	   that	  
sovereignty	  entails	  by	  one	  distinct	  definition.	  
Finally,	   Krasner	   splits	   sovereignty	   into	   distinct	   different	   areas	   and	   it	   is	   this	  
recognition	  that	  sovereignty	  cannot	  be	  easily	  defined	  by	  a	  single	  all-­‐encompassing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	   Martti	   Koskenniemi,	   From	   Apology	   to	   Utopia:	   The	   Structure	   of	   International	   Legal	  
Argument	  (CUP	  2005)	  pg.	  242	  
76	  Ibid.	  pg.	  246	  
77	  Ibid.	  pg.	  255	  
78	  Lotus	  Case	  (France	  v	  Turkey)	  [1927]	  PCIJ	  (ser	  A)	  No	  10.	  
79	  Supra	  Note.	  75	  pg.	  258	  
80	  Ibid.	  pg.	  225	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definition	   that	   sets	   his	   work	   apart	   and	   above	   others.	   Instead	   of	   one	   grand	  
definition,	  Krasner	  splits	  sovereignty	  down	  into	  four	  constituent	  parts.	  
	  
International	   Legal	   Sovereignty:	   An	   area	   of	   State	   power	   involved	   in	   the	  
recognition	  of	  other	  States	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  enter	  international	  agreements.81	  
Westphalian	  Sovereignty:	  State	  control	  associated	  with	  the	  political	  organisation	  
of	   the	   State	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   State	   to	   exclude	   external	   actors	   from	   the	  
authority	  structures	  within	  the	  State’s	  territory.82	  
Domestic	  Sovereignty:	  This	   involves	   the	  State	  being	  able	   to	  organise	   its	  political	  
structure	   in	   whatever	   way	   it	   sees	   fit	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   this	   public	   structure	   to	  
exercise	  effective	  control	  within	  the	  State.83	  
Interdependence	   Sovereignty:	   This	   area	   concerns	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   State	   to	  
regulate	  the	  flow	  of	  information,	  ideas,	  goods,	  people,	  pollutants	  or	  capital	  across	  
the	  borders	  of	  the	  State’s	  territory.84	  
Unfortunately	  the	  distinctions	  are	  not	  as	  clear	  as	  Krasner	  would	  have	  us	  believe.	  
Whilst	   he	   acknowledges	   there	   is	   some	   overlap,85	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   his	   definitions	  
that	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  considerable	  overlap	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  sovereignty.	  International	  
legal	   sovereignty	   is	   dependent	   upon	   domestic	   sovereignty;86	   Westphalian	  
sovereignty	  can	  override	  interdependence	  sovereignty	  through	  consent;	  with	  the	  
ability	  to	  give	  consent	  coming	  from	  international	  legal	  sovereignty.	  	  
Whilst	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   show	   the	   distinct	   parts	   of	   sovereignty	   so	   that	  we	   can	   see	  
exactly	   what	   powers	   are	   attributed	   to	   States,	   it	   is	   crucial	   that	   sovereignty	   is	  
viewed	  as	   an	   all-­‐encompassing	   concept	   that	   cannot	   easily	   be	  broken	  down	   into	  
distinct	  parts.	  Whilst	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  Bank's	  actions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  member	  States	  
will	   primarily	   focus	   upon	  what	   Krasner	   defines	   as	  Westphalian	   sovereignty,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Stephen	  Krasner,	  Sovereignty	  Organized	  Hypocrisy	  (Princeton	  University	  Press	  1999)	  pg.	  
3	  
82	  Ibid.	  pg.	  3-­‐4	  
83	  Ibid.	  pg.	  4	  
84	  Ibid.	  pg.	  4	  
85	  Ibid.	  pg.	  4-­‐5	  
86	   The	   ability	   to	   exercise	   effective	   control	   over	   a	   territory	   is	   a	   criterion	   of	   Statehood	   –	  
Supra	  Note.	  67,	  pg.	  493	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effect	  of	  any	  potential	  breach	  of	  this	  sovereignty	  is	  felt	  across	  all	  of	  the	  four	  areas	  
that	  Krasner	  distinguishes.	  
1.4.2	  Consent	  
In	  line	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  sovereignty	  moves	  the	  principle	  of	  consent.	  If	  State’s	  are	  
sovereign	  and	  maintain	  control	  to	  legislate	  for	  the	  population,	  a	  State	  cannot	  be	  
bound	   unless	   it	   has	   agreed	   to	   be	   bound.	   Consent	   is	   central	   to	   the	   modern	  
understanding	   of	   international	   law.87	   From	   the	   sources	   of	   international	   law,88	  
consent	   may	   be	   given	   expressly	   in	   a	   treaty,89	   or	   it	   may	   be	   implied	   by	   a	   State	  
acquiescing	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  customary	  law.90	  
Consent	   has	   classically	   been	   seen	   as	   central	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	   If	  
international	   law	   has	   no	   coercive	   force,	   then	   States’	   consent	   and	   acceptance	  
ensures	   that	   States	   generally	   comply	   with	   the	   law.91	   Consent	   allows	   for	   the	  
protection	  of	  individual	  States	  and	  reinforces	  sovereign	  equality	  by	  providing	  that	  
no	  State	  can	  be	  forced	  to	  comply	  with	  a	   law	  that	  has	  withheld	   its	  consent	  from.	  
Yet	   in	   addition	   and	   importantly,	   international	   law	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   obtain	   its	  
legitimacy	   from	   the	   consent	   of	   States	   as	   States	   represent	   their	   individual	  
populations	  in	  international	  law.92	  
Within	   this	   traditional	   positivist	   paradigm,	   a	   ‘law’	   that	   is	   created	   without	   the	  
consent	  of	  the	  sovereign	  is	  not	  a	  law	  and	  any	  action	  that	  goes	  beyond	  what	  States	  
have	  consented	  to,	  is	  outside	  of	  the	  law.	  
1.4.3	  Sovereign	  Equality	  
International	   law	   under	   this	   19th	   century	   positive	   theory	   approach	   and	   as	  
advocated	  by	  Vattel	   is	   that	   law	   is	   the	  will	  of	   sovereign	  States.	  Law	   is	  created	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Anthony	  Aust,	  Handbook	  of	   International	  Law	   (CUP	  2005)	  pg.	  4.	  See	  Andrew	  Guzman,	  
‘Against	  Consent’	  (2012)	  52(4)	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  747,	  748	  for	  a	  detailed	  
examination	   in	  academic	   literature	  of	   the	  general	  acceptance	  of	   consent	  as	   the	  basis	  of	  
international	  law.	  
88	  These	  are	  examined	  in	  1.5	  The	  Creation	  of	  Rules	  
89	  José	  Cabranes,	   ‘International	  Law	  by	  Consent	  of	  the	  Governed’	  (2007)	  42	  (1)	  Valpariso	  
University	  Law	  Review	  119,	  131	  
90	   Ibid.	  132	  and	  J	  Brierly,	  The	  Law	  of	  Nations:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  International	  Law	  of	  
Peace,	  Humphrey	  Waldock	  (ed)	  (Sixth	  Edition,	  OUP	  1978)	  pg.	  51	  
91	  Supra	  Note.	  87	  (Guzman)	  pg.	  752	  
92	  Matthew	   Lister,	   ‘The	   Legitimating	  Role	   of	   Consent	   in	   International	   Law’	   (2010)	   11	   (2)	  
Chicago	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  663,	  669.	  For	  alternative	  views	  on	  the	  requirement	  of	  
consent	   for	   legitimacy	   see;	   Allen	   Buchanan,	   Justice,	   Legitimacy	   and	   Self-­‐Determination:	  
Moral	   Foundations	   for	   International	   Law	   (OUP	   2004)	   243-­‐52	   and	   Jack	   Goldsmith	  &	   Eric	  
Posner,	  The	  Limits	  of	  International	  Law	  (OUP	  2005)	  189-­‐93	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State	  consent	  either	  expressly,	  in	  a	  treaty,	  or	  tacitly,	  in	  custom	  international	  law.	  
This	   approach	   rejected	   the	   traditional	   natural	   theory	   of	   international	   law	  
advocated	  by	  Grotius	  with	  its	  top-­‐down	  approach	  of	  law	  existing	  above	  the	  State	  
and	   instead	   replaced	   it	  with	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  as	   law	  being	   created	  by	   the	  
States	   themselves	   between	   States.	   This	  moved	   the	   sovereign	   equality	   of	   States	  
central	  to	  the	  theory	  as	  it	  was	  only	  through	  a	  States	  sovereign	  nature	  were	  they	  
able	   to	   contribute	   to	   law	   creation	   and	   only	   through	   their	   consent	   were	   they	  
bound.	  
Despite	  the	  obvious	  inequalities	  and	  differences	  between	  States	  in	  terms	  of	  size,	  
population,	   financial	   and	   military	   might,	   the	   doctrine	   of	   sovereign	   equality	  
ensures	   that	   in	   public	   international	   law	   all	   States	   are	   equal.	   This	   encompasses	  
both	  a	  protection	  under	  the	  law,	  that	  all	  States	  are	  equally	  entitled	  to	  enjoy	  their	  
rights	   and	   an	   obligation	   under	   the	   law,	   and	   that	   all	   States	   are	   required	   to	   fulfil	  
their	  obligations	   to	  other	   States.	   It	   has	  been	   said	   that	   “(n)o	  principle	  of	   general	  
law	  is	  more	  universally	  acknowledged	  than	  the	  perfect	  equality	  of	  nations”93	  and	  
that	   the	   principle	   “has	   never	   been	   expressly	   doubted	   or	   denied…	   in	   any	   formal	  
judicial	  utterance	  in	  a	  national	  court”.94	  
Yet	  more	   than	   being	   a	   basis	   for	   international	   law	   and	   justice,95	   the	   principle	   of	  
equality	  between	  States	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  positivist	  theory	  that	  law	  can	  only	  be	  
created	   by	   sovereign	  will.	   If	   all	   States	   are	   not	   equal,	   law	   could	   be	   created	   by	   a	  
more	  powerful	  State	  and	  applied	  against	  a	   less	  powerful	  State	   thereby	  rejecting	  
the	   sovereign	  paradigm.	   The	   equality	   of	   States	   highlights	   the	  pluralist	   nature	  of	  
the	   positivist	   school	   of	   thought.	   International	   law	  was	   separate	   to	   national	   law	  
and,	  at	  least	  originally	  with	  absolute	  sovereignty,	  there	  was	  a	  principle	  of	  absolute	  
non-­‐intervention	   in	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  another	  State.	  Although	  international	  
law	  regulated	  conduct	  between	  States,	   it	  was	  distinct	   from	  the	   legal	  affairs	  of	  a	  
State	  and	  in	  turn,	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  a	  State	  could	  not	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  the	  
non-­‐performance	  of	  an	  international	  obligation.96	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	   Chief	   Justice	   Marshall,	   Antelope	   (1825)	   quoted	   in	   Arnold	   McNair,	   ‘Equality	   in	  
International	  Law’	  (1928-­‐29)	  26	  Michigan	  Law	  Review	  136	  
94	  Edwin	  Dickinson,	  The	  Equality	  of	  States	  in	  International	  Law	  (CUP	  1920)	  pg.	  161	  
95	   Norwegian	   Shipowners’	   Claims	   case	   (1922),	   Permanent	   Court	   of	   Arbitration,	   United	  
Nations	  Reports	  of	  International	  Arbitral	  Awards,	  Vol.	  I,	  pg.	  338	  
96	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  (adopted	  23	  May	  1969,	  entered	  into	  force	  27	  
January	  1980)	  1155	  UNTS	  331,	  Article	  27	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1.5	  The	  Creation	  of	  Rules	  
Sources	  are	  central	  to	  positivism.	  If	  law	  is	  the	  will	  of	  States	  and	  States	  can	  only	  be	  
bound	  by	  what	  they	  have	  consented	  too,	  then	   it	   is	  evident	  that	  only	  through	  an	  
expression	  of	  will	  can	  a	  law	  be	  created.	  All	  sources	  of	  law	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  able	  
to	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  consent	  of	  States	  to	  be	  bound.	  Article	  38	  of	  the	  International	  
Court	  of	  Justice	  is	  traditionally	  seen	  as	  the	  modern	  embodiment	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  
international	   law.97	   Of	   course,	   the	   various	   sources	   existed	   before	   this	   date	   yet	  
Article	  38	  codified	  State	  thought	  on	  the	  subject.98	  
1.	   The	   Court,	   whose	   function	   is	   to	   decide	   in	   accordance	  with	  
international	   law	   such	   disputes	   as	   are	   submitted	   to	   it,	   shall	  
apply:	  
a.	   international	   conventions,	   whether	   general	   or	   particular,	  
establishing	  rules	  expressly	  recognized	  by	  the	  contesting	  states;	  
b.	   international	   custom,	   as	   evidence	   of	   a	   general	   practice	  
accepted	  as	  law;	  
c.	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  recognized	  by	  civilized	  nations;	  
d.	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  59,	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  
the	   teachings	   of	   the	   most	   highly	   qualified	   publicists	   of	   the	  
various	   nations,	   as	   subsidiary	  means	   for	   the	   determination	   of	  
rules	  of	  law.	  
Article	  38	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  positivism	  that	   law	  must	  emanate	  from	  
States.	  The	  only	  law	  under	  Article	  38	  without	  a	  readily	  identified	  form	  of	  consent	  
from	  States	  are	  the	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  teachings	  under	  (d)	  that	  can	  be	  argued	  
to	   be	   implied	   consent	   by	   being	  based	  upon	   laws	   that	   States	   have	   consented	   to	  
and	  State	  practice.99	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  Supra	  Note.	  67	  pg.	  5	  
98	   For	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   creation	   of	   Article	   38	   see,	   Andreas	   Zimmerman,	   Christian	  
Tomuschat	  &	  Karin	  Oellers-­‐Frahm	  (eds.),	  The	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice:	  
A	  Commentary	  (OUP	  2006)	  pg.	  689-­‐690	  
99	   International	   conventions	   (treaties)	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   consented	   to	   by	   a	   State’s	  
signature,	  exchange	  of	   instruments,	  ratification,	  acceptance,	  approval	  or	  accession;	  VCLT	  
Article	  11	  &	  Anthony	  Aust,	  Modern	  Treaty	  Law	  and	  Practice	   (Second	  Edition,	  CUP	  2007)	  
Chapter	   7.	   International	   custom	   (customary	   international	   law)	   and	   general	   principles	   of	  
international	  law	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  consented	  to	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  practice,	  opinio	  juris,	  
acquiescence	   or,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   general	   principles,	   by	   “being	   recognized	   by	   civilized	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1.6	  Evolution	  
This	   classic	   positivism	   approach	   survived	   largely	   unscathed	   through	   to	   the	   20th	  
century	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Lotus	  case	  providing	  that:	  
International	   law	   governs	   relations	   between	   independent	  
States.	  The	  rules	  of	  law	  binding	  upon	  States	  therefore	  emanate	  
from	   their	   own	   free	   will	   as	   expressed	   in	   conventions	   or	   by	  
usages	   generally	   accepted	   as	   expressing	   principles	   of	   law	   and	  
established	  in	  order	  to	  regulate	  the	  relations	  between	  these	  co-­‐
existing	   independent	   communities	   or	   with	   a	   view	   to	   the	  
achievement	   of	   common	   aims.	   Restrictions	   upon	   the	  
independence	  of	  States	  cannot	  therefore	  be	  presumed.100	  
However,	  in	  the	  years	  following	  World	  War	  II,	  classic	  positivism	  came	  under	  attack	  
and	   demanded	   a	   more	   nuanced	   understanding.	   Although	   the	   UN	   Charter	  
reaffirmed	   the	   sovereign	   equality	   of	   all	   States101	   and	   the	   principle	   of	   non-­‐
intervention,102	   the	   creation	   of	   international	   bodies	   by	   States	   challenged	   the	  
concept	  of	   sovereignty	   as	   an	   absolute	   control	   over	   a	  population103	   as	   no	   longer	  
could	  a	  State	  claim	  exclusive	  jurisdiction	  in	  all	  aspects	  over	  its	  territory.104	  
Human	  rights	  developed	  and	  came	  to	  the	  fore	  of	  international	  law	  that	  prevented	  
States	   legislating	   or	   acting	   on	   any	   subject	   or	   restricting	   any	   right	   that	   they	  
wished.105	  The	  sovereignty	  of	  a	  State	  was	  no	   longer	  completely	   inviolable	  under	  
the	   law	  and	   rather	   than	   sovereignty	  being	   seen	  as	   invested	   in	   a	   sovereign,	  or	   a	  
supreme	   ruler,	   it	   is	   invested	   in	   the	   people	   of	   a	   State	   creating	   a	   people’s	  
sovereignty.106	   Humanitarian	   law	   developed	   and	   still	   develops	   to	   this	   day,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nations”;	  Michael	   Byers,	  Custom,	  Power	   and	   the	  Power	   of	   Rules:	   International	   Relations	  
and	  Customary	  International	  Law	  (CUP	  1999)	  pg.	  3	  
100	  Supra	  Note.	  78,	  Para.	  44	  
101	  Article	  2,	  Section	  1	  
102	  Article	  2,	  Section	  7	  
103	   Jenik	   Radon,	   ‘Sovereignty:	   A	   Political	   Emotion,	  Not	   a	   Concept’	   (2004)	   40(2)	   Stanford	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  195,	  200	  
104	  Chapter	  VII	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter	   is	  the	  most	  commonly	  cited	   limitation	  as	   it	  
restricted	  the	  ability	  of	  States	  to	  use	  force.	  
105	  Jus	  cogens	  could	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  develop	  along	  this	  argument	  to	  a	  greater	  degree.	  
106	  Kofi	  Annan,	   ‘Two	  Concepts	  of	  Sovereignty’,	  The	  Economist	  352	   (September	  18,	  1999)	  
pg.	  49	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challenging	   the	   positivist	   theory	   by	   allowing	   for	   the	   intervention	   in	   the	   internal	  
affairs	   of	   another	   State	   in	   limited	   circumstances.	   Humanitarian	   intervention,	  
including	  the	  emerging	  norm	  of	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect,107	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  at	  
contrast	   with	   the	   consent	   of	   sovereignty	   outlined	   in	   the	   positivist	   paradigm	   by	  
allowing	   the	   interference	  within	   the	   territory	   of	   a	   sovereign	   State	  without	   that	  
State’s	  express	  consent.108	  
Consent	  also	  came	  under	  challenge	  as	  if	  positivism	  sought	  to	  find	  the	  will	  of	  States	  
by	   viewing	   State	   conduct,	   conduct	   existed	   that	   States	   were	   bound	   by	   law	   that	  
they	  had	  not	  consented	  to.	  Newly	  created	  States	  were	  and	  are	  bound	  by	  existing	  
customary	   international	   law.	   This	  was	   of	   particular	   relevance	   during	   the	   period	  
following	  the	  end	  of	   the	  World	  War	   II	  as	   the	  process	  of	  decolonization	  occurred	  
and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  new	  States	  were	  formed	  in	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  Despite	  
being	   newly	   created	   States,	   all	   existing	   customary	   international	   law,	   that	   other	  
States	  had	  an	  option	  to	  either	  be	  bound	  by	  or	  maintain	  a	  position	  of	  a	  persistent	  
objector,	  bound	  these	  newly	  created	  sovereign	  States.109	  
Jus	   cogens	   and	   obligations	   erga	   omnes	   developed	   that	   again	   challenged	   the	  
concept	   of	   consent.	   The	   contents	   of	   both	   concepts	   are	   heavily	   debated,110	   yet	  
both	  legal	  norms	  restrict	  the	  ability	  of	  States	  to	  consent	  to	  actions	  either	  intra	  or	  
extra	  territorially	  by	  ruling	  that	  some	  norms	  are	  fundamental	  principles	  accepted	  
by	  the	  international	  community	  from	  which	  no	  derogation	  is	  ever	  permitted.111	  	  
Although	   both	   of	   these	   circumstances	   could	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   a	   form	   of	  
consent,112	  academics	  also	  sought	  to	  challenge	  consent	  as	  central	  to	  international	  
law	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  global	  challenges	  faced	  were	  too	  large	  for	  any	  one	  State	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107	   See	   generally	   60/1	   2005	   World	   Summit	   Outcome	   A/RES/60/1	   Paras.	   138-­‐140	   and	  
specifically	  for	  the	  challenge	  to	  sovereignty	  see	  Carsten	  Stahn,	   ‘Responsibility	  to	  Protect:	  
Political	   Rhetoric	   or	   Emerging	   Legal	  Norm?’	   (2007)	   101	   (1)	   AJIL	   99,	   102-­‐104	  &	   112-­‐115;	  
Gareth	  Evans	  &	  Mohamed	  Sahnoun,	  ‘The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect’	  (2002)	  81	  (6)	  Foreign	  
Affairs	  99,	  110	  
108	  Although	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  consenting	  to	  create	  humanitarian	  law,	  States	  have	  
freely	  given	  up	  their	  right	  to	  consent	  in	  these	  limited	  circumstances.	  
109	  Sir	  Claud	  Waldock,	  General	  Course	  on	  Public	  International	  Law	  (Sijthoff	  1962)	  pg.	  52	  
110	  See	  Alfred	  Verdross,	   ‘Jus	  Dispositivum	  and	  Jus	  Cogens	   in	   International	  Law’	  (1966)	  60	  
AJIL	  55;	  Cherif	  Bassiouni,	   ‘International	  Crimes:	   Jus	  Cogens	  and	  Obligations	  Erga	  Omnes’	  
(1996)	   59(4)	   Law	   and	   Contemporary	   Problems	   63;	   and	   Jurisdictional	   Immunities	   of	   the	  
State	  (Germany	  v.	  Italy;	  Greece	  intervening)	  (2012)	  ICJ	  143	  Paras.	  92-­‐97	  
111	  VCLT	  Article	  53	  
112	  Supra	  Note.	  74	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opt	   out	   from	   by	  withholding	   consent.113	   The	   totality	   of	   challenges	   from	   human	  
rights	   to	   jus	   cogens	   has	   led	   to	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   positivist	   movement	   as	   an	  
analytical	   tool	   for	   understanding	  public	   international	   law	  waning	  within	   the	   last	  
century.	   Yet,	   although	   the	   tenants	   of	   positivism	   have	   been	   challenged,	  modern	  
international	  law	  remains	  largely	  best	  understood	  in	  terms	  defined	  by	  a	  positivist	  
understanding.	   Whilst	   sovereignty	   is	   no	   longer	   absolute,	   the	   concept	   of	  
sovereignty	   linked	   with	   being	   able	   to	   exclude	   actors	   from	   interfering	   in	   the	  
domestic	  affairs	  of	  a	  State	   is	   limited	  on	  strict	  grounds	  that	  States	  have	  generally	  
consented	  to.	  Human	  rights	  have	  posed	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  
exclusive	  control	  yet	  the	  notion	  of	  humanitarian	  intervention	  or	  a	  responsibility	  to	  
protect	  are	  still	  in	  their	  infancy.	  	  
Positivism	  as	  a	  tool	  of	   legal	  understanding	  survived	  these	  attacks	  as	   it	   is	  still	   the	  
best	   tool	   to	   generally	   describe	   the	   system	   of	   law	   creation	   within	   public	  
international	   law.	   There	   exist	   other	   schools	   of	   thought	   that	   have	   developed	   to	  
counter	   the	   positivist	   thought114	   yet	   despite	   the	   challenges	   to	   positivism,	  
international	   law	   is	   still,	   at	   least	   largely,	   based	   upon	   notions	   of	   sovereignty,	  
consent	   and	   equality	   and	   positivism	   remains	   the	   dominant	   legal	   theory.115	   In	  
specific	  circumstances,	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  relationships,	  positivism	  does	  not	  
provide	  acceptable	  answers	  to	  how	  States	  (and	  now	  individuals,	  organisations	  and	  
companies)	   are	   behaving	   in	   terms	   of	   law	   and	   so	   appropriate	   theories	   have	  
developed	   and	   have	   been	   used.	   Yet	   States	   are	   still	   predominately	   the	   actors	   of	  
international	  law	  in	  law	  creation	  and	  whether	  sovereignty	  is	  vested	  in	  a	  supreme	  
ruler	   or	   the	   people,	   it	   is	   States	   in	   their	   sovereign	   equality	   that	   primarily	   create	  
public	  international	  law.	  International	  organisations	  can	  create	  law	  on	  the	  limited	  
mandates	   transferred	   to	   them	   by	   States,	   and	   whilst	   individuals	   and	   companies	  
have	  become	  subjects	  of	   international	   law,	  the	  creation	  of	   law	  is	  still	  dominated	  
by	  States.116	  
The	   modern	   day	   positivism	   theory,	   although	   more	   nuanced	   to	   allow	   limited	  
circumstances	  for	  restriction	  of	  certain	  areas	  of	  law	  creation,	  is	  still	  largely	  similar	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  See	  for	  example	  Jonathan	  Charney,	  ‘Universal	  International	  Law’	  (1993)	  87(4)	  AJIL	  529	  
114	  See	  Chapter	  Two.	  
115	   Shirley	   Scott,	   ‘International	   Law	   as	   Ideology:	   Theorizing	   the	   Relationship	   between	  
International	  Law	  and	  International	  Politics’	  (1994)	  5	  EJIL	  313,	  322.	  Also	  see	  the	  decisions	  
of	  the	  ICJ;	  Asylum	  Case	   (1950),	   ICJ	  Rep.,	  pg.	  266;	  Anglo-­‐Norwegian	  Fisheries	  case	   (1951),	  
ICJ	  Rep.,	  pg.	  116;	  &	  US	  Nationals	  in	  Morocco	  case	  (1952),	  ICJ	  Rep.,	  pg.	  176	  
116	  Antonio	  Cassese,	  International	  Law	  (Second	  Edition,	  OUP	  2005)	  pg.	  71-­‐72	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to	   the	  19th	  century	   theory	  although	  not	  as	  strict	  on	   its	  definition	  of	   sovereignty.	  
State	   consent	   and	   sovereign	   equality	   of	   States117	   are	   still	   central	   concepts	   and	  
whilst	  States	  do	  not	  retain	  an	  exclusive	  right	  to	  law	  creation	  or	  an	  exclusive	  right	  
to	  behave	   in	  any	  manner	   in	   its	  own	   territory,	   States	  dominate	   law	  creation	  and	  
only	   international	   organisations	   within	   their	   mandates	   given	   by	   States	   are	   also	  
able	  to	  contribute.	  
	  
1.7	   The	   Application	   of	   Positive	   Theory	   to	   International	  
Organisations	  
The	  work	  so	  far	  has	  concentrated	  on	  the	  application	  of	  legal	  theory	  to	  the	  conduct	  
of	  States.	  However,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  an	  appropriate	  legal	  
theory	   would	   need	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   conduct	   of	   States	   in	   creating	   the	  
organisation,	  and	  consider	  and	  explain	  the	  actual	  work	  of	  the	  organisation.	  Once	  
States	   create	   an	   organisation,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   considered	   how	   that	   respective	  
organisation’s	   actions	   are	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   law.	   This	   is	   critical	   for	   an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  actions	  that	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  taken	  since	  its	  inception.	  
International	  organisations	  have	  acquired	  competence	  to	  regulate	  in	  matters	  that	  
were	   traditionally	   seen	   as	  within	   the	  domestic	   domain	  of	   States.118	   Rather	   than	  
being	  seen	  as	  an	  actual	  reduction	  on	  sovereignty,	  in	  terms	  of	  law,	  membership	  of	  
organisations	  is	  seen	  as	  “delegation”	  or	  “transfer”	  of	  powers	  depending	  upon	  the	  
degree	   to	   which	   members	   have	   given	   away	   their	   powers.119	   Yet	   sovereignty	   is	  
legally	   seen	   to	   remain	  with	   the	  State	  as,	   in	   terms	  of	   law,	  States	  expressed	   their	  
will	   in	   joining	   the	   organisation	   to	   be	   bound	   by	   such	   terms	   within	   that	   specific	  
competence.120	  This	  is	  despite	  organisations	  adopting	  majority	  voting	  or	  weighted	  
voting	  as	  States	  express	  their	  consent	  to	  join	  under	  those	  terms.	  Martinez	  in	  her	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Article	  2	  (1)	  United	  Nations	  Charter	  (1945)	  
118	   For	   example,	   the	   United	   Nations	   Security	   Council	   regulates	   the	   use	   of	   force	   in	  
international	   law,	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   regulates	   the	   use	   of	   exchange	  
arrangements	  and	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  regulates	  import	  tariffs	  and	  other	  trade	  
barriers.	  
119	  Dan	  Sarooshi,	  International	  Organizations	  and	  their	  Exercise	  of	  Sovereign	  Powers	  (OUP	  
2005)	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  
120	  Ian	  Brownlie,	  Principles	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  (Sixth	  Edition,	  OUP	  2003)	  pg.	  290	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work	   on	   the	   limits	   that	   national	   constitutions	   put	   on	   transfer	   of	   sovereignty,	  
established	  three	  implicit	  requirements	  in	  the	  transfer.121	  
Firstly,	   organisations	   can	   exercise	   certain	   powers	   but	   ownership	   remains	   with	  
States.122	  Secondly,	   there	  are	   limits	  to	  how	  much	  power	  can	  be	  transferred	  by	  a	  
State.	   ‘Constitutions	   prohibit	   the	   transfer	   of	   the	   totality	   of	   the	   state’s	   powers	  
which,	   although	   vested	   in	   Parliaments	   and	   other	   internal	   institutions,	   emanate	  
directly	  from	  the	  people’.123	  Organisations	  can,	  therefore,	  never	  replace	  a	  State124	  
and	   must	   act	   within	   the	   limited	   competence	   transferred	   to	   them.	   Thirdly	   and	  
finally,	   there	   are	   temporal	   limits	   to	   the	   transfer	   in	   that	   a	   State	   can	   always	  
withdraw	   from	   an	   organization	   either	   under	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   treaty	   or	  
unilaterally.125	   Although	   a	   State	   might	   incur	   international	   responsibility	   for	  
unilateral	   withdrawal,	   it	   is	   conceptually	   and	   legally	   impossible	   to	   keep	   a	   State	  
within	  an	  organisation	  against	  its	  will.126	  	  
These	   three	   national	   constitutional	   requirements	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   transfer	  
or	  delegation	  of	  powers	  to	  an	  organisation	  is	  always	  legally	  at	  the	  continuing	  will	  
of	   the	   State	   and	   that	   if	   the	  will	   of	   a	   State	   changes	   it	   can	   reassert	   its	   powers	   to	  
regulate	  upon	  the	  transfer	  or	  delegated	  powers.	  In	  addition,	  and	  in	  keeping	  with	  
the	  positivist	  school	  of	  thought,	  an	  international	  organisation	  can	  only	  act	  within	  
the	   boundaries	   that	   the	   sovereigns	   creating	   it	   set	   out.	   This	   is	   as	   under	   the	  
positivist	   paradigm	   a	   law	   is	   only	   if	   a	   sovereign	   has	   consented	   to	   it,	   and	   if	   an	  
organisation	  acts	  outside	  its	  mandate,	  it	  is	  acting	  outside	  of	  the	  sovereign	  will	  and	  
therefore	  encroaching	  upon	  the	  member	  States’	  national	  sovereignty.	  
The	   legal	   boundaries	   that	   define	   an	   organisations	  mandate	   are	   primarily	   found	  
within	   the	   treaty	   establishing	   the	   organisation.	   The	   treaty	   is	  what	   confers	   legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121Magdelena	  Martinez,	  National	   Sovereignty	   and	   International	   Organizations	   (Martinus	  
Nijhoff	  Publishers	  1996)	  
122	  Ibid.	  pg.	  68	  
123	  Ibid.	  pg.	  68-­‐69	  
124	   Martinez	   notes	   the	   Reparation	   for	   Injuries	   case,	   Infra	   Note	   127,	   pg.	   178	   which,	  
although	  affirming	  the	  international	  personality	  of	  an	  international	  organisation,	  limits	  its	  
personality	  by	  confirming	  that	  an	  organisation	  ‘is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as…	  a	  State,	  which	  it	  
is	  certainly	  not,	  or	  that	  its	  legal	  personality	  and	  rights	  and	  duties	  are	  the	  same	  as	  those	  of	  
a	  State.’	  Ibid.	  
125	  Ibid.	  pg.	  69	  
126	  Nathan	  Feinberg,	  ‘Unilateral	  Withdrawal	  from	  an	  International	  Organization’	  (1963)	  39	  
Brit.	  Y.B.	  Int’l	  L.	  189	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personality	  upon	  the	  organisation	  and	  what	  defines	   the	  said	  personality.127	   If	  an	  
organisation	   was	   to	   act	   outside	   of	   its	   terms	   under	   its	   founding	   treaty,	   the	  
organisation	  would	  be	  acting	  contrary	  to	  the	  will	  expressed	  by	  its	  member	  States	  
which	  would	   in	   turn	   infringe	  upon	   their	   sovereignty	  under	   the	  positivist	   theory.	  
Sovereign	  equality	  would	  also,	  therefore,	  be	  questioned	  if	  the	  organisation	  acting	  
outside	  of	  its	  mandate	  and	  treated	  some	  member	  States	  in	  a	  different	  fashion	  to	  
others.	  The	  theory	  would,	  therefore,	  suggest	  that	  States	  would	  rigorously	  seek	  to	  
prevent	  organisations	  acting	  outside	  of	  their	  mandate	  to	  protect	  their	  sovereignty	  
and	   their	   sovereign	   equality.	   Recent	   statements	   in	   relation	   to	   sovereignty	  
demonstrate	   that	   protection	   of	   sovereignty	   is	   of	   fundamental	   importance	   to	  
States.128	   If	   a	   State	   was	   unable	   to	   prevent	   an	   organisation	   breaching	   its	  
sovereignty,	   via	   being	   outvoted	   in	   either	   majority	   or	   weighted	   voting,	   States	  
would	  be	  free	  to	  avail	  themselves	  of	  either	  a	  negotiated	  exit	  under	  the	  treaty	  or	  a	  
unilateral	  withdrawal	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  its	  sovereignty.	  
The	   positivist	   theory	   of	   public	   international	   law,	   therefore,	   requires	   that	   the	  
actions	  of	  organisations	  stay	  within	  their	  mandates.	  If	  sovereign	  States	  can	  act	  in	  
any	  way	  that	   they	  wish	  as	   long	  as	   they	  do	  not	  contravene	  an	  explicit	   law,129	   the	  
opposite	   is	   true	   for	   international	   organisations	   in	   that	   they	   can	   only	   act	   in	   a	  
manner	  grounded	  within	  the	   law	  creating	  them.	  This	  consequently	  moves	  treaty	  
interpretation	   to	   a	   central	   concept	   within	   the	   positivist	   school	   in	   regard	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127	  Reparation	  for	  Injuries	  case,	  ICJ	  Reports	  (1949),	  pg.	  178-­‐9	  
128	   In	  relation	  to	  Gibraltar,	  “As	   I	  have	  said	  before,	  we	  will	  never	  agree	  to	  any	  transfer	  of	  
sovereignty	   –	   or	   even	   start	   a	   process	   of	   negotiation	   of	   sovereignty	   –	   without	   your	  
consent”	   British	   Prime	   Minister	   David	   Cameron	   10	   September	   2013,	   available	   at	  
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/gibraltar-­‐national-­‐day-­‐message-­‐from-­‐the-­‐prime-­‐
minister	   accessed	   September	   2013.	   In	   relation	   to	   Mali,	   ‘The	   members	   of	   the	   Security	  
Council	   shared	  the	  concerns	  raised	  by	  representatives	  of	  ECOWAS	  regarding	  the	  current	  
challenges	   for	   the	   restoration	   of	   full	   constitutional	   order	   in	  Mali	   and	   for	   upholding	   the	  
sovereignty,	  unity	  and	   territorial	   integrity	  of	  Mali.’	   SC/10676	  AFR/2407	  18	   June	  2012.	   In	  
relation	   to	   Pakistan,	   “We	   want	   our	   American	   friends	   to	   respect	   our	   sovereignty”.	  
Pakistan’s	  ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  Ambassador	  Rehman,	  reported	  at	  
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-­‐News-­‐13-­‐15490-­‐Pakistan-­‐asks-­‐US-­‐to-­‐respect-­‐its-­‐
sovereignty	  available	  September	  2013.	  In	  relation	  to	  China,	  “China	  will…	  never	  waver	  from	  
its	   determination	   to	   guard	   its	   national	   sovereignty”.	   Chinese	   Defense	   Minister	   Liang	  
Guanglie	  reported	  at	  
http://english.sina.com/china/2012/0530/472178.html	  available	  June	  2013.	  In	  relation	  to	  
the	  United	   States,	   “Critics	   claim	  we	  would	   surrender	  U.S.	   sovereignty	   under	   this	   treaty.	  
But,	  in	  fact,	  it	  is	  exactly	  the	  opposite.	  We	  would	  secure	  sovereign	  rights”	  Secretary	  Hillary	  
Clinton	  testimony	  before	  the	  Senate	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  23	  May	  2012,	  The	  
Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  Convention	  (Treaty	  Doc.	  103-­‐39):	  The	  U.S.	  National	  Security	  and	  Strategic	  
Imperatives	  for	  Ratification.	  Emphasis	  added	  in	  all	  quotes.	  	  
129	  Lotus	  Case	  (France	  v	  Turkey)	  [1927]	  PCIJ	  (ser	  A)	  No	  10	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international	   organisations	   as	   determining	   the	   exact	   legal	   will	   of	   the	   member	  
States	   is	   imperative	   to	   ensure	   that	   an	   organisation	   does	   not	   encroach	   upon	  
States’	  sovereignty.	  	  
In	   analysing	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  World	   Bank,	   the	   positivist	   theory	  would	   require	  
that	  its	  actions	  be	  grounded	  in	  its	  treaty.	  If	  the	  Bank	  were	  to	  take	  actions	  outside	  
of	  this	  mandate,	  outside	  of	  how	  this	  can	  be	  interpreted,	  then	  the	  positivist	  theory	  
would	   not	   be	   able	   to	   explain	   how	   the	   Bank	   was	   working.	   For	   any	   analysis	   of	  
whether	   the	   Bank	   is	   acting	   in	   or	   outside	   of	   its	   mandate,	   an	   understanding	   of	  
treaty	  interpretation	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  developed.	  
	  
1.8	  Treaty	  Interpretation	  
Under	  the	  positivist	   theory,	  consent	   is	  central	   to	   international	   relations	   in	   terms	  
of	   law.	   When	   applied	   to	   international	   organisations,	   consent	   and	   sovereignty	  
require	   that	   an	   organisation	   can	   only	   act	   within	   its	   mandate	   otherwise	   the	  
organisation	   is	  breaching	   the	  sovereignty	  of	   its	  members	  by	  acting	   in	  areas	   that	  
the	   State	   had	   intended	   stay	   within	   its	   jurisdiction.	   The	   rules	   for	   interpreting	  
treaties	   have	   developed	   over	   the	   history	   of	   international	   relations	   but	   in	   1949	  
work	  began	   to	  codify	  existing	   rules	   in	   the	  creation	  of	   the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  
the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	   (VCLT).	  The	  purpose	  of	   the	  convention	  was	  to	  cover	  treaties	  
that	   applied	   between	   States130	   either	   bilaterally	   or	  multilaterally,	   such	   as	   in	   the	  
case	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  international	  organisation.	  
There	  exists	  a	  subsequent,	  unratified,	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  
between	   States	   and	   International	   Organisations	   or	   between	   International	  
Organisations.131	  Although	   it	   largely	   reflects	   the	  VCLT,	   it	  will	  not	  be	  examined	  at	  
this	   point	   as	   the	   legal	   status	   of	   agreements	   between	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	  
individual	  members	  is	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	  VCLT	  Article	  1	  
131	  (adopted	  21	  March	  1986)	  25	  ILM	  543.	  Although	  there	  are	  41	  parties	  who	  have	  ratified	  
the	  treaty,	  only	  29	  are	  States	  and	  the	  other	  12	  are	  international	  organisations.	  35	  States	  
are	  required	  for	  the	  treaty	  to	  enter	   into	  force	  (Article	  85).	  16	  States	  and	  5	  organisations	  
are	  signatories	  who	  have	  not	  yet	  ratified.	  The	  World	  Bank	  is	  neither	  a	  signatory	  or	  ratified	  
party.	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1.8.1	  The	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  
As	   of	   September	   2013,	   113	   States	   have	   ratified	   the	   VCLT	   with	   a	   further	   14	  
signatories	  who	  as	  of	  yet	  have	  not	  ratified.	  Although	  not	  every	  State	  is	  a	  signatory	  
of	   the	   VCLT,	   the	   majority	   of	   Articles	   have	   been	   seen	   to	   either	   restate	   what	  
customary	  international	  law	  was	  at	  the	  time	  of	  signature	  or	  have	  since	  developed	  
into	  customary	  international	  law.132	  
Article	  31	  stipulates	  the	  general	  rule	  of	  interpretation	  for	  treaties.	  
1. A	  treaty	  shall	  be	  interpreted	  in	  good	  faith	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ordinary	  
meaning	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  treaty	  in	  their	  context	  and	  in	  light	  
of	  its	  object	  and	  purpose.133	  
The	  rules	  of	  interpretation	  articulated	  upon	  by	  the	  VCLT	  placed	  the	  interpretation	  
of	  provisions	   ‘in	  good	   faith’	  as	   the	  central	  proponent.134	  This	   is	   the	   requirement	  
that	  parties	  ‘act	  honestly,	  fairly	  and	  reasonably,	  and	  to	  refrain	  from	  taking	  unfair	  
advantage’.135	  Out	  of	  the	  possible	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  interpretation,136	  the	  
VCLT	   focuses	  upon	  a	   textual	  approach	  emphasising	   the	  ordinary	  meaning	  of	   the	  
words.	   This	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   primary	   interpretation	   through	   the	   ‘ordinary	  
meaning	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  treaty’	  as	  the	  text	  is	  presumed	  to	  be	  the	  
accurate	  expression	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  parties,	  or,	  under	  the	  positive	  theory,	  
the	  will	  of	  the	  States	  in	  consenting	  to	  a	  treaty.	   It	   is	  presumed	  that	  the	  parties,	   if	  
meaning	   something	   different,	   would	   have	   used	   different	   terms	   and,	   therefore,	  
the	  ordinary	  meaning	  is	  relied	  upon.	  The	  text	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  of	  the	  
World	  Bank,	  reflecting	  the	  will	  of	  the	  founders	  at	  Bretton	  Woods,	  is	  consequently	  
the	   central	   premise	   from	  which	   a	   legal	   analysis	   of	   the	  work	  of	   the	  Bank	   should	  
begin	  to	  evaluate	  its	  work	  under	  the	  positivist	  theory.	  
However,	  one	  could	  not	  interpret	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  purely	  through	  use	  of	  
a	  dictionary	  in	  the	  abstract	  as	  the	  terms	  must	  be	  interpreted	  ‘in	  their	  context	  and	  
in	  light	  of	  its	  object	  and	  purpose’.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Fisheries	  Jurisdiction	  (United	  Kingdom	  v.	  Iceland),	  1973,	  I.C.J.	  Rep.	  3	  
133	  Emphasis	  added.	  
134	  Mark	  Villiger,	  Commentary	  on	  the	  1969	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  (Brill	  
2009)	  pg.	  425	  
135	  Ibid.	  
136	   See	  Duncan	  French,	   ‘Treaty	   Interpretation	  and	   the	   Incorporation	  of	  Extraneous	   Legal	  
Rules’	  (2006)	  55	  (2)	  Int’l	  &	  Comparative	  L.Q.	  281	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2. The	   context	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   interpretation	   of	   a	   treaty	   shall	  
comprise,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  text,	  including	  its	  preamble	  and	  annexes:	  
a. Any	  agreement	  relating	  to	  the	  treaty	  which	  was	  made	  between	  all	  
the	  parties	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  treaty;	  
b. Any	   instrument	   which	   was	   made	   by	   one	   or	   more	   parties	   in	  
connection	  with	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  treaty	  and	  accepted	  by	  the	  
other	  parties	  as	  an	  instrument	  related	  to	  the	  treaty.	  
Paragraph	  2	  defines	   the	   context	   that	   can	  be	  used	   for	   interpreting	   a	   treaty.	   This	  
context	   is	  seen	  to	  be	  the	  treaty	  as	  a	  whole137	  and	  any	  agreement	  related	  to	   the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  treaty	  made	  between	  the	  parties.	  Whether	  this	  agreement	  is	  to	  
be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  treaty	  depends	  upon	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  parties.138	  
3. There	  shall	  be	  taken	  into	  account,	  together	  with	  the	  context:	  
a. Any	   subsequent	   agreement	   between	   the	   parties	   regarding	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  treaty	  or	  the	  application	  of	  its	  provisions;	  
b. Any	   subsequent	   practice	   in	   the	   application	   of	   the	   treaty	   which	  
establishes	   the	   agreement	   of	   the	   parties	   regarding	   its	  
interpretation;	  
c. 	  Any	  relevant	  rules	  of	  international	  law	  applicable	  in	  the	  relations	  
between	  the	  parties.	  
Paragraph	   3	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	   agreement	   of	   States	   after	   a	   treaty	   has	   been	  
concluded	   as	   a	   tool	   of	   interpretation	   of	   terms.	   In	   addition	   to	   any	   agreement	  
between	   all	   of	   the	   parties	   regarding	   interpretation,	   subsequent	   practice	   in	   the	  
application	  of	   the	   treaty	   should	  be	   taken	   into	  account	  when	   interpreting	   terms.	  
Both	  forms	  of	  subsequent	  agreement	  under	  the	  positivist	  paradigm	  envision	  that	  
the	  sovereign	  will	  of	  States	  might	  evolve	  over	  time	  and	  therefore	  allow	  parties	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  Competence	  of	  the	  ILO	  to	  Regulate	  Agricultural	  Labour,	  P.C.I.J.	  (1922),	  Series	  B,	  Nos.	  2	  
and	  3,	  pg.	  23	  
138	   Draft	   Articles	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   with	   Commentaries,	   1966,	   Interpretation	   of	  
Treaties,	  para.	  13	  
	   49	  
agree	   on	   one	   specific	  meaning	   for	   a	   piece	   of	   text.	   All	   State	   parties	  must	   agree	  
either	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  by	  not	  disputing	  the	  interpretation.139	  
4. A	   special	   meaning	   shall	   be	   given	   to	   a	   term	   if	   it	   is	   established	   that	   the	  
parties	  so	  intended.	  
As	  a	  final	  point	  under	  the	  general	  rule	  of	  interpretation,	  a	  special	  meaning	  can	  be	  
given	  to	  a	  term	  if	  the	  alleging	  party	  can	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  parties,	  at	  the	  point	  
of	  establishment,	  sought	  to	  give	  it	  a	  special	  meaning.140	  
These	   rules	   provided	   within	   Article	   31	   are	   consistent	   with	   a	   positivist	  
understanding	  of	  international	  law.	  What	  the	  State	  has	  consented	  to	  is	  central	  to	  
the	   textual	   approach	   placing	   the	   ordinary	  meaning	   of	   the	  words	   central	   to	   the	  
interpretation.	   This	   in	   turn	   allows	   States	   to	   carefully	   negotiate	   the	   terms	   of	   a	  
treaty	   in	   the	   knowledge	   that	   the	   terms	   are	   the	   crucial	   examined	   provision.	   In	  
terms	   of	   treaties	   establishing	   international	   organisations,	   the	   textual	   approach	  
allows	  States	  to	  limit	  the	  sovereignty	  that	  they	  delegate	  or	  transfer	  by	  reference	  
to	   the	  wording	   that	   is	   used	   in	   the	   founding	   treaty.	   If	   States	   seek	   to	   change	   the	  
meaning	  of	  a	  particular	  term,	  States	  can	  use	  the	  Article	  31	  (3)(a)	  procedure,	  as	  a	  
general	  rule,	  or	  any	  specific	  procedure	  contained	  within	  the	  treaty	  to	  modify	  the	  
existing	  interpretation	  and	  establish	  a	  new	  meaning	  for	  a	  clause.	  
Further	   than	   the	   general	   rule	   provided	   for	   in	  Article	   31,	   Article	   32	   provides	   the	  
rules	   of	   interpretation	   where	   the	   meaning	   from	   interpretation	   is	   unclear	   or	   to	  
confirm	  a	  meaning	  using	  Article	  32.	  
Recourse	   may	   be	   had	   to	   supplementary	   means	   of	  
interpretation,	  including	  the	  preparatory	  work	  of	  the	  treaty	  and	  
the	   circumstances	   of	   its	   conclusion,	   in	   order	   to	   confirm	   the	  
meaning	   resulting	   from	   the	   application	   of	   article	   31,	   or	   to	  
determine	   the	  meaning	  when	   the	   interpretation	   according	   to	  
article	  31:	  	  
(a)	  leaves	  the	  meaning	  ambiguous	  or	  obscure;	  or	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(b)	   leads	   to	   a	   result	   which	   is	   manifestly	   absurd	   or	  
unreasonable.141	  
The	   word	   ‘supplementary’	   confirms	   that	   Article	   32	   cannot	   be	   used	   as	   an	  
alternative	   interpretative	   tool	   but	   only	   as	   an	   aid	   to	   interpretation	   under	   Article	  
31142	   or	   when	   a	   meaning	   is	   ambiguous,	   obscure	   or	   leads	   to	   a	   result	   that	   is	  
manifestly	   absurd	  or	   unreasonable.	   This	   is	   inline	  with	   the	  positivist	   paradigm	   in	  
that	  the	  preparatory	  work	  and	  the	  circumstances	  of	  a	  treaty’s	  conclusion	  can	  both	  
be	   used	   as	   an	   aid	   to	   discern	   the	   will	   of	   the	   signatory	   States.	   If	   wording	   in	   the	  
World	   Bank’s	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   is	   unclear,	   recourse	   may	   be	   had	   to	   these	  
supplementary	  means	  of	   interpretation.	  The	  final	  rule	  of	   interpretation	  provided	  
in	   the	   VCLT	   concerns	   when	   a	   treaty	   has	   been	   authenticated	   in	   two	   or	   more	  
languages	   and	   establishes	   that	   the	   text	   in	   each	   language	   is	   equally	  
authoritative.143	  
1.8.2	  Customary	  International	  Law	  
The	  VCLT,	  as	  a	  treaty,	  only	  binds	  the	  111	  States	  who	  have	  ratified	  it	  as	  these	  are	  
the	   States	   who	   have	   expressed	   a	   sovereign	   will	   to	   be	   bound.	   However,	   as	   a	  
reflection	   of	   customary	   international	   law,	   the	   rules	   of	   interpretation	  within	   the	  
VCLT	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  bind	  non-­‐signatories.	  
Prior	   to	   the	   VCLT,	   interpretation	   proceeded	   on	   an	   ad	   hoc	   basis	   with	   different	  
tribunals	   giving	  different	  weights	   to	   the	   text	  of	   the	   treaty,	   the	   intentions	  of	   the	  
parties	   and	   the	   objects	   and	   purposes	   of	   the	   treaty.144	   All	   of	   these	   processes	  
sought	  to	  confirm	  the	  will	  of	  the	  signatory	  States	  in	  line	  with	  the	  positive	  theory	  
to	  affirm	  what	  the	  States	  have	  consented	  to.	  The	  work	  of	  the	  ICJ	  has	  been	  littered	  
with	  interpreting	  treaties,145	  including	  its	  1994	  judgment	  of	  the	  Territorial	  Dispute	  
case146	  that	  held	  that	  various	  provisions	  of	  the	  VCLT,	   including	  Article	  31,	  were	  a	  
reflection	  of	  customary	  international	   law.147	  The	  VCLT,	  even	  if	   it	  could	  be	  argued	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  Emphasis	  added.	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  Supra	  138	  para.	  19	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  VCLT	  Article	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  Supra	  Note.	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  Introduction	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  See	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  example;	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  Channel	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  (United	  Kingdom	  v.	  Albania)	   I.C.J.	  Reports	  1949,	  
244;	  Military	   and	   Paramilitary	   Activities	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   and	   against	   Nicaragua	   (Nicaragua	   v.	   United	  
States	   of	   America)	   ICJ	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   14;	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   Interpretation	   of	   Peace	   Treaties	   with	  
Bulgaria,	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  and	  	  Romania,	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  Phase,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  I.C.J.	  Reports	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  71	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  Territorial	  Dispute	  (Libyan	  Arab	  Jamahiriya	  v.	  Chad)	  I.C.J.	  Reports	  1994,	  6	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to	  be	  an	  accurate	  reflection	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  since	  its	  inception	  and,	  
therefore,	  binding	  upon	  non-­‐signatories,	  would	  only	  be	  binding	  upon	   the	  World	  
Bank	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   from	   the	   ratification	   of	   the	   VCLT.	   The	   foundational	  
customary	   international	   law	   that	   the	  VCLT	  was	  based	  upon	  could	   in	   contrast	  be	  
binding	   from	   1945	   and	   the	   World	   Bank’s	   inception	   depending	   upon	   when	   the	  
customary	  law	  was	  formed.	  
In	   specific	   relation	   to	   international	   organisations,	   the	   ICJ	   has	   established	   that	  
beyond	   the	   interpretation	   concerning	   express	   powers	   attributed	   by	   a	   founding	  
treaty,	  an	  organisation	  can	  also	  exercise	  ‘implied	  powers’	  to	  achieve	  its	  objectives.	  
The	   Reparations	   case,	   that	   established	   the	   international	   legal	   personality	   of	  
international	   organisations,	   allowed	   the	   ICJ	   to	   recognise	   for	   the	   first	   time	   the	  
concept	  of	  implied	  powers.148	  
“Under	  international	  law,	  the	  Organization	  must	  be	  deemed	  to	  
have	  those	  powers	  which,	  though	  not	  expressly	  provided	  in	  the	  
Charter,	   are	   conferred	   upon	   it	   by	   necessary	   implication	   as	  
being	  essential	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  its	  duties.”149	  
These	  implied	  powers	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  need	  of	  the	  organisation	  ‘to	  achieve	  their	  
objectives’150	   and	   in	   addition	   in	   the	   Interpretation	   of	   Peace	   Treaties	   Advisory	  
Opinion	  the	  ICJ	  stated	  that:	  
"(t)he	  principle	  of	  interpretation	  expressed	  in	  the	  maxim:	  ut	  res	  
magisvaleat	   quam	   pereat,	   often	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   rule	   of	  
effectiveness,	   cannot	   justify	   the	   Court	   in	   attributing	   to	   the	  
provisions	  for	  the	  settlement	  of	  disputes	  in	  the	  Peace	  Treaties	  a	  
meaning	  which...would	  be	  contrary	  to	  their	  letter	  and	  spirit.”151	  
The	  role	  of	  interpretation	  and	  the	  attributing	  of	  implied	  powers	  is,	  therefore,	  not	  
to	  revise	  the	  treaty	  by	  running	  counter	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  treaty	  but	   instead	  to	  
supplement	  the	  existing	  express	  powers	  only	  so	  far	  as	  to	  allow	  an	  organisation	  to	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  Permanent	  Court	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  International	  Justice	  had	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  Interpretation	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  Use	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fulfil	   its	   purpose.	   Under	   the	   positivist	   theory,	   if	   a	   treaty	   provision	   were	   to	   run	  
counter	   to	   an	   implied	   power,	   the	   treaty	   provision	   would	   prevail	   as	   a	   sign	   of	  
express	  consent	  of	  the	  parties.	  
There	   are	   two	  principal	   views	   on	   implied	   powers.152	   The	  wide	   view	   asserts	   that	  
they	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  an	  organisation’s	  duties.153	  The	  narrow	  
view	  asserts	  that	  there	  should	  be	  an	  explicit	  power	  from	  which	  the	  implied	  power	  
could	  be	  implied.154	  Within	  the	  positivist	  school	  of	  thought,	  both	  views	  regarding	  
the	   doctrine	   of	   implied	   powers	   are	   acceptable	   as	   they	   are	   seeking	   to	   establish	  
what	  States	  consented	  to	  when	  creating	  an	  international	  organisation.	  Whether	  a	  
power	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   performance	   of	   a	   specific	   duty	   or	   implied	   from	   an	  
explicit	  power,	  neither	  option	  allows	  an	  organisation	  to	  act	  contrary	  to	  its	  treaty	  
or	  establish	  new	  powers	  that	  are	  not	  directly	   linked	  to	  what	  the	  founding	  States	  
sought	  the	  organisation	  to	  do.	  
Outside	   of	   implied	   powers,	   potential	   customary	   international	   law	   exists	  
concerning	   the	   role	   of	   practice	   in	   interpretation.	   The	   International	   Law	  
Commission	  (ILC),	  in	  its	  sixtieth	  session	  in	  2008,	  included	  the	  topic	  “Treaties	  over	  
time”	   within	   its	   programme	   of	   work	   with	   the	   aim	   to	   examine	   subsequent	  
agreements	   and	   practice	   in	   relation	   to	   interpretation	   of	   treaties.155	  
Acknowledging	   that	   some	   treaties	   are	   being	   interpreted	   in	   vastly	   different	   time	  
periods	   and	   settings	   to	   when	   they	  were	   created,	   the	   Commission	   is	   seeking	   to	  
establish	   subsequent	   practice	   by	   international	   courts	   and	   tribunals	   to	   ascertain	  
what	   the	   established	   procedure	   is.	   The	   ILC	   has	   currently	   appointed	   a	   Special	  
Rapporteur	  to	  examine	  the	  project.	  
The	  2009	  decision	  by	  the	  ICJ	  in	  the	  Costa	  Rica	  v.	  Nicaragua156	  case	  lent	  credence	  
to	  an	  evolutionary	  approach	   to	   treaty	   interpretation	   that	  has	  diverged	   from	  the	  
role	   of	   practice	   in	   interpretation.	   Whilst	   the	   role	   of	   practice	   seeks	   to	   identify	  
subsequent	  agreement,	  either	  tacit	  or	  explicit,	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  States	  have	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   Regarding	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interpreted	   a	   treaty	   provision,	   the	   evolutionary	   approach	   seeks	   to	   identify	   an	  
intention	  by	  the	  parties	  to	  create	  a	  treaty	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  evolving	  over	  time	  to	  
remain	  effective	  and	  relevant	  in	  light	  of	  potentially	  changing	  conditions.157	  The	  ICJ	  
found	  that:	  
“there	   are	   situations	   in	   which	   the	   parties’	   intent	   upon	  
conclusion	   of	   the	   treaty	   was,	   or	   may	   be	   presumed	   to	   have	  
been,	  to	  give	  the	  terms	  used	  ⎯	  or	  some	  of	  them	  ⎯	  a	  meaning	  or	  
content	  capable	  of	  evolving,	  not	  one	  fixed	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  so	  
as	  to	  make	  allowance	  for,	  among	  other	  things,	  developments	  in	  
international	   law.	   In	   such	   instances	   it	   is	   indeed	   in	   order	   to	  
respect	   the	   parties’	   common	   intention	   at	   the	   time	   the	   treaty	  
was	   concluded,	   not	   to	   depart	   from	   it,	   that	   account	   should	   be	  
taken	  of	   the	  meaning	  acquired	  by	   the	   terms	   in	  question	  upon	  
each	  occasion	  on	  which	  the	  treaty	  is	  to	  be	  applied.”158	  
This	   approach	  was	   in	   contrast	   to	   previous	   ICJ	   cases	   on	   the	   issue	  where	   the	   ICJ	  
applied	  the	  original	  meaning	  the	  parties	  had	  assigned	  to	  the	  word	  and	  ruled	  out	  
subsequent	   developments	   in	   the	  words	  meaning.159	   Such	   an	   interpretative	   tool	  
could	   be	   of	   considerable	   importance	   in	   assessing	   the	   World	   Bank,	   as	   the	  
organisation	  rests	  upon	  a	  treaty	  that	  has	  been	  in	  force	  for	  considerable	  amount	  of	  
time.	  
Two	  tests	  must	  be	  fulfilled	  for	  an	  evolutionary	  approach	  to	  be	  considered.	  Firstly,	  
the	   parties	  must	   have	   used	   generic	   terms	   in	   the	   treaty	  with	   the	   parties	   having	  
been	   aware	   that	   the	   terms	   were	   likely	   to	   evolve	   over	   time.160	   Specialist	   terms	  
could	   not	   be	   considered	   for	   an	   evolutionary	   interpretation.	   Secondly	   the	   treaty	  
has	  been	  entered	  into	  for	  ‘a	  very	  long	  period	  or	  is	  “of	  continuing	  duration”’.161	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	   Julian	  Arato,	   ‘Subsequent	  Practice	  and	  Evolutive	   Interpretation:	  Techniques	  of	  Treaty	  
Interpretation	  over	  Time	  and	  Their	  Diverse	  Consequences’	  (2010)	  9	  (3)	  Law	  &	  Practice	  of	  
International	   Courts	   and	   Tribunals	   443,	   445	   and	   Malgosia	   Fitzmaurice,	   ‘Dynamic	  
(Evolutive)	  Interpretation	  of	  Treaties’	  (2008)	  1	  Hague	  YRBK	  Int’l	  L.	  101,	  102	  
158	  Supra	  Note.	  156	  pg.	  242,	  para.	  64	  
159	  Rights	  of	  Nationals	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  in	  Morocco	  (France	  v.	  United	  States	  
of	  America)	   ICJ	  Reports	  1952,	  pg.	  176	  and	  Kasikili/Sedudu	  Island	  (Botswana/Namibia)	   ICJ	  
Reports	  1999	  (II),	  pg.	  1062,	  para.	  25	  
160	  Supra	  Note.	  156	  pg.	  243,	  para.	  66	  
161	  Supra	  Note.	  156	  pg.	  243,	  para.	  66	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This	  interpretative	  tool	  of	  using	  an	  evolutionary	  approach	  stays	  within	  the	  positive	  
paradigm	  by	  seeking	  to	  establish	  the	  original	  intention	  of	  the	  parties	  and	  precisely	  
what	   they	   had	   consented	   to.	   The	   evolutionary	   approach,	   similar	   to	   a	   textual	   or	  
purposive	   approach,	   is	   not	   a	   rigid	   rule	   of	   interpretation	   but	   rather	   a	   tool	   an	  
interpreter	  can	  use	  to	  best	  identify	  the	  exact	  consent	  a	  State	  has	  transferred	  to	  an	  
international	   organisation.	   If	   it	   can	   be	   demonstrated	   or	   presumed	   that	   States	  
sought	   to	   allow	   terms	   to	   have	   an	   evolutionary	   character,	   then	   allowing	   an	  
evolutionary	   interpretation	   is	   simply	   fulfilling	   the	   wishes	   and	   consent	   of	  
contracting	  States.	  Although	  the	  evolutionary	  approach	  allows	  for	  the	  changing	  in	  
meaning	  of	  terms	  over	  time,	  the	  approach	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  contradiction	  of	  
other	   treaty	   provisions.	   Where	   the	   founding	   States	   have	   unambiguously	   either	  
allowed	   or	   prevented	   the	   actions	   of	   an	   international	   organisation,	   the	  
evolutionary	  approach	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  identifying	  the	  limits	  of	  consent	  transferred	  to	  
an	  organisation	  does	  not	  override	  or	  allow	  for	  interpretations	  that	  are	  in	  conflict	  
with	  separate	  treaty	  provisions.	  
1.8.3	  World	  Bank	  Usage	  
The	  VCLT	  only	  binds	  States	  who	  have	  ratified	  it	  and	  the	  applicability	  of	  customary	  
international	   law	   directly	   to	   organisations	   is	   debatable.162	   The	   interpretation	   of	  
the	   World	   Bank	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   is	   legally	   conducted	   by	   the	   Board	   of	  
Directors	  in	  the	  first	  instance.163	  In	  2000,	  the	  late	  Ibrahim	  Shihata,	  former	  General	  
Counsel	   of	   the	   World	   Bank,164	   published	   The	   World	   Bank	   Legal	   Papers165	   that	  
articulated	   upon	   the	   process	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   follows	   in	   interpreting	   its	  
founding	   treaty.	   This	   process	   is	   crucial	   under	   the	   positivist	   theory	   of	   public	  
international	  law	  as	  it	  is	  only	  through	  acting	  within	  its	  purposes	  that	  the	  Bank	  can	  
ensure	  that	  it	  does	  not	  encroach	  upon	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  members.	  
The	   Bank	   employs	   a	   teleological,	   functional	   approach	   to	   interpretation	   of	   its	  
Articles166	  seemingly	  counter	  to	  the	  textual	  approach	  enshrined	  in	  the	  VCLT.	  This,	  
however,	  often	  renders	  the	  same	  result	  as	  the	  textual	  approach	  yet	  for	  the	  World	  
Bank,	   in	  relation	  to	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  teleological	  approach	  and	  the	  textual	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  See	  Chapter	  Two.	  
163	   World	   Bank	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   Article	   IX.	   Subsequent	   interpretation,	   if	   a	   State	  
disputes	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors,	  is	  conducted	  by	  the	  Board	  of	  Governors.	  
164	  From	  1983	  to	  1998.	  
165	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publisers	  2000)	  
166	  Ibid.	  pg.	  LIX
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approach,	   the	   teleological	   approach	   will	   prevail.	   The	   Bank	   envisions	   three	  
scenarios	   where	   such	   a	   conflict	   could	   exist;	   firstly,	   where	   a	   special	   meaning	   is	  
demonstrated	   to	   apply	   to	   the	   text	   in	   question	   from	   the	   beginning	   by	   the	  
founders.	  This	  is	  in	  turn	  covered	  by	  Article	  31(4)	  of	  the	  VCLT.	  Secondly,	  where	  the	  
context	   suggests	   a	   broader	   meaning	   or	   thirdly,	   where	   the	   context	   suggests	   a	  
narrower	   meaning.167	   These	   in	   turn	   are	   covered	   by	   Article	   31(1)	   of	   the	   VCLT,	  
which	   states	   that	   terms	  of	   a	   treaty	   should	  be	   interpreted	   ‘in	   their	   context’.	   The	  
teleological	  approach	  employed	  by	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  textual	  approach	  employed	  
by	   the	   VCLT	   are,	   therefore,	   not	   as	   different	   as	   might	   be	   suggested.	   This	   is	  
primarily	   because	   the	   VCLT	   does	   not	   employ	   a	   pure	   textual	   approach	   to	   the	  
exclusion	  of	  all	  else	  as	  it	  maintains	  two	  safeguards;	  that	  the	  treaty	  be	  interpreted	  
in	  ‘good	  faith’	  and	  secondly	  that	  the	  terms	  are	  interpreted	  ‘in	  their	  context	  and	  in	  
the	  light	  of	  its	  object	  and	  purpose’.	  This	  teleological	  approach	  or	  VCLT	  object	  and	  
purpose	   approach	   is	   limited	   by	   the	   text	   of	   the	   treaty;	   ‘(o)ne	   of	   the	   ordinary	  
meanings	  will	  eventually	  prevail’.168	  The	  objects	  and	  purposes	  can,	  therefore,	  not	  
be	  used	  to	  override	  an	  express	  provision	  of	  the	  treaty.	  
Neither	   approach,	   however,	   allows	   an	   interpreter	   to	   transpose	   their	   purposes	  
over	  a	  treaty	  or	  use	  an	  overriding	  treaty	  purpose	  to	  override	  the	  specific	  context	  
of	  a	  provision.	  This	  could	  be	  demonstrated	  if	  ‘the	  Bank	  was	  interfering	  in	  matters	  
prohibited	  under	  its	  Articles’	  or	  acting	  ‘ultra	  vires’.169	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   teleological	   approach,	   the	  World	   Bank	   interpretative	   process	  
uses	   the	   tool	   of	   practice	   as	   an	   aid	   to	   interpretation	   yet	   acknowledges	   that	   this	  
cannot	   be	   substituted	   for	   amendment	   or	   used	   by	   the	   Bank	   to	   avoid	   the	  
amendment	   process.170	   	   The	   process	   of	   ‘a	   subsequent,	   repetitive	   practice	  
accepted	   by	   member	   states	   without	   interruption	   or	   controversy,	   and	   thus	  
establishing	   a	   virtual	   agreement	   of	   the	   parties’171	   is,	   in	   theory,	   akin	   to	   the	  
subsequent	  practice	  provided	  for	  by	  the	  VCLT	  Article	  31(3)(b).	  Such	  a	  process	  of	  
modification	  ‘cannot,	  however,	  be	  intentionally	  introduced	  from	  the	  beginning	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  Ibid.	  pg.	  LX	  
168	  Mark	  Villiger,	  Commentary	  on	  the	  1969	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  (Brill	  
2009)	  pg.	  428	  
169	  Supra	  Note.	  165	  pg.	  LVI	  
170	  Ibid.	  pg.	  XLIV	  and	  XLVIII	  
171	  Ibid.	  pg.	  IV	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an	   amendment	   of	   the	   text	   by	   unauthorized	   means’.172	   The	   restriction	   of	   this	  
approach	   would,	   therefore,	   appear	   to	   be	   that	   the	   Bank	   cannot	   deliberately	  
introduce	  policies	  that	  are	  counter	  to	  its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  yet	  that	  they	  can	  
develop	  unintentionally,	  in	  whatever	  form	  that	  appears,	  and	  over	  time	  be	  seen	  to	  
become	  consistent	  with	  the	  Articles.	  Setting	  aside	  questions	  over	  the	  competency	  
of	   bodies	   that	   can	   unintentionally	   begin	   practice	   that	   is	   counter	   to	   their	   own	  
Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  under	  the	  positivist	  theory	  of	  public	   international	   law	  the	  
practice	   of	   an	   organisation	   should	   always	   be	   constrained	   by	   the	   Articles	   of	  
Agreement.	   Although	   practice	   can	   be	   used	   under	   the	   VCLT	   in	   a	   fashion	   as	  
evidence	  of	  the	  understanding	  between	  parties	  as	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  treaty,	  it	  
cannot	   be	   used	   as	   a	   form	   of	   amendment	   as	   the	   World	   Bank	   usage	   would	   by	  
implication	  provide.	  	  
Even	  if	  the	  World	  Bank	  argument	  regarding	  practice	  is	  to	  be	  accepted	  and	  even	  if	  
States	   were	   to	   accept	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   in	   this	   regard,	   there	   is	   a	  
period	   between	   first	   break	   of	   treaty	   and	   acceptance	   where	   the	  World	   Bank	   is	  
acting	   outside	   of	   its	   mandate,	   either	   by	   furthering	   its	   mandate	   and	   infringing	  
upon	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  members	  or	  by	  not	  doing	  the	  job	  that	  was	  given	  to	  it	  
by	   the	   signatories.	   This	   is	   incompatible	  with	   the	   principle	   of	   consent	  within	   the	  
positivist	  theory.	  
Under	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   of	   the	   Bank	   this	   separation	   between	  
interpretation	  and	  amendment	   is	  evident	  as	  the	  Articles	  also	  contain	  a	  provision	  
for	   amendment	   of	   the	   Articles.173	   Any	   proposal	   to	   amend	   the	   Articles	   of	  
Agreement,	   after	   approval	   from	   the	   Board,	   requires	   three-­‐fifths	   of	   members	  
holding	  four-­‐fifths	  of	  the	  total	  voting	  power	  to	  approve	  the	  amendment.174	  Once	  
approved,	   the	   amendment	   enters	   into	   force	   for	   all	  members.175	   The	   separation	  
between	   interpretation	   and	   amendment	   by	   the	   member	   States	   in	   creating	   the	  
Bank	   confirms	   a	   willingness	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   two	   independent	  
concepts.	  Whilst	  interpretation,	  under	  the	  relevant	  rules,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  keep	  the	  
World	   Bank’s	   work	   current	   without	   a	   constant	   requirement	   of	   amendment	   as	  
time	   lapses	   between	   ratification	   and	   work,	   it	   cannot	   be	   used	   to	   expand	   the	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  Ibid.	  pg.	  IV	  
173	  Article	  VIII	  
174	  Ibid.	  (a)	  
175	  Ibid.	  (c)	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mandate	  of	  the	  Bank	  beyond	  what	  the	  member	  States	  had	  already	  consented	  to:	  
that	   is	   the	  role	  of	  amendment.	   If	   the	  members	  sought	  to	  use	  the	  Bank	   in	  a	  new	  
purpose,	   the	   process	   of	   amendment	   exists	   for	   this	   in	   keeping	   with	   the	   rule	   of	  
positive	  theory	  that	  the	   law	  is	  based	  upon	  consent	  of	  States.	   If,	  however,	  only	  a	  
small	   percentage	   of	   members	   sought	   to	   use	   the	   Bank	   in	   a	   new	   fashion,	   the	  
process	   of	   amendment	   protects	   other	   members	   from	   having	   their	   sovereignty	  
infringed	  upon.	  	  
This	  separation	  between	  interpretation	  and	  amendment	  establishes	  a	  willingness	  
of	   the	   Bank’s	   membership	   to	   not	   allow	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   to	   use	  
interpretation	   as	   an	   informal	   means	   of	   amendment.	   Interpretation	   has	   its	   role	  
and	  in	  turn	  amendment	  has	  its	  role.	  
The	  Bank	  also	  has	  another	  form	  of	  treaty	  interaction	  by	  creating	  a	  third	  category	  
between	  interpretation	  and	  amendment	  that	  Shihata	  defines	  as	  ‘filling	  of	  gaps’.	  If	  
interpretation	  is	  governed	  by	  principles	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  VCLT	  and	  amendment	  by	  
Article	  VIII	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  ‘filling	  of	  gaps’	  is	  ‘supplementing	  the	  text	  
and	  allowing	  its	  provisions	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  its	  purpose’.176	  This	  is	  akin	  
to	  the	  implied	  powers	  doctrine	  from	  customary	  international	  law	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  
an	   organisation	   powers	   to	   fit	   the	   purposes	   States	   agreed	   for	   it	   to	   have.	   This	   is	  
wider	  than	  the	  narrow	  form	  of	  implied	  powers	  provided	  for	  by	  Article	  V	  (2)(f):	  
“The	   Board	   of	   Governors,	   and	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   to	   the	  
extent	   authorized,	   may	   adopt	   such	   rules	   and	   regulations	   as	  
may	  be	  necessary	  or	  appropriate	  to	  conduct	  the	  business	  of	  the	  
Bank.”	  
Both	   for	   interpretation	   and	   filling	   of	   gaps,	   neither	   can	   be	   used	   to	   “reach	   a	  
meaning	  that	  goes	  into	  directions	  unrelated	  to	  the	  declared	  objective	  of	  the	  text	  
or	   violates	   its	   explicit	   wording”.177	   Any	   such	   use	   would	   create	   an	   actual	  
amendment	   of	   the	   treaty	   by	   the	   interpreters	   and	   go	   against	   the	   will	   of	   the	  
member	  States.	  
The	   Bank	   is,	   therefore,	   limited	   by	   two	   factors	   expressly	   within	   its	   Articles	   of	  
Agreement	  when	  interpreting	  provisions.	  Firstly,	  they	  must	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	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purposes	   of	   the	   Bank,	   as	   all	   work	   of	   the	   Bank	   must	   be	   consistent	   with	   the	  
purposes.	  Secondly,	  the	  interpretation	  must	  be	  consistent	  with	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  
Articles	  in	  that	  if	  one	  article	  expressly	  denies	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Bank	  to	  perform	  an	  
action,	   this	   in	   turn	   limits	   possible	   interpretations	   of	   separate	   articles.	   Deriving	  
from	   outside	   the	   Articles,	   through	   either	   using	   the	   teleological	   or	   textual	  
approach,	   the	  Bank	   is	   limited	   to	  apply	  one	  of	   the	  possible	  ordinary	  meanings	   to	  
words.	  
	  
1.9	  Model	  for	  Application	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  
In	  relation	  to	  an	  international	  organisation,	  the	  definitive	  position	  of	  the	  modern	  
positivist	  theory	  is	  that	  an	  organisation	  can	  only	  legally	  act	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  
what	  its	  founding	  treaty	  provides.	  This	  is	  as	  this	  reflects	  the	  sovereign	  will	  of	  the	  
organisation’s	  member	  States	  and	  what	  they	  have	  consented	  the	  organisation	  to	  
do.	  This	  can	  only	  be	  changed	  by	  an	  amendment	  or	  subsequent	  agreement.	   If	  an	  
international	   organisation	   were	   to	   act	   outside	   of	   this	   confine,	   it	   would	   be	  
encroaching	  upon	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  its	  membership.	  In	  turn,	  a	  focus	  is	  then	  upon	  
treaty	  interpretation	  and	  the	  rules	  that	  it	  provides	  to	  ascertain	  the	  exact	  will	  of	  its	  
members	  and	  to	  ensure	  their	  sovereignty	  is	  not	  infringed	  upon.	  
The	  World	  Bank,	  in	  its	  legal	  view	  of	  treaty	  interpretation	  towards	  its	  own	  Articles	  
of	   Agreement,	   uses	   a	   teleological	   approach	   whilst	   the	   VCLT	   uses	   a	   textual	  
approach,	   however,	   it	   has	   been	   established	   that	   the	   end	   result	   of	   using	   one	  
approach	   as	   seen	   from	   the	   positive	   theory’s	   perspective	   is	   not	   substantially	  
different	   from	   the	   other.	   Any	   treaty	   interpretation	   cannot	   take	   the	   place	   of	  
amendment	   procedures	   and	   interpreters	  must	   at	   all	   times	   ensure	   that	   they	   do	  
not	   replace	   the	   members’	   purposes	   or	   text	   with	   their	   own.	   Any	   infringement	  
would	  be	  against	  the	  positivist	  school	  of	  thought	  that	  organisations	  are	  bound	  by	  
their	   founding	   treaty	   as	   the	   infringement	   would	   dispute	   the	   positivist	  
understanding	  that	  an	  organisation	  is	  bound	  by	  the	  sovereign	  will	  that	  created	  it.	  
The	  positivism	  approach	  outlined	  here	   is	  not	   the	  only	  analytical	   tool	   to	  examine	  
international	   organisations.	   It	   is,	   however,	   the	   predominant	   one.	   Additional	  
theories	  that	  have	  arisen	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  Two.	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The	  positivism	  model	  that	  has	  been	  elaborated	  upon	  will	  now	  be	  applied	  against	  
the	  World	  Bank	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  Bank	  has	  kept	  within	  its	  mandate.	  If	  it	  
has	  not,	  an	  alternative	  legal	  analytical	  tool	  will	  need	  to	  be	  sought	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
sense	  of	  the	  Bank	  in	  law.	  
	  
1.10	  World	  Bank	  History	  
The	  history	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	  has	  been	  recorded	   in	  numerous	  sources178	  and	   is	  
one	  of	   evolution	   and	  perhaps	   even	   at	   various	   points	   revolution.	   The	  Bank	   itself	  
seeks	  to	  record	  all	  major	  events	  and	  announcements	  related	  to	   its	  work179	  since	  
the	   Bretton	  Woods	   conference	   and	  make	   this	   available	   to	   the	   public	   under	   the	  
transparency	  doctrine	  that	  it	  has	  implemented.	  Although	  the	  history	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank	   is	   an	   area	   that	   is	   already	   extensively	   covered	   within	   the	   literature,	   the	  
application	   of	   an	   analytical	   framework	   based	   upon	   the	   positivist	   theory	   to	   this	  
history	  is	  not.	  The	  history	  section	  is	  crucial	  to	  not	  only	  establish	  that	  the	  Bank	  has	  
moved	   from	   its	   original	   mandate,	   but	   just	   how	   far	   it	   has	   gone.	   If	   it	   can	   be	  
determined	   that	   the	  World	   Bank	   is	   no	   longer	   acting	   in	   law	   under	   the	   positivist	  
theory,	  an	  alternative	  analytical	  framework	  can	  begin	  to	  be	  sought	  and	  applied	  in	  
an	  effort	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  legal	  ramifications	  of	  what	  has	  occurred.	  
This	   section	   will	   argue	   that	   whilst	   sometimes	   the	   World	   Bank	   has	   sought	   to	  
expand	   its	  work	  by	   the	   creation	  of	  new	  arms	  of	   the	  Bank,	  with	  associating	  new	  
Articles	   of	   Agreement	   for	   States	   to	   sign,	   it	   has	   shown	   on	   other	   occasions	   a	  
remarkable	   willingness	   to	   read	   into,	   ignore	   and	   add	   to	   its	   own	   Articles	   of	  
Agreement	  with	   little	   to	  no	   input	   via	   its	  member	   States	   in	   the	   traditional	   sense	  
envisioned	  by	  the	  positivist	  theory.	  This	  has	  included	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  dialog	  
in	   international	   law	   allowing	   the	   direct	   access	   of	   individuals	   to	   an	   international	  
organisation	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  The	  Inspection	  Panel,	  its	  creation	  and	  issues,	  will	  be	  
written	  on	  extensively	  in	  Chapter	  Five	  but	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  at	  its	  relevant	  point	  
in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Bank	  within	  this	  chapter.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	   Edward	  Mason	   &	   Robert	   Asher,	   The	  World	   Bank	   Since	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1.10.1	  The	  Reconstruction	  Years	  
The	  Bank	  began	  operations	   on	   25	   June	   1946.	   Early	  warning	   indicators	   to	   States	  
that	   the	   Bank	   could	   be	   seeking	   to	   fulfil	   a	   different	   purpose	   to	   that	   which	   was	  
given	  to	  it	  actually	  pre-­‐dated	  the	  date	  operations	  began	  to	  7	  May	  1946	  when	  the	  
Executive	  Directors	  met	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  The	  meeting	  is	  remembered	  for	  trying	  
and	  failing	  to	  appoint	  the	  first	  President	  of	  the	  Bank	  but	  of	  greater	  concern	  should	  
have	  been	  the	  early	  quest	  by	  the	  Bank	  to	  “adapt”	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  The	  
meeting	   had	   the	   intention	   of	   expressing	   general	   purposes	   for	   the	   Bank	   (as	  
opposed	   to	   those	   given	   in	   the	   Articles)	   and	   to	   adapt	   the	   Articles	   to	   an	  
international	   situation	   that	   had	   gone	   through	   deep	   changes	   since	   the	   articles	  
were	  written.180	  Whilst	   the	   end	   to	  World	  War	   II	   had	   changed	   circumstances	   on	  
the	   international	   scene,	   the	  Bank	  and	   the	   IMF	  had	  been	   created	   for	   application	  
after	  the	  war	  had	  ended:	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  focus	  on	  reconstruction.	  Although	  
the	  primary	  job	  of	  interpretation	  was	  given	  to	  the	  Executive	  Directors,	  the	  Bank’s	  
willingness	   to	  begin	   adapting	   the	  purposes	  of	   the	  organisation,	  which	  had	  been	  
carefully	  worded	  and	  negotiated	   in	  the	  Conference,	  before	   it	  had	  already	  begun	  
should	  have	  been	  an	  early	  warning	  indicator	  to	  States	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  ambition.	  
Eugene	  Meyer,	   the	   first	   President	   of	   the	   Bank,	   had	   an	   uneasy	   relationship	  with	  
the	  Board.	  Meyer	  resented	  the	  Board,	  who	  represent	  Member	  States	  within	  the	  
Bank,	   intruding	   into	   the	   running	   of	   the	   Bank	   and	   challenging	   his	   authority	  
eventually	   leading	   to	  his	   resignation.181	   John	   J.	  McCloy	  only	   took	   the	  position	  of	  
President	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  he	  would	  have	  the	  Board’s	  subordination.	  This	  has	  
led	   to	   a	   sizeable	   independence	   of	   the	   working	   staff	   of	   the	   Bank182	   where	   the	  
Board	  still	  votes	  upon	  loan	  proposals	  but	  the	  staff	  decides	  what	  to	  propose.	  
With	  the	  United	  States	  population	  still	  sceptical	  of	  the	  new	  institutions,	  members	  
of	  staff	   from	  the	  World	  Bank	  undertook	  a	  series	  of	   lecture	  tours	  throughout	  the	  
country	   to	   provide	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   organisation.	   On	   14	   October	  
1946,	  J.W.	  Beyen,	  who	  was	  an	  Executive	  Director	  at	  the	  Bank,	  clarified	  his	  position	  
on	  what	  he	  felt	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Bank	  were,	  to	  provide	  the	  finance	  necessary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	   Edward	  Mason	   &	   Robert	   Asher,	   The	  World	   Bank	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Policies,	  Operations,	   and	   Impact	   of	   the	   International	   Bank	   for	   Reconstruction	   (Brookings	  
Institution	  Press	  1973)	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  40-­‐2	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  Mallaby,	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  World’s	  Banker	  (Penguin	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to	   re-­‐build	   war-­‐torn	   countries	   and	   when	   reconstruction	   was	   complete,	   to	   fund	  
development	  programs	  that	  could	  not	  find	  adequate	  private	  funding.183	  
Early	  loans	  focused	  upon	  this	  purpose	  of	  reconstruction	  after	  the	  war184	  but	  even	  
the	   early	   loans	   were	   not	   without	   controversy.	   Poland	   was	   the	   first	   country	   to	  
withdraw	   from	   the	  Bank	  under	   the	  belief	   that	   the	  Bank	  was	   taking	   criteria	   that	  
was	  not	  contained	  in	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  into	  account	  in	  its	  loan	  application	  
process.	   The	   Bank	   had	   sent	   a	  mission	   to	   Poland	   in	   1947	   to	   obtain	   information	  
regarding	  the	  application185	  and	  later	  when	  the	  loan	  was	  refused,	  Poland	  took	  the	  
step	   of	  withdrawing	   from	   the	   Bank.	   Poland’s	   accusation,	   as	   put	   forward	   by	   the	  
Polish	  ambassador	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  was	  that	  the	  Bank	  had	  denied	  the	  Polish	  
loan	  application	  as	  Poland	  had	  refused	  to	  accede	  to	  the	  Marshall	  Plan.186	  The	  Bank	  
heavily	   refuted	   these	  accusations	  at	   the	   time	  yet	   this	  was	   the	   first	   time	   that	  an	  
accusation	  had	  officially	  been	  made	  that	  the	  Bank	  had	  overstretched	  its	  mandate	  
and	  was	  considering	  outside	  influences	  in	  its	  decisions.	  Subsequently	  the	  Bank	  has	  
acknowledged	  that	  outside	  influences	  effected	  its	  decision.187	  
Any	  action	  taken	  by	  the	  Bank	  that	  does	  not	  correspond	  with	  the	  purposes	  set	  out	  
would	  be	  seen,	  under	  the	  positive	  theory,	  as	  an	  infringement	  on	  the	  sovereignty	  
of	  members.	  This	  is	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  positivist	  theory	  of	  delegated	  authority	  on	  
the	  strict	  areas	  consented	  to.	  Yet	  even	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Bank,	  it	  was	  clear	  
that	  the	  Bank	  was	  taking	  elements	  into	  account	  that	  it	  was	  not	  empowered	  to	  do	  
and	  was	  ignoring	  sections	  of	  its	  founding	  treaty	  that	  it	  did	  not	  feel	  should	  apply	  to	  
it.	  The	  positive	  theory	  cannot	  explain	  this,	  as	  these	  actions	  are	  not	  linked	  to	  State	  
consent	  and	  are	  explicitly	  against	  it.	  
1.10.2	  The	  Move	  to	  Development	  
There	   cannot	   be	   a	   meaningful	   discussion	   on	   the	   history	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	  
without	  reference	  to	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  as	  it	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  plan	  that	  truly	  
shifted	   the	  World	  Bank’s	   focus.	   The	  Marshall	   Plan,	   also	   known	  as	   the	  Economic	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  World	  Bank	  Group	  Historical	  Chronology	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184	  For	  example,	  Loan	  0001	  to	  0004.	  
185	  World	  Bank	  Group	  Historical	  Chronology	  pg.	  17	  
186	  World	  Bank	  Press	  Releases,	  March	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  1950	  
187	  See;	  http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,	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  accessed	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Cooperation	   Act	   of	   1948,188	   was	   a	   bilateral	   assistance	   program	   between	   the	  
United	  States	  and	  various	  European	  States	  to	  assist	  European	  States	   in	  post-­‐war	  
recovery.	   The	   plan	   provided	   $13	   billion	   to	   European	   countries	   that	   joined	   the	  
Organisation	   for	   European	   Economic	   Co-­‐Operation.189	   The	   plan,	   whilst	   widely	  
seen	   as	   a	   success,190	   took	   from	   the	   Bank	   of	   one	   of	   its	   two	   primary	   objectives	  
allowing	   it	   to	   shift	   its	   resources	   to	   its	   only	   other	   primary	   objective:	  
development.191	  This	  meant	  that	  within	  two	  years	  of	  J.	  W.	  Beyen’s	  assurances	  that	  
the	  Bank	  was	  concerned	  with	  post-­‐War	  reconstruction,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  Bank	  had	  
fundamentally	  shifted.	  
As	   Europe	   was	   largely	   availing	   itself	   of	   the	   Marshall	   Plan,	   the	   Bank’s	   focus	  
increasingly	  moved	  outside	  of	  Europe	  (as	  the	  States	  there	  no	   longer	  required	   its	  
assistance)	   and	   focused	   upon	   financing	   the	   development	   of	   less	   economically	  
developed	  countries.192	  	  
On	  25	  March	  1948,	  the	  Bank	  issued	  its	  first	  development	  loans.	  Both	  loans	  were	  
to	  Chile	  to	  help	  the	  State	  develop	  their	  power,	  irrigation	  and	  agricultural	  sectors.	  
This	  new	  shift	   to	  development	   loans	  was	  envisioned	   in	  the	  Articles	  but	  as	  noted	  
earlier,	   the	   introduction	  was	  only	  done	  under	  pressure	   from	  developing	  nations	  
and	  was	  not	   considered	   the	  primary	  purpose	  of	   the	  Bank	  by	   the	  majority	   of	   its	  
founders.	   The	   founders,	   however,	   had	   envisioned	   a	   time	   when	   reconstruction	  
would	  be	  complete	  and	  the	  Bank	  would	  have	  to	  shift	  its	  focus	  and,	  therefore,	  had	  
provided	  adequate	  regulations	  in	  the	  Articles	  on	  how	  these	  loans	  should	  progress	  
and	   what	   they	   should	   be	   for.	   The	   only	   difference	   was	   that	   the	   shift	   from	  
reconstruction	   to	   development	   had	   happened	   far	   faster	   than	   any	   States	   had	  
anticipated.	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  J	  Bradford	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  ‘The	  Marshall	  Plan:	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  al.	  (eds.),	  Post-­‐World	  
War	  II	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  Press	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  (1966)	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   Moris,	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   World	   Bank	   and	   Human	   Rights:	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Mismatched	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  (1997)	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  ILSA	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   Gerald	  Meier,	   ‘The	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1.10.3	  The	  Beginning	  of	  Activism	  
The	  success	  of	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  allowed	  the	  Bank	  a	  relative	  amount	  of	  freedom.	  
Policies	   that	   were	   not	   expressly	   stated	   in	   the	   Articles	   were	   allowed	   to	   pass	   by	  
States	  in	  elation	  at	  how	  the	  post-­‐war	  development	  was	  progressing193	  and	  blinded	  
States	  to	  the	  future	  consequences	  for	  their	  sovereignty.	  
Article	  V	  Section	  6	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  details	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  Advisory	  
Council	  at	  the	  Bank	  to	  advise	  the	  Bank	  on	  general	  policy.	  Looking	  at	  the	  present	  
structure	   of	   the	   Bank	  might	   raise	   the	   question	   of	  where	   this	   Council	   sits	   in	   the	  
current	   command	   structure	   as	   it	   is	   not	   shown.	   In	   1948	   the	   Executive	   Directors	  
took	  their	  first	  step	  to	  outright	  deny	  a	  provision	  of	  the	  Articles.	  The	  first	  meeting	  
of	  the	  Advisory	  Council	  was	  held	  but	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  recommended	  
to	   the	  Executive	  Directors	   that	   the	  Council	  would	  not	  provide	  value	   for	   the	  cost	  
and	   time.	   Agreeing	   with	   the	   Chairman,	   after	   a	   study,	   the	   Bank	   was	   effectively	  
abolished	   by	   not	   appointing	   any	   new	   councillors	   after	   the	   initial	   terms	   had	  
expired.	  Although	  of	   seeming	   little	   consequence	  at	   the	   time,	   it	  denies	  States	  an	  
element	   of	   control	   at	   the	   Bank.	   If	   the	   Advisory	   Council	   had	   recommended	   a	  
course	  of	   action	  and	  advised	   the	  Executive	  Directors	   so,	   the	  Executive	  Directors	  
would	   have	   to	   explain	   any	   deviation	   from	   this	   recommendation.	   Instead	   now,	  
more	  power	   is	   vested	   in	   the	  Executive	  Directors	  and	  President	   than	   the	  Articles	  
provided.	  Now	   it	   is	   for	   the	  Executive	  Directors	   to	  decide	   solely	  on	  Bank	  policies	  
without	  recommendation.	  	  
The	  Executive	  Directors	  represent	  the	   interests	  of	  the	  member	  States	  within	  the	  
organisation	   and	   so	   on	   a	   narrow	   reading	   this	   may	   appear	   consistent	   with	   the	  
positivist	   theory.	   The	   five	   largest	   contributors	   (United	   States,	   Japan,	   Germany,	  
France	  and	  United	  Kingdom)	  each	  appoint	  a	  Director	  and	   the	   current	  183	  other	  
members	  elect	  the	  remaining	  20.	  The	  amount	  of	  Directors	  has	  evolved	  since	  the	  
original	  12	  to	  the	  25	  that	  are	  in	  place	  currently.	  Yet	  the	  agreement	  to	  dissolve	  the	  
use	   of	   the	   Advisory	   Council	   and	   the	   tacit	   agreement	   reached	   after	   Eugene	  
Meyer's	  resignation	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  President’s	  agendas	  becoming	  the	  focus	  of	  
the	  Bank.	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   European	   Recovery	   Program	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  Perspective	  (Greenwood	  1983)	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As	   the	   1950s	   progressed,	   increasingly	   senior	   employees	   at	   the	   Bank	   began	   to	  
refute	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement.	   Advisors	   at	   the	   Bank	   began	   to	   take	   other	  
considerations	   into	   account	   for	   development	   loans194	   before	   the	   Bank	   began	   to	  
openly	   admit	   that	   its	   mission	   had	   changed	   with	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Board	   of	  
Governors	   stating	   “I	   do	   not	   regard	   its	  mission	   encompassed	   within	   the	   narrow	  
definitions	  of	   reconstruction	  and	  development”.195	  Additionally,	   in	  1956,	  Eugene	  
R.	  Black,	  then	  President	  of	  the	  Bank	  stated	  that	  even	  if	  Hungary	  were	  a	  member	  
of	   the	   Bank,	   he	   would	   not	   be	   prepared	   to	   recommend	   a	   loan	   to	   the	   present	  
Hungarian	  government.196	  This	  was	  the	  first	  open	  acknowledgement	  that	  the	  Bank	  
was	   openly	   acting	   outside	   its	   Articles	   by	   taking	   political	   considerations	   into	  
account	   when	   deciding	   upon	   loan	   applications	   yet	   still	   there	   remained	   no	  
amendment	  of	  the	  Bank's	  Articles	  to	  account	  for	  it.	  
The	   Bank	   began	   to	   broaden	   its	   interpretation	   of	   what	   ‘development’	  
encompassed	  and	  in	  1963	  introduced	  concept	  of	  lending	  for	  education.197	  
Throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  60s	  the	  World	  Bank	  sought	  to	  expand	  its	  mandate	  via	  
the	   creation	   of	   new	   arms	   of	   its	   organisation.	   The	   International	   Finance	  
Corporation	  was	  established	   in	  1956,	   the	   International	  Development	  Association	  
in	  1960	  and	  was	  subsequently	  followed	  by	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  Settlement	  
of	  Investment	  Disputes	  in	  1966.	  As	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  arms	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  
Group,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   creation	   of	   the	   Multilateral	   Investment	   Guarantee	  
Agency	   in	  1988,	   took	  place	  via	   the	  signing	  of	   individual	  agreements	  via	  member	  
States	  they	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  complying	  with	  the	  positive	  international	  law	  theory.	  In	  
contrast	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  activities	  concerning	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  
Reconstruction	  and	  Development,	   the	   creation	  of	   these	  new	  arms	   to	   the	  World	  
Bank	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  traditional	  positive	  approach	  to	  international	  law	  as	  
States	   have	   consented	   to	   the	   activities	   of	   these	   branches	   as	   envisioned	   at	   the	  
time	  of	  creation	  and	  the	  treaties	  were	  created	  in	  the	  expected	  legal	  fashion.	  The	  
IFC	  in	  its	  work	  uses	  the	  same	  policies	  and	  guidelines	  that	  apply	  to	  the	  IBRD.	  Many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	   Such	   as	   using	   them	   as	   a	   defense	   against	   communism,	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   Bank	   Group	   Historical	  
Chronology	  pg.	  36	  
195	  World	  Bank	  Group	  Historical	  Chronology,	  pg.46	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  Bank	  Press	  Release,	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  26,	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   Katherine	  Marshall,	   The	  World	   Bank:	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   Reconstruction	   to	   Development	   to	   Equity	  
(Routledge	  2009)	  pg.	  31	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of	  the	  subsequent	  arguments	  developed	  during	  this	  thesis	  may	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  
it.	  
The	  creation	  of	  the	  IFC	  lead	  to	  the	  first	  of	  two	  amendments	  of	  the	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  
Agreement.	   In	  1965	  the	  first	  amendment	  allowed	  the	  IBRD	  to	  lend	  to	  the	  IFC	  up	  
to	   four	   times	   the	   IFC	   subscribed	   capital.198	   The	   second	   amendment	   was	  
introduced	  in	  1989	  and	  modified	  the	  voting	  structure	  to	  require	  an	  80%	  majority	  
of	   votes,199	   compared	   to	   the	   previous	   85%	   majority	   of	   votes.	   The	   use	   of	   the	  
amendment	   procedure	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   Bank	   can,	   if	   it	   chooses	   to,	  
implement	  the	  procedures	  envisioned	  within	  the	  Articles	  consented	  to	  by	  States	  
and,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   first	   amendment,	   that	   the	   amendment	   procedure	   is	   an	  
effective	  mechanism	   to	   increase	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   Bank	   if	   States	   require	   it.	   As	  
there	   was	   no	   provision	   within	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   to	   lend	   to	   another	  
organisation,	   the	   member	   States	   changed	   the	   Articles	   to	   incorporate	   it.	   If	   the	  
Bank	  were	   to	   extend	   its	  mandate	   in	   other	   areas	   at	   the	  will	   of	   States,	   it	   should	  
follow	   this	   model	   of	   amendment.	   This	   process	   of	   amendment	   reflects	   the	  
expectations	  from	  the	  positive	  theory	  and	  readily	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  Bank	  and	  
its	  member	  States	  can	  be	  willing	  to	  change	  the	  Articles	  if	  sought.	  
1.10.4	  Quantity	  Rather	  Than	  Quality	  
In	   1968	   Robert	   S.	   McNamara	   became	   President	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   Group	   and	  
quickly	   set	   out	   his	   vision	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Bank.	   Instead	   of	   focusing	  
upon	   loans	   for	   actual	   projects,	   President	  McNamara	   sought	   to	   shift	   the	   Bank's	  
emphasis	  towards	  research	  loans.	  	  
In	  1969	  he	  called	  for	  a	  doubling	  of	  the	  amount	   lent	  from	  the	  previous	  five	  years	  
(which	  would	  mean	  in	  the	  next	  five	  years	  that	  the	  Bank	  would	  lend	  as	  much	  as	  it	  
had	   in	   its	   first	   twenty-­‐two)200	   and	   in	   1971	   approved	   the	   first	   loan	   solely	   for	  
research.	  During	  the	  1970s	  the	  IBRD	  lent	  three	  times	  as	  much	  to	  Africa	  as	  it	  had	  in	  
the	  previous	  decade,201	  replacing	  former	  colonial	  powers	  as	  the	  principal	  actor	  on	  
the	  continent.	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  Article	  III	  Section	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  Article	  VIII	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200	  World	  Bank	  Group	  Historical	  Chronology,	  pg.	  134	  
201	  Devesh	  Kapur,	  John	  Lewis	  &	  Richard	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  (eds.),	  The	  World	  Bank:	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  First	  Half	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(Brookings	  Institution	  Press	  1997)	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President	  McNamara	  sought	  to	  overtly	  change	  the	  Bank	  when	  previous	  Presidents	  
had	  sought	  to	  do	  covertly.	  He	  argued	  that	  development	  encompassed	  more	  than	  
just	  financial	  concerns	  (that	  were	  stipulated	  in	  the	  Articles)	  and	  sought	  to	  widen	  
definitions	   of	   development	   to	   include	   nutrition,	   education,	   a	   more	   equitable	  
distribution	  of	  income,	  improvements	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  life,	  the	  environment,	  and,	  
crucially	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Bank,	  saw	  the	  elimination	  of	  poverty	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  
Bank’s	   responsibility.202	   The	   departments	   of	   the	   Bank	   reflected	   this	   with	   the	  
introduction	   of	   departments	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   new	   subject	   areas	   such	   as	   the	  
environment	  and	  population	  control.	  
Aaron	   Broches	   was	   the	   Banks	   longest	   serving	   General	   Counsel	   working	   at	   the	  
Bank	   from	  1959-­‐1978.	  Subsequent	   to	  his	   leaving	   the	  Bank’s	   service,	  Mr	  Broches	  
commented	  that	  the	  most	  important	  function	  of	  the	  legal	  department	  at	  the	  Bank	  
was	  to	  ensure	  “that	  the	  President	  and	  the	  Board	  of	  Executive	  Directors	  observed	  
their	   respective	   powers	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement”.203	  When	   Robert	  
McNamara	  took	  the	  role	  as	  President	  of	  the	  Bank	  Mr	  Broches	  commented	  that	  his	  
role	  as	  mediator	  was	  “severely	  challenged”.204	  
The	  concern	  highlighted	  by	  Broches	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  Bank’s	  President	  and	  
Board	   of	   Executive	   Directors	   were	   acting	   outside	   the	   positive	   theory.	   If	  
international	   organisations	   are	   bound	   by	   State	   consent,	   this	   concept	   of	   a	  
President	  challenging	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	   is	  outside	  of	   this.	   If	  States'	  have	  
only	  consented	  to	  the	  Bank	  behaving	  in	  one	  way,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  counter	  for	  the	  
President	   to	   challenge,	   reinterpret,	   edit	   and	   replace	   in	   way	   that	   he	   sees	   fit.	  
Instead	  the	  positivist	  theory	  would	  require	  that	  international	  organisation	  respect	  
the	  sovereignty	  and	  consent	  of	  its	  members.	  
Throughout	  the	  1970s	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  Bank	  did	  not	  change	  in	  respect	  of	  moving	  
away	   from	   development,	   its	   only	   aim	   left,	   but	   the	   President	   changed	   the	  
definition	   of	  what	   “development”	  meant	   and	   the	   focus	   changed	  with	   that.	   The	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freedom	  given	  to	   the	  President	  by	   the	  abolition	  of	   the	  Advisory	  Council	  allowed	  
him	   to	   define	   “development”	   personally	   (even	   though	   it	   was	   different	   to	   what	  
other	   Presidents	   and	   the	   founders	   had	  defined	   the	   term	   to	  mean)	   and	   led	   to	   a	  
vast	   expansion	   of	   what	   the	   Bank	   was	   willing	   to	   lend	   for.	   The	   Bank’s	   increased	  
activism,	  however,	  came	  at	  a	  cost	  to	  States	  that	  is	  examined	  below.	  
Up	   until	   this	   point,	   the	   changes	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   had	   been	   making	   are	   in	  
respect	   of	   increasing	   its	   powers	   under	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement.	   This	   provides	  
evidence	  of	  an	  evolution	  at	   the	  Bank	   from	   the	  organisation	   it	  was	   set	  up	   to	  be,	  
towards	  a	  system	  outside	  of	  the	  control	  of	  States.	  The	  following	  period,	  however,	  
explains	   a	   further	   evolution	   in	   the	   Bank’s	   legal	   personality	   towards	   an	  
organisation	   that	   is	   exercising	   a	   governance	   function	   over	   States	   through	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  normative	  regime.	  This	  area	  will	  be	  examined	  extensively	  in	  Chapter	  
Four.	  
1.10.5	  Conditionality,	  Corruption	  and	  Good	  Governance	  
In	   the	   1980s,	   the	   Bank	   increasingly	   moved	   into	   the	   areas	   of	   competence	   that	  
were	   traditionally	   conceived	   of	   as	   domestic	   jurisdiction.	   This	  was	   done	   through	  
the	   introduction	   of	   guidelines	   unrelated	   to	   finance	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	  
Structural	   Adjustment	   Loans.	   Developing	   States	   that	   had	   borrowed	   heavily	   to	  
fund	  development	  were	  increasingly	  encountering	  financial	  troubles	  repaying	  the	  
debt.205	   The	   new	   form	   of	   loans	   issued	   by	   the	   Bank	   provided	   new	   loans	   to	  
borrowing	  countries	   to	  pay	  back	  old	   loans	  but	  crucially	  borrowing	  countries	  had	  
to	   agree	   to	   change	   certain	   macro-­‐economic	   policies	   to	   what	   the	   Bank	   has	  
proscribed	   as	   an	   acceptable	  model.206	   The	   loans	  were	   in	   essence	   a	   crisis-­‐driven	  
tool	  where	  a	  member	  State	  could	  receive	  assistance	  to	  restructure	  their	  existing	  
debts	  but	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  underwent	  fundamental	  economic	  reforms.	  	  
The	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Loans	  and	  the	  conditions	  that	  they	  placed	  upon	  States	  
for	   their	   approval	   built	   upon	   existing	   “conditionality”	   that	   was	   present	   for	   the	  
World	   Bank.	   As	   the	   countries	   that	   required	   assistance	   generally	   were	   receiving	  
assistance	   from	   the	   IMF	   to	   help	   resolve	   balance	   of	   payment	   problems,	   States	  
encouraged	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  develop	  simultaneous	  policies	  so	  that	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  Kevin	  Anderson,	   ‘International	  Law	  and	  State	  Succession:	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  Solution	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  Debt	  
Crisis?’	  (2005)	  Utah	  L.	  Rev.	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   David	   Woodward,	   Debt,	   Adjustment	   and	   Poverty	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   Developing	   Countries	   (Pinter	  
Publishers	  1992)	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they	   were	   not	   asked	   to	   implement	   conflicting	   conditions	   by	   the	   two	   main	  
multilateral	  finance	  providers.	  This	  was	  the	  point	  where	  the	  work	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  
the	   World	   Bank	   became	   closest	   as	   they	   dealt	   with	   similar	   areas	   and	   imposed	  
similar	   conditions.	   Criticism	   before,	   during	   and	   after	   the	   implementation	   of	  
Structural	  Adjustment	  Loans	  was	  fierce	  and	  the	  events	  of	  the	  1980s	  led	  directly	  to	  
the	  protests	  that	  helped	  change	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  Bank	  in	  the	  1990s.207	  
The	  Bank	  argues	  that	  it	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  use	  conditions	  to	  protect	  its	  limited	  
resources208	   to	   keep	   them	   available	   for	   member	   States	   should	   they	   need	   and	  
legally	  derive	  from	  Article	  III	  Section	  4	  (v)	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement:	  
In	  making	   or	   guaranteeing	   a	   loan,	   the	   Bank	   shall	   pay	   due	  
regard	   to	   the	   prospects	   that	   the	   borrower,	   and,	   if	   the	  
borrower	   is	   not	   a	  member,	   that	   the	   guarantor,	   will	   be	   in	  
position	   to	   meet	   its	   obligations	   under	   the	   loan;	   and	   the	  
Bank	   shall	   act	   prudently	   in	   the	   interests	   both	   of	   the	  
particular	   member	   in	   whose	   territories	   the	   project	   is	  
located	  and	  of	  the	  members	  as	  a	  whole.	  
	  
The	  conditions	  are,	  therefore,	  from	  the	  Bank’s	  perspective,	  a	  means	  of	  the	  Bank	  
ensuring	  repayment.	  
The	  conditions	  attached	  to	  loans	  quickly	  evolved	  to	  encompass	  a	  huge	  degree	  of	  
reform	   required	   to	   receive	   funding.	  As	   the	  Bank	  evidenced	   that	  members	  often	  
did	   not	   fulfil	   these	   conditions,	   the	   conditions	   became	   more	   detailed	   and	  
specific.209	  As	  well	  as	  the	  agreement	  to	  pursue	  economic	  reform,	  other	  structural	  
adjustments	   were	   required	   by	   States.	   Fiscal	   restraint,	   opening	   trade,	   trade	  
liberalisation	   and	   privatisation210	  were	   all	   standard	   elements	   that	   also	   caused	   a	  
focus	   for	  other	  Bank	   loans.	  As	  State	  resources	  were	  pushed	  towards	   the	  private	  
sector	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   enable	   growth,	   Bank	   loans	   were,	   therefore,	   required	   for	  
basic	  social	  services	  such	  as	  health,	  education	  and	  housing.211	  This	  resulted	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  See	  Chapter	  Four.	  
208	  Review	  of	  World	  Bank	  Conditionality	  (World	  Bank	  2005)	  pg.	  2	  
209	  Supra	  Note.	  197	  pg.	  40	  
210	   Berta	   Hernandez-­‐Truyol,	   ‘Cuba	   and	   Good	   Governance’	   (2004)	   14(2)	   Transnat’l	   L.	   &	  
Contemp.	  Probs.	  655,	  663	  
211	   James	  Gathii,	   ‘Human	  Rights,	   the	  World	  Bank	   and	   the	  Washington	  Consensus:	   1949-­‐
1999’	  (2000)	  94	  Am.	  Soc’y	  Int’l	  L.	  Proc.	  144,	  145	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Bank	   introducing	   "safeguards"	   and	   "operational	   directives"	   in	   areas	   such	   as	  
indigenous	  people,	   the	   environment	   and	   relocation	  due	   to	  heavy	  NGO	   lobbying	  
for	  the	  Bank	  to	  consider	  the	  ramifications	  of	  its	  lending.	  
The	  current	  Operational	  Manual,	  that	  contains	  all	   instructions	  to	  staff	  on	  how	  to	  
prepare	  projects,	  includes:	  
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.0	  -­‐	  Piloting	  the	  Use	  of	  Borrower	  Systems	  to	  Address	  
Environmental	  and	  Safeguard	  Issues	  in	  Bank-­‐Supported	  Projects	  	  
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.01	  –	  Environmental	  Assessment 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.02	  –	  Environmental	  Action	  Plans 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.04	  –	  Natural	  Habitats 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.07	  –	  Water	  Resources	  Management 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.09	  –	  Pest	  Management 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.10	  –	  Indigenous	  Peoples 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.11	  –	  Physical	  Cultural	  Resources 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.12	  –	  Involuntary	  Resettlement 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.20	  –	  Gender	  and	  Development 
 
The	  Operations	  Manual	  and	  the	  Operational	  Policies	  and	  Bank	  Procedures	  that	  it	  
contains	   bind	   the	   staff	   of	   the	   Bank.	   However,	   a	   State	   cannot	   have	   a	   project	  
approved	   unless	   the	   staff	   follows	   these	   procedures	   so	   in	   turn	   the	   Operations	  
Manual	  binds	  borrowing	  States.	  The	  link	  between	  conditions	  being	  placed	  upon	  a	  
State	  to	  ensure	  repayment	  of	  the	  Bank's	  resources	  is	  broken	  as	  a	  number	  of	  these	  
policies	   are	   not	   linked	   to	   economic	   factors	   but	   instead	   to	   politically	   desirable	  
outcomes.	  
This	   push	   by	   the	   Bank	   to	   incorporate	   areas	   not	   traditionally	   associated	   with	  
lending	  and	  not	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  Articles	  is	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  positivist	  
international	   law	  theory.	  This	  governance	  role,	   in	  telling	  member	  States	  what	  to	  
do,	  presents	  a	  challenge	  to	  conceptualising	  in	  law	  this	  governance	  authority.	  If	  the	  
positive	   theory	   of	   international	   law	   is	   based	   upon	   consent,	   the	   will	   of	   the	  
sovereign,	  then	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  this	  theory	  can	  describe	  what	  is	  happening	  when	  
a	  sovereign	  is	  restricted	  and	  governed	  itself.	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The	  Bank’s	  argument	  that	  State’s	  “own”212	  the	  loan	  and	  do	  not	  have	  to	  agree	  to	  it	  
is	  weak	  when	  considering	  the	  financial	  position	  many	  of	  the	  States	  were	  and	  are	  
in.	  With	  mounting	  debt	  and	   increasing	   foreign	  pressure	   for	   actions	   to	  be	   taken,	  
States	  were	   left	  with	  no	   choice	  but	   to	   accept	   the	  Bank’s	   proposals.	  On	   the	  one	  
hand	   the	   beneficiary	   State	   agrees	   to	   a	   loan	   under	   these	   conditions	   but	   on	   the	  
other	  the	  World	  Bank	  is	  requiring	  conditions	  are	  met	  that	  are	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  
provision	   within	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   stipulating	   that	   only	   "economic	  
considerations"	   are	   taken	   into	   account.	   There	   is,	   therefore,	   a	   conflict	   with	  
consent.	  
A	  distinction	   should	  be	  established	  between	  what	   some	  might	   consider	  a	  moral	  
obligation,	  for	  example	  that	  the	  World	  Bank	  considers	  environmental	  factors	  in	  its	  
lending,	   and	   what	   is	   legally	   possible	   under	   the	   positivist	   theory.	   A	   number	   of	  
actors	  pushed	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  environmental,	  indigenous	  rights	  and	  other	  
policies	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   then	   introduced.	   Yet	   the	   question	   over	  
environmental	   standards	   is	   inheritently	   political	   and	   not	   economical.	   Should	   a	  
State	  proceed	  with	  a	  project	   that	   they	  know	  will	  harm	  the	  environment	  but	  will	  
increase	   development	   (in	   whatever	   form	   the	   State	   decides	   that	   term	   to	  
encompass)	  for	  the	  people	  of	  the	  State?	  This	   judgment	   is	  political	   for	  borrowers	  
and	   is,	   therefore,	   outside	   the	   remit	   of	   the	   World	   Bank.	   By	   implementing	  
safeguard	  policies	   in	   this	   area,	   the	  Bank	   is	   acting	  against	   its	  political	  prohibition	  
and	  has	  usurped	  the	  borrowing	  State’s	  sovereign	  right.	  “Too	  often…	  development	  
institutions	   including	   the	   World	   Bank	   had	   taken	   too	   heavy	   a	   hand	   in	   program	  
design,	  suiting	  it	  to	  their	  perceptions	  of	  how	  development	  should	  proceed”.213	  
Increasingly	  throughout	  the	  1980’s,	  the	  World	  Bank	  sought	  to	  push	  private	  sector	  
reform	   rather	   than	   public	   sector	   reform214	   even	   going	   as	   so	   far	   as	   to	   say	   that	  
“Economic	  growth	  in	  all	  countries	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  liberal	  
trade	  environment”.215	  The	  days	  of	  States	  seeking	  money	   for	  projects	  had	   fallen	  
aside	   and	   instead	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  World	  
Bank	   and	   its	   members	   had	   reversed.	   Whilst	   initially	   loan	   applications	   were	  
approved	   unless	   there	   was	   a	   specific	   reason	   not	   too,	   now	   loans	   were	   only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  See	   for	  a	   recent	  example;	  Nicola	  Smithers,	  The	   Importance	  of	  Stakeholder	  Ownership	  
for	  Capacity	  Development	  Results	  (World	  Bank	  Institute	  2011)	  	  
213	  Supra	  Note.	  197	  pg.	  16	  
214	  World	  Bank	  Group	  Historical	  Chronology,	  pg.	  181	  
215	  World	  Bank	  Group	  Historical	  Chronology,	  pg.	  184	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approved	   if	   the	   State	   could	   satisfy	   the	   Bank	   that	   the	   State	   would	   meet	   Bank	  
conditions.	   The	   fact	   that	   these	   conditions	   had	   never	   been	   agreed	   upon	   at	   the	  
Bretton	  Woods	  Conference	  or	  implemented	  through	  amendments	  to	  the	  Articles	  
did	  not	  encumber	  the	  Bank.	  Instead	  of	  States	  directing	  the	  Bank	  as	  provided	  for	  in	  
positive	  international	  law	  theory,	  the	  Bank	  was	  and	  is	  directing	  States:	  the	  Bank	  is	  
occupying	   a	   governance	   role.	   This	   issue,	   the	   creation	   of	   operational	   guidelines	  
and	   the	   conditions	   placed	   upon	   loans,	   is	   further	   assessed	   in	   Chapter	   Four	   to	  
consider	  whether	  they	  have	  amounted	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  normative	  system.	  
Throughout	   this	   period	   the	   definition	   of	   “development”	   continually	  widened	   to	  
allow	  the	  Bank	  to	  encroach	  upon	  an	   increasing	  area	  of	  governance	  until	   in	  1989	  
the	   term	   “good	   governance”	   was	   coined.	   The	   term	   emerged	   in	   an	   analysis	   of	  
operations	   in	   Africa	   in	   the	   1989	  World	   Bank	   Study	   “Sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   –	   from	  
Crisis	   to	  Sustainable	  Growth”.	  The	  report	  argued	  that	  a	  better	  public	  sector	  was	  
required	   in	  order	   to	   facilitate	  growth	  yet	   the	   study	   itself	  defined	  governance	  as	  
“the	  exercise	  of	  political	  power	  to	  manage	  a	  nation’s	  affairs”.	  	  
Furthermore,	  corruption	  and	  its	  effect	  upon	  member	  State	  governments	  became	  
a	  focus	  of	  the	  Bank	  during	  the	  tenure	  of	  James	  Wolfensohn	  as	  President.	  
The	   evolutionary	   approach,	   outlined	   by	   the	   ICJ	   in	   the	   Costa	   Rica	   v.	   Nicaragua	  
case,	  could	  encapsulate	  this	  change	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  “development”	  if	  the	  two	  
tests	  that	  it	  identified	  are	  met.	  First,	  the	  parties	  must	  have	  used	  generic	  terms	  in	  
the	  treaty	  that	  the	  parties	  were	  aware	  were	  likely	  to	  evolve	  over	  time.	  Specialist	  
terms	   could	  not	  be	   considered	   for	   an	  evolutionary	   interpretation.	   Secondly,	   the	  
treaty	  has	  been	  entered	  into	  for	  ‘a	  very	  long	  period	  or	  is	  “of	  continuing	  duration”’.	  
Whilst	  the	  second	  test	  may	  be	  judged	  to	  be	  met	  by	  a	  treaty	  in	  force	  for	  forty	  years	  
at	   the	   time	  of	   these	   reforms,	   the	   first	   test	  would	  depend	  upon	   the	   intention	  of	  
the	   parties	   and	   how	   they	   viewed	   “development”	   within	   the	   World	   Bank’s	  
purposes.	  As	  a	   starting	  point,	   the	  VCLT	  and	   the	  purposive	  approach	  adopted	  by	  
the	  Bank,	  would	  both	  see	  development	  as	  a	  specialist	  term,	  and	  as	  the	  long	  term	  
aim	  for	  the	  Bank	  (with	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction	  always	  going	  to	  come	  to	  an	  end	  at	  
some	  point),	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  founders	  would	  use	  a	  generic	  term	  in	  
this	  context.	  Furthermore,	  given	  the	  considerable	  influence	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  
sovereignty	  had	  upon	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  conference	  as	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	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agreements	  were	  made,	   it	   is	  considerably	  doubtful	  that	  the	  founders	  considered	  
that	  the	  word	  development	  was	  a	  term	  that	  was	  likely	  to	  evolve	  over	  time.	  
Nevertheless,	   if	   it	   could	   somehow	   be	   argued	   that	   an	   evolutionary	   approach	  
should	   be	   adopted	   in	   relation	   to	   this	   term,	   quod	   non,	   then	   the	   evolutionary	  
approach	  would	   still	   require	   that	   the	   term	  development	  be	  bound	  by	   the	  other	  
wordings	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  
Good	   governance	   and	   corruption	   are	   inherently	   political	   as	   they	   deal	   with	   the	  
political	  nature	  of	  a	  State	  and	  the	  relationship	  with	  its	  citizens.	  The	  Bank	  had	  legal	  
counsel	  stating	  that	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  issues	  of	  corruption	  would	  be	  against	  
the	   requirement	   from	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   that	   the	   Bank	   not	   consider	  
political	   affairs.	   The	   Bank	   legal	   counsel	   identified	   six	   requirements	   from	   the	  
Articles	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Bank	  and	  politics:	  
‘One,	   that	   the	   proceeds	   of	   each	   loan	   be	   used	   with	   due	  
attention	   to	   considerations	   of	   economy	   and	   efficiency,	   not	  
under	  political	  or	  other	  non-­‐economic	  influences;	  two,	  that	  the	  
Bank	  not	  interfere	  in	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  its	  members;	  three,	  
that	   the	   Bank	   not	   be	   influenced	   by	   the	   political	   character	   of	  
members;	   four,	   that	   only	   economic	   considerations	   which	   are	  
weighed	  impartially	  be	  taken	  into	  account;	  five,	  that	  the	  loyalty	  
of	  the	  President	  and	  staff	  be	  entirely	  to	  the	  Bank	  and	  their	  duty	  
be	   international	   in	   character;	   and	   six,	   that	   members	   of	   the	  
Bank	  respect	  the	  international	  character	  of	  this	  duty.’216	  
	  
This	   legal	   report	   demonstrates	   the	   fallacy	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   legal	   reasoning.	  Whilst	  
they	  were	  willing	  to	  use	  a	  purposive	  approach	  towards	  the	   interpretation	  of	  the	  
purposes	  of	  the	  Bank	  to	  view	  them	  as	  wide	  as	  possible,	  they	  did	  not	  question	  the	  
purposes	  of	   the	  Bank’s	  non-­‐political	  nature	  and	  apply	  accordingly.	  The	   founders	  
had	  clear	  reason	  to	  move	  the	  Bank	  outside	  of	  political	  concerns:	  as	  a	  worldwide	  
organisation	   it	  should	  not	   in	   law	  be	   influenced	  by	  one	  political	  viewpoint	  and	  as	  
political	  decisions	  are	   sometimes	  of	   a	   contentious	  nature,	   they	  are	  best	   kept	   to	  
those	   they	   affect	   to	   make	   those	   decisions.	   The	   evolutionary	   approach	   would,	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therefore,	   fail	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   term	   development	   as,	   even	   if	   utilised,	   it	   is	  
bound	  by	  the	  political	  prohibition	  provision	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  
In	   turn,	   a	   purposive	   approach	   as	   used	   by	   the	   Bank	   towards	   the	   Articles	   should	  
have	   included	   all	   Articles,	   i.e.	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   can	   act	   within	   its	   general	  
purposes	   except	   where	   it	   is	   specifically	   excluded	   from	   doing	   so.	   The	   textual	  
approach	  adopted	  by	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  also	  would	  fail	   to	  provide	  a	  reason	  
for	  the	  Bank	  moving	  into	  areas	  that	  were	  political	  due	  to	  the	  ordinary	  meaning	  of	  
the	  words	  prohibiting	  political	  activity	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Bank.	  
In	  1992,	  the	  report	  of	  the	  Independent	  Review	  of	  the	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Project	  was	  
published	  by	   the	  Bank.	   This	  was	   the	   first	   independent	   review	  of	   a	   Bank	   project	  
commissioned	  by	  the	  Bank	  since	  its	  inception217	  and	  criticised	  the	  Bank	  for	  falling	  
short	  of	  the	  standings	  that	  were	  expected	  from	  the	  Bank’s	  guidelines	  and	  policies.	  
This	  report	  and	  other	  factors	  that	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  directly	  led	  to	  
the	  creation	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Inspection	  Panel	  in	  September	  1993.	  	  
The	   Inspection	  Panel	   is	  an	   independent	  body	  within	   the	  World	  Bank	  Group	   that	  
assesses	  the	  projects	  of	  the	  IBRD	  and	  the	  IFC	  to	  see	  if	  management	  has	  complied	  
with	  the	  operational	  policies	  and	  procedures	  they	  should	  follow	  in	  creating	  a	  loan,	  
i.e.	   has	  management	  made	   the	   borrowing	   State	   comply	  with	   the	   conditions	   for	  
assistance.	   It	   is	   sufficient	   for	   this	   chapter’s	   purpose	   to	   note	   three	   areas	   of	  
concern:	  
1) The	  Panel,	   its	   purpose,	   its	   process,	   its	   recommendations	   and	   its	   powers	  
are	  not	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  cannot	  be	  implied	  by	  
judicial	  interpretation.	  
2) The	  Panel	  was	  created	  without	  treaty	  amendment.	  
3) The	   Panel	   allowed,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   international	   financial	   law,	  
individuals	  to	  directly	  contact	  an	  international	  organisation	  without	  going	  
through	  their	  respective	  State.	  
	  
The	   creation	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   significantly	   deviates	   from	   the	   positivist	  
international	   law	   theorem.	   States	   had	   not	   consented	   to	   be	   bound	   by	   this	   new	  
area	   of	   the	   Bank,	   nor	   provided	   for	   the	   new	   dialog	   between	   individuals	   and	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international	   organisations.	   The	   State’s	   traditional	   place	   as	   a	   conduit	   in	   law	  
between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  international	  legal	  plane	  had	  been	  broken	  for	  the	  
first	   time.	   Whilst	   international	   law	   had	   previously	   reached	   beyond	   States	   to	  
individuals,218	   never	   before	   had	   individuals	   reached	   into	   the	   international	   law	  
sphere.	  
In	   1996	   the	   Bank	   for	   the	   first	   time	   took	   a	   decision	   completely	   outside	   of	   its	  
Articles	   of	   Agreement	   in	   relation	   to	   its	   membership.	   Article	   III	   Section	   1	   (a)	  
stipulates	  that	  "The	  resources	  and	  facilities	  of	  the	  Bank	  shall	  be	  used	  exclusively	  
for	  the	  benefit	  of	  members".	  Yet	  after	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  Yugoslavia,	   the	  Bank	   lent	  
money	   to	  Bosnia	  before	   it	   became	  a	  member.219	   This	   is	   further	   evidence	  of	   the	  
lack	  of	  ability	  of	  the	  positive	  theory	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  acted.	  
The	   increasing	  use	  of	  conditions	  on	  an	   increasing	  amount	  of	  subject	  areas,	  even	  
when	   economical,	   could	   not	   continue.	   The	   Bank	   was	   in	   an	   ironical	   position	   of	  
forcing	  States	  who	  least	  could	  afford	  it	  and,	  therefore,	  required	  external	  funding,	  
to	   apply	   conditions	   they	   could	   not	   afford	   to	   do.	   The	   decline	   in	   lending	   was	  
dramatic	   as	   States	   that	   could	   do	   so	   rebelled	   and	   sought	   funding	   elsewhere.220	  
Unfortunately	   this	   left	  States	  who	  could	  not	  afford	   to	   raise	   funding	   through	  any	  
other	  mechanism	  using	  the	  Bank	  and	  having	  to	  implement	  its	  conditions.	  
The	   Bank	   resolved	   to	   use	   less	   conditionality	   upon	   its	   loans	   but	   the	   current	  
Operational	   Manual,	   as	   examined	   above,	   still	   contains	   the	   same	   requirements	  
that	   are	   placed	   indirectly	   upon	   a	   State.	   Recent	   developments	   on	   conditionality	  
and	   the	   Operational	   Procedures	   include	   the	   first	   time	   use	   in	   Chad	   of	   the	   Bank	  
insisting	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   public	   institution221	   and	   the	   2005	   review	   of	  
conditionality	   when	   the	   Bank	   undertook	   a	   review	   of	   its	   policy	   of	   attaching	  
conditions	  to	  loans.	  It	  concluded,	  “Bank	  support	  remains	  broadly	  consistent	  with	  
the	  good	  practice	  principles	  on	  conditionality”.222	  	  
1.10.6	  President’s	  Agendas	  
The	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank	  should	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  yet	  this	  
has	   not	   always	   been	   the	   case.	   As	   the	   Bank’s	   role	   has	   evolved,	   the	   link	   to	   the	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Articles	   and	   what	   the	   founders	   envisioned	   this	   role	   to	   be	   has	   been	   lost.	   An	  
interesting	  exercise	  is	  to	  note	  how	  each	  of	  the	  successive	  World	  Bank	  Presidents	  
described	  the	  Bank’s	  role:	  
Eugene	  Meyers	  (June	  1946	  –	  December	  1946):	  “(t)o	  promote	  international	  flow	  of	  
long-­‐term	  capital	  and	  to	  assure	  funds	  for	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  devastated	  areas	  
and	  the	  development	  of	  resources	  in	  member	  countries.”223	  
John	   J.	   McCloy	   (March	   1947	   –	   June	   1949):	   “The	   reconstruction	   phase	   of	   the	  
Bank’s	  activities	  is	   largely	  over.	  The	  development	  phase	  –	  assisting	  in	  developing	  
the	   productive	   facilities	   and	   resources	   of	   the	  world	  wherever	   the	   opportunities	  
present	  themselves	  –	  is	  under	  way.”224	  
Eugene	   R.	   Black	   (July	   1949	   –	   December	   1962):	   “We	   ourselves	   must	   play	   a	  
significant	  part	  in	  helping	  these	  countries	  to	  achieve	  the	  new	  standards	  of	  life	  to	  
which	  they	  aspire.”225	  
George	  David	  Woods	   (January	   1963	   –	  March	  1968):	   “(w)e	  have	  no	  objective	   to	  
serve	  but	  economic	  development.”226	  
Robert	  S.	  McNamara	  (April	  1968	  –	  June	  1981):	  “The	  lesson	  of	  the	  last	  decade	  has	  
been	  that	  we	  cannot	  simply	  depend	  on	  economic	  growth	  alone…Future	  places	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank…must	  give	   far	  greater	  attention	   to	   the	  basic	  problems	  affecting	  
the	  lives	  of	  the	  developing	  peoples”227	  
Alden	  Clausen	  (July	  1981	  –	  June	  1986):	  “The	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IFC	  can	  help	  to	  
strengthen	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  the	  developing	  nations…not	  because	  it	  is	  an	  end	  
in	   itself,	   but	   because	   it	   is	   a	   vital	   means	   of	   alleviating	   poverty	   and	   securing	  
economic	  growth.”228	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Barber	  Conable	   (July	   1986	  –	  August	   1991):	   “The	   central	   challenge	  of	   the	  World	  
Bank…is	   the	   same	   in	   1986	   as	   in	   1946:	   to	  mobilize	   the	  will	   and	   resources	  of	   the	  
affluent	  and	  of	  the	  afflicted	  alike	  in	  the	  global	  battle	  against	  poverty.”229	  
Lewis	   Preston	   (September	   1991	   –	  May	   1995):	   “sustainable	   poverty	   reduction	   is	  
the	  overarching	  objective	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.”230	  
James	   D.	  Wolfensohn	   (June	   1995	   –	  May	   2005):	   “(W)e	  must	   tackle	   the	   issue	   of	  
economic	   and	   financial	   efficiency.	   But	   we	   also	   need	   to	   address	   transparency,	  
accountability,	  and	   institutional	  capacity.	  And	  let’s	  not	  mince	  words:	  we	  need	  to	  
deal	  with	  the	  cancer	  of	  corruption.”231	  
Paul	   Wolfowitz	   (June	   2005	   –	   June	   2007):	   “(g)overnance	   is	   a	   necessity	   and	  
important	  part	  of	  the	  development	  agenda.”232	  
Robert	  B.	  Zoellick	  (July	  2007	  –June	  2012):	  “It	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Bank	  Group	  to	  
assist	  countries	  to	  help	  themselves	  by	  catalyzing	  the	  capital	  and	  policies	  through	  a	  
mix	   of	   ideas	   and	  experience,	   development	  of	   private	  market	   opportunities,	   and	  
support	   for	   good	   governance	   and	   anti-­‐corruption	   –	   spurred	   by	   our	   financial	  
resources.”233	  
Jim	   Yong	   Kim	   (July	   2012	   –	   Present):	   “As	   a	   global	   institution	   with	   188	  member	  
countries,	   the	   World	   Bank	   must	   play	   a	   pivotal	   role	   in	   brokering	   solutions	   to	  
achieve	  a	  world	  free	  of	  poverty.”234	  
When	   Wolfensohn	   gave	   his	   inaugural	   speech	   as	   the	   Bank's	   President	   Malloch	  
Brown,	   the	  Vice	  President	  of	   External	  Affairs,	   commented	   that	  Wolfensohn	  was	  
not	   "on	  message".	  A	   fellow	   staff	  member	  observed	   that	   "(H)e's	   the	   President,	   I	  
think	  you'll	  find	  that	  is	  the	  message".235	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  World	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   Barber	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  1991)	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   Jim	  Yong	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These	  statements	  show	  a	  clear	  shift	  in	  time	  away	  from	  the	  purposes	  lain	  down	  in	  
Article	  1	  of	   the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  The	  realm	  of	  politics	   treads	  closely	   in	  the	  
footsteps	  of	  international	  law	  and	  it	  must	  always	  be	  with	  care	  that	  statements	  are	  
analysed.	  However,	  as	  the	  Presidents	  are	  the	  head	  of	  the	  institution	  and	  head	  of	  
the	  employees	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  their	  statements	  deserve	  some	  consideration.	  
It	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  as	  Presidents	  have	  changed,	  their	  interpretation	  of	  the	  precise	  
role	  of	  the	  Bank	  has	  changed.	  This	  has	  been	  sought	  to	  be	  remedied	  by	  the	  Bank	  
attempting	   to	   stretch	   the	   meaning	   of	   words	   in	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   to	  
incorporate	   new	   areas	   of	   competence	   as	   old	   ones	   have	   elapsed	   (the	   shift	   from	  
reconstruction	  to	  development)	  or	  when	  other	  aims	  have	  not	  fallen	  within	  explicit	  
meanings	   of	   words	   (the	   increasingly	   wider	   interpretation	   of	   the	   word	  
“development”	  to	  incorporate	  large	  swaths	  of	  society).	  
If	  law	  emanates	  from	  States	  as	  the	  positivist	  theory	  asserts,	  then	  the	  express	  will	  
of	   States	   should	   direct	   the	   World	   Bank,	   and	   not	   a	   President’s	   agenda.	   The	  
evolution	  of	  the	  Bank	  has	  not	  been	  reflected	  in	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  purposes	  of	  
the	  Bank,	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  
	  
1.11	  Conclusion	  
The	  World	   Bank	   of	   today	   is	   a	   very	   different	   organisation	   to	   the	   one	   created	   in	  
1945.	  As	   the	  various	  Presidents	  have	  used	  their	  own	   interpretation	  on	  what	   the	  
Bank	   should	  do,	   it	  has	   shifted	   from	   the	  original	   vision	  of	   reconstruction	   in	   large	  
infrastructure	  projects	   to	  attempting	   to	   represent	   the	  world’s	  poorest	   in	   loosely	  
framed	   development	   terms.	   As	   shown,	   the	   World	   Bank	   has	   gone	   through	   this	  
remarkable	  metamorphosis	  with	  numerous	  steps	  in	  between.	  The	  crucial	  element	  
of	   this	  brief	  history	  has	  been	   to	  argue	   the	   lack	  of	  State	  control	   in	   the	  change	   in	  
emphasis	   in	   the	   Bank	   and	   that	   this	   change	   has	   not	   occurred	   with	   necessary	  
matching	  changes	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  Articles	  of	  Agreements.	  
It	   is	  difficult	   to	  argue	  that	   the	  abolition	  of	  poverty	   is	  not	  a	  worthwhile	  and	   lofty	  
goal	   that	   the	   world	   should	   aim	   for.	   However,	   this	   in	   turn	   raises	   a	   number	   of	  
questions	  of	  effectiveness.	   Is	   the	  World	  Bank	   the	  best	  avenue	   for	  achieving	   this	  
goal?	   Who	   gave	   it	   the	   power	   to	   assume	   this	   mantle?	   As	   seen	   throughout	   its	  
history,	   the	  Bank	  has	  consistently	  argued	  that	   its	  emphasis	  has	  stemmed	  from	  a	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legal	   interpretation	  of	   its	   treaty.	  However,	   the	  Bank’s	  actions	  are	  not	  consistent	  
with	  any	  form	  of	  treaty	  interpretation.	  The	  introduction,	  use	  and	  requirement	  of	  
conditions	  and	  Operational	  Policies	  has	  forced	  the	  Bank	  away	  from	  its	  mandate	  to	  
the	  obtuse	  position	  where	  its	  aim	  is	  to	  reduce	  poverty	  but	  it	  cannot	  lend	  to	  some	  
of	   the	   poorest	   people	   as	   they	   do	   not	   meet	   its	   environmental	   or	   political	  
conditions.	  
The	  problems	  arising	  from	  the	  acts	  of	  an	  international	  organisation	  outside	  of	  its	  
mandate,	   such	  as	   the	  World	  Bank,	  are	   ‘far	   from	  being	   resolved,	  and	   in	  any	  case	  
are	  not	  susceptible	  to	  resolution	  by	  means	  of	  simplified	  formulations’.236	  Chapter	  
Four	   will	   examine	   these	   issues	   and	   what	   they	   mean	   when	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	  
governance	  and	  law.	  
However,	   the	   most	   remarkable	   feature	   of	   the	   Bank's	   evolution	   has	   been	   the	  
behaviour	  of	  States.	  States	  are	  largely,	  with	  a	  very	  few	  exceptions,	  accepting	  that	  
the	   Bank	   can	   behave	   in	   such	   a	  manner,	   even	   when	   it	   is	   not	   in	   their	   own	   best	  
interest.	   Where	   States	   have	   rigorously	   sought	   to	   protect	   their	   sovereignty	  
elsewhere,	  they	  have	  not	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Bank.	  As	  the	  most	  readily	  utilised	  tool	  
of	  understanding	  public	  international	  law,	  the	  history	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  been	  
analysed	  against	   the	  positive	   theory.	   This	   tool	   cannot	  explain	   the	  actions	  of	   the	  
Bank	  acting	  outside	  of	  its	  mandate	  and,	  therefore,	  outside	  of	  and	  at	  times	  against	  
State	  consent.	  	  
In	  particular,	  the	  governance	  role	  that	  the	  Bank	  is	  exercising	  needs	  to	  be	  framed	  
in	  terms	  of	  law.	  The	  Bank	  is	  telling	  member	  States	  to	  do,	  and	  is	  doing	  it	  based	  on	  
rules	   that	   it	   has	   established	   itself.	   If	   governance	   cannot	   be	   based	   upon	   State	  
consent,	   alternative	   theories	   need	   to	   be	   considered	   to	   frame	   this	   role	   that	   the	  
Bank	  is	  exercising	  in	  terms	  of	  law.	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Chapter	  Two:	  Alternative	  Theories	  
	  
2.1	  Introduction	  
The	   history	   of	   the	   philosophy	   of	   law,	   or	   jurisprudence,	   is	   a	   history	   of	   theories	  
attempting	  to	  either	  tell	  how	  the	  law	  should	  be	  (normative	  jurisprudence)	  or	  how	  
the	   law	   is	   (analytical	   jurisprudence)	   although	   at	   many	   times	   both.	   Public	  
international	   law	  has	  its	  own	  subset	  of	  theories	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  
how	   it	   operates,	   either	   emanating	   from	   national	   law	   theories	   being	   applied	  
internationally	   or	   theories	   specifically	   and	   only	   designed	   for	   the	   international	  
arena.	  
The	   theory	   of	   law	   between	   nations	   has	   repeatedly	   moved	   between	   two	   main	  
basis	  of	   law,	  positive	  law	  and	  natural	   law.1	  Hugo	  Grotious	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  modern	  
founder	  of	   international	   law,2	  yet	   law	  governing	  the	  conduct	  between	  nations	   is	  
thousands	  of	   years	  old	  and,	  although	   the	  most	  prevalent,	   the	  positive	   school	  of	  
thought	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  only	  theory	  that	  has	  or	  is	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  work	  of	  
international	  organisations	  within	  public	  international	  law.	  
Chapter	  One	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  
adequately	  explained	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  positivist	  theory.	  A	  plethora	  of	  theories	  
exist	   that	   attempt	   to	   outline	   the	   legal	   basis	   for	   the	   work	   of	   organisations	   in	  
international	   law	   and	   although	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	   systems	   theory	  
approach,	   this	   chapter	   will	   consider	   the	  main	   alternative	   legal	   approaches	   that	  
have	  been	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  work	  of	   international	  organisations	  and	  highlights	  
why	   they	  are	  an	   inappropriate	  mechanism	   for	  explaining	   the	  work	  of	   the	  World	  
Bank.	  
International	  organisations	  acting	  outside	  of	   their	   founders’	  mandate,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  governance	  function	  that	  they	  arguably	  now	  possess,	  of	  telling	  States	  what	  to	  
do,	   are	   not	   exclusive	   to	   the	   World	   Bank.	   Other	   organisations	   have	   been	  
considered	   in	   the	   academic	   literature	   and	   in	   reflecting	   upon	   this	   shift	   in	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governance,	   a	   number	   of	   dominant	   approaches	   have	   emerged	   via	   which	   the	  
actions	   of	   international	   organisations	   have	   sought	   to	   be	   explained	   in	   law.	   This	  
chapter	   examines	   and	   rejects	   these	   other	   theories,	   in	   order	   to	   argue	   that	   the	  
traditional	   tools	   that	   have	   been	   utilised	   to	   explain	   the	   work	   of	   international	  
organisations	  are	  not	  adequate	  to	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
Four	   alternative	   analytical	   tools	   are	   examined:	   progressive	   positive,	  
constitutionalisation	  of	  international	  organisations,	  global	  administrative	  law	  and	  
international	   institutional	   law.	   The	   constitutionalisation	   of	   international	  
organisations,	   global	   administrative	   law	   and	   international	   institutional	   law	   are	  
developed	  areas	  of	  legal	  scholarship	  that	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  other	  international	  
organisations	   in	  order	   to	  explain	   their	  work	  and	   their	   governance	   function.	   This	  
chapter	  argues	  that	  whilst	  they	  may	  be	  acceptable	  models	  for	  the	  understanding	  
of	   other	   international	   organisations,	   they	   fail	   to	   explain	   in	   law	   the	  work	   of	   the	  
Bank.	   In	   addition	   to	   these	   established	   theories,	   the	   progressive	   positive	   tool,	   a	  
term	   coined	   for	   this	   thesis,	   is	   a	   developing	   area	   of	   international	   law	   that	   is	  
explored,	   but	   ultimately	   found	   unsuccessful,	   to	   explain	   in	   law	   the	   work	   of	   the	  
World	  Bank.	  
	  
2.2	  Theories	  at	  Work	  
According	   to	   the	   traditional	   conception	   of	   international	   law	   based	   upon	   the	  
positive	   theory,	  States	  and	  only	  States	  can	  create	  and	  alter	   international	   law,	  as	  
the	   only	   valid	   expression	   of	   sovereign	   will.	   Although	   this	   account	   is	   successful	  
enough	   to	   describe	   the	  majority	   of	   law	  making	   that	   occurs	   at	   the	   international	  
level,	  it	  has	  been	  found,	  especially	  since	  the	  1940s	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  current	  
multilateral	  system	  that	  the	  behaviour	  exhibited	  by	  both	  States	  and	  international	  
organisations	   could	   not	   always	   be	   explained	   within	   this	   model.	   Instead	   an	  
alternative	   model	   is	   necessary	   to	   be	   adopted	   in	   a	   number	   of	   specific	  
circumstances.	  
The	  evolution	  and	  shift	  in	  theories	  of	  law	  is	  nothing	  new.	  As	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  
the	  positive	  theory	   itself	  overtook	  natural	   law	  as	  the	  prevalent	  theory	  to	  explain	  
law.3	   The	  multitudes	   of	   separate	   theories	   that	   exist	   to	   define	  what	   law	   is,	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	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  Chapter	  1.4	  The	  Application	  of	  Positive	  Theory	  to	  International	  Law	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supporters	  for	  and	  against,	  acts	  as	  ample	  evidence	  that	  the	  popularity	  of	  theories	  
strengthens	  and	  fades	  over	  time.	  The	  waning	  of	  influence	  that	  the	  positive	  theory	  
wields	   in	   international	   legal	   theory	   since	   the	   end	  of	   the	   Second	  World	  War	  has	  
been	   demonstrated	   in	   Chapter	   One.4	   Yet	   even	   at	   its	   height	   of	   influence,	   the	  
positive	   theory	   was	   by	   no	   means	   universal	   in	   its	   following.	   Supporters	   of	  
alternative	  theories	  have	  existed	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  positivism	  in	  
international	   law5	  and	   in	  the	  present,	  with	  the	  fading	  of	  support	  for	  the	  positive	  
theory	   in	   some	   respects,	   other	   theories	   have	   gained	   an	   increasing	   amount	   of	  
supporters.	  
Yet	   supporters	  of	   various	   theories	  appear	   to	  be	  polarised	  by	   their	   support	   for	  a	  
chosen	   theory.6	  Theories	  are	  generally	   seen	  as	  mutually	  exclusive	  concepts	  with	  
applicability	   across	   the	   legal	   spectrum.	   In	   science,	   however,	   the	   applicability	   of	  
different	   theories	   for	   different	   concepts	   is	   readily	   accepted;	   the	   concept	   of	  
‘model-­‐dependent	   realism’	   exists.7	   This	   is	   the	   conception	   that	   if	   a	   model	  
accurately	   predicts	   events,	   it	   is	   attributed	   a	   seal	   of	   truth	   for	   the	   area	   that	   it	  
attempts	   to	   explain.	   However,	   if	   two	   separate	   models	   with	   two	   different	  
fundamental	  philosophies	  can	  both	  accurately	  explain	  previous	  and	  predict	  future	  
events,	   model-­‐dependent	   realism	   states	   that	   one	   theory	   is	   not	   anymore	   ‘true’	  
than	  the	  other.	  The	  user	  is	  free	  to	  employ	  whichever	  model	  is	  most	  convenient	  to	  
any	  circumstance.8	  
This	  model	  dependant	  concept	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  modern	  international	  law	  with	  the	  
propagation	   of	   theories	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   accurately	   describe	   events	   that	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  Chapter	  1.6	  Evolution	  
5	   See	   for	   example;	   James	   Lorimer,	   The	   Institutes	   of	   Law:	   a	   Treatise	   of	   the	   Principles	   of	  
Jurisprudence	   as	   Determined	   by	   Nature	   (Edinburgh	   1872),	   Pasquale	   Mancini,	   Diritto	  
Internazionale	   (Reprinted	   by	   Nabu	   Press	   2010)	   &	   Quincy	   Wright,	  Mandates	   Under	   the	  
League	  of	  Nations	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press	  1930)	  
6	   This	   has	   particularly	   been	  demonstrated	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   Soviet	   school	   of	   positivism.	  
See	   for	   example;	   "scholars	   such	   as	   Korovin	   who	   argued	   that	   the	   Soviet	   Government	  
should	  recognise	  only	  treaties	  [as	  a	  source	  of]	  international	  law	  and	  should	  reject	  custom	  
are	  absolutely	  wrong"	  quoted	  in	  Pashukanis,	  Ocherki	  po	  Mezhdunarodnomu	  Pravu	  (Essays	  
in	   International	   Law),	   (Moscow	   1935)	   Ch.	   2,	   cited	   in	   Jan	   Triska,	   ‘Treaties	   and	   Other	  
Sources	   of	   Order	   in	   International	   Relations:	   The	   Soviet	   View’	   (1958)	   52(4)	   American	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  699,	  704-­‐5.	  Although	  note	  the	  limited	  use	  by	  some	  authors	  of	  
the	   applicability	   of	   different	   theories	   to	   describe	   different	   areas	   of	   law;	   Kal	   Raustiala	  &	  
Anne-­‐Marie	   Slaughter,	   'International	   Law,	   International	   Relations	   and	   Compliance',	   in	  
Thomas	   Risse	   &	   Beth	   Simmons	   (eds.),	   The	   Handbook	   of	   International	   Relations	   (Sage	  
Publications	  2002)	  538	  
7	  Stephen	  Hawking	  &	  Leonard	  Mlodinow,	  The	  Grand	  Design	  (Bantam	  Press	  2010)	  
8	  Ibid.	  pg.	  46	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occurred.	   Fragmentation,9	   constitutionalisation,10	   and	   spheres11	   are	   examples	   of	  
attempts	   to	   separate	   international	   law	   into	   discreet	   sections	   that	   can	   be	  
explained	  by	  reference	  to	  individual	  legal	  theories.	  The	  four	  legal	  theories	  that	  will	  
be	  examined	   in	  this	  chapter	  are	  all	   instances	  of	  existing	  and	  developing	  theories	  
used	   to	   describe	   the	   relationship	   between	   international	   organisations	   and	  
sovereign	  States.	  The	  very	  presence	  of	  so	  many	  competing	  theories	  demonstrates	  
that	   it	   is	   increasingly	   difficult	   for	   one	   theory	   to	   adequately	   describe	   every	  
eventuality	  of	   law.	   If	  one	  theory	  managed	  to	   fit	  all	  existing	  circumstances,	   there	  
would	   be	   nothing	   to	   compete	   with.	   However,	   in	   a	   fragmented	   world	   of	  
international	   law,	   if	   two	   (or	  more)	   theories	  accurately	  predict	   future	  events	  and	  
adequately	  describe	  current	  events,	  if	  the	  model	  dependent	  realism	  concept	  was	  
applied	  to	  law,	  it	   is	  difficult	  to	  argue	  that	  one	  theory	  is	  better	  or	  more	  true	  than	  
another.	  
During	   the	   first	   thirty	   years	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century,	   scientists	   discovered	   that	  
the	   models	   they	   were	   using	   to	   explain	   reactions	   that	   occurred	   through	  
observation	  were	  no	  longer	  accurate	  when	  applied	  at	  the	  atomic	  level.	  A	  distinct	  
set	   of	   theories	  had	   to	  be	  developed	  and	  used	   called	  quantum	  mechanics.	   Since	  
this	   time,	   theoretical	   physicists	   have	   been	   attempting	   to	   unify	   these	   quantum	  
theories	   (theories	   that	   describe	   what	   happens	   on	   the	   macroscopic	   level)	   with	  
Einstein’s	   theory	   of	   general	   relativity	   (a	   theory	   that	   describes	  what	   happens	   on	  
the	   everyday	   level	   and	   higher).	   Science	   from	   the	   days	   of	   Plato,	   to	   Newton	   to	  
modern	   M-­‐theory	   has	   been	   on	   a	   quest	   to	   find	   better	   and	   better	   theories	   or	  
models	  to	  describe	  the	  laws	  that	  govern	  the	  universe.	  Legal	  scholars	  have	  been	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Conclusions	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Study	  Group	  on	  the	  Fragmentation	  of	  International	  Law:	  
Difficulties	  arising	  from	  the	  Diversification	  and	  Expansion	  of	  International	  Law.	  Available	  at	  
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf;	  
Martti	   Koskenniemi	   and	   Päivi	   Leino,	   'Fragmentation	   of	   International	   Law?	   Postmodern	  
Anxieties'	  (2002)	  15(3)	  Leiden	  Journal	  of	  Inter'l	  L.	  553;	  and	  Andreas	  Zimmermann	  &	  Reiner	  
Hoffmann,	  with	  assisting	  editor	  Hanna	  Goeters,	  Unity	  and	  Diversity	  of	   International	   Law	  
(Duncker	  &	  Humblot	  2006)	  
10	  Jan	  Klabbers,	  Anne	  Peters	  &	  Geir	  Ulfsten,	  The	  Constitutionalisation	  of	  International	  Law	  
(OUP	  2009);	  Ernst-­‐Ulrich	  Petersmann,	  'How	  to	  Reform	  the	  UN	  System?	  Constitutionalism,	  
International	  Law,	  and	   International	  Organizations'	   (1997)	  10(3)	  Leiden	   Journal	  of	   Int'l	   L.	  
421;	   and	   Klaus	   Armingeon,	   Karolina	   	   Mileqicz,	   Simone	   Peter	   and	   Anne	   Peters,	   'The	  
Constitutionalisation	   of	   International	   Trade	   Law'	   within	   Thomas	   Cottier	   (ed.),	   The	  
Prospects	  of	  International	  Trade	  Regulation	  (CUP	  2011)	  
11	   Sir	   G.	   Fitzmaurice,	   ‘The	   General	   Principles	   of	   International	   Law	   Considered	   from	   the	  
Standpoint	  of	   the	  Rule	  of	   Law’	   (1957)	  92(2)	  Hague	  Recueil	   and	  Hersch	   Lauterpacht,	  The	  
Development	  of	  International	  Law	  by	  the	  International	  Court	  (CUP	  1982)	  399	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a	   similar	   search	   for	   better	   and	   better	  models	   to	   describe	  what	   law	   is	   and	  why	  
people	   follow	   it.	   Again	   from	   Plato,	   to	   Locke	   and	   Hart,	   legal	   scholars	   have	   put	  
forward	  an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  theories	  in	  efforts	  to	  describe	  this.	  
Crucially,	  however,	   this	   search	   to	  better	  describe	  and	  predict	   circumstances	  has	  
led	   to	   a	   specialisation	   in	   legal	   thinking.	   There	   are	   now	   theories	   to	   describe	  
national	  law,	  indigenous	  law	  and	  international	  law.	  Even	  within	  international	  law,	  
due	   to	   fragmentation	   we	   have	   different	   theories	   to	   explain	   different	   areas:	  
constitutionalisation	   for	   organisations,12	   compliance	   theory	   for	   observance,13	  
rational	   choice	   theory14	   and	   game	   theory15	   for	   customary	   international	   law	   and	  
many	  more.	  We	   are	   left	   in	   a	   position	  where,	   like	  modern	  day	   physics,	  we	  have	  
different	   theories	   to	   describe	   distinct	   separate	   areas	   but	   are	   lacking	   a	   widely	  
accepted	  theory	  to	  link	  them	  all	  together	  or	  to	  adequately	  describe	  what	  is	  ‘law’	  
in	  every	  circumstance.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   there	   does	   exist	   at	   least	   one	   crucial	   difference	   between	   the	  
philosophies	  of	  law	  and	  physics	  that	  must	  be	  analysed.	  Since	  the	  universe	  began,	  
the	  laws	  that	  govern	  physics	  have	  never	  changed;	  only	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  
laws	  has.	  Laws	  that	  govern	  the	  binding	  of	  atoms	  in	  the	  universe	  have	  not	  changed	  
and,	   importantly,	   never	   will	   in	   the	   future.	   Law	   is	   altogether	   different.	   Five	  
hundred	   years	   ago	   before	   the	   introduction	   of	  modern	   international	   law,	   States	  
would	   not	   have	   followed	   a	   rule	   lain	   down	   by	   an	   international	   body	   with	   an	  
exclusive	  jurisdiction	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  A	  State’s	  right	  to	  wage	  war	  was	  viewed	  
as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   statehood	   and	   an	   international	   body	   passing	   a	   resolution	  
either	  forbidding	  or	  allowing	  the	  use	  of	  force	  would	  not	  have	  been	  viewed	  as	  law.	  
Similarly	  today,	  many	  people	  might	  object	  to	  a	  religious	  organisation	  laying	  down	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Supra	  Note.	  10	  (Jan	  Klabbers,	  Anne	  Peters	  &	  Geir	  Ulfsten)	  
13	  Andrew	  Guzman,	  ‘A	  Compliance-­‐Based	  Theory	  of	  International	  Law’	  (2002)	  90	  California	  
L.R.	  1823	  and	  George	  Downs,	  David	  Rocke	  and	  Peter	  Barsoom,	   'Is	   the	  Good	  News	  about	  
Compliance	  Good	  News	  about	  Cooperation?'	  (1996)	  50	  International	  Organization	  379	  
14	   Alexander	   Thompson,	   'Applying	   Rational	   Choice	   Theory	   to	   International	   Law:	   The	  
Promise	   and	   Pitfalls'	   (2002)	   31	   Journal	   of	   Legal	   Studies	   285;	   Robert	   Keohane,	   'Rational	  
Choice	  Theory	  and	  International	  Law:	  Insights	  and	  Limitations'	  (2002)	  31	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  
Studies	  307	  &	  Andrew	  Guzman,	  How	  International	  Law	  Works:	  A	  Rational	  Choice	  Theory	  
(OUP	  2008)	  
15	   Jack	  Goldsmith	   and	   Eric	   Posner,	   'A	   Theory	   of	   Customary	   International	   Law'	   (1999)	   66	  
University	   of	   Chicago	   L.	   Rev.	   1113;	   Mark	   Chinen,	   'Game	   Theory	   and	   Customary	  
International	  Law:	  A	  Response	  to	  Professors	  Goldsmith	  and	  Posner'	  (2001)	  23	  Michigan	  J.	  
Int’l	  L.	  143	  &	  Francesco	  Parisi	  &	  Nita	  Ghei,	   'The	  Role	  of	  Reciprocity	   in	   International	  Law'	  
(2003)	  36	  Cornell	  Int’l	  L.	  J.	  93	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rules	  that	  they	  must	  abide	  by,	  something	  that	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  did	  on	  a	  
regular	  basis	  throughout	  Europe	  during	  the	  Middle	  Ages.16	  
Internationally	   the	   pace	   of	   change	   in	   relations	   and	   legal	   dealings	   has	   been	  
significant,	  yet	  in	  essence	  international	  lawyers	  are	  still	  using	  the	  same	  traditional	  
sovereignty	  based	  theory	  to	  describe	  events.	  
For	  example,	  the	  presently	  accepted	  sources	  of	  international	   law	  that	  are	  widely	  
quoted	   in	   both	   academic	   opinion	   and	   supported	   by	   previous	   State	   practice	   are	  
enshrined	  in	  Article	  38	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  Statute.	  State	  practice,	  
however,	   has	   moved	   beyond	   these	   rigid	   structures	   and	   to	   persist	   with	   an	  
inflexible	  adherence	  to	   these	  sources	  has	  been	  said	   to	  undermine	  the	  relevance	  
of	  international	  law.17	  A	  more	  fluid	  plurality	  of	  sources	  would	  benefit	  the	  survival,	  
and	  continuing	  relevance,	  of	  international	  law.18	  
Law	  has	  evolved	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  evolve	  so	  that	  what	  people	  accept	  as	  a	  law	  
or	   even	   where	   law	   comes	   from	   will	   adapt	   as	   it	   has	   in	   the	   past.	   This	   has	   the	  
implication	  that,	  at	  best,	  any	  theory	   that	   is	  offered	  to	  explain	   ‘what	   is	   law?’	  can	  
only	   adequately	   explain	  what	   is	   happening	   in	   present	   circumstances	   and	   in	   the	  
past	  whilst	  having	  a	  diminished	  future	  value.	  Every	  theory	  has	  an	  unknown	  time	  
stamp	  attached	  to	  it;	  it	  might	  expire	  after	  six	  months,	  ten	  years	  or	  at	  some	  distant	  
point	   in	  the	  future	  but	  at	  some	  stage	  a	  model	  will	  no	   longer	  accurately	  describe	  
current	  and	  future	  events	  as	  law	  will	  have	  evolved	  beyond	  it.	  
The	  only	  way	  to	  provide	  ‘future-­‐proof’	  theories	  is	  to	  create	  a	  theory	  so	  basic	  that	  
it	   is	  of	  extreme	  difficultly	  to	  argue	  against.	   ‘Law	  is	  what	  people	  perceive	  as	   law’,	  
that	   in	   itself	   is	  so	  simplistic	  as	  to	  always	  apply,	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  meaningful	  
tool	  for	  analysis	  of	  norms.	  
Model	   dependent	   realism	   and	   the	   evolution	   of	   understanding	   of	   law	   are	  
fundamental	  aspects	  of	  this	  analysis.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  this	  work	  to	  dispute	  
the	  applicability	  of	  the	  positive	  theory	  generally,	  no	  such	  analysis	  is	  contained	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Louis	  Goodman,	  ‘Democracy,	  Sovereignty	  and	  Intervention’	  (1993-­‐1994)	  9	  AM.	  U.	  J.	  Int’l	  
L.	  &	  Pol’y	  27	  	  
17	  Bruno	  Simma,	  ‘Universality	  of	  International	  Law	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  a	  Practitioner’	  
(2009)	  20	  EJIL	  265,	  269-­‐270	  
18	  Andrea	  Bjorklund	  &	  Sophie	  Nappert,	   'Beyond	  Fragmentation',	   in	  Todd	  Weiler	  &	  Freya	  
Baetens	   (eds.),	   New	   Directions	   in	   International	   Economic	   Law	   –	   in	   Memoriam	   Thomas	  
Wälde	  (CMP	  Publishing	  2011)	  439,	  446	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the	   work	   done	   throughout	   cannot	   be	   extrapolated	   to	   other	   areas	   of	   public	  
international	   law	  with	  ease.	  The	  positive	  theory	  has	   failed	  to	  make	  sense	   in	  one	  
area	  of	  public	  international	  law,	  international	  organisations,	  of	  one	  aspect	  of	  that	  
area,	   the	  World	  Bank.	  Alternative	   theories	   are,	   therefore,	   sought	   to	   explain	   the	  
workings	   of	   this	   one	   particular	   aspect.	   If	   a	   theory	   can	   adequately	   explain	   the	  
workings	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  it	  should	  be	  accepted	  as	  applying	  in	  that	  context,	  but	  
not	  automatically	  refuting	  the	  work	  of	  others	  either	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  
or	  more	  generally.	  
	  
2.3	  What	  is	  Public	  International	  Law?	  
Perhaps	  international	  law	  has	  developed	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  one	  model	  can	  no	  
longer	  accurately	  reflect	  all	  areas	  of	   the	  discipline.	  Fragmentation	  has	   led	  to	  the	  
specialisation	  of	  subject	  areas	  within	  the	  field	  resulting	  in	  the	  possibility	  that	  what	  
is	   perceived	   as	   ‘international	   law’	   might	   be	   different	   depending	   upon	   the	   area	  
concerned.	  Understanding	  this	  area	  is	  required	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  
in	   order	   to	   determine	   whether	   general	   rules	   of	   applicability	   should	   be	   sought,	  
laws	  that	  apply	   in	  all	  areas	  of	  public	   international	   law,	  or	  whether	  rules	  that	  are	  
only	  applicable	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  law.	  
For	  example,	  a	  UN	  General	  Assembly	   resolution	  can	  be	  argued	   to	  be	   law	  within	  
human	   rights19	   but	  might	   struggle	   to	  overcome	   the	   threshold	   to	   amount	   to	   law	  
within	  an	  area	  such	  as	  international	  banking	  regulation.20	  
This	  would	  result	  in	  a	  series	  of	  models	  that	  would	  be	  required	  to	  describe	  in	  law	  
different	   areas,	   each	   would	   describe	   their	   own	   specific	   regime.	   Perhaps	   as	  
Bjorklund	  and	  Nappert	   suggest,	   a	   ‘nuclei	  model’	  might	  exist	  with	   the	   traditional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	   Gregory	   Kerwin,	   'The	   Role	   of	   United	   Nations	   General	   Assembly	   Resolutions	   in	  
Determining	  Principles	  of	  International	  Law	  in	  United	  States	  Courts'	  (1983)	  Duke	  L.	  J.	  876;	  
Marko	  Ōberg,	   'The	   Legal	   Effects	   of	   Resolutions	   of	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   and	   General	  
Assembly	   in	   the	   Jurisprudence	   of	   the	   ICJ'	   (2005)	   16	   (5)	   EJIL	   879;	   and,	   in	   reference	   to	  
Declaration	  on	  the	  Granting	  of	  Independence	  to	  Colonial	  Countries	  and	  Peoples	  (General	  
Assembly	   resolution	   1514	   (XV)	   of	   14	   December	   1960)	   as	   an	   "important	   stage	   in	   [the]	  
development"	   of	   international	   law,	   Legal	   Consequences	   for	   States	   of	   the	   Continued	  
Presence	  of	  South	  Africa	  in	  Namibia	  (South	  West	  Africa)	  Notwithstanding	  Security	  Council	  
Resolution	  276	  (1970),	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  I.C.J.	  Reports	  1971,	  p.	  16.	  para.	  52	  
20	   Kern	   Alexander,	   'The	   Role	   of	   Soft	   Law	   in	   the	   Legalization	   of	   International	   Banking	  
Supervision:	  A	  Conceptual	  Approach'	  (2000)	  ESRC	  Centre	  for	  Business	  Research,	  University	  
of	  Cambridge,	  Working	  Paper	  No.	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sovereignty	  based	  concept	  of	  international	  law	  at	  the	  centre	  with	  various	  subject	  
areas,	  such	  as	  human	  rights,	  having	  separated	  and	  now	  revolve	  around	  a	  centre.21	  
This	  could	  explain	  both	  fragmentation	  and	  why	  the	  areas	  that	  have	  separated	  off	  
have	  largely	  the	  same	  structure	  but	  also	  have	  some	  crucial	  differences.	  It	  is	  these	  
differences	  that	  have	  caused	  the	  subject	  areas	  to	  break	  off	  but	  they	  maintain	  ties	  
with	   the	   original	   concept.	   Crucially	   all	   the	   separated	   areas	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
traditional	  centre	  combine	  together	  to	  make	  international	  law	  as	  a	  whole.	  
This	  model	  that	  Bjorklund	  and	  Napport	  propose,	  and	  ultimately	  disagree	  with,	  can	  
be	   readily	   described	  by	   a	  metaphor	   of	   viewing	   international	   law	   as	   an	   unstable	  
nucleus.	  If	  international	  law	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  nucleus	  originally,	  the	  areas	  that	  have	  
separated	  off	   can	  be	   seen	   as	   ejected	   from	   the	  original	   nucleus	   into	   an	   electron	  
like	  orbit.	  The	  model	  of	   fragmentation	  and	  separation	  would	  suggest	   that	   in	  the	  
future,	  other	  areas	  of	  international	  law	  will	  separate	  off	  from	  our	  traditional	  view	  
and	   continue	   to	   develop	   into	   their	   own	   distinct	   areas	   of	   law.	   If	   we	   follow	   this	  
model	  to	  a	  point	  of	  reductio	  ad	  absurdum,	   international	   law	  would	  fracture	  to	  a	  
point	  where	   the	   traditional	   theory	  would	  encapsulate	  nothing.	   Yet	   international	  
law	  possesses	   laws	   that	  apply	  across	  all	  of	   the	  separated	  areas	   that	  continue	   to	  
develop	   after	   these	   areas	   are	   apparently	   separated	   from	   the	  main:	   jus	   cogens.	  
There	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  the	  separate	  areas	  that	  are	  ejected	  communicate	  with	  
each	   other	   in	   the	   form	   of	   tribunal	   decisions.22	   This	   would	   suggest	   that	   a	  
constitutional	  model	   would	   be	  more	   appropriate	   with	   a	   top-­‐down	   approach	   to	  
law	  making.	  
Yet	  this	  constitutional	  model	  does	  not	  match	  our	  modern	  understanding	  of	  how	  
States	  interact	  and	  how	  international	  law	  works.	  For	  general	  international	  law	  to	  
exist	   in	   a	   constitutional	   model	   above	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   States,	   a	   rule	   of	  
recognition	  would	  have	  to	  exist	  that	  places	  a	  norm	  of	  international	  law	  above	  all	  
of	  the	  distinct	  areas.	  This	  draws	  on	  the	  legal	  positivism	  work	  of	  Hart	  who	  started	  
from	  the	  premise	  that	  a	  system	  of	  law	  relied	  upon	  a	  single	  rule	  of	  recognition	  to	  
exist.	  Any	  norm	  within	  the	  system	  could	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  law	  without	  passing	  this	  
rule	   of	   recognition	   as	   this	   rule	   would	   identify	   what	   are	   the	   primary	   rules	   of	  
obligation	  within	  a	  system.23	  In	  a	  national	  setting,	  this	  rule	  of	  recognition	  might	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Supra	  Note.	  18	  pg.	  446-­‐7	  
22	  Ibid.	  pg.	  448-­‐52	  
23	  H.L.A.	  Hart,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Law	  (Second	  Edition,	  Clarendon	  Press	  1944)	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‘a	  norm	  has	  to	  be	  passed	  by	  the	  democratically	  elected	  Parliament	  for	  it	  to	  be	  law’	  
yet	  Hart	  argued	  that	  there	  did	  not	  exist	  any	  one	  single	  meta-­‐norm	  in	  international	  
law	   that	   rested	  above	  States.24	  Hart	   instead	  believed	   that	   international	   law	  was	  
binding	   because	   legal	   officials	   on	   the	   international	   stage	   acted	   as	   if	   it	   was	   so25	  
resulting	  in	  a	  somewhat	  illogical	  result	  of	  international	  law	  being	  binding	  but	  not	  a	  
legal	  system.26	  	  
This	  constitutional	  model,	  for	  the	  whole	  international	  legal	  system,	  also	  does	  not	  
match	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	   international	   law.	  Hart	  could	  find	  no	  rule	  of	  
recognition	   that	  would	   bind	   each	   area	   together27	   and	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   law	  
into	   separate	   sections	  would	   reflect	  a	   shift	  away	   from	  one	  centralised	  model	   to	  
differing	  models	  for	  different	  sections.	  
Law,	   however,	   is	   a	   concept	   that	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   area	   encapsulated	   by	  
international	   law.	   If	   a	  model	   existed	   that	   replaced	  positivism	  across	   all	   areas	   of	  
international	  law,	  simply	  observing	  international	  law	  is	  not	  enough	  because	  of	  the	  
interaction	  that	   it	  has	  with	  national	   law.	  Common	  themes	  can	  be	  seen	  between	  
the	   law	   propagated	   at	   the	   national	   law,	   sub-­‐national	   and	   international	   level.	  
There	  even	  exist	  common	  themes	  between	  the	  distinct	  areas	  within	  international	  
law.	   Although	   the	   sources,	   subjects	   and	   participants	   might	   change	   among	   the	  
various	  areas	  of	  law,	  all	  areas	  of	  the	  discipline	  share	  a	  distinction	  based	  upon	  the	  
behaviour	   of	   the	   participants;	   a	   binary	   legal/illegal	   distinction.	   This	   is	   that	  
wherever	  law	  is	  defined	  it	  must	  always	  contain	  an	  element	  of	  analysing	  behaviour	  
to	  see	  if	  it	  is	  either	  legal	  or	  illegal.	  
The	  positive	  theory,	  even	  with	  all	  the	  caveats	  and	  problems	  that	  have	  developed,	  
remains	  the	  dominant	  model	  of	  understanding	  in	  legal	  terms	  public	  international	  
law,	  yet	   that	  does	  not	  preclude	   the	   introduction	  of	  more	  specialised	  models	   for	  
application	   to	   specific	   international	   legal	   regimes.	   In	   examining	   the	   relationship	  
between	   international	   organisations	   and	   their	   member	   States,	   a	   number	   of	  
dominant	  theories	  have	  developed.	  The	  specialisation	  of	  international	  law	  would	  
allow	   for	   the	  development	  of	  “law”	  within	   these	   theories	   that	  only	  apply	  within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Ibid.	  Chapter	  10	  
25	  Ibid.	  pg.	  234	  
26	  Ibid.	  pg.	  236.	  Although	  Hart	  never	  explicitly	  classed	  international	  law	  as	  a	  'primitive	  legal	  
order',	  its	  lacking	  a	  rule	  of	  recognition	  placed	  it	  in	  this	  category.	  Mehrdad	  Payandeh,	  'The	  
Concept	  of	  International	  Law	  in	  the	  Jurisprudence	  of	  H.L.A.	  Hart'	  (2010)	  21(4)	  EJIL	  967,	  978	  
27	  Ibid.	  pg.	  233-­‐4	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the	   context	   of	   this	   specialisation;	   either	   perceived	   as	   the	   general	   relationship	  
between	  international	  organisations	  and	  States	  or,	  narrower,	  in	  this	  circumstance	  
the	   legal	   relationship	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	   its	  member	  States.	  Although	  
there	  may	  be	  both	  general	  and	  specific	  models	  available,	  it	  is	  their	  applicability	  to	  
this	  specific	  context	  and	  how	  well	  they	  explain	  the	  actions	  that	  is	  of	  concern.	  
In	  this	  context,	  four	  models	  are	  analysed	  against	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  see	  if	  and	  how	  
well	  they	  can	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank.	  
	  
2.4	  Progressive	  Positivism	  
2.4.1	  Defining	  Progressive	  Positivism	  
The	   term	   ‘progressive	   positivism’	   is	   a	   term	   coined	   for	   this	   thesis.	   It	   is	   used	   to	  
describe	  a	  school	  of	  thought	  that	  is	  emerging	  from	  the	  positive	  school	  and	  is	  used	  
in	  this	  context	  as	  a	  potential	  candidate	  to	  explain	  in	  law	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank	  and	  its	  acceptance	  by	  States.	  
In	   2000	   the	   International	   Law	   Commission	   (ILC),	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	  
codification	  and	  progressive	  development	  of	   international	   law,28	  began	   research	  
on	  the	  topic	  “Responsibility	  of	  international	  organizations”.29	  This	  work	  stemmed	  
from	   the	   completion	   of	   the	   Draft	   Articles	   on	   Responsibility	   of	   States	   for	  
Internationally	   Wrongful	   Acts.	   After	   eight	   Special	   Rapporteur	   reports,	   seven	  
drafting	   committee	   reports	   and	   seven	   rounds	   of	   comments	   from	   States	   and	  
international	   organisations,	   in	   the	   3119th	   meeting	   on	   8	   August	   2011	   the	   ILC	  
finalised	  the	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  the	  Responsibility	  of	  International	  Organisations	  and	  
decided	  to	  recommend	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  ‘(a)	  to	  take	  note	  
of	   the	   draft	   articles	   on	   the	   responsibility	   of	   international	   organizations	   in	   a	  
resolution,	  and	  to	  annex	  them	  to	  the	  resolution;	  (b)	  to	  consider,	  at	  a	  later	  stage,	  
the	  elaboration	  of	  a	  convention	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  draft	  articles’.30	  
The	   Articles	   on	   the	   Responsibility	   of	   International	   Organisations	   (ARIO)	   were	  
acknowledged	   by	   the	   General	   Assembly	   and	   a	   time	   slot	   has	   been	   provisionally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Law	  Commission,	  Article	  1,	  Paragraph	  1	  
29	   Official	   Records	   of	   the	   General	   Assembly,	   Fifty-­‐fifth	   Session,	   Supplement	   No.	  
10	  (A/55/10),	  paras.	  726-­‐728	  and	  729	  (1)	  
30	   ILC	   63rd	   Session,	   Provisional	   Summary	  Record	  of	   the	   3119th	  Meeting,	   8th	   August	   2011	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timetabled	  for	  the	  sixty-­‐ninth	  session	  (2014)	  to	  consider	  the	  question	  of	  the	  form	  
that	  might	  be	  given	  to	  the	  articles31.	  
The	   ARIO	   is	   intended	   to	   cover	   and	   answer	   two	   issues;	   the	   responsibility	   of	   an	  
international	   organisation	   for	   an	   act	   that	   is	   internationally	   wrongful	   and	   the	  
responsibility	   of	   a	   State	   for	   the	   conduct	   of	   an	   international	   organisation.32	  
According	  to	  its	  commentary,	  the	  ARIO	  exclusively	  handles	  secondary	  rules,	  which	  
consider	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   breach	   of	   an	   international	   obligation	   and	   the	  
consequence	   for	   the	   relevant	   international	   organisation,	   and	   seeks	   to	   leave	  
primary	   rules,	   which	   establish	   obligations	   for	   international	   organisations,33	  
outside	  of	  its	  remit.	  Yet,	  to	  establish	  when	  a	  breach	  has	  occurred,	  the	  ILC	  has	  had	  
to	  clarify	  what	  an	  ‘international	  obligation’	  is	  and	  when	  an	  organisation	  breaches	  
it.	  
Article	  10	  	  
1.	   There	   is	   a	   breach	   of	   an	   international	   obligation	   by	   an	  
international	   organization	   when	   an	   act	   of	   that	   international	  
organization	  is	  not	  in	  conformity	  with	  what	  is	  required	  of	  it	  by	  
that	   obligation,	   regardless	   of	   the	   origin	   or	   character	   of	   the	  
obligation	  concerned.	  	  
2.	   Paragraph	   1	   includes	   the	   breach	   of	   an	   international	  
obligation	   that	   may	   arise	   for	   an	   international	   organization	  
towards	  its	  members	  under	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  organization.34	  
Traditional	   positivism	   thought	   on	   international	   organisations	   informs	   that	  
international	   organisations	   are	   bound	   by	   their	   founding	   treaties.	   Although	   the	  
obligations	  of	  an	  international	  organisation	  can	  be	  modified	  over	  time	  by	  practice,	  
it	  is	  from	  the	  original	  treaty	  that	  the	  organisation	  derives	  its	  sovereign	  consent	  and	  
responsibility.	  As	   examined	   in	  Chapter	  One,	   a	   subsequent	   treaty	   can	  modify	   the	  
obligations	   of	   the	   organisation	   either	   towards	   its	   membership	   as	   a	   whole	   or	  
towards	   a	   group	   of	   members	   provided	   the	   subsequent	   treaty	   fulfils	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  UNGA	  Res.	  66/100	  (27	  February	  2012)	  Responsibility	  of	  International	  Organizations	  
32	  Draft	  Articles	  on	   the	  Responsibility	  of	   International	  Organizations,	  with	  Commentaries	  
2011	  (2)	  
33	  Ibid.	  (3)	  
34	  Ibid.	  Article	  10.	  Emphasis	  added.	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requirements	  set	  down	  by	  the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Treaties.	  Yet	  the	  
ARIO,	  with	  what	  is	  being	  termed	  for	  this	  thesis	  ‘progressive	  positivism’,	  is	  seeking	  
to	   bind	   international	   organisations	   to	   more	   than	   their	   respective	   founding	  
treaties.	  
By	   including	   the	   text	   ‘regardless	   of	   the	   origin	   or	   character	   of	   the	   obligation	  
concerned’,	   the	   ILC	   are	   expanding	   or	   acknowledging	   the	   available	   sources	   of	  
breach	   that	   incur	   international	   responsibility.	   The	   commentaries	  attached	   to	   the	  
ARIO	   confirm	   that	   for	   an	   international	   organisation,	   an	   international	   obligation	  
‘may	  be	  established	  by	  a	  customary	  rule	  of	   international	   law,	  by	  a	  treaty	  or	  by	  a	  
general	  principle	  applicable	  within	  the	  international	  legal	  order’.35	  This	  moves	  the	  
laws	   binding	   upon	   international	   organisations	   from	   the	   narrow	   traditional	  
positivist	  school,	  where	  only	  the	  treaty	  is	  binding,	  to	  a	  wider	  progressive	  positivist	  
understanding,	   that	   any	   collective	   legal	   expression	   of	   sovereign	   will	   is	   binding	  
upon	  an	  international	  organisation.	  
If	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  have	  not	  been	  able	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  reference	  
to	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   or	   any	   subsequent	   agreement	   between	   its	  
membership,	   the	   progressive	   positive	   tool	   would	   consider	   wider	   expressions	   of	  
sovereign	  will	  as	  also	  being	  able	  to	  influence	  and	  be	  an	  appropriate	  legal	  basis	  for	  
action	  by	  the	  World	  Bank.	  Therefore,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Bank’s	  actions	  have	  
a	  possibility	   to	  be	  grounded	   in	   this	  wider	   framework,	   in	   customary	   international	  
law	  and	  general	  principles,	  needs	  to	  be	  examined.	  
The	  implications	  of	  the	  progressive	  positive	  theory	  and	  its	  possible	  applicability	  to	  
the	  Bank	  need	  to	  be	  established	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  any	  analysis.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  
practicalities	   of	   the	   progressive	   positive	   position	   raise	   interesting	   questions	   for	  
international	  organisations	  in	  the	  future.	  As	  an	  example,	  if	  an	  organisation’s	  treaty	  
prohibits	   it	  from	  taking	  a	  certain	  action,	  yet	  customary	  international	   law	  requires	  
that	   it	   takes	   that	   action,	   the	   international	   organisation	   will	   either	   incur	  
international	  responsibility	  for	  breaching	  its	  treaty	  or	  for	  breaching	  customary	  law.	  
Ordinarily	   in	   a	   conflict	   of	   laws,	   the	   lex	   specialis	   tool	   is	   applied	   and	   the	   ARIO	  
contains	   a	   provision	   concerning	   this	   tool.36	   The	   concept	   that	   a	   specialist	   rule	  
overrides	  a	  general	  rule	  has	  a	  long	  history	  in	  international	  jurisprudence	  with	  roots	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Ibid.	  Article	  10	  Commentary	  (2)	  
36	  Ibid.	  Article	  64	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back	  to	  Grotius37	  yet	  in	  the	  context	  of	  responsibility	  of	  international	  organisations	  
does	   not	   offer	   as	   much	   assistance	   as	   is	   required.	   In	   the	   above	   example,	   the	  
specialist	   rule	   would	   relate	   to	   the	   treaty	   as	   that	   is	   referencing	   conduct	   of	   the	  
organisation	   whilst	   the	   customary	   international	   law	   is	   referencing	   conduct	  
generally.	   Yet	   if	   the	   organisation’s	   treaty	   is	   silent	   on	   an	   issue,	   under	   the	  
progressive	  positive	  understanding	  the	  organisation	  would	  be	  bound	  by	  customary	  
international	  law.	  Or,	  for	  an	  approach	  with	  greater	  nuance,	  if	  both	  the	  treaty	  and	  
the	  customary	   law	  require	  positive	  action	  and	  the	  customary	   international	   law	   is	  
more	  specialist	  than	  the	  treaty,	  the	  customary	  law	  would	  apply.	  
As	   treaties	   are	   created	   at	   a	   specific	   time	   and	   customary	   international	   law	   is	  
continually	   evolving	   as	   continual	   practice	   occurs,	   as	   the	   period	   between	   any	  
conflict	   of	   laws	   and	   creation	   of	   a	   treaty	   becomes	   greater,	   the	   greater	   the	  
possibility	   that	   customary	   international	   law	  would	   become	  more	   specialist	   than	  
the	   treaty.	  Particularly	   if	   an	  organisation’s	   treaty	   is	   silent	  on	  an	   issue,	  under	   the	  
progressive	  paradigm	  an	  organisation	  is	  bound	  by	  customary	  international	  law	  and	  
would	  have	  to	  act	  in	  a	  manner	  as	  to	  not	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  breach	  of	  that	  law.	  
The	   tool	   as	   articulated	   upon	   by	   Article	   64	   ARIO	   does	   not	   sufficiently	   limit	   the	  
competence	  of	  an	  organisation	  to	  only	  its	  treaty	  or	  internal	  rules.	  	  
Article	  64	  
These	   articles	   do	   not	   apply	  where	   and	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   the	  
conditions	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  internationally	  wrongful	  act…	  
of	  an	  international	  organization…	  are	  governed	  by	  special	  rules	  
of	  international	  law.	  Such	  special	  rules	  of	  international	  law	  may	  
be	  contained	   in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  organization	  applicable	  to	  the	  
relations	   between	   an	   international	   organization	   and	   its	  
members.	  
Firstly,	   to	   use	   this	   Article	   to	   articulate	   that	   the	   responsibility	   of	   an	   organisation,	  
what	   it	   is	   and	   how	   it	   is	   created,	   stems	   solely	   from	   the	   treaty	  would	   undermine	  
every	   preceding	   Article	   in	   the	   ARIO	   by	   rendering	   them	   worthless	   as	   every	  
organisation	  has	  a	  founding	  treaty	  outlining	  rules	  applicable	  to	  that	  organisation.	  
Secondly,	   the	   application	   as	   articulated	   upon	   only	   allows	   for	   the	   use	   of	   lex	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specialis	   when	   a	   special	   rule	   of	   international	   law	   already	   exists.	   	   Although	   the	  
traditional	   positivist	   theory	   position	   is	   that	   organisations	   are	   generally	   expressly	  
limited	   to	   the	   purposes	   lain	   down	   in	   their	   treaties	   (and,	   therefore,	   unable	   to	  
consider	  customary	   international	   law	  as	   it	   is	  not	  under	  their	  purposes),	   this	  does	  
not	  necessarily	  preclude	  the	  application	  of	  customary	  law	  within	  the	  purposes	  lain	  
down,	  particularly	  where	  a	   large	   time	   frame	  has	  elapsed	  between	   ratification	  of	  
the	  treaty	  and	  a	  potential	  conflict	  as	  customary	  international	  law	  has	  the	  potential	  
to	  become	  more	   specialised.	   Thirdly,	   the	   commentary	  makes	   clear	   that	   this	  was	  
not	   a	   blanket	   statement	   applicable	   to	   all	   organisations	   by	   stating	   that	   ‘(t)hese	  
special	   rules	   may	   concern	   the	   relations	   that	   certain	   categories	   of	   international	  
organizations	   or	   one	   specific	   international	   organization	   have	   with	   some	   or	   all	  
States	  or	  other	  international	  organizations’.38	  Fourthly,	  if	  the	  ARIO	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  
customary	  international	  law,	  then	  this	  would	  imply	  that	  there	  exists	  in	  customary	  
international	  law	  a	  minimum	  duty	  binding	  upon	  all	  organisations	  that,	  unless	  their	  
treaty	  specifically	  rejects,	  allows	  for	  the	  application	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  
norms	  to	  an	  organisation.	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  Article	  10	  is	  merely	  a	  reflection	  
of	   customary	   international	   law	   that	   acknowledges	   that	   legal	   responsibility	   can	  
stem	  from	  customary	  international	  law.	  	  
This	   leaves	   an	   unclear	   situation	  where	   it	  would	   appear	   that	   some	   organisations	  
are	   only	   bound	   by	   their	   treaty	   in	   areas	   of	   law,	   whilst	   some	   are	   bound	   by	  
customary	   international	   law	  as	  well.	  For	  application	  to	  the	  World	  Bank,	   it	  would,	  
therefore,	  need	  to	  be	  established	  that	  as	  a	  minimum	  customary	  international	  law	  
could	  only	  bind	  within	  the	  specific	  purposes	  of	  the	  Bank,	  and	  whether	  the	  criteria	  
in	  Article	  64	  ARIO	  apply.	  
It	   should	  be	  noted	   that	   it	   is	  only	  assumed	   that	   in	  a	   conflict	   the	   lex	   specialis	   tool	  
would	  be	  applied	  by	  any	  relevant	  decision	  maker.	  If	  States	  give	  a	  clear	  affirmation	  
of	  the	  progressive	  positive	  principle	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  decision	  maker	  might	  seek	  
to	  distinguish	  laws,	  in	  which	  case	  an	  international	  organisation	  would	  be	  bound	  by	  
both	  its	  treaty	  and	  customary	  international	  law,	  or	  seek	  to	  apply	  the	  lex	  posterior	  
principle,	   that	   later	  rules	  override	  earlier	   rules,	  as	  a	  more	  recent	  confirmation	  of	  
State	   consent.	   Alternatively	   a	   customary	   international	   law	   could	   exist	   that	   does	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not	  amount	  to	  a	  jus	  cogen	  yet	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  application	  of	  the	  lex	  specialis	  
principle.39	  
Whilst	   a	   treaty	   seeks	   to	   limit	   the	   scope	   of	   an	   organisation	   under	   the	   positivist	  
theory	   by	   only	   allowing	   it	   to	   act	   within	   the	   limit	   the	   member	   States	   have	  
consented	  too,	   the	  progressive	  positivist	  understanding	  would	  appear	   to	  be	  only	  
limited	   by	   the	   applicability	   of	   a	   customary	   international	   law	   to	   the	  work	   of	   the	  
organisation.	  	  
Under	   the	   progressive	   positive	   interpretation	   proposed	   by	   the	   ARIO,	   an	  
organisation	   is	   bound	   by	   both	   its	   treaty	   and	   customary	   international	   law	   and	   in	  
case	   of	   conflict	   must	   bear	   responsibility	   for	   the	   law	   it	   breaches.	   The	   nature	   of	  
‘responsibility’	   is	   not	   examined	   in	   the	   ARIO40	   yet	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   an	   organisation	  
bears	  a	  responsibility	  to	  act	  within	  the	  law	  and	  that	  if	  customary	  international	  law	  
maintains	   that	  an	  organisation	  acts	   in	  contrary	   to	   its	   treaty	   then	  an	  organisation	  
faces	  a	  choice	  on	  whether	  to	  bear	  responsibility	  for	  either	  a	  breach	  of	  its	  treaty	  or	  
for	  a	  breach	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  or	  alternatively	  seek	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  
lex	  specialis	  tool	  should	  be	  applied.	  
Using	   the	   tool	  of	   lex	   specialis	  will	   allow	  a	   treaty	   to	  prevail	   for	  an	  organisation	   in	  
some	  circumstances	  yet,	  as	  demonstrated,	  circumstances	  can	  exist	   that	  preclude	  
the	   blanket	   use	   of	   the	   tool	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   treaty	   to	   limit	   an	   organisation’s	  
competence.	  An	  organisation	  is	  usually	   limited	  by	  the	  purposes	  that	  are	  assigned	  
to	   it	   under	   its	   treaty	   which	   at	   the	   time	   of	   creation,	   with	   the	   lex	   specialis	   tool,	  
would	   allow	   an	   organisation	   to	   claim	   that	   is	   treaty	   took	   precedence	   over	  
customary	   international	   law	   and,	   therefore,	   it	   had	   to	   act	   in	   conformity	   with	   its	  
treaty.	   However,	   as	   time	   progresses,	   a	   greater	   possibility	   exists	   that	   customary	  
international	   law	   will	   bear	   a	   relevance	   to	   an	   organisations	   work	   if	   customary	  
international	  law	  becomes	  more	  specialised	  on	  the	  purposes	  that	  the	  organisation	  
is	  created	  to	  handle.	  This	  may	  have	  implications	  and	  allow	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  
the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  if	  customary	  international	  law,	  for	  example	  defining	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development	   or	   allowing	   for	   a	   governance	   role,	   had	   developed	   to	   be	   more	  
specialised	  than	  the	  treaty	  provisions.	  
2.4.2	  What	  Evidence	  Supports	  the	  Progressive	  Positivist	  Understanding?	  
As	  the	  ARIO	   is	  not	  yet	   in	   treaty	   form,	   the	  only	   legal	  possibility	  some	  or	  all	  of	   its	  
provisions	  can	  be	  binding	  upon	  States	  is	  if	   it	  amounts	  to	  customary	  international	  
law.	  This	  questions	  the	  role	  that	  the	  ILC	  has	  played	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ARIO	  in	  
whether	  it	  has	  sought	  to	  codify	  existing	  customary	  international	  law	  or	  has	  sought	  
to	  progressively	  develop	  the	  law	  in	  this	  area.	  Whilst	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ILC	  has	  been	  
the	   primary	   mover	   towards	   the	   development	   of	   this	   school	   of	   thought,	   there	  
exists	   other	   legal	   scholarship	   that	   claims	   that	   customary	   international	   law	   is	  
directly	  applicable	  to	  international	  organisations.	  
Disputes	  on	  this	  subject	  are	  rare	  which	  has	   led	  to	   little	  practice	   in	  Courts	  on	  the	  
subject	  of	  the	  responsibility	  of	  international	  organisations.41	  However,	  the	  ICJ	  has	  
ruled	  that	  international	  organisations,	  as	  subjects	  of	  international	  law,	  are	  bound	  
by	   ‘general	   rules	  of	   international	   law’42	  whilst	   the	  European	  Court	  of	   Justice	  has	  
acknowledged	   that	   ‘the	   European	  Community	  must	   respect	   international	   law	   in	  
the	   exercise	   of	   its	   powers.	   It	   is	   therefore	   required	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   rules	   of	  
customary	   international	   law’.43	   Notwithstanding	   these	   judgments,	   and	   the	  
allowance	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  for	  the	  application	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  
law	   to	   peacekeeping	   operations,44	   the	   practice	   of	   the	   application	   of	   customary	  
international	  law	  to	  organisations	  or	  even	  the	  acknowledgement	  by	  organisations	  
that	   they	   are	   bound	   is	   sparse.	   The	   majority	   of	   the	   academic	   work	   on	   the	  
application	   of	   customary	   international	   law	   to	   organisations	   has	   developed	   in	  
relation	   to	   human	   rights	   and	  whether	   international	   organisations	   are	   bound	   to	  
respect	  them.45	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The	  ARIO	  contains	  a	  number	  of	  provisions	  that	  have	  been	  contested	  by	  numerous	  
governments	   and	   international	   organisations,	   including	   the	   World	   Bank.46	   The	  
attribution	   of	   customary	   international	   law	   to	   international	   organisations	   drew	  
criticism	   on	   a	   number	   of	   grounds.	   The	   IMF	   sought	   to	   ensure	   that	   inconsistent	  
customary	   international	   law	   ‘would	   neither	   override	   the	   provisions	   of	   an	  
organization’s	  charter	  nor	  govern	  actions	  taken	  pursuant	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  
organization’s	   charter’47	   yet	   as	   demonstrated,	   the	   lack	   of	   explicit	   recognition	   of	  
this	   situation	   within	   the	   ARIO	   does	   not	   preclude	   the	   application	   of	   customary	  
international	   law	   over	   an	   organisations	   treaty	   in	   specific	   circumstances.	   The	  
International	   Labour	   Organization,	   in	   questioning	   the	   existence	   of	   customary	  
international	   law	  on	   responsibility	   binding	  upon	  organisations,	   states	   ‘the	   views	  
expressed	   by	   international	   organizations	   reflect	   not	   only	   the	   lack	   of	  opinio	   juris	  
but	   rather	   a	   clear	  opposition	   to	   the	  existence	  of	   any	   customary	   law	   in	   the	   field	  
except	   for	   a	   very	   narrow	   set	   of	   norms	   that	  may	   be	   recognized	   as	   jus	   cogens	   in	  
international	  law’.48	  
The	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   in	   contrast	   sought	   to	   include	  
‘established	   or	   generally	   accepted	   principles	   of	   international	   law’	   within	   the	  
definition	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  organisation49	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  specifically	  
acknowledged	  ‘general	   international	   law’	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  governing	  
international	  organisations.50	  Whether	   ‘general	   international	   law’	   is	   the	   same	  as	  
‘customary	   international	   law’	   is	   questionable	   yet	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   these	  
organisations	   sought	   legal	   grounding	   outside	   of	   their	   traditional	   internal	   law	   of	  
the	   treaty.	   The	   International	   Criminal	   Police	  Organization	   specifically	   states	   that	  
‘applicable	   rules	   of	   customary	   international	   law’	   are	   ‘obligations	   resting	   upon	  
international	  organizations’.51	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pauwelyn,	  ‘The	  Role	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  in	  the	  WTO:	  How	  far	  can	  we	  go?’	  (2001)	  
95	   AJIL	   535	   and	   for	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   the	   IMF;	   Sigrun	   Skogly,	   The	   Human	   Rights	  
Obligations	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (Cavendish	  Publishing	  
2001)	  
46	  For	  governments	  see	  A/CN.4/547	  and	  A/CN.5/636.	  For	   international	  organisations	  see	  
A/CN.4/545,	   A/CN.4/556,	   A/CN.4/568,	   A/CN.4/582,	   A/CN.4/593,	   A/CN.4/609	   and	  
A/CN.4/637.	  For	  the	  World	  Bank	  specifically	  see	  A/CN.4/568	  and	  A/CN.4/637.	  
47	  A/CN.4/545	  pg.	  13	  
48	  A/CN.4/637	  pg.	  15	  
49	  A/CN.4/556	  pg.	  39	  
50	  A/CN.4/637	  pg.	  7	  
51	  A/CN.4/556	  pg.	  30	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Germany	   acknowledges	   that	   there	   is	   no	   customary	   international	   law	   on	   the	  
responsibility	   of	   international	   organisations52	   yet	   goes	   on	   to	   state	   that	   ‘a	  
minimum	  standard	  of	  responsibility	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  customary	  international	  
law	   and	   from	   human	   rights	   standards	   as	   well	   as	   generally	   accepted	   standards	  
contained	   in	   widely	   ratified	   treaties’.53	   In	   contrast,	   Democratic	   Republic	   of	   the	  
Congo	  state	  that	   ‘any	  action	  or	  omission	  by	  an	  organization	  that	   is	   incompatible	  
with	  the	  rules	  of	  general	  customary	  law	  or	  the	  provisions	  of	  a	  treaty	  to	  which	  it	  is	  
a	  party	  constitutes	  an	  internationally	  wrongful	  act	  that	  will	  be	  attributable	  to	  that	  
organization’.54	  
One	  major	   fault	   behind	   the	   ARIO	   is	   that	   it	   readily	   assumes	   that	   like	   States,	   all	  
international	  organisations	  enjoy	  the	  same	  legal	  personality	  and	  so	  general	  rules	  
can	   apply	   to	   all	   organisations	   equally.55	   This	   is	   known	   not	   to	   be	   the	   case.	   All	  
organisations	   have	   the	   personality	   given	   to	   them	   by	   their	   founding	   treaty	   and	  
vary	  according	  to	  the	  powers	  given	  to	  them	  and	  the	  manner	  States	  sought	  them	  
to	  behave	  both	  in	  the	  relations	  to	  members	  and	  relations	  to	  non-­‐members.56	  The	  
ARIO,	  in	  attempting	  to	  create	  a	  general	  framework,	  has	  sought	  to	  ignore	  this.	  The	  
different	  opinions	  expressed	  by	  both	  States	  and	  organisations	  demonstrate	   that	  
there	  is	  no	  general	  consensus	  amongst	  actors	  on	  this	  subject.	  Some	  organisations	  
are	  happy	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  customary	  international	  law	  obligations,	  some	  are	  not,	  
yet	  the	  ARIO	  seeks	  to	  apply	  rules	  to	  them	  all	  equally.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  A/CN.4/556	  pg.	  47	  
53	  Ibid.	  
54	  A/CN.4/556	  pg.	  28	  
55	   This	   is	   highlighted	   in	   A/CN.4/637	   by	   the	   European	   Commission	   (pg.	   8),	   International	  
Labour	  Organization	  (pg.	  8),	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (pg.	  9),	  a	  Joint	  submission	  of	  the	  
Comprehensive	   Nuclear-­‐Test-­‐Ban	   Treaty	   Organization,	   the	   International	   Civil	   Aviation	  
Organization,	   the	   International	   Fund	   for	   Agricultural	   Development,	   the	   International	  
Labour	   Organization,	   the	   International	   Maritime	   Organization,	   the	   International	  
Organization	   for	   Migration,	   the	   International	   Telecommunication	   Union,	   the	   United	  
Nations	   Educational,	   Scientific	   and	   Cultural	   Organization,	   the	   United	   Nations	   World	  	  
Tourism	   Organization,	   the	   World	   Health	   Organization,	   the	   World	   Intellectual	   Property	  
Organization,	  the	  World	  Meteorological	  Organization	  and	  the	  World	   	  Trade	  Organization	  
(pg.	   10),	  North	  Atlantic	   Treaty	  Organization	   (pg.	   11)	   and	   the	  Organization	   for	   Economic	  
Cooperation	  and	  Development	  (pg.	  13).	  
56	   The	   ICJ	   has	   stated	   that	   “international	   organizations	   do	   not,	   unlike	   States,	   possess	   a	  
general	  competence,	  but	  are	  governed	  by	  the	   ‘principle	  of	  specialty’,	   that	   is	  to	  say,	  they	  
are	   invested	   by	   the	   States	   which	   create	   them	   with	   powers,	   the	   limits	   of	   which	   are	   a	  
function	   of	   the	   common	   interests	   whose	   promotion	   those	   States	   entrust	   to	   them.”	  
Legality	   of	   the	  Use	   by	   a	   State	   of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	   in	  Armed	  Conflict,	   Advisory	  Opinion,	  
I.C.J.	  Reports	  1996,	  p.	  66	  at	  78,	  para.	  25.	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The	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  ARIO	   is,	   therefore,	  debatable	  and	  support	  amongst	  
States	   and	   international	   organisations	   for	   the	   application	   of	   customary	  
international	   law	   to	  organisations	   is	  not	  uniform.	  However,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   if	   the	  
ARIO	  is	  given	  a	  treaty	  form	  which	  is	  ratified	  or	  an	  otherwise	  clear	  endorsement	  by	  
States,	  then	  conceptually	  the	  application	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  norms	  to	  
the	   work	   of	   international	   organisations	   will	   be	   possible	   and	   legally	   allow	  
organisations	   to	  work	  within	   limits	   set	  by	   customary	   international	   law	   that	   is	  of	  
relevance	  to	  their	  mandate.	  
2.4.3	  Applied	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  
Despite	  the	  reservations	  outlined	  above,	  if	  the	  World	  Bank	  is	  bound	  by	  customary	  
international	   law	   under	   the	   progressive	   positive	   school	   of	   thought,	   there	   is	  
potential	   to	   legally	   explain	   some	   or	   all	   of	   the	   actions	   that	   the	  World	   Bank	   has	  
taken	   outside	   of	   the	   positive	   theory.	   The	   introduction	   of	   environmental,	  
indigenous	   and	   resettlement	   rights,	   the	   focus	   upon	   a	   widening	   definition	   of	  
development	   including	   good	   governance	   and	   corruption	   and	   more	   broadly	   the	  
shift	   away	   from	   its	   original	   role	   as	   a	   project	   financer	   could	   potentially	   be	  
explained	   under	   the	   progressive	   positivist	   school	   if	   there	   were	   customary	  
international	  law	  in	  place	  that	  the	  Bank	  could	  rely	  upon	  as	  legal	  justification	  for	  its	  
actions.	  
As	  the	  ARIO	  is	  not	  a	  treaty	  and	  is	  only	  binding	  if	  it	  is	  customary	  international	  law,	  
a	  circular	  argument	   is	  created	  in	  reference	  to	   its	  applicability.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  
ARIO	   accurately	   reflects	   customary	   international	   law,	   the	   ARIO	   contains	   the	  
provisions	   that	   stipulate	   international	   organisations	   are	   bound	   by	   customary	  
international,	   yet	   only	   apply	   to	   international	   organisations	   if	   international	  
organisations	  are	  bound	  by	  customary	  international	  law	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  There	  is	  
no	  readily	  available	  solution	  to	  this	  paradox	  until	  the	  form	  of	  the	  ARIO	  is	  settled	  
by	   the	   General	   Assembly	   in	   2014	   and	   until	   that	   point	   the	   law	   on	   this	   area	  will	  
remain	  unclear.	  
Setting	  aside	  this	  paradox,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  issues	  that	  do	  not	  readily	  allow	  
the	  application	  of	  the	  progressive	  positive	  thought	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  explain	  in	  
law	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  actions	  since	  its	  inception.	  
Firstly,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  this	   is	  an	  emerging	  school	  of	  thought.	   If	  States	  give	  a	  clear	  
affirmation	  of	  the	  progressive	  positive	  paradigm	  by	  ratifying	  the	  ARIO	  in	  a	  treaty	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form,	   this	   could	   only	   explain	   the	  World	   Bank’s	   actions	   going	   forward	   from	   that	  
point	   or,	   if	   States	   articulate	   that	   this	   is	   in	   their	   opinion	   a	   reflection	   of	   existing	  
customary	  international	  law,	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank	  from	  the	  emergence	  
of	  this	  thought	  forward.	  The	  controversy	  associated	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ARIO	  
demonstrates	   that	   there	   is	   no	   general	   consensus	   as	   of	   yet	   and	   whilst	   it	   could	  
possibly	   explain	   recent	   or	   future	   actions	   of	   the	   Bank,	   historical	   actions	   are	   not	  
readily	  justified.	  
Secondly,	   although	   progressive	   positivism	   would	   suggest	   the	   applicability	   of	  
customary	  international	  law	  within	  the	  purposes	  of	  an	  organisation,	  in	  the	  event	  
of	   conflict	   the	   lex	   specialis	   tool	   is	   applied	   and	   the	   organisation’s	   treaty	   would	  
prima	  facie	  prevail.	  Although	  this	  is	  a	  developing	  area	  and	  the	  application	  of	  these	  
legal	  principles	  is	  not	  clear,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  although	  customary	  international	  
law	  can	  be	  binding	  if	  it	  concerns	  a	  matter	  within	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  organisation	  
and	   is	   not	   expressly	   counter	   to	   a	   provision	   of	   the	   treaty,	   customary	   law	   on	  
unrelated	  subjects	  or	  that	  is	  expressly	  counter	  to	  a	  provision	  is	  not	  binding.	  	  
The	   introduction	   of	   OP	   4.01	   Environmental	   Assessment,	   OP	   4.10	   Indigenous	  
Peoples	   and	   OP	   4.12	   Involuntary	   Resettlement	   are	   all	   examples	   of	  World	   Bank	  
actions	   that	   have	   dealt	   with	   areas	   potentially	   governed	   by	   customary	  
international	  law.57	  Yet,	  as	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  human	  rights	  are	  inherently	  
political	   and	   the	   Bank’s	   actions	   on	   these	   topics	   are	   expressly	   against	   the	   no	  
political	  interference	  clause	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.58	  Setting	  aside	  whether	  
human	  rights	  are	  within	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Bank,	  if	  customary	  international	  law	  
is	  in	  conflict	  with	  a	  treaty	  provision,	  the	  treaty	  provision	  prevails.	  In	  the	  examples	  
given	   above	   the	   Bank’s	   actions	   are	   expressly	   against	   a	   treaty	   provision	   and,	  
therefore,	  cannot	  be	  explained	  via	  the	  progressive	  positive	  school	  of	  thought.	  
Thirdly,	   it	   is	   unclear	   if	   the	   areas	   of	   law	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   have	   introduced	  
despite	  its	  treaty	  actually	  exist	  in	  customary	  international	  law.	  An	  examination	  of	  
the	  exact	   legal	  status	  of	  human	  rights	   is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	   thesis	  yet	   it	   is	  
sufficient	   to	   note	   that	   there	   is	   considerable	   debate	   surrounding	   whether	   all,59	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  The	  status	  of	  norms	  concerning	   the	  environment,	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	   involuntary	  
resettlement	  is	  unclear.	  The	  subject	  is	  discussed	  further	  below.	  
58	  Article	  IV	  Section	  10	  
59	  Marc	  Cogen,	  “Human	  rights,	  prohibition	  of	  political	  activities	  and	  the	  lending	  policies	  of	  
World	  Bank	  and	  International	  Monetary	  Fund”	  in	  Subrata	  Chowdhury,	  Erik	  Denters	  &	  Paul	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some60	   or	   no61	   human	   rights	   are	   customary	   international	   law.	   The	   ICJ	   in	   its	  
judgments	   has	   tended	   towards	   the	   opinion	   that	   only	   some	   human	   rights	   are	  
customary	  international	  law,62	  none	  of	  which	  are	  of	  direct	  relevance	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  
work.	   Even	  when	   human	   rights	   are	   given	   the	   status	   of	   customary	   international	  
law,	  there	  is	  debate	  that	  they	  possibly	  only	  extend	  to	  State	  responsibility	  as	  they	  
were	  created	  as	  protection	  against	  the	  power	  of	  States.63	  
Finally,	   if	   the	   ARIO	   is	   customary	   international	   law,	   it	   raises	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	  
international	   organisation	   amounting	   to	   a	   persistent	   objector.	   As	   this	   is	   a	  
developing	  area	  of	  law,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  international	  organisations	  can	  attain	  
this	   status.	   One	   of	   the	   areas	   of	   concern	   that	   has	   raised	   such	   controversy	   in	  
relation	   to	   the	   ARIO	   is	   the	   readiness	   that	   the	   ILC	   has	   transferred	   areas	   of	   law	  
applicable	  to	  States	  to	  international	  organisations.64	  Although	  it	  is	  law	  that	  States	  
can	   be	   persistent	   objectors,	   it	   should	   not	   be	   assumed	   that	   international	  
organisations	   can	   attain	   this	   status	   simply	   as	   they	   have	   legal	   personality,	  
particularly	   in	   a	   situation	   where	   all	   of	   its	   members	   accept	   the	   applicability	   of	  
customary	   international	   law.	   The	  World	   Bank	   expressly	   states	   that	   the	   internal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
de	   Waart	   (eds.),	   The	   Right	   to	   Development	   in	   International	   Law	   (Martinus	   Nijhoff	  
Publishers	  1992)	  379,	  at	  387	  
60	   The	  United	  Nations	  Office	  of	   the	  High	  Commissioner	  of	  Human	  Rights	  advocates	   that	  
‘(s)ome	   fundamental	   human	   rights	   norms	   enjoy	   universal	   protection	   by	   customary	  
international	  law’.	  Available	  at	  
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx	   accessed	   September	  
2013.	  
61	  In	  reference	  to	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Rights,	  the	  IMF	  has	  
stated	  that	   ‘it	   is	  not	  generally	  accepted	  that	  the	  Covenant	  (or	  the	  norms	  contained	  in	   it)	  
form	  part	  of	  general	  or	   customary	   international	   law’	  François	  Gianviti,	   ‘Economic,	  Social	  
and	   Cultural	   Rights	   and	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund’	   (2002)	   available	   at	  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/gianv3.pdf	   accessed	   August	  
2013.	  
62	   The	   right	   to	   self-­‐determination	   (East	  Timor	   case	   (Portugal	   v.	  Australia)	   [1995]	   ICJ	  Rep	  
90,	  at	  101),	  the	  prohibition	  on	  genocide	  (Reservations	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prevention	  
and	  Punishment	  of	   the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide	   [1951]	   ICJ	  Rep	  15,	  at	  23),	   freedom	  from	  racial	  
discrimination	   including	   apartheid,	   and	   the	   prohibition	   on	   slavery	   (Barcelona	   Traction	  
Light	   and	   Power	   Co.	   Ltd.	   (Belgium	   v.	   Spain)	   [1970]	   ICJ	   Rep	   3,	   at	   32),	   freedom	   from	  
arbitrary	   detention	   and	   the	   right	   to	   physical	   integrity,	   (Diplomatic	   and	   Consular	   Staff	   in	  
Tehran	   [1980]	   ICJ	   Rep	   3,	   at	   42)	   protection	   against	   denial	   of	   justice	   (Barcelona	   Traction	  
Light	   and	   Power	   Co.	   Ltd.	   (Belgium	   v.	   Spain)	   [1970]	   ICJ	   Rep	   3,	   at	   47).	   For	   a	   further	  
discussion	  of	  this	  topic	  see	  Tawhida	  Ahmed	  &	  Israel	  de	  Jesus	  Butler,	  ‘The	  European	  Union	  
and	  Human	  Rights:	  An	  International	  Law	  Perspective’	  (2006)	  17(4)	  EJIL	  771	  
63	  Namita	  Wahi,	  ‘Human	  Rights	  Accountability	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank:	  A	  Critique	  
of	  Existing	  Mechanisms	  and	  Articulation	  of	  a	  Theory	  of	  Horizontal	  Accountability’	   (2006)	  
12	  U.C.	  Davis	  J.	  Int’l	  L.	  &	  Pol’y	  331,	  376	  
64	  For	  a	  government’s	  perspective	  see	  A/CN.4/636	  pg.	  8	  Portugal	  (1).	  For	  an	  international	  
organisation’s	  perspective	  see	  the	  IMF’s	  comments	  A/CN.4/637	  pg.	  9-­‐10	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law	   of	   an	   organisation	   ‘prevail(s)	   over	   all	   international	   obligations	   other	   than	  
those	  deriving	  from	  jus	  cogens’65	  and	  rejects	  the	  ARIO’s	  ability	  to	  codify	  primary	  
rules	  of	  responsibility.66	  However,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  this	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  
allow	  the	  Bank	  to	  act	  as	  a	  persistent	  objector	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  some	  or	  all	  of	  
its	  members	  accept	  the	  progressive	  positive	  argument	  under	  the	  ARIO.	  
Despite	   the	   potential	   that	   the	   progressive	   positive	   school	   of	   thought	   offers	   for	  
explaining	  some	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  going	  forward,	  its	  application	  to	  
explaining	   the	  previous	  actions	   in	   law	   is	   insufficient	  due	   to	  not	  all	   actions	  being	  
able	  to	  be	  traced	  to	  customary	  international	  law	  and	  the	  limited	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  
can	  be	  applied	  to	  historical	  actions.	  
Other,	  more	  widely	   accepted,	   tools	   of	   analysis	   are,	   therefore,	   examined.	   These	  
tools	  have	  found	  a	  use	  in	  explaining	  the	  work	  of	  other	  international	  organisations	  
in	  terms	  of	  law	  and	  may	  serve	  a	  similar	  purpose	  for	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
	  
2.5	  Constitutionalisation	  of	  International	  Organisations	  
2.5.1	  Defining	  Constitutionalisation	  
Defining	  the	  term	  ‘constitutionalisation’	   is	  no	  easy	  task	  due	  to	  the	  multitudes	  of	  
work	   applying	   the	   term	   in	   different	   forms.	   In	   general	   uncontroversial	   forms,	   it	  
refers	  to	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  traditional	  positivist	  theory	  of	  international	  law	  based	  
upon	   bilateral	   relations	   between	   equals	   and	   the	   acceptance	   of	   a	   verticalization	  
within	   international	   law	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   international	   constitutional	   order.	  What	  
form	   this	   constitution	   takes,	   how	   it	   is	   articulated	   and	   what	   exactly	   is	  
encompassed	  within	  this	  order	  are	  all	  readily	  debated.	  Academic	  literature	  in	  this	  
discipline	   has	   in	   general	   evolved	   from	   seeking	   constitutionalised	   orders	   within	  
one	   specific	   fragment	   of	   international	   law	   generally	   involving	   an	   international	  
organisation,	  assuming	  that	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  international	  law	  holds	  true,	  to	  
seeking	  a	  constitutionalist	  reading	  for	  public	  international	  law	  in	  its	  entirety	  based	  
upon	  ‘common	  interests’67	  or	  ‘community	  interests’68	  that	  limit	  State	  sovereignty	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  A/CN.4/637	  pg.	  41	  World	  Bank	  (4)	  Emphasis	  in	  original.	  
66	  Ibid.	  World	  Bank	  (1)	  &	  (2)	  
67	  Thomas	  Kleinlein,	  Konstitutionalisierung	  im	  Völkerrecht	  (Springer-­‐Verlag,	  2012)	  
68	  Steven	  Wheatley,	  The	  Democratic	  Legitimacy	  of	  International	  Law	  (Hart	  2010)	  pg.	  171	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like	  a	  constitutional	  order.69	  Yet	  it	  is	  this	  initial	  understanding,	  one	  based	  upon	  the	  
constitutionalisation	   of	   international	   organisations,	   which	   is	   examined	   in	   this	  
section	  as	  to	  determine	  its	  applicability	  to	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
The	   term	   ‘constitutionalisation’	   is	   created	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   traditionally	  
domestic	  view	  of	  a	  constitution.	  What	  is	  recognised	  as	  a	  constitution	  domestically	  
was	   created	   by	   legal	   philosophy	   in	   the	   18th	   and	   19th	   centuries70	   as	   a	  means	   of	  
limiting	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   State	   for	   the	   intrusion	   on	   domestic	   rights	   and	  
guaranteeing	   the	   political	   participation	   of	   a	   State’s	   citizens.71	   This	   domestic	  
constitution	   typically	   includes	   the	   basic	   structures	   in	   which	   political	   power	   is	  
organised,	   the	   checks	   and	   balances	   between	   different	   areas	   of	   government,	  
human	   rights	   protection,	   political	   legitimacy	   and	   a	  means	  of	   social	   integration72	  
and	  it	  is	  these	  processes	  that	  are	  being	  extrapolated	  onto	  the	  international	  plane	  
to	   provide	   a	   legal	   theory	   for	   the	   work	   of	   international	   organisations.	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  attempted	  introduction	  of	  the	  Treaty	  establishing	  a	  Constitution	  
for	   Europe	   demonstrates	   a	   willingness	   outside	   of	   academia	   to	   accept	   that	   a	  
constitution	   is	  more	   than	   limited	   to	  a	  domestic	   sphere	  and	  can	  be	  employed	  as	  
terminology	  within	  the	  international	  legal	  domain.	  
Inside	  academia,	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  term	  ‘constitutionalisation’	   in	  relation	  to	  
international	  organisations	  has	  been	  present	  since	   the	   term	  was	   initially	  used	   in	  
reference	   to	   the	   United	   Nations	   charter	   and	   debates	   surrounding	   whether	   it	  
amounted	  to	  a	  constitution	  for	  a	  new	  world	  order.73	  The	  evolutionary	  processes	  
of	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   WTO	   have	   also	   drawn	   increasing	   parallels	   with	   domestic	  
systems	  and	  spawned	  a	  furore	  of	  academic	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  exact	  nature	  
of	  constitutionalisation	  present	  within	  these	  organisations.74	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	   See	   generally,	   Jan	   Klabbers,	   Anne	   Peters	  &	  Geir	   Ulfstein,	   The	   Constitutionalization	   of	  
International	   Law	   (OUP	   2009)	   and	   Ernst-­‐Ulrich	   Petersmann,	   ‘Constitutionalism	   and	  
International	  Organizations’	  (1996)	  17	  Nw.	  J.	  Int’l	  L.	  &	  Bus.	  398	  
70	  Erika	  de	  Wet,	  ‘The	  International	  Constitutional	  Order’	  (2006)	  55	  Int’l	  &	  Comp.	  L.Q.	  51	  
71	   Bardo	   Fassbender,	   ‘The	   United	   Nations	   Charter	   as	   Constitution	   of	   the	   International	  
Legal	  Community’	  (1998)	  36	  Columbia	  J’nal	  of	  Transnational	  L.	  573	  
72	   Frank	   Schorkopf	   and	   Christian	   Walter,	   ‘Elements	   of	   Constitutionalization:	   Multilevel	  
Structures	   of	   Human	   Rights	   Protection	   in	  General	   International	   and	  WTO-­‐Law’	   (2003)	   4	  
German	  L.	  J’nal	  1359,	  1360	  
73	  Wilfried	   Jenks,	   ‘Some	  Constitutional	  Problems	  of	   International	  Organizations’	   (1945)	  2	  
BYIL	   11.	   For	   a	   more	   current	   account,	   see	   Pierre-­‐Marie	   Dupuy,	   ‘The	   Constitutional	  
Dimension	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Revisited’	  (1997)	  1	  Max	  Planck	  UNYB	  1	  
74	  For	  work	  on	  the	  EU	  see;	  Jürgen	  Habermas,	  ‘The	  Crisis	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  the	  Light	  
of	  a	  Constitutionalization	  of	  International	  Law’	  (2012)	  23(2)	  EJIL	  335;	  Thomas	  Christiansen	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Constitutionalisation	  within	   this	   context	   focuses	  upon	   the	   founding	   treaty	  of	   an	  
international	  organisation	  and	   it	  having	  or	  giving	   it	   (depending	  on	  one’s	   view)	  a	  
special	   character;	   namely	   as	   a	   constitution	   of	   that	   organisation.	   The	   treaty,	  
therefore,	  creates	  a	  new	  subject	  of	  international	  law	  that	  is	  empowered	  to	  realise	  
specific	   common	   goals	   between	   its	  members	   yet	   is	   crucially	   constrained	   by	   the	  
same	  document	  as	  the	  powers	  attributed	  to	  an	  international	  organisation	  have	  to	  
be	  exercised	  within	  the	  legal	  framework	  given	  to	  it.75	  
‘The	   constitution	   of	   an	   international	   organization	   thus	  
embodies	   the	   legal	   framework	   within	   which	   an	   autonomous	  
community	   of	   a	   functional	   (sectoral)	   nature	   realizes	   its	  
respective	   functional	   goal,	   e.g.	   trade	   liberalization,	   human	  
rights	   protection,	   or	   the	   maintenance	   of	   international	   peace	  
and	  security.’76	  
Organisations	  must,	  therefore,	  only	  exercise	  powers	  that	  can	  be	  readily	  traced	  to	  
their	   respective	   legal	   frameworks	  and	  constitutionalisation	  provides	  a	   viewpoint	  
for	   the	   rejection	   in	   law	   of	   ultra-­‐vires	   actions.	   Whilst	   similar	   to	   the	   traditional	  
positivist	   understanding	   up	  until	   this	   point,	   the	   constitutionalist	   school	   seeks	   to	  
move	  beyond	  the	  existence	  of	  a	   legal	   framework,	  which	   if	   the	  only	   requirement	  
would	   allow	  all	   treaty	  based	   international	   organisations	   to	  be	   constitutionalized	  
to	  differing	  extents,	  and	  identifies	  and/or	  advocates	  for	  the	  application	  of	  certain	  
constitutionalist	  principles,	   ‘such	  as	  the	  rule	  of	   law,	  checks	  and	  balances,	  human	  
rights	   protection,	   and	   possibly	   also	   democracy,	   to	   the	   law	   of	   international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
&	   Christine	   Reh,	   Constitutionalizing	   the	   European	   Union	   (Palgrave	   2009)	   and	   Berthold	  
Rittberger	   &	   Frank	   Schimmelfennig,	   ‘The	   Constitutionalization	   of	   the	   European	   Union’	  
(2006)	  13(8)	  Journal	  of	  European	  Public	  Policy	  1148.	  For	  work	  on	  the	  WTO	  see;	  Deborah	  
Cass,	  The	   Constitutionalization	   of	   the	  World	   Trade	  Organization	   (OUP	   2005)	  which	   is	   in	  
contrast	  to	  her	  earlier	  work	  in	  Deborah	  Cass,	  ‘The	  “Constitutionalization”	  of	  International	  
Trade	   Law:	   Judicial	   Norm-­‐Generation	   as	   the	   Engine	   of	   Constitutional	   Development	   in	  
International	  Trade’	  (2001)	  12	  EJIL	  39	  and	  Markus	  Krajewski,	   ‘Democratic	  Legitimacy	  and	  
Constitutional	   Perspectives	   of	   WTO	   Law’	   (2001)	   35	   J’nal	   of	   World	   Trade	   Law	   167.	   For	  
international	   organizations	   generally	   see;	   José	   Alvarez,	   ‘Constitutional	   Interpretation	   in	  
International	   Organizations’,	   in	   Jean	   Marc	   Coicaud	   &	   Veijo	   Heiskanen	   (eds.),	   The	  
Legitimacy	  of	  International	  Organizations	  (United	  Nations	  UP	  2001)	  and	  Neil	  Walker,	  ‘The	  
EU	   and	   the	  WTO:	   Constitutionalism	   in	   a	  New	  Key’,	   in	  Grainne	   de	   Búrca	  &	   Joanne	   Scott	  
(eds.),	  The	  EU	  and	  the	  WTO:	  Legal	  and	  Constitutional	  Issues	  (Hart	  2001)	  
75	  Anne	  Peters,	  ‘Global	  Constitutionalism	  Revisited’,	  presented	  at	  a	  seminar	  on	  the	  Future	  
of	   International	   Constitutional	   Law	   in	   Amsterdam	   28	   November	   2003	   available	   at	  
https://ius.unibas.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/fe/file/Peters
_Global_Constitutionalism_Revisited.pdf	  accessed	  July	  2013.	  
76	  Supra	  Note.	  70,	  pg.	  53	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organizations’.77	  This	  seeks	  to	  recreate	  the	  nationalist	  idea	  of	  a	  constitution	  within	  
the	   international	   sphere.78	  The	  constitutionalist	   theory	   is,	  however,	  accepting	  of	  
the	   incomplete	   constitutionalist	   make-­‐up	   of	   its	   organisational	   subjects	   and	  
acknowledges	   that	   organisations	   can	   appear	   at	   different	   stages	   of	  
constitutionalisation	  along	  a	  spectrum79.	  It	  then	  proceeds	  to	  advocate	  for	  further	  
constitutionalising	  of	  organisations	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  various	  principles	  
outlined	  above.	  
If	   the	   World	   Bank	   is	   accepted	   as	   falling	   within	   this	   theory,	   it	   may	   explain	   the	  
actions	   that	   it	   has	   taken	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   constitutionalist	   nature	   of	   its	  
founding	   document.	   The	   requirement	   to	   introduce	   these	   other	   areas	   of	  
constitutionalist	   principles,	   such	   as	   human	   rights	   protection,	   could	   explain	   the	  
need	  for	  the	  Bank	  to	  consider	  such	  areas	  despite	  not	  being	  found	  in	  its	  Articles	  of	  
Agreement.	  
Beyond	   the	   requirement	   of	   a	   founding	   treaty,	   certain	   legal	   aspects	   can	   be	  
identified	   that	   are	   highlighted	   as	   evidence	   of	   a	   process	   of	   constitutionalisation.	  
Different	   authors	   have	   highlighted	   different	   aspects	   yet	   the	   main	   points	   are	  
examined	   below.80	   This	   is	   not	   a	   requirement	   list	   that	   outlines	   every	   aspect	   an	  
organisation	  must	  possess.	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  as	  of	  the	  acknowledgment	  by	  the	  
school	   of	   thought	   that	   different	   organisations	   can	   embody	   some	  or	   all	   of	   these	  
aspects	  and	  are,	  therefore,	  at	  different	  points	  of	  being	  constitutionalised.	  Dunoff	  
even	   urges	   that	   scholars	   do	   not	   close	   down	   constitutionalisation	   to	   only	   those	  
principles	   extrapolated	   from	   national	   regimes	   and	   instead	   scholars	   ‘articulate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Jan	  Klabbers,	  Anne	  Peters	  &	  Geir	  Ulfstein,	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	  International	  Law	  
(OUP	  2009)	  pg.	  204	  
78	   This	   view	   of	   constitutionalization	   rejects	   the	   somewhat	   traditional	   concept	   of	   a	  
constitution	   as	   embodying	   the	   total	   governance	   applicable	   to	   a	   grouping	   of	   people	   and	  
instead	  is	  based	  upon	  a	  pluralistic	  understanding	  of	  law.	  It	  therefore	  allows	  constitutions	  
to	  develop	  in	  various	  sectors	  of	  international	  law	  that	  are	  not	  in	  conflict	  with	  each	  other	  
or	  with	  national	  constitutions	  or	  even	  with	  one	  overarching	  international	  law	  constitution.	  
For	  further	  work	  on	  this	  see	  Ibid.	  pg.	  202.	  
79	   This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   for	   work	   on	   the	   WTO	   that	   advocates	   for	   further	  
constitutionalising	   of	   the	   organisations	   such	   as	   Klaus	   Armingeon,	   Karolina	   Milewicz,	  
Simone	  Peter	   and	  Anne	  Peters,	   ‘The	  Constitutionalisation	  of	   International	   Trade	   Law’	   in	  
Thomas	   Cottier	   &	   Panagiotis	   Delimatsis	   (eds.),	   The	   Prospects	   of	   International	   Trade	  
Regulation:	  From	  Fragmentation	  to	  Coherence	  (CUP	  2011)	  pg.	  69	  
80	   See	   Deborah	   Cass,	   The	   Constitutionalization	   of	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organization	   (OUP	  
2005)	   Chapter	   5	   for	   an	   appreciation	   of	   the	   points	   created	   by	   an	   ‘institutional	  
managerialism’	  approach,	  ‘rights-­‐based	  constitutionalization’	  approach	  and	  ‘judicial	  norm-­‐
generation’	  approach.	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forms	   of	   constitutionalism	   designed	   to	   open	   up	   spaces’81	   by	   focusing	   beyond	   a	  
static	  frame.	  However,	  some	  constitutional	  principles	  are	  articulated	  upon	  here	  to	  
create	  a	  framework	  for	  application	  against	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
Existence	   of	   constitutional	   principles:	   Constitutional	   principles	   such	   as	   human	  
rights,	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  or	  democracy,	  emanating	  from	  the	  founding	  treaty,	  should	  
bind	  Member	  States.82	  
Autonomy	   of	   the	   organisation:	   The	   organisation	   exists	   autonomous	   from	   its	  
creators.	   Although	   international	   organisations	   are	   acknowledged	   as	   being	  
‘endowed	   with	   a	   certain	   autonomy’,83	   this	   feature	   of	   constitutionalisation	  
examines	   how	   autonomous	   an	   organisation	   is	   by	   considering	   a	   number	   of	  
features	   such	   as	   the	   relationship	   between	   members	   and	   the	   organisation,	   the	  
basis	  of	  validity	  for	  the	  organisation’s	  law	  and	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  
law	  over	  Members.84	  
The	  legalization	  of	  dispute	  settlement:	  The	  organisation	  contains	  a	  judicial	  system	  
to	  adjudicate	  upon	  disputes	  that	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  constitution.	  This	  is	  based	  
upon	   the	   process	   of	   judicial	   review	   from	   national	   legal	   systems	   that	   provide	   a	  
check	  and	  balance	  over	  the	  power	  of	  the	  executive	  and	  legislature.	  The	  EU,	  with	  
the	  ECJ,	  and	  the	  WTO,	  with	  its	  Appellate	  Body,	  are	  held	  as	  two	  examples	  of	  this	  in	  
action.	  
Direct	   application	   of	   organisational	   rules	   at	   a	   national	   level:	   This	   aspect	   entails	  
the	  direct	  application	  of	   the	  organisation’s	   rules	  within	  Member	  Courts	  allowing	  
citizens	   of	   the	  members	   to	   constrain	   the	   domestic	   government	   by	   reference	   to	  
the	   rules	   of	   the	   organisation.	   Work	   in	   this	   area	   has	   primarily	   stemmed	   from	  
analysis	   of	   the	   EU	   in	   light	   of	   the	   ECJ’s	   decision	   in	   the	  Costa	   v	   ENEL85	   case	   that	  
highlighted	  the	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law	  over	  national	  law.86	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Jeffrey	  Dunoff,	   ‘Constitutional	  Conceits:	  The	  WTO’s	  ‘Constitution’	  and	  the	  Discipline	  of	  
International	  Law’	  (2006)	  17(3)	  EJIL	  647,	  673	  
82	  Supra	  Note.	  75,	  pg.	  7	  
83	  Legality	  of	  the	  Use	  by	  a	  State	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  in	  Armed	  Conflict,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  
ICJ	  Reports	  1996,	  66,	  para.	  19	  
84	  For	  more	  discussion	  of	  the	  features	  examined	  see	  Supra	  Note.	  77,	  pg.	  208-­‐210	  
85	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  [1964]	  ECR	  1251	  
86	  See	  for	  example	  G.	  Federico	  Mancini,	  ‘The	  Making	  of	  a	  Constitution	  for	  Europe’	  (1989)	  
26	  Common	  Market	  L.	  Rev.	  595	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Overcomes	   the	   domestic	   political	   process-­‐deficiencies:	   The	   international	  
organisation’s	   law	  prevents	  deficiency	   that	   can	  arise	   from	   the	  domestic	  political	  
process	  by	  not	  allowing	  certain	  actions	  from	  taking	  place.	  Work	  on	  the	  WTO	  has	  
focused	   upon	   the	   ability	   of	   international	   trade	   rules	   to	   prevent	   national	  
protectionist	  interests.87	  
Accountability	   towards	   its	   citizens:	  The	  organisation	  must	  be	   legally	  accountable	  
for	  its	  actions.	  Traditionally	  this	  has	  involved	  accountability	  to	  the	  Member	  States	  
of	   the	   organisation	   yet	   from	   a	   constitutionalist	   perspective	   also	   involves	  
accountability	  to	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  Member	  States.88	  
Existence	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   human	   rights	   responsibilities:	   The	   organisation	  
must	  be	  bound	  by	  legal	  principles,	  specifically	  identified	  from	  its	  treaty,	  that	  act	  to	  
contain	  the	  scope	  and	  limit	  the	  application	  of	  the	  organisation.	  All	  secondary	  law	  
must	   flow	   from	  and	  not	  be	   in	   conflict	  with	   the	  primary	   constitution	   creating	  an	  
internal	   hierarchy	   of	   law	   norms	   with	   the	   primary	   norms	   emanating	   from	   the	  
treaty	  acting	  above	  secondary	  norms.	  Peters	  additionally	  calls	  for	  the	  requirement	  
that	  organisations	  respect	  human	  rights	  due	  to	  them	  forming	  ‘the	  core	  of	  modern	  
constitutional	  law’.89	  
The	  constitutionalist	  school	  of	  thought	  seeks	  to	  improve	  the	  work	  of	  organisations	  
by	   drawing	   in	   other	   elements	   from	   a	   constitutionalist	   construction,	   mainly	  
legitimacy	  and	  democratic	  accountability,	  and	  offering	  solutions	  to	  the	  problems	  
that	  they	  present.90	  The	  work	  on	  constitutionalisation	  is	  nonetheless	  not	  relevant	  
to	   every	   organisation,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   plethora	   of	   work	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  
United	  Nations,	  EU	  and	  the	  WTO	  and	  the	  relatively	  small	  amount	  of	  application	  to	  
other	   organisations.	   The	   existence	   of	   some	   or	   all	   of	   the	   above	   aspects	   only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	   Ernst-­‐Ulrich	   Petersmann,	   Constitutional	   Functions	   and	   Constitutional	   Problems	   of	  
International	  Economic	  Law	  (Westview	  1991)	  pg.	  96	  
88	  See	  for	  example	  ECJ,	  Case	  26/62,	  Van	  Gend	  &	  Loos	  [1963]	  ECR	  3,	  at	  II.B	  that	  subjects	  of	  
the	  Community	  legal	  order	  ‘comprise	  not	  only	  member	  states	  but	  also	  their	  nationals’.	  
89	  Supra	  Note.	  77,	  pg.	  214	  
90	   Jean	   Marc	   Coicaud,	   ‘Conclusion:	   International	   Organizations,	   the	   Evolution	   of	  
International	  Politics,	  and	  Legitimacy’	  in	  Jean	  Marc	  Coicaud	  &	  Veijo	  Heiskanen	  (eds.),	  The	  
Legitimacy	   of	   International	   Organizations	   (United	   Nations	   UP	   2001)	   519	   and	   Steven	  
Wheatley,	  The	  Democratic	  Legitimacy	  of	  International	  Law,	  (Hart,	  2010)	  pg.	  193-­‐207	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provides	  evidence	  of	  a	  process	  of	  constitutionalising	   taking	  place	   rather	   than	  an	  
organisation	  being	  explicitly	  constitutional.91	  
2.5.2	  Applied	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  
A	   constitutionalist	   approach	   to	   the	  World	   Bank	   would	   offer	   a	   number	   of	   legal	  
answers	  to	  the	  actions	  that	  the	  Bank	  has	  taken.	  
The	  autonomy	  of	  the	  Bank	  from	  its	  Members	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  One	  
yet	  rather	  than	  seeing	  World	  Bank	  actions	  that	  are	  outside	  of	  or	  against	  the	  treaty	  
as	  encroaching	  upon	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  as	  the	  positivist	  school	  of	  
thought	  would	  suggest,	  the	  actions	  under	  a	  constitutionalist	  approach	  are	  simply	  
ultra	  vires	  and	  should	  be	  accorded	  no	  legal	  status	  and	  the	  Bank	  should	  only	  act	  in	  
accordance	   with	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   as	   its	   constitution.	   Alternatively,	   as	  
seen	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  human	  right	  norms	  within	  the	  Bank’s	  legal	  system,	  
this	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   evidence	   of	   constitutional	   principles	   that,	   as	   are	   core	   to	  
modern	   constitutional	   law,	  offer	   an	  explanation	   for	  why	   the	  Bank	  has	   read	   into	  
the	  treaty,	  despite	  their	  traditionally	  non-­‐economic	  position,	  as	  requirements	  for	  
lending.	   Their	   use	   as	   Operational	   Policies	   and	   conditions	   upon	   loans	   provide	  
evidence	  of	  the	  organisation	  seeking	  to	  bind	  its	  Members	  to	  its	  own	  internal	  law	  
as	   well	   preventing	   domestic	   political	   process-­‐deficiencies	   that	   could	   allow	  
Members	  to	  regulate	  in	  a	  fashion	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  internal	  law	  of	  the	  Bank	  or	  
with	  human	  rights	  obligations	  generally.	  
The	   introduction	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   legalise	  
dispute	  settlement	  that	  had	  previously	  only	  taken	  place	  in	  diplomatic	  or	  political	  
spheres.	   Also	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   provides	   an	   accountability	   mechanism	   for	  
citizens	  of	  Member	  States	  who	  are	  eligible	   to	  apply	   to	  start	  proceedings	  against	  
the	  World	  Bank	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  Bank	  does	  not	  act	  outside	  of	  its	  internal	  law.	  
Despite	   this	   apparent	   suggested	   constitutional	   nature,	   a	   number	   of	   significant	  
problems	  are	  present	  that	  prevent	  the	  ready	  application	  of	  this	  school	  of	  thought.	  
The	   constitutionalist	   theory	   is	   based	   upon	   the	   premise	   of	   an	   organisations	  
founding	  treaty	  being	  a	  constitution.	  As	  a	  constitution	  is	  a	  higher	  form	  of	  law	  that	  
cannot	   be	   broken,	   any	   act	   outside	   of	   the	   treaty	   would	   be	   ultra	   vires	   and,	  
therefore,	  by	  application	  of	  the	  legalization	  of	  dispute	  settlement,	  be	  void	  and	  the	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  Supra	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  81,	  Footnote	  33	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actions	  brought	  back	  into	  line	  of	  the	  constitution.	  When	  this	  is	  applied	  against	  the	  
World	   Bank,	   two	   points	   dispute	   the	   application.	   Firstly,	   as	   demonstrated	   in	  
Chapter	   One,	   States	   are	   accepting	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   despite	   them	  
being	  outside	  the	  treaty.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  States	  are	  alleging	  the	  World	  Bank	  
has	  broken	  its	  mandate	  and	  that	   its	  powers	  should	  be	  constrained	  to	  only	  those	  
attributed	  under	   the	   treaty,	   they	   are	  willing	   to	   accept	   the	  World	  Bank	  dictating	  
terms	  in	  agreements	  and	  requiring	  environmental,	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	  other	  
standards	   in	   loans	   that	   are	   not	   encompassed	   within	   the	   original	   treaty	   and	   in	  
some	   cases	   are	   explicitly	   against	   the	   words	   of	   the	   treaty.	   The	   use	   of	  
constitutionalist	   theory,	   like	   the	  positivist	   school,	   cannot	  explain	   this	  occurrence	  
as	   under	   the	   constitutionalist	   approach,	   despite	   the	   autonomy	   given	   to	   the	  
organisation,	   the	   members	   of	   the	   Bank	   would	   be	   requiring	   it	   to	   act	   within	   its	  
constitution.	  
Secondly,	  although	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  
legalization	   of	   dispute	   settlement,	   as	   will	   be	   examined	   in	   Chapter	   Five,	   the	  
creation	  and	  use	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  interpretation	  
of	   the	   treaty	   as	   the	   constitutionalist	   theory	   would	   suggest	   but	   is	   instead	  
concerned	   with	   the	   legalisation	   of	   the	   secondary	   norms	   that	   exist	   within	   the	  
World	   Bank.	   The	   Panel	   does	   not	   interpret	   or	   concern	   itself	  with	   the	   treaty	   and	  
examine	  whether	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  actions	  are	  ultra	  vires,	  unlike	  the	  WTO	  Dispute	  
Settlement	   system	   that	   examines	   disputes	   concerning	   interpretation	   of	   the	  
primary	   documents,92	   it	   instead	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   interpretation	   and	  
application	   of	   the	   Operational	   Policies	   and	   Bank	   Procedures	   and	   whether	   the	  
Bank’s	  actions	  have	  complied	  with	  these	  norms.	  	  
In	   addition	   as	   examined	   in	   Chapter	   One,	   the	   Operational	   Policies	   are	   explicitly	  
against	   the	   treaty	   in	   interfering	   with	   the	   political	   affairs	   of	   its	   Member	   States	  
which	   under	   a	   constitutionalist	   approach	   could	   not	   occur.	   Instead,	   the	  
Operational	   Policies,	   as	   secondary	   norms,	  would	   have	   to	   be	   in	   compliance	  with	  
the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   as	   its	   constitution.	   The	  Operational	   Policies	   also	   only	  
concern	   a	   small	   number	   of	   human	   rights	   rather	   than	   a	   protection	   of	   all	   human	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   2	   of	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organization	   Agreement,	   Understanding	   on	   Rules	   and	  
Procedures	  Governing	  the	  Settlement	  of	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rights	  or	  even	  a	  specific	  subset	  such	  as	  civil	  and	  political	   rights	  appearing	   to	  put	  
the	  place	  the	  Bank	  against	  ‘the	  core	  of	  modern	  constitutional	  law’.93	  
Despite	  the	  attractions	  that	  a	  constitutionalist	   reading	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	  offers,	  
the	   problems	   presented	   prevent	   the	   application	   as	   an	   effective	   tool	   for	  
understanding	  the	  Bank’s	  actions	  in	  law.	  In	  the	  future,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  World	  
Bank	   will	   develop	   to	   such	   an	   extent	   that	   a	   constitutionalist	   approach	   offers	   a	  
better	   understanding	   of	   its	  workings,	   yet	  without	   the	   development	   of	   the	   legal	  
aspects	   identified	   above,	   particularly	   in	   reference	   to	   the	   hierarchal	   form	   of	   the	  
internal	   law	  with	  all	  secondary	  norms	  existing	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  treaty,	  the	  
current	  problems	  of	  application	  prevent	  any	  meaningful	  analysis	  using	  this	  tool.	  
	  
2.6	  Global	  Administrative	  Law	  
2.6.1	  Defining	  Global	  Administrative	  Law	  
The	   notion	   of	   a	   global	   administrative	   law	   is,	   similar	   to	   progressive	   positive,	   an	  
emerging	   school	   of	   thought.94	   However,	   unlike	   progressive	   positive,	   this	   theory	  
has	  garnered	  considerable	  academic	  debate	  since	  a	  seminal	  paper	  in	  2005	  alleged	  
the	   emergence	   of	   a	   global	   administrative	   law	   that	   could	   be	   utilised	   to	   explain	  
aspects	   of	   global	   governance	   that	   the	   positivist	   school	   no	   longer	   was	   able	   to	  
explain.95	   The	   theory	   is	   built	   upon	   the	   twin	   premise	   that	   much	   of	   what	   is	  
described	   as	   global	   governance	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   regulatory	   administration	  
and	  that	  this	  regulatory	  capacity	  is	  often	  organised	  and	  shaped	  by	  principles	  of	  an	  
administrative	  law	  character.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Supra	  Note.	  77,	  pg.	  214	  
94	   Although	   the	   term	   ‘international	   administrative	   law’	   has	   been	   in	   use,	   it	   has	   typically	  
referred	   to	   the	   administrative	   rules,	   procedures	   and	   tribunals	   of	   international	  
organisations	   that	   are	   concerned	   with	   an	   organisation’s	   staff.	   See	   Nassib	   Ziadé	   (ed.),	  
Problems	   of	   International	   Administrative	   Law	   (Martinus	   Nijhoff	   2008).	   However	   in	   the	  
early	  twentieth	  century	  scholarship	  on	  this	  area	  was	  concerned	  with	  a	  wider	  formulation	  
that	   encompassed	  what	   is	   now	  being	   referred	   to	   as	   global	   administrative	   law.	   See	   Paul	  
Reinsch,	  ‘International	  Administrative	  Law	  and	  National	  Sovereignty’	  (1909)	  3	  AJIL	  1.	  Some	  
authors	  have	  however	  in	  the	  inter-­‐years	  used	  the	  term	  ‘international	  administrative	  law’	  
in	  the	  wider	  sense	  that	  is	  now	  being	  used	  by	  ‘global	  administrative	  law’.	  See	  for	  example,	  
Daniel	  Partan,	  ‘International	  Administrative	  Law’	  (1981)	  75(3)	  AJIL	  639	  and	  Henry	  Perritt,	  
Jr,	   ‘International	   Administrative	   Law	   for	   the	   Internet:	   Mechanisms	   of	   Accountability’,	  
(1999)	  51	  Administrative	  Law	  Review	  871.	  
95	   Benedict	   Kingsbury,	   Nico	   Krisch	   &	   Richard	   Stewart,	   ‘The	   Emergence	   of	   Global	  
Administrative	  Law’	  (2005)	  68	  (3	  &	  4)	  Law	  and	  Contemporary	  Problems	  15	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The	   focus	   upon	   global	   governance	   is	   premised	   upon	   the	   claim	   that	   there	   are	   a	  
number	  of	   transnational	   systems	  of	   regulation,	   established	  either	   formally	   via	   a	  
treaty	   or	   in	   an	   informal	   fashion,	   that	   address	   global	   issues	   that	   a	   single	   State	  
cannot	  manage	  alone	  which	  have	  shifted	  regulatory	  competence,	  in	  these	  specific	  
areas,	   from	   national	   governments	   to	   a	   global	   level.96	   Beyond	   the	   accepted	  
positivist	   theory,	   which	   as	   examined	   in	   Chapter	   One	   explains	   the	   transfer	   of	  
governance	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  sovereignty,	  global	  administrative	  law	  alleges	  that:	  	  
“much	   of	   the	   detail	   and	   implementation	   of	   such	   regulation	   is	  
determined	   by	   transnational	   administrative	   bodies…	   that	   perform	  
administrative	   functions	   but	   are	   not	   directly	   subject	   to	   control	   by	  
national	   governments	   or	   domestic	   legal	   systems	   or,	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
treaty	  based	  regimes,	  the	  states	  party	  to	  the	  treaty.”97	  
This	   distinction	   of	   transnational	   bodies	   acting	   outside	   the	   effective	   control	   of	  
States	   is	   what	   separates	   global	   administrative	   law	   from	   simply	   being	   the	  
application	   of	   administrative	   law	   principles	   to	   administrative	   bodies	   within	   the	  
positivist	  theory.	  The	  application	  of	  existing	  administrative	  law	  principles	  is	  based	  
upon	  the	  assertion	  that	  the	  exercise	  of	  global	  governance	  is	  either	  done	  or	  should	  
be	   done	   in	   a	   fashion	   consistent	  with	   administrative	   law	   ideals.	   This	   descriptive-­‐
prescriptive	   dichotomy	   is	   used	   to	   examine	   existing	   legal	  mechanisms,	   principles	  
and	   practices	   that	   promote	   or	   affect	   the	   accountability	   of	   global	   administrative	  
bodies	   to	   ensure	   that	   these	   bodies	   meet	   adequate	   standards	   of	   transparency,	  
consultation,	  participation,	   rationality,	   and	   legality,	   and	  provide	  effective	   review	  
of	  the	  rules	  and	  decisions	  these	  bodies	  make.98	  
The	  focus	  on	  governance	  by	   international	  organisations	  and	  the	  acceptance	  that	  
these	   organisations	   take	   actions	   outside	   of	   State	   consent	   is	   what	   offers	   global	  
administrative	   law	   theory	   as	   a	   potential	  model	   of	   understanding	   for	   the	  World	  
Bank.	  
Kingsbury,	  Krisch	  and	  Stewart	  define	  administrative	  action	  in	  the	  domestic	  setting	  
as	  State	  acts	  that	  are	  not	  legislative	  or	  judicial	  and,	  whilst	  accepting	  there	  is	  a	  blur	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Ibid.	  pg.	  16	  
97	  Ibid.	  pg.	  16	  
98	  Ibid.	  pg.	  17	  and	  see	  ‘Global	  Administrative	  Law	  Project	  Concept	  and	  Working	  Definition’,	  
Institute	  for	  International	  Law	  and	  Justice,	  New	  York	  University	  School	  of	  Law	  available	  at	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  accessed	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  2013.	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in	   the	   boundaries	   of	   this	   definition	   and	   acknowledging	   that	   there	   is	   no	   agreed	  
functional	  differentiation	  beyond	  the	  domestic	  settings,	  allege	  that	  many	  actions	  
of	   international	   institutions	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   within	   a	   similar	   definition	  
applied	   to	   the	   international	   setting.99	   It	   includes	   rulemaking,	   adjudications	   and	  
other	  decisions	  that	  do	  not	  consist	  of	  treaty	  making	  or	  simple	  dispute	  settlements	  
between	  parties.100	   Administrative	   law,	   as	   distinct	   from	  administrative	   action,	   is	  
law	   that	   governs	   the	   exercise	   of	   power	   by	   public	   officials101	   and	   it	   is	   the	  
application	   of	   administrative	   law	   to	   administrative	   action	   that	   the	   global	  
administrative	  law	  theorem	  is	  concerned	  with.	  
The	  use	  of	  global	  administrative	  law,	  and	  its	  focus	  upon	  accountability,	  raises	  the	  
issue	   of	   to	   who	   are	   organisations	   accountable.	   Under	   the	   positivist	   theory,	  
organisations	   are	   only	   accountable	   to	   their	   signatory	   States	   yet	   national	  
administrative	  law	  is	  concerned	  with	  ensuring	  that	  public	  officials	  are	  accountable	  
to	  the	  public.102	  Global	  administrative	  law	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  that	  organisations	  are	  
accountable	   to	   the	   subjects	   that	   their	   work	   affects,	   whether	   that	   is	   States,	  
individuals	  or	  private	  entities.103	  
One	  specific	  element	  of	  global	  administrative	   law	   is	   the	   focus	  upon	   the	  work	  of	  
formal	   international	   organisations	   and	   the	   global	   administrative	   regulation	   that	  
they	   propagate.104	   International	   organisations	   are	   alleged	   to	   be	   the	   main	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	   Ibid.	  pg.	  17	  and	  see	  Carol	  Harlow,	  ‘Global	  Administrative	  Law:	  The	  Quest	  for	  Principles	  
and	   Values’	   (2006)	   17(1)	   EJIL	   187	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   administrative	   basis	   for	   these	  
standards.	  
100	   Richard	   Stewart,	   ‘U.S.	   Administrative	   Law:	   A	  Model	   for	   Global	   Administrative	   Law?’	  
(2005)	  68(3	  &	  4)	  Law	  and	  Contemporary	  Problems	  63	  
101	  David	  Dyzenhaus,	  ‘The	  Rule	  of	  (Administrative)	  Law	  in	  International	  Law’,	  (2005)	  68(3	  &	  
4)	  Law	  and	  Contemporary	  Problems	  127	  
102	   ‘Therefore,	   the	   concept	   of	   accountability	   involves	   two	   distinct	   stages:	   	   answerability	  
and	  enforcement.	   	  Answerability	  refers	  to	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  government,	   its	  agencies	  
and	  public	  officials	  to	  provide	  information	  about	  their	  decisions	  and	  actions	  and	  to	  justify	  
them	   to	   the	   public	   and	   those	   institutions	   of	   accountability	   tasked	   with	   providing	  
oversight.	   	   Enforcement	   suggests	   that	   the	   public	   or	   the	   institution	   responsible	   for	  
accountability	   can	   sanction	   the	   offending	   party	   or	   remedy	   the	   contravening	   behavior.’	  
within	  Rick	  Stapenhurst	  &	  Mitchell	  O’Brien,	  ‘Accountability	  in	  Governance’	  available	  at	  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/Account
abilityGovernance.pdf	  accessed	  September	  2013.	  
103	  Specifically	  see,	  Nico	  Krisch,	   ‘The	  Pluralism	  of	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’	  (2006)	  17(1)	  
EJIL	  247	  and	  generally	  see	  Simon	  Chesterman,	  ‘Globalization	  Rules:	  Accountability,	  Power,	  
and	  the	  Prospects	  for	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’	  (2008)	  14	  Global	  Governance	  39	  
104	   Benedict	   Kingsbury	   &	   Lorenzo	   Casini,	   ‘Global	   Administrative	   Law	   Dimensions	   of	  
International	   Organizations	   Law’	   (2009)	   6	   Int’l	   Organizations	   L.	   Rev.	   319;	   Benedict	  
Kingsbury	   &	   Richard	   Stewart,	   ‘Legitimacy	   and	   Accountability	   in	   Global	   Regulatory	  
Governance:	   The	   Emerging	  Global	   Administrative	   Law	   and	   the	  Design	   and	  Operation	   of	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administrative	   actors	   of	   international	   administration105	   with	   the	   application	   of	  
administrative	   law	   theory	   useful	   for	   three	   specific	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   the	   growing	  
demand	   for	   improved	   accountability	   of	   organisations106	   has	   the	   potential	   to	  
‘seriously	   limit	   the	  effectiveness’107	  of	  organisations	  as	   ‘oversight	  and	  control	  by	  
states…	   can	   distort	   priorities	   and	   effective	   structures,	   and	   may	   even	   worsen	  
problems	   of	   (international	   organisation)	   misconduct	   and	   corruption’.108	   In	   this	  
area,	  the	  global	  administrative	  law	  theorem	  is	  in	  direct	  contrast	  with	  the	  positivist	  
school	   that	   demands	   organisations	   are	   only	   accountable	   to	   the	   States	   that	   are	  
members.	   Global	   administrative	   law	   offers	   alternatives	   to	   the	   accountability	  
problem.	  	  	  
Secondly,	  global	  administrative	  law	  offers	  insights	  into	  the	  horizontal	  relationship	  
(relations	   between	   organisations	   and	   States)	   and	   vertical	   relationship	   (relations	  
between	  organisations,	  States	  and	  national	  administrations)109	   that	   international	  
organisations	  currently	  practice.110	  Finally,	  organisations	  now	  produce	  a	  wealth	  of	  
‘rules,	  principles,	  decisions,	  soft-­‐law,	  and	  non-­‐legal	  norms’.111	  As	  these	  are	  largely	  
fragmented	  and	  do	  not	  always	  reconcile	  with	  each	  other,	  traditional	  formal	  norms	  
and	  rules	  of	  jurisdiction,	  such	  as	  found	  in	  treaty	  law	  and	  customary	  international	  
law,	  are	  not	  enough	   to	  effectively	  manage	   the	   sheer	  amount	  but	   ‘by	  a	  dynamic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Administrative	   Tribunals	   of	   International	   Organizations’	   in	   Katerina	   Papanikolaou	   (ed.),	  
International	   Administrative	   Tribunals	   in	   a	   Changing	   World	   (Esperia	   Publications	   2008)	  
and,	   for	   the	   World	   Bank	   specifically,	   Pascale	   Dubois	   &	   Aileen	   Nowlan,	   ‘Global	  
Administrative	  Law	  and	  the	  Legitimacy	  of	  Sanctions	  Regimes	  in	  International	  Law’	  (2010)	  
36	  Yale	  Journal	  Int’l	  L.	  Online	  	  
105	  Steven	  Wheatley,	  The	  Democratic	  Legitimacy	  of	  International	  Law	  (Hart,	  2010)	  pg.	  21	  
106	  See	  August	  Reinisch,	  ‘Securing	  the	  Accountability	  of	  International	  Organizations’	  (2001)	  
7	   Global	   Governance	   131,	   Thomas	   Zweifel,	   International	   Organizations	   and	   Democracy:	  
Accountability,	  Politics	  and	  Power	  (Lynne	  Rienner	  2006),	  for	  development	  banks	  generally	  
see	   Eisuke	   Suzuki	  &	   Suresh	  Nanwani,	   ‘Responsibility	   of	   International	  Organizations:	   The	  
Accountability	  Mechanisms	   of	  Multilateral	   Development	   Banks’	   (2005-­‐2006)	   27	  Mich.	   J.	  
Int’l	  L.	  177	  and	  for	  the	  World	  Bank	  specifically	  see	  Jonathan	  Fox	  &	  L.	  David	  Brown	  (eds.),	  
The	  Struggle	  for	  Accountability:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  NGOs,	  and	  Grassroots	  Movements	   (MIT	  
1998).	  
107	   Benedict	   Kingsbury	   &	   Lorenzo	   Casini,	   ‘Global	   Administrative	   Law	   Dimensions	   of	  
International	  Organizations	  Law’	  (2009)	  6	  Int’l	  Organizations	  L.	  Rev.	  319,	  356	  
108	  Ibid.	  
109	  See	  Richard	  Stewart	  &	  Michelle	  Ratton	  Sanchez	  Badin,	  ‘The	  World	  Trade	  Organization:	  
Multiple	  Dimensions	  of	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’	  (2011)	  9(3	  &	  4)	  Int.	  J.	  Constitutional	  L.	  
556	  and	  Georgios	  Dimitropoulos,	   ‘Collegial	  Rule-­‐Implementation:	  Peer	  Reviews	   in	  Global	  
Administrative	   Law’	   prepared	   for	   the	   Global	   Fellows	   Forum,	   6	   December	   2011,	   at	   New	  
York	  University	  Law	  School	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_070658.pdf	  accessed	  August	  2013.	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  Note.	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process	  of	  regulation	  in	  which	  global	  administrative	  law	  can	  play	  a	  useful	  part'112	  a	  
tool	  can	  be	  created	  to	  manage	  these	  normative	  activities.	  
2.6.2	  Applied	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  
Conceptually	  the	  theory	  of	  a	  global	  administrative	  law	  is	  hampered	  by	  the	  variety	  
of	  global	  governance.	  In	  attempting	  to	  capture	  all	  forms	  of	  governance	  within	  its	  
work,	  it	  falls	  upon	  the	  same	  fallacy	  as	  the	  ARIO	  in	  not	  acknowledging	  the	  distinct	  
differences	   between	   organisations.	   The	   structure,	   voting	   mechanisms,	   decision	  
making	  bodies,	   judicial	  organs	  including	  compulsory	  or	  voluntary	  settlement,	  the	  
subjects	   of	   regulation,	   purposes	   of	   the	   organisation,	   quantity	   of	   State	  
involvement	  as	  well	  as	  the	  quantity	  of	  State	  members	  all	  have	  an	  effect	  upon	  the	  
make-­‐up	   and	   “administrative	   action”	   of	   the	   organisation	   and	   in	   defining	  
administrative	  action	  as	  rulemaking,	  adjudications	  and	  other	  decisions	  that	  do	  not	  
consist	   of	   treaty	   making	   or	   simple	   dispute	   settlements	   between	   parties,	   the	  
theory	  moves	  away	  from	  the	  conceptual	  base	  that	  separated	  it	  from	  the	  positivist	  
paradigm:	   that	   the	   action	   was	   outside	   of	   State	   control.	   The	   wide	   basis	   and	  
definitions	   used	   by	   global	   administrative	   law	   in	   turn	   ensure	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	  
stipulate	   that	   something	   is	   not	   administrative	   action,	   particularly	   within	   an	  
international	  organisation.	  
In	  reference	  to	  the	  work	  specifically	  on	  international	  organisations,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  
disconnect	  in	  the	  descriptive-­‐prescriptive	  element	  in	  the	  global	  administrative	  law	  
theory.	   Rather	   than	   focusing	   upon	   a	   descriptive	   element	   of	   what	   States’	   are	  
accepting,	   the	   theory	   focuses	  upon	  describing	  how	  organisations	   should	   behave	  
and	   how	   governance	   should	   function:	   if	   an	   organisation	   governs,	   it	   should	   use	  
administrative	  law	  principles.	  The	  descriptive	  element	  is,	  therefore,	  focused	  upon	  
the	  search	   for	  governance	  rather	   than	  the	  search	   for	  existing	  administrative	   law	  
principles	  within	  an	  organisation.	  Again,	  the	  differences	  in	  organisations	  and	  their	  
mandates	  do	  not	  readily	  suggest	  the	  wide	  acceptance	  of	  administrative	  principles	  
by	  States	  otherwise	  all	  organisations	  would	  already	   incorporate	  the	  principles	  of	  
transparency,	   consultation,	   participation,	   rationality,	   and	   legality,	   and	   provide	  
effective	  review	  of	  the	  rules	  and	  decisions	  that	  they	  make.	  It	  is	  not	  disputed	  that	  
some	  organisations	  have	   incorporated	  various	  elements	   from	  administrative	   law	  
into	  their	  mechanisms	  and	  structures,	  but	  rather	  than	  being	  seen	  as	  a	  widespread	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evidence	  of	   a	  paradigm	   shift	   towards	   a	   global	   administrative	   law	   this	   should	  be	  
seen	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  individuality	  of	  organisations	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  evolve	  in	  
a	  fashion	  that	  is	  relevant	  towards	  the	  organisation	  rather	  than	  some	  outside	  ideal	  
standard	  that	  all	  organisations	  are	  moving	  towards.	  
However,	   beyond	   the	   positive,	   progressive	   positive	   or	   constitutionalisation	  
schools	   of	   thought,	   the	   theory	   of	   a	   global	   administrative	   law	   goes	   furthest	   in	  
accurately	   describing	   the	   World	   Bank’s	   actions	   in	   law.	   As	   Chapter	   One	  
demonstrated	  that	  the	  World	  Bank	  is	  no	  longer	  under	  the	  direct	  control	  of	  States’	  
who	  were	   party	   to	   the	   treaty,	   global	   administrative	   law	   explains	   this	   in	   law	   by	  
using	   it	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   its	   theory	   that	   this	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   global	  
governance.	   The	   rules,	   including	   the	   Operational	   Policies	   and	   best	   practice,	  
established	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  World	   Bank’s	   lending,	   are	   seen	   as	   administrative	  
action	   under	   the	   theory	   from	   a	   global	   governance	   perspective	   that	   should	   be	  
subject	  to	  administrative	  law	  ideals.	  
The	  work	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  Five	  for	  
the	   effect	   that	   they	   had	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   and	  
environmental	  policies.	   This	   inclusion	   could	  be	   seen	  as	  evidence	  of	   consultation	  
and	   public	   participation	   yet	   this	   ad	   hoc	   inclusive	   nature	   by	   one	   World	   Bank	  
President113	   cannot	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  widespread	   adoption	   of	   consultation	   or	   public	  
participation.	  
The	  World	   Bank	   has	   also	   been	   praised	   for	   its	   transparency	   policy	   in	   relation	   to	  
global	   administrative	   law.114	   Yet	   the	   transparency	   allowed	   for	   by	   the	   Bank	   is	  
different	   from	   transparency	   as	   called	   for	   by	   global	   administrative	   law.115	   Board	  
meeting	   deliberations	   concerning	   how	   policies	   are	   created,	   the	   key	   arm	   of	  
governance	  used	  by	  the	  Bank,	  are	  only	  eligible	  for	  disclosure	  after	  declassification	  
that	  is	  governed	  by	  strict	  timelines,116	  when	  these	  policies	  have	  even	  been	  sent	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  Sebastian	  Mallaby,	  The	  World’s	  Banker	  (Penguin	  2004)	  pg.	  87	  
114	   Euan	   MacDonald,	   ‘Transparency	   at	   the	   World	   Bank’,	   available	   at	  
http://globaladminlaw.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/transparency-­‐at-­‐world-­‐bank.html	  
accessed	  September	  2013.	  
115	   ‘Decisional	  transparency	  and	  access	  to	   information	  are	   important	  foundations	  for	  the	  
effective	   exercise	   of	   participation	   rights	   and	   rights	   of	   review’,	   Malcolm	   Shaw,	  
International	   Law	   (Sixth	   Edition,	   CUP	   2008)	   pg.	   39.	   Also	   see	   Michael	   Barr	   &	   Geoffrey	  
Miller,	   ‘Global	   Administrative	   Law:	   The	   View	   from	   Basel’	   (2006)	   17(1)	   EJIL	   15	   for	   the	  
application	  of	  global	  administrative	  transparency	  in	  an	  international	  law	  context.	  
116	  The	  World	  Bank	  Policy	  on	  Access	  to	  Information,	  1	  July	  2010,	  para.	  16	  (B)	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the	  Board	  at	  all.	  This	  additionally	  affects	  the	  public	  participation	  in	  governance,	  as	  
without	   a	   transparency	   policy	   in	   place	   to	   readily	   make	   available	   information	  
pertaining	   to	   how	   and	  why	   rules	   are	   created,	   public	   participation	   is	   necessarily	  
limited.	   In	   addition,	   information	   provided	   by	   a	   Member	   State	   in	   confidence	  
cannot	   be	   disclosed	   without	   the	   express	   permission	   of	   the	   country,	   therefore,	  
again	  restricting	  the	  transparency	  policy	  required	  by	  administrative	  law.117	  	  
The	  creation	  and	  work	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  has	  also	  drawn	  attention	  under	  the	  
global	  administrative	   law	  theorem118	  and	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  providing	  a	  review	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank’s	  actions	  against	   its	  policies	   yet	   the	   limitations	  of	   this	  approach	  
should	  be	  established.	  Firstly,	  despite	  it	  providing	  reasoned	  decisions	  as	  called	  for	  
by	   global	   administrative	   law,119	   as	   will	   be	   examined	   in	   Chapter	   Five,	   the	   locus	  
standi	   of	   the	   Panel	   only	   allows	   groups	   of	   individuals	   directly	   affected	   by	   the	  
Bank’s	  lending	  to	  make	  a	  request	  for	  inspection.	  States	  who	  are	  directly	  affected	  
by	   policies,	   such	   as	   a	   borrowing	   State	   in	   any	   loan	   agreement,	   cannot	   use	   this	  
avenue	   to	   review	  management’s	   conduct,120	   therefore,	   limiting,	   in	   this	   context,	  
who	  the	  Bank	  is	  accountable	  to.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  no	  review	  of	  the	  actual	  policies,	  
simply	   management’s	   actions	   against	   the	   policies,	   which	   whilst	   similar	   to	   the	  
administrative	   law	   concept	   of	   judicial	   review	   does	   not	   allow	   for	   an	   effective	  
review	  of	  the	  rules	  that	  are	  actually	  affecting	  the	  governance	  of	   individuals.	  The	  
World	  Bank	  is,	  therefore,	  not	  accountable	  to	  the	  people	  its	  decisions	  affect	  in	  this	  
context.121	  
In	   addition,	   if	   administrative	   law	   is	   the	   constraint	  of	  power	  by	  public	  officials	   in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   law,	   staff	   at	   the	   Bank	   would	   in	   turn	   be	   constrained	   from	  
regulating	  on	  subjects	  outside	  of	  their	  legal	  mandate.	  As	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  
One,	   the	  Bank	  has	  repeatedly	   regulated	  on	  subjects	   that	  cannot	  be	  traced	  to	   its	  
Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  The	  global	  administrative	  law	  theorem	  would	  suggest	  that	  
this	   is	   legally	   prohibited	  which	   runs	   counter	   to	   the	   acceptance	  by	   States	   of	   this	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  Ibid.	  para.	  14	  
118	  Mariarita	  Circi,	  ‘The	  World	  Bank	  Inspection	  Panel:	  The	  Indian	  Mumbai	  Urban	  Transport	  
Project	  Case’,	  within	  Sabino	  Cassese,	  Bruno	  Carotti,	  Lorenzo	  Casini,	  Marco	  Macchia,	  Euan	  
MacDonald	   &	   Mario	   Savino	   (eds.),	   Global	   Administrative	   Law	   Cases,	   Materials,	   Issues	  
(Second	  Edition,	  University	  of	  Rome	  2008)	  pg.	  129	  
119	  Supra	  Note.	  95,	  pg.	  39	  
120	   On	   issues	   of	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   States	   have	   the	   option	   of	  
availing	   themselves	   of	   Article	   IX	   (b)	   requesting	   the	  matter	   by	   referred	   to	   the	   Board	   of	  
Governors	  whose	  decision	  is	  final	  on	  a	  four-­‐fifths	  majority.	  
121	  Supra	  Note.	  103	  (Krisch)	  pg.	  250	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action,	  even	  when	  it	  is	  not	  in	  a	  State’s	  best	  interest	  such	  as	  when	  they	  are	  seeking	  
financial	  assistance.	  
Similar	   to	   the	   problem	   that	   prevents	   the	   application	  of	   the	   progressive	   positive	  
theorem	   for	   historical	   acts,	   whilst	   the	   global	   administrative	   law	   theorem	   offers	  
potential	   insights	  for	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Bank	  going	  forward,	  the	  theorem	  struggles	  
to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  past	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank.	  Even	  if	  it	  is	  accepted	  that	  the	  
transparency	   policy,	   consultation	   on	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   subjects	   and	  
introduction	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   amount	   to	   a	   furtherance	   of	   administrative	  
law	  ideals	  within	  the	  Bank	  within	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  the	  global	  administrative	  
law	   theorem	   can	   only	   explain	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Bank	   previous	   to	   these	   as	  
administrative	   actions	   which	   raises	   the	   question	   of	   why	   has	   the	   Bank	   not	  
voluntarily	   introduced	  or	  been	  required,	  either	   legally	  or	  politically,	   to	   introduce	  
administrative	   ideals	   in	   the	   proceeding	   four	   decades	   if	   it	   has	   been	   acting	   in	   an	  
administrative	  capacity.	  
In	  terms	  of	  explaining	  how	  and	  why	  the	  Bank	  is	  acting	   in	  a	  governance	  function,	  
the	   global	   administrative	   law	   theorem	  may	   still	   make	   valuable	   contributions	   to	  
the	   analysis.	   Yet	   the	   lack	   of	   administrative	   law	   ideals	   refutes	   the	   application	   of	  
this	  doctrine	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  generally.	  Whilst	  there	  has	  been	  slight	  evidence	  of	  
a	   shift	   towards	   these	   ideals,	  with	   the	   transparency	   of	   certain	   elements	   and	   the	  
Inspection	  Panel	  process	  acting	  as	  a	  review,	  there	  is	  no	  wide	  spread	  adoption	  of	  
administrative	   law	   ideals.	   The	   wide	   definition	   of	   administrative	   action	   leaves	   a	  
situation	  where	  either	  the	  theory	  is	  applied	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  is	  seen	  as	  acting	  
in	   an	  administrative	   function	  without	   the	  administrative	  oversight,	   a	   reasonable	  
conclusion	  that	  would	  require	  the	  Bank	  to	  begin	  introducing	  these	  administrative	  
ideals	   into	   its	  work,	   or	   an	  alternative	   legal	   theory	   is	   sought	   that	  better	   explains	  
the	  present	  position	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	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2.7	  International	  Institutional	  Law	  
	  “From	   a	   formal	   standpoint,	   the	   constituent	   instruments	   of	  
international	   organizations	   are	   multilateral	   treaties,…	   their	  
character…	  is	  conventional	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  institutional”122	  
The	  final	  major	  theory	  that	   is	  present	   in	  the	  literature	  concerning	  the	  legal	  work	  
of	   international	   organisations	   is	   international	   institutional	   law.	   Although	   each	  
organisation	  is	  viewed	  as	  having	  its	  own	  unique	  law	  and	  practice,123	  international	  
institutional	   law	   examines	   “those	   rules	   of	   law	   that	   govern	   their	   legal	   status,	  
structure	   and	   functioning”124	   as	   common	   elements	   across	   international	  
organisations.125	  When	  a	  new	  international	  organisation	  is	  formed,	  it	  builds	  upon	  
the	   previous	   work	   of	   other	   international	   organisations	   and	   mimics	   their	  
institutional	  character	  (although	  of	  course	  there	  can	  be	  differences).	  International	  
institutional	   law	   is,	   therefore,	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	  a	  theory	  of	  generality.	   It	   is	  not	  
seeking	  to	  describe	  the	  details	  of	  every	  organisation,	  but	  is	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  
of	  all	  organisations	  to	  determine	  which	  elements	  are	  common	  across	  the	  scope	  of	  
applicability.	   Once	   these	   points	   are	   identified,	   the	   analysis	   has	   progressed	   to	  
influencing	  how	  other	  organisations	  should	  evolve	  or	  should	  be	  created	   in	  order	  
to	  match	  this	  international	  institutional	  law.	  
Although	   this	   theory	   has	   become	   prevalent	   in	   the	   literature,	   its	   very	   nature	  
precludes	  the	  ready	  application	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  explaining	  how	  the	  
Bank	  is	  acting.	  International	  institutional	  law	  focuses	  upon	  the	  laws	  that	  develop	  
in	  relation	  to	  the	  institutional	  setting	  of	  the	  organisation:	  membership,	  organs	  of	  
the	   organisation,	   decision-­‐making,	   voting,	   judicial	   organs	   and	   the	   general	   legal	  
status	   of	   the	   organisation	   are	   examples	   of	   such.	   Whilst	   these	   offer	   valuable	  
insights	  into	  both	  a	  normative	  and	  prescriptive	  analysis	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  structure,	  it	  
is	   not	   the	   institutional	   arrangements	   of	   the	   Bank	   that	   the	   Bank’s	   work	   is	  
questioning,	   but	   how	   to	   explain	   in	   law	   its	   actions.	   If	   the	   institutional	  
arrangements	   of	   the	   Bank	   as	   set	   down	   by	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   are	   not	  
respected	   by	   the	   Bank,	   for	   example	   with	   the	   refusal	   to	   create	   the	   Advisory	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  Legality	  of	  the	  Use	  by	  a	  State	  of	  Nuclear	  Weapons	  in	  Armed	  Conflict,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  
ICJ	  Reports	  1996,	  66,	  para	  19.	  
123	   Henry	   Schermers	   &	   Niels	   Blokker,	   ‘International	   Institutional	   Law’	   (Fifth	   Edition,	  
Martinus	  Njohoff	  2011)	  
124	  Ibid.	  pg.	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125	  Jan	  Klabbers,	  ‘An	  Introduction	  to	  International	  Institutional	  Law’	  (CUP	  2002)	  pg.	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Council,	   the	   actions	   cannot	   be	   explained	   in	   law	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   very	  
institutions	  themselves	  and	  the	  rules	  that	  they	  propagate.	  
Therefore,	  although	  the	  theory	  may	  be	  of	  use	  on	  a	  general	  scale,	  and	  allow	  for	  the	  
examination	  of	  legal	  consequences	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  internal	  rules	  
such	  as	  Operational	  Policies,	   its	  general	  proposition,	   that	   the	   institutional	  make-­‐




Four	   legal	   theories;	   progressive	   positive,	   constitutionalisation,	   global	  
administrative	   law	   and	   international	   institutional	   law,	   that	   may	   be	   used	   to	  
describe	   in	   law	   the	   conduct	   of	   international	   organisations	   have	   been	   examined	  
and	   found	   to	   inadequately	   explain	   in	   law	   the	  work	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   and	  why	  
States	  are	  willing	   to	  accept	   that	   the	  Bank	  acts	   the	  way	   that	   it	  does.	  Despite	   the	  
calls	  from	  academia	  and	  NGOs	  for	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  respect	  its	  mandate,	  States	  
themselves	  appear	  willing	   to	  allow	   the	  Bank	   to	  dictate	   terms	  when	   lending	   that	  
were	  never	  delegated	  to	  it	  under	  the	  original	  agreement.	  
The	  emerging	  field	  of	  progressive	  positive	  theory	  that	  seeks	  to	  bind	  international	  
organisations	   to	   customary	   international	   law	   was	   examined.	   Despite	   the	  
application	   of	   the	   theory	   to	   possibly	   explain	   the	   introduction	   of	   environmental,	  
indigenous	   and	   resettlement	   rights,	   the	   focus	   upon	   a	   widening	   definition	   of	  
development	   including	   good	   governance	   and	   corruption	   and	   more	   broadly	   the	  
shift	   away	   from	   its	   original	   role	   as	   a	   project	   financer,	   the	   theory	   was	  
demonstrated	  to	  be	  broadly	  unsuitable	  for	  application	  to	  the	  World	  Bank.	  Firstly,	  
as	  an	  emerging	  school	  of	  thought	  it	  could	  possibly	  explain	  recent	  or	  future	  actions	  
of	  the	  Bank	  but	   is	   incapable	  of	  explaining	  historical	  actions.	  Secondly,	  the	  use	  of	  
lex	   specialis	  would	   suggest,	   despite	   this	  being	  an	  emerging	   field	  of	   law	   that	   the	  
application	   of	   customary	   international	   law	   cannot	   counter	   an	   express	   treaty	  
provision	  such	  as	  the	  no	  political	  interference	  clause	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  
Thirdly,	  it	  is	  unclear	  if	  the	  areas	  of	  law	  that	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  introduced	  despite	  
its	   treaty	   actually	   exist	   in	   customary	   international	   law.	   Finally,	   the	  World	   Bank	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expressly	  rejects	  the	  ability	  to	  codify	  primary	  rules	  of	  responsibility	  and	  the	  ability	  
of	  any	  law,	  except	  jus	  cogens,	  to	  prevail	  over	  its	  treaty.	  
Subsequently,	   the	  constitutionalisation	  of	   international	  organisations	  theory	  was	  
applied	   against	   the	   World	   Bank.	   The	   theory	   offered	   potential	   insights	   into	   the	  
human	  rights	  norms	  introduced	  by	  the	  Bank	  as	  constitutional	  principles,	  its	  use	  of	  
the	   Inspection	   Panel	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   legalise	   dispute	   settlement	   and	   as	   an	  
accountability	  mechanism	  and	   the	  use	  of	  Operational	   Policies	   and	   conditions	   as	  
evidence	  of	  the	  organisation	  seeking	  to	  bind	  its	  Members	  to	  its	  own	  internal	  law.	  
However,	   again	   there	  was	   demonstrated	   to	   be	   sufficient	   problems	   to	  make	   the	  
constitutionalisation	   theory	  unsuitable	   for	   the	  World	  Bank.	  Firstly,	   if	   the	  Articles	  
of	   Agreement	   were	   seen	   as	   a	   constitutional	   document,	   States	   would	   not	   be	  
willing	  to	  let	  the	  Bank	  act	  outside	  of	  it	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  Chapter	  One.	  Secondly,	  
the	  Inspection	  Panel	  does	  not	  act	  as	  a	  court	  that	  judges	  the	  Bank’s	  actions	  against	  
the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  as	  a	  constitution.	   Instead	   it	   rules	  on	  secondary	  norms	  
within	   the	  Bank	   system.	  Thirdly,	   the	   limited	  number	  of	  human	   rights	   chosen	  by	  
the	  Bank	   to	   legalise	  within	   its	   system	   is	   counter	   to	   the	   constitutionalist	   reading	  
that	  human	  rights	  are	  at	  the	  core	  of	  modern	  constitutional	  law.	  
Then,	  global	  administrative	   law,	  as	  an	  emerging	  school	  of	  thought,	  was	  analysed	  
for	   potential	   application	   to	   the	  World	   Bank.	   The	   theory	   offers	   valuable	   insights	  
into	   the	   work	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   as	   a	   governance	   actor	   yet	   could	   not	   be	  
effectively	   applied	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   administrative	   ideals	   present	   within	   the	  
Bank.	  Firstly,	  again,	  as	  an	  emerging	  school	  of	  thought	  this	  could	  only	  explain	  the	  
recent	  or	  future	  work	  of	  the	  Bank	  but	  is	  incapable	  of	  explaining	  historical	  actions.	  
Secondly,	   the	   ad	   hoc	   nature	   of	   consultation	   and	   public	   participation,	   limited	  
transparency	   and	   limited	   review	   of	   World	   Bank	   action	   do	   not	   suggest	   the	  
widespread	  adoption	  of	  administrative	  law	  ideals	  within	  the	  Bank	  system.	  Finally,	  
the	  Bank	  has	  repeated	  regulated	  on	  subjects	  that	  cannot	  be	  traced	  to	  its	  Articles	  
of	  Agreement.	  The	  global	  administrative	   law	   theorem	  would	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	  
legally	  prohibited	  which	  runs	  counter	  to	  the	  acceptance	  by	  States	  of	  this	  action.	  
Finally,	   international	   institutional	   law	  was	   considered	   but	   rejected	   due	   its	   focus	  
upon	   the	   institutional	   arrangements	   of	   the	   Bank,	   rather	   than	   explaining	   the	  
Bank’s	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  law.	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This	   chapter	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   Bank	   cannot	   be	   using	   customary	   international	  
law	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   its	   action;	   nor	   can	   its	   work	   be	   explained	   under	   the	  
constitutionalisation	   theory	   that	   is	   offered	   for	   other	   organisations;	   and	   finally,	  
neither	   can	   it	   be	   explained	   by	   global	   administrative	   law	   or	   international	  
institutional	   law.	   If	   none	   of	   the	   main	   analytical	   tools	   that	   have	   been	   used	   to	  
explain	   the	   governance	   role	   of	   international	   organisations	   adequately	   explain	  
what	   is	   happening,	   an	   alternative	   is	   required.	   Systems	   theory	   is	   offered	   as	   an	  
alternative	  analytical	  tool	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  actions	   in	   law	  and	  States’	  
acceptance	  of	  these	  actions.	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Chapter	  Three:	  Systems	  Theory	  
3.1	  Introduction	  
The	  dominant	  theories	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  in	  law	  how	  international	  
organisations	  are	  supposed	  to	  act	  have	  failed	  to	  explain	  the	  work	  that	  the	  World	  
Bank	   has	   endeavoured	   in	   since	   its	   inception.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   States	   have	  
accepted	  this	  behaviour	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  cannot	  be	  explained.	  This	  is	  particularly	  
questionable	   under	   the	   positivist	   approach	   to	   public	   international	   law,	   as	   the	  
most	  common	  and	  readily	  accepted	  tool	  of	  understanding	  in	  this	  field,	  as	  it	  is	  on	  
this	   tool	   that	   the	   basis	   of	   consent	   is	   built	   upon.	   ‘Fragmentation’,	  
‘constitutionalisation’,	  and	  ‘spheres’	  are	  all	  terms	  that	  have	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  
the	  current	   legal	  understanding	  of	   international	   law	  whilst	   it	   is	  alleged	  that	  they	  
all	   essentially	   remain	   within	   the	   positivist	   public	   international	   law	   theory	   of	  
consent.1	   This	   chapter	   will	   introduce	   an	   alternative	   theory	   that	   will	   be	   applied	  
throughout	   the	   rest	   of	   this	   thesis	   that	   offers	   an	   alternative	   legal	   perspective	   of	  
the	  Bank's	  actions.	  	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  the	  positivist	  theory	  of	  international	  law	  cannot	  
explain	   the	   practice	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   and,	   as	   examined	   in	   Chapter	   Two,	   the	  
readily	  available	  alternatives	  are	  inappropriate.	  The	  Bank	  is	  exercising	  powers	  that	  
were	   neither	   given	   to	   it,	   either	   directly	   or	   that	   can	   be	   implied,	   by	   its	   founding	  
treaty,	   subsequently	   introduced	   through	   treaty	   amendment	   or	   introduced	   with	  
the	  consent	  of	  all	  member	  States.	  Yet	   in	  contrast	  States	  do	  not	  object	  and	  allow	  
for	  the	  Bank	  to	  act	  in	  such	  a	  fashion.	  
The	   inference	  of	  the	  positivist	  theory	  of	   international	   law	  from	  Chapter	  One	  can	  
be	  summarised	  as	  that	  if	  a	  norm	  does	  not	  emanate	  from	  a	  State,	  then	  it	  cannot	  be	  
seen	   as	   ‘law’	   and	   holds	   no	   legal	   standing.	   Although	   the	   norm	  might	   contain	   a	  
political	  or	  a	  moral	  force,	  it	  lacks	  a	  legal	  force	  to	  characterise	  it	  as	  'law'.	  Yet	  if	  this	  
theory,	   and	  other	   theories	   that	   remain	  within	   this	   assumption	  of	   consent,	   does	  
not	   fully	   explain	   both	   the	   relevant	   actions	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   State's	  
acceptance	  of	   these	  actions,	   it	  needs	   to	  consider	  what	   is	   ‘law’	  under	  alternative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   See	   Tai-­‐Heng	   Cheng,	   'Positivism,	  New	  Haven	   Jurisprudence,	   and	   the	   Fragmentation	   of	  
International	   Law'	   within	   Todd	   Weiler	   &	   Freya	   Baetens	   (eds.),	   New	   Directions	   in	  
International	  Economic	  Law	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  2011)	  pg.	  411	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theories	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	   legal	  explanation.	  Chapter	  Two	  examined	  four	  
alternative	  prevalent	  theories;	  this	  chapter	  in	  turn	  examines	  systems	  theory	  as	  an	  
alternative	  tool.	  
Although	  none	  of	  the	  dominant	  theories	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  understand	  in	  terms	  
of	  law	  the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  an	  alternative	  theory,	  solely	  for	  application	  to	  
this	  relationship	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  States,	  is	  now	  suggested.	  As	  a	  tool	  
of	  analysis	  that	  is	  not	  often	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  organisations,	  this	  
chapter	   will	   scrutinize	   both	   the	   fundamentals	   of	   the	   theory	   itself	   to	   provide	   a	  
comprehensive	  overview	  of	  the	  tool,	  but	  also	  the	  specifics	  that	  the	  theory	  would	  
require	  for	  the	  development	  and	  ready	  application	  of	  a	  legal	  system.	  
	  
3.2	  Systems	  Theory	  
When	  referring	   to	  a	   “system	  of	   law”	   it	   could	  be	  assumed	   that	  all	   legal	   theorists	  
refer	  to	  the	  same	  phenomenon.	  Traditional	  legal	  systems	  such	  as	  municipal	  law,2	  
indigenous	   law3	   and	   even	   the	   sometimes	   more	   controversially	   assigned	  
international	   law4	   are	   all	   defined	   as	   systems	   of	   law	   in	   academia.	   However,	   the	  
understanding	  over	  what	  exactly	  amounts	  to	  a	  system	  of	  law	  is	  not	  clear.	  Each	  of	  
these	  recognised	  different	  systems	  of	  law	  have	  fundamentally	  different	  elements,	  
but	   to	   be	   recognised	   as	   systems	   at	   all,	   it	   would	   be	   assumed	   that	   a	   number	   of	  
common	  factors	  exist	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  classification	  of	  a	  “system	  of	  law”.	  What	  
these	  factors	  are,	  and	  how	  they	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  
this	  chapter.	  
If	   positive	   law,	   as	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	  One,	   is	   one	   attempt	   to	   describe	   various	  
legal	   systems,	   systems	   theory	   is	   an	  alternative	  attempt	  by	  academics	   to	  answer	  
these	   questions.	   Although	   not	   widely	   used	   in	   Western	   academia	   since	   its	  
inception,	   recently	   there	   has	   been	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   amount	   of	   work	   citing	   it,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  David	  Palmeter,	   'The	  WTO	  as	  a	  Legal	  System'	   (2000)	  24(1)	  Fordham	   	   International	  Law	  
Journal	  444,	  445	  
3	  Ernest	  Uwazie,	  'Modes	  of	  Indigenous	  Disputing	  and	  Legal	  Interactions	  Among	  the	  Ibos	  of	  
Eastern	  Nigeria'	  (1994)	  34	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Pluralism	  87	  
4	  Rosalyn	  Higgins,	  Problems	  and	  Process:	  International	  Law	  and	  How	  We	  Use	  It	  (OUP	  1995)	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particularly	  in	  non-­‐legal	  academia.5	  Systems	  theory,	  like	  all	  the	  other	  theories	  that	  
have	  been	  examined,	  is	  a	  tool	  of	  analysis	  via	  which	  the	  work	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  can	  
sought	  to	  be	  explained.	  
The	  origin	  of	  autopoiesis	  systems	  theory	  is	  from	  biological	  science.	  Maturana	  and	  
Varela	  had	  the	  belief	   that	  a	  biological	  entity	  could	  be	  defined	   in	  reference	  to	   its	  
autonomy.6	  ‘Autopoiesis’	  was	  the	  word	  created	  to	  define	  this:	  ‘what	  defines	  life	  is	  
the	   existence	   and	   persistence	   of	   a	   self-­‐referential	   and	   self-­‐reproducing	  
organization	   of	   the	   elements	   that	   constitute	   each	   living	   system’.7	   This	   theory	  
provided	   a	   new	   theory	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   living	   system	   and	   its	  
relationship	  to	  other	  systems.	  	  	  
The	   ‘self-­‐reference’	   in	   the	  definition	   refers	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  each	   living	   system	   is	  
independent	   and	   is	   solely	   composed	   of	   fundamental	   parts	   that	   do	   not	   interact	  
with	  the	  outside	  world	  but	  only	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  order	  of	  a	  system	  is	  created	  
by	  how	  these	  parts	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  rather	  than	  from	  being	  defined	  from	  
outside	  the	  system.	  As	  these	  fundamental	  parts	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  system	  itself,	  
the	  system	  is	  said	  to	  be	  ‘self-­‐reproducing’.	  
As	  the	  system	  is	  self-­‐reproducing,	  changes	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  system	  can	  only	  
occur	   internally	   rather	   than	   through	   external	   forces.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   an	  
external	   environment	   can	   have	   no	   effect	   upon	   a	   system,	   it	   is	   instead	   that	   the	  
internal	   structure	   of	   the	   system	  defines	   how	   this	   change	   takes	   place.	   Biological	  
autopoiesis	  systems	  theory	  acknowledges	  that	  a	  system	  cannot	  exist	  in	  a	  vacuum.	  
The	  system	  and	  the	  outside	  environment	  constantly	  cause	  minor	  changes	  to	  each	  
other,	   but	   it	   is	   the	   structure	   of	   both	   the	   external	   environment	   and	   the	   internal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  See	  for	  example	  Kristof	  Van	  Assche	  &	  Gert	  Verschraegen,	  'The	  Limits	  of	  Planning:	  Niklas	  
Luhnmann’s	  Systems	  Theory	  and	  the	  Analysis	  of	  Planning	  and	  Planning	  Ambitions'	  (2008)	  
7(3)	   Planning	   Theory	   263;	   Diederich	   Hinrichsen	   &	   Anthony	   Pritchard,	   Mathematical	  
Systems	  Theory:	  Modelling,	  State	  Space	  Analysis,	  Stability	  and	  Robustness	  (Springer-­‐Verlag	  
2010);	   and	   Barry	   Gibson	   &	   Olga	   Boiko,	   'Luhmann's	   Social	   Systems	   Theory,	   Health	   and	  
Illness'	   in	   Graham	   Scambler	   (ed.),	   Contemporary	   Theorists	   for	   Medical	   Sociology	  
(Routledge	  2012)	  
6	  Humberto	  Maturana,	  Francisco	  Varela	  &	  Ricardo	  Uribe,	  'Autopoiesis:	  The	  Organization	  of	  
Living	  Systems,	  Its	  Characterization	  and	  a	  Model'	  (1974)	  5	  Biosystems	  187	  which	  was	  later	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  upon	  in	  Humberto	  Maturana	  &	  Francisco	  Varela,	  Autopoiesis	  and	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  The	  
Realization	  of	  the	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  (D.	  Reidel	  Publishing	  Company	  1980)	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   Ana	   Lourenço,	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   of	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   (2010)	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system	   that	   define	   what	   these	   changes	   are.	   This	   constant	   interaction	   between	  
systems	   is	   caused	   ‘structural	   coupling’.8	   This	   coupling	   can	   only	   occur	   between	  
closed	   systems,	   rather	   than	   earlier	  manifestations	   of	   the	   systems	   theory	  model	  
that	  were	   called	   open	   systems.9	   A	   closed	   system	   is	   a	   system	   that,	   as	   described	  
above,	   is	   identified	   by	   ‘a	   network	   of	   dynamic	   processes	   whose	   effects	   do	   not	  
leave	  the	  network’,10	  that	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  internal	  structure	  of	  the	  system	  has	  no	  
effect	  upon	   the	  environment	  outside	  but	  only	   the	   system	  as	  a	  whole	  does.	  This	  
explains	  why	  the	  environment	  cannot	  effect	  structural	  change	  upon	  a	  system:	  the	  
pressure	   from	   the	   external	   environment	   is	   interpreted	   through	   the	   internal	  
language	   of	   the	   system.11	   An	   open	   system	   in	   contrast	   has	   a	   free-­‐flow	   of	  
information	  and	  interaction	  between	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  system	  and	  its	  external	  
environment.	  
	  
3.3	  Luhmann	  and	  the	  Law	  
Niklas	   Luhmann	   applied	   this	   closed	   system	   approach	   from	   biology	   to	   the	   social	  
sciences.12	   His	   intention	   was	   to	   create	   a	   theoretical	   framework	   that	   could	   be	  
applied	   across	   the	   various	   borders	   of	   the	   social	   sciences	   to	   any	   system.	   In	  
Luhmann’s	  work,	  he	  defines	   the	  crucial	   conceptual	   leap	   that	  autopoiesis	   system	  
makes	  over	  general	  systems	  theory	  is	  its	  self-­‐reproducing	  nature.13	  Not	  only	  did	  a	  
system	   create	   its	   own	   structure,	   but	   ‘everything	   that	   is	   used	   as	   a	   unit	   by	   the	  
system	   is	   produced	   as	   a	   unit	   by	   the	   system	   itself’.14	   This	   theory	   of	   autopoietic	  
systems	   results	   in	   an	  operational	  definition	  of	   systems.15	   For	  biological	   systems,	  
life	   was	   the	   crucial	   element	   for	   autopoiesis	   defined	   by	   cell	   production	   and	  
reproduction.	   For	   psychic	   systems,	   consciousness	  was	   the	   element	   required	   for	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  Humberto	  Maturana	  &	  Francisco	  Varela,	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  Tree	  of	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  The	  Biological	  Roots	  of	  
Human	  Understanding	  (Shambhala	  Publications	  Inc	  1992)	  pg.	  99	  
9	   See	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   example;	   Ludwig	   van	  Bertalanffy,	   'The	   Theory	  of	  Open	   Systems	   in	   Physics	   and	  
Biology'	   (1950)	   111	   Science	   23;	   Daniel	   Katz	   &	   Robert	   Kahn,	   The	   Social	   Psychology	   of	  
Organization	   (Willey	   1966)	  &,	   for	   open	   systems	   application	   to	   law,	   Lawrence	   Friedman,	  
The	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  System:	  A	  Social	  Science	  Perspective	  (Russel	  Sage	  1975)	  pg.	  237-­‐246	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  Supra	  Note.	  8,	  pg.	  89	  
11	  Supra	  Note.	  7	  
12	  The	  seminal	  piece	  of	  Luhmann's	   introducing	  the	  concept	  of	  autopoietic	  social	  systems	  
was	   Niklas	   Luhmann,	   Soziale	   Systeme:	   Grundriß	   einer	   allgemeinen	   Theorie	   (Suhrkamp	  
1986).	  	  
13	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  Essays	  on	  Self-­‐Reference	  (Columbia	  University	  Press	  1990)	  pg.	  3	  
14	  Ibid.	  
15	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  Note.	  5	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autopoiesis	   defined	   by	   thoughts	   generating	   thoughts.	   To	   distinguish	   between	  
systems,	   an	   analysis	   must	   distinguish	   the	   repeated	   elements	   that	   allow	   the	  
creation	   of	   a	   system.	   This	   analysis	   of	   the	   repeated	   elements	   that	   allow	   for	   the	  
creation	   of	   a	   system	   led	   Luhmann	   to	   argue	   that	   for	   social	   systems,	   the	   specific	  
requirement	   for	   autopoiesis	   was	   communication.16	   It	   was	   the	   internal	  
communication	   of	   the	   system	   that	   allowed	   it	   to	   be	   self-­‐reproducing.	  
Communication	   can	   only	   result	   from	   previous	   communication	   and	   result	   in	  
further	  communication.	  
For	   a	   system	   to	   exist,	   it	   has	   to	   absorb	   information	   from	   the	   outside	  world	   and	  
then	  interpret	  it	  in	  a	  form	  that	  exists	  solely	  for	  that	  system	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  the	  
outside	   environment.17	   This	   allows	   the	   identification	   of	   systems	   through	   the	  
meaning	   that	   is	   given	   to	   communication	   in	   different	   contexts.	   For	   example,	   the	  
systems	  of	  politics,	  law	  or	  the	  economy	  can	  be	  identified	  by	  the	  various	  meanings	  
that	  they	  give	  to	  communication.	  In	  Luhmann’s	  work,	  he	  identified	  the	  boundaries	  
of	   these	   various	   systems	   by	   the	   application	   of	   various	   binary	   codes	   to	   the	  
communication.	  It	  was	  the	  communication	  along	  these	  binary	  codes	  this	  allowed	  
the	  autonomy	  and	  identification	  of	  each	  system.	  For	  law,	  the	  binary	  code	  that	  he	  
established	   was	   a	   legal/illegal	   code	   that	   works	   on	   the	   premise	   that	   law	   is	  
continuously	   involved	   in	  defining	  actions	  as	   legal	  or	   illegal.	  Any	  communications	  
that	  invoke	  other	  codes	  belong	  outside	  the	  system	  in	  the	  environment.	  Thus	  the	  
legal	  system	  becomes	  operationally	  closed	  and	  defines	  external	  communication	  in	  
reference	   to	   its	   own	   code.	   It	   also	   results	   in	   legal/illegal	   communication	   being	  
available	   only	   to	   a	   legal	   system,	   as	   other	   systems	   will	   interpret	   the	  
communication	  under	  its	  own	  procedures.	  	  
This	   analysis	   by	   Luhmann	   and	   application	   of	   systems	   theory	   results	   in	   a	   very	  
specific	  view	  of	  a	  legal	  system.	  It	  is	  not	  defined	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  structures	  of	  a	  
system,	  such	  as	  Parliaments,	  Courts	  or	  even	  lawyers;	  it	  is	  defined	  in	  reference	  to	  
the	   communication	   that	   occurs	   within	   any	   societal	   system.	   In	   society,	   if	  
communication	   is	   concerned	  with	   legal/illegal	   behaviour,	   it	   belongs	   to	   the	   legal	  
system.	  If	  it	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  this	  binary	  divide,	  it	  belongs	  outside	  of	  the	  legal	  
system	   but	   within	   another	   area	   of	   society.	   The	   legal	   system	   is	   not	   split	   from	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17	   Fabio	   Carvalho	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   Simon	   Deakin,	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(2010)	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society	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  is	  one	  of	  multiple	  differentiated	  systems	  that	  make	  up	  and	  
contribute	  to	  the	  societal	  system	  as	  a	  whole.18	  
If	  Luhmann	  was	  the	  original	  applier	  of	  systems	  theory	  to	   law,	  others	  have	  taken	  
his	   mantle	   and	   found	   applications	   for	   it	   throughout	   legal	   academia.19	   Baxter	  
extended	  this	  work	  to	  state	  that	  the	  inherent	  closure	  of	  the	  system	  does	  not	  deny	  
that	   other	   systems	   can	   influence	   each	   other	   and	   that	   there	   is	   natural	   part	   of	  
interdependencies.20	  The	  ‘openness’	  of	  this	  closed	  system	  however	  does	  not	  rest	  
upon	   an	   exchange	   of	   information	   but	   only	   the	  way	   a	   system	   views	   its	   external	  
environment.	   Each	   system	   observes	   each	   other	   but	   the	   information	   garnered	  
from	  the	  environment	  is	  conditioned	  by	  the	  internal	  programming	  of	  the	  system.	  
Deakin	  applied	  this	  to	  the	  legal	  system	  and	  concluded	  that	  a	  legal	  system	  receives	  
information	  and	  processes	  it	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  creating	  legal	  meaning.21	  
As	   a	   system	   has	   to	   continuously	   perform	   the	   self-­‐referential	   operation	   that	  
provides	  the	  basic	  elements	  for	  production	  and	  re-­‐production,	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  a	  
legal	  system	  continuously	  frames	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  legal/non-­‐legal	  meaning	  of	  
communication.	  Yet	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  decide	  if	  an	  action	  is	  lawful	  is	  via	  the	  law	  
itself,	  a	  continuous	  loop	  is	  created	  once	  a	  system	  comes	  into	  place.	  The	  difficulty	  
is	  a	  system	  evolving	   to	  an	  autonomous	   legal	  system	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	   in	  fact	  
involves	  a	  paradox.	  	  
For	  a	  system	  to	  exist	  it	  firstly	  has	  to	  be	  truly	  autonomous	  but	  as	  soon	  as	  a	  system	  
claims	  this	  it	  cuts	  itself	  from	  the	  roots	  that	  created	  it.22	  Yet	  when	  this	  is	  applied	  to	  
public	   international	   law,	   this	   creates	   a	   paradox.	  Although	   the	   application	  of	   the	  
positive	  theory	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  been	  disputed,	  it	  is	  readily	  accepted	  for	  the	  
creation	   of	   international	   organisations	   there	   must	   be	   an	   element	   of	   State	  
consent.	   The	   movement	   beyond	   that	   is	   questionable	   and	   requires	   further	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  Baxter,	   'Autopoiesis	   and	   the	   "Relative	  Autonomy"	  of	   Law'	   (1998)	   19(6)	  Cardozo	  
Law	  Review	  1987,	  2008	  
21	  Simon	  Deakin,	  'Evolution	  for	  our	  Time:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Legal	  Memetics.'	  (2002)	  ESRC	  Centre	  
for	  Business	  Research,	  University	  of	  Cambridge	  Working	  Paper	  nº	  242.	  
22	  Gunther	  Teubner,	  Global	  Law	  Without	  a	  State	  (Ashgate	  1997)	  pg.	  16	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analysis,	  but	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  it	  is	  not	  disputed	  that	  the	  genesis	  of	  international	  
organisations	   is	   based	   in	   State	   consent.	   This	   then	   leads	   to	   the	   paradoxically	  
position	   if	   systems	   theory	   is	   to	   be	   applied	   where	   an	   autonomous	   system	   is	  
created	  which	   in	   theory	   is	   self-­‐producing	  and	  self-­‐reproducing	  yet	  only	  occurred	  
as	   States	   ‘produced’	   it.	   The	   only	  way	   to	   rectify	   this	   paradox	   is	   if	   the	   institution	  
goes	  through	  the	  ‘deparadoxification	  technique	  of	  externalization’.23	  Rather	  than	  
following	  through	  the	  internal	  paradox	  of	  State	  consent	  to	  autonomy	  to	  how	  can	  
it	  be	  autonomous	  with	  State	  consent,	  the	  system	  simply	  externalises	  the	  question	  
and	  acts	   as	   if	   it	   has	   always	  been	  autonomous.	   Teubner	   states	   that	   the	   simplest	  
way	  to	  go	  through	  this	  process	   is	  to	  start	  arbitrating	  upon	  the	   internal	  “laws”	  of	  
the	   system.24	   It	   essentially	   creates	   secondary	   rules	   and	   begins	   arbitrating	   upon	  
them.	  This	  is	  one	  element	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  proposition	  that	  a	  system	  can	  only	  be	  
truly	  autonomous	  if	  it	  has	  a	  quasi-­‐Court	  like	  element	  that	  will	  be	  further	  examined	  
later	  on.	  
This	   work	   was	   elaborated	   and	   built	   upon	   by	   Calliess	   and	   Renner.25	   If	   law	   was	  
communication	   based	   upon	   a	   legal/illegal	   divide,	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	  
communication	  was	   ‘the	  stabilization	  of	  normative	  expectations’.26	  Actors	  of	   the	  
system	   could	   rely	   on	   the	   norms	   contained	   in	   the	   system	  as	   they	   had	   reason	   to	  
believe	  that	  actions	  would	  be	  assessed	  in	  reference	  to	  these	  norms,	  and	  found	  to	  
be	  either	   legal	  or	   illegal.	  Normative	  expectations	  could	  only	  be	  stable	  and	  relied	  
upon	   if	   actors	   exist	   in	   an	   operationally	   closed	   system,	   as	   in	   an	   open	   system	  
external	   factors	   could	   always	   override	   or	   change	   existing	   norms.	   If	   the	   closed	  
system	   were	   self-­‐referencing	   and	   self-­‐reproducing,	   a	   continual	   process	   of	  
remembering	   and	   forgetting	   would	   occur.	   It	   would	   remember	   and	   stabilise	  
normative	  expectations	  for	  norms	  that	  amount	  to	  law,	  and	  forget	  norms	  that	  are	  
not	   law	   so	   they	   cannot	   be	   relied	   upon.	   This	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	  
expectations	   through	   the	   continual	   remembering	   and	   forgetting	   process	   in	   turn	  
relies	  upon	  communication	  circulating	  around	  a	  system.	  If	  actors	  in	  a	  system	  are	  
not	   aware	   of	   the	   legal	   communication,	   their	   normative	   expectations	   cannot	  
become	  stabilised.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Ibid.	  pg.	  17	  
24	  Ibid.	  
25	  Gralf-­‐Peter	  Calliess	  &	  Moritz	  Renner,	  ‘From	  Soft	  Law	  to	  Hard	  Code:	  the	  Juridification	  of	  
Global	  Governance’	  (2009)	  22(2)	  Ratio	  Juris	  260	  
26	   Ibid.	   pg.	   263.	   See	   also	   Supra	   Note.	   18	   for	   Luhmann’s	   work	   on	   the	   stabilisation	   of	  
normative	  expectations.	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Systems	  theory	  has	  a	  particular	  use	  when	  binding	  norms	  are	  recognised	  within	  an	  
environment	   rather	   than	   traditional	   conceptions	   of	   what	   amounts	   to	   “law”.	   As	  
previously	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   One,27	   within	   international	   law	   the	   traditional	  
approach	   to	   sources	   are	   outlined	   in	   Article	   38	   of	   the	   Statute	   of	   the	   ICJ.	   Yet	  
systems	   theory	  when	   analysing	   communication	   from	   the	   environment	   does	   not	  
ask	  the	  question	  ‘is	  the	  law	  a	  recognised	  law?’.	  It	  only	  frames	  the	  communication	  
in	  a	  legal/non-­‐legal	  meaning	  and	  assesses	  whether	  it	  belongs	  to	  the	  legal	  system.	  
‘If	   the	   question	   arises	  whether	   something	   is	   legal	   or	   illegal,	   the	   communication	  
belongs	  to	  the	  legal	  system,	  and	  if	  not	  then	  not.’28	  If	  an	  international	  organisation	  
could	  be	  shown	  then	  to	  be	  framing	   its	  rules	  and	  procedures	   in	  terms	  of	   law	  and	  
acting	   as	   if	   they	   are	   law,	   systems	   theory	   would	   allow	   an	   explanation	   to	   this	  
phenomenon	   in	   a	   way	   that	   the	   traditional	   theory	   of	   State	   sovereignty	   based	  
international	  law	  would	  not.	  	  
	  
3.4	  From	  a	  Normative	  System	  to	  a	  Legal	  System	  
Although	   systems	   theory	   developed	   out	   of	   biology	   to	   play	   in	   role	   in	   numerous	  
academic	  analyses	  across	  social	  fields,	  it	  was	  the	  work	  primarily	  of	  Luhmann	  and	  
subsequently	   Teubner	   that	   developed	   the	   role	   of	   systems	   theory	   and	   its	  
application	  to	  law.	  However,	  systems	  theory	  as	  outlined	  so	  far	  is	  questionable	  for	  
an	  analysis	  of	  the	  development	  of	  a	   legal	  system	  as	   it	  only	  provides	  elements	  to	  
understand	   when	   a	   system	   has	   become	   functionally	   differentiated.29	   Whilst	   it	  
readily	   identifies	   the	  criteria	  of	  what	  a	   legal	   system	   looks	   like,	   this	   in	   itself	  does	  
not	   provide	   an	   answer	   to	   how	   a	   legal	   system	   develops	   initially	   as	   to	   ascertain	  
what	  causes	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  to	  a	  legal	  system.	  	  Both	  Luhmann	  
and	  Teubner	  developed	   independent	   tests,	   that	  will	   be	  examined,	  but	   the	  main	  
focus	   that	   writers	   have	   centred	   upon	   is	   using	   the	   analytical	   tool	   to	   work	   with	  
already	  established	  legal	  systems.	  
It	   is	  crucial	  that	   in	  developing	  a	  tool	  of	  analysis	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  
that	   the	  elements	   that	  are	   common	   to	  all	   systems	  of	   law	  under	   systems	   theory	  
are	  identified.	  If	  systems	  theory	  is	  to	  successfully	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  See	  1.5	  The	  Creation	  of	  Rules	  
28	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  'Operational	  Closure	  and	  Structural	  Coupling:	  The	  Differentiation	  of	  the	  
Legal	  System'	  (1992)	  13(5)	  Cardozo	  Law	  Review	  1419,	  1428	  
29	  Simon	  Roberts,	  ‘Against	  a	  Systemic	  Legal	  History’	  1	  Rechtsgeschichte	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the	   elements	   that	   are	   required	   to	   firstly	   create	   a	   normative	   system	   and	   the	  
elements	   required	   for	   this	   system	   to	  evolve	   into	   a	   fully	  operational	   closed	   legal	  
system	  must	  be	  identified	  to	  see	  if	  these	  elements	  do	  or	  have	  existed	  within	  the	  
World	  Bank	  framework.	  It	   is	  only	  through	  the	  application	  of	  these	  various	  stages	  
to	   the	   Bank	   that	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   Bank	   has	   developed	   into	   an	  
autonomous	  legal	  system	  under	  systems	  theory.	  
Luhmann	  developed	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  a	  legal	  system	  within	  his	  
seminal	  work,	  Law	  as	  a	  Social	  System.30	  The	  legal	  system	  as	  defined	  by	  Luhmann	  is	  
a	  normatively	  closed	  system	  that	  is	  continuously	  involved	  in	  a	  self-­‐reference	  and	  
self-­‐reproduction.31	   The	   system	   develops	   from	   a	   normative	   system	   into	   a	   legal	  
system	  by	   the	  operation	  of	   communication	  along	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide:	   as	   this	  
operative	   divide	   is	   what	   defines	   a	   system	   of	   law.	   The	   two	   tests	   proposed	   by	  
Luhmann	  to	  discern	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  are	  the	  ‘functional	  specification	  
of	   law’,	   that	  the	  system	  and	   its	   laws	  are	  focused	  upon	  a	  specific	  problem	  within	  
the	   overarching	   societal	   system;	   and	   that	   the	   system	   is	   involved	   in	   a	   binary	  
distinction	   between	   positive	   conduct	   (‘legal’)	   and	   negative	   conduct	   (‘illegal’).32	  
This	  involvement	  in	  the	  distinction	  must	  not	  occur	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis	  but	  must	  be	  
a	  continuous	  self-­‐reference	  of	  legal	  terminology.	  Only	  if	  they	  ‘refer	  recursively	  to	  
each	  other	   (and	  pretend	   that	   this	  has	  always	  been	   the	   case)	   can	  a	   legal	   system	  
tighten	  and	  become	  operatively	  closed’.	  
The	  language	  used	  here	  by	  Luhmann	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  point	  where	  a	  system	  
can	  be	  at	   a	  point	  between	  a	  normative	   system	  and	   legal	   system;	   as	   the	   system	  
‘tightens’,	   yet	   this	   area	   is	   insufficiently	   dealt	   with	   by	   Luhmann.	   Luhmann’s	   two	  
tests	   also	   are	   insufficient	   for	   gaining	   an	   insight	   into	   the	   evolution	   between	  
normative	   and	   legal	   systems.	   All	   normative	   systems	   will	   be	   involved	   in	   a	  
‘functional	  specification’	  as	  they	  will	  be	  creating	  norms	  to	  guide	  expectations	  (as	  
provided	   for	  under	  Luhmann’s	  analysis).33	  Calling	   for	   the	   functional	   specification	  
to	  be	  ‘of	  law’	  does	  not	  deter	  this	  criticism	  as	  the	  test	  to	  see	  if	  a	  function	  is	  ‘of	  law’	  
is	   contained	   within	   the	   second	   test	   i.e.	   that	   it	   is	   operating	   on	   the	   legal/illegal	  
binary	  distinction.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  Law	  as	  a	  Social	  System,	  translated	  by	  Klaus	  Ziegert	  (OUP	  2004)	  
31	  Ibid.	  pg.	  70	  
32	  Steven	  Wheatley,	  The	  Democratic	  Legitimacy	  of	  International	  Law	  (Hart	  2010)	  pg.	  284	  
33	  Niklas	   Luhman,	  A	  Sociological	   Theory	  of	   Law,	   translated	  by	   Elizabeth	  King	   and	  Martin	  
Albrow	  (Routledge	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  Paul	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The	  qualifying	   language	  used	  for	  the	  second	  test	  also	  allows	  for	  ambiguity	  when	  
analysing	  either	  an	  evolving	  or	  newly	  created	  legal	  system.	  As	  the	  language	  being	  
used	   to	  define	   the	   legal/illegal	  behaviour	  must	  occur	  more	   than	  once,	   Luhmann	  
turns	  his	   tests	   from	  an	  objective	  analysis	   to	  a	   subjective	  one.	  This	   then	   leads	   to	  
questions	   of	   how	   many	   times	   are	   required	   for	   the	   system	   to	   use	   legal/illegal	  
communication	  before	  a	  normative	  system	  turns	   into	  a	   legal	  system	  and	  what	   is	  
the	  status	  of	  the	  system	  when	  the	  legal/illegal	  binary	  distinction	  has	  been	  invoked	  
more	  than	  once	  yet	  less	  than	  this	  operative	  amount.	  
The	   answers	   to	   these	   questions	   from	   Luhmann’s	   work	   are	   inconclusive,	   and	  
rather	   than	   duplicate	   the	   work	   put	   forward	   by	   others	   (primarily	   Teubner)	   and	  
using	   their	   tests	   for	   a	   system,	   as	   this	   work	   will	   develop	   a	   separate	   argument	  
outside	   of	   Luhmann’s	   understanding	   of	   system	   theory,	   a	   consideration	   of	   the	  
general	  requirements	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  is	  required.	  
3.4.1	  Requirements	  of	  a	  Legal	  System	  
Systems	  theory	  is	  an	  attempt	  at	  a	  general	  jurisprudence	  by	  attempting	  to	  identify	  
various	  elements	  that	  are	  common	  to	  all	   legal	  systems.	  Although	  systems	  theory	  
identifies	  the	  operative	  requirements	  for	  a	  system	  that	  were	  examined	  previously,	  
a	  search	  through	  other	  attempts	  at	  a	  general	  jurisprudence	  is	  required	  to	  develop	  
a	  critique	  of	  the	  tests	  that	  Luhmann	  proposes	  as	  requirements	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  
a	   system	   and	   to	   develop	   a	   framework	   independent	   of	   Luhmann	   that	   can	   be	  
applied	  to	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
The	   traditional	   position	   for	   any	   critique	   of	   a	   general	   jurisprudence	   of	   a	   legal	  
system	  starts	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Hart.	  Hart’s	  work	  provides	  that	  a	  legal	  system	  must	  
contain	  a	  rule	  of	  recognition,	  a	  rule	  that	  establishes	  which	  norms	  within	  a	  system	  
are	   identifiable	   as	   norms.34	   Yet	   Hart’s	   work	   goes	   further	   to	   identify	   two	   key	  
elements	  that	  are	  required	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  legal	  system.	  
A	  legal	  system	  can	  only	  exist	  if	   it	  contains	  both	  primary	  rules,	   ‘human	  beings	  are	  
required	   to	   do	   or	   abstain	   from	   certain	   actions’,35	   and	   secondary	   rules,	   ‘human	  
beings	  may	  by	  doing	  or	  saying	  certain	  things	   introduce	  new	  rules	  of	  the	  primary	  
type,	  extinguish	  or	  modify	  old	  ones,	  or	  in	  various	  ways	  determine	  their	  incidence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  H.L.A.	  Hart,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Law	  (Third	  Edition,	  OUP	  2012)	  pg.	  100	  
35	  Ibid.	  pg.	  81	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of	   control	   their	   operations’.36	   Primary	   rules	   are,	   therefore,	   the	   ‘laws’	   that	   guide	  
individual’s	   behaviour	   in	   a	   society	   and	   secondary	   rules	   are	   the	   rules	   that	   legal	  
actors	  use	  to	  identify	  and	  change	  primary	  rules.37	  
Hart’s	  theory	  is	  a	  theory	  based	  upon	  positivist	  law.	  Although	  it	  has	  other	  elements	  
that	  have	  been	  critiqued,38	  the	  analysis	  in	  Chapter	  One	  has	  already	  demonstrated	  
that	  the	  positivist	  theory	  of	  law	  does	  not	  adequately	  explain	  what	  is	  happening	  at	  
the	  World	  Bank.	  What	  Hart’s	  work	  does,	  however,	   is	  provide	  an	   introduction	   to	  
the	  concept	  of	  secondary	  rules	  within	  a	  legal	  system:	  the	  rules	  that	  actors	  within	  
the	  system	  use	  to	  identify	  primary	  rules.	  If	  this	  concept	  is	  taken	  over	  and	  applied	  
to	  systems	  theory,	  it	  questions	  whether	  a	  similar	  rule	  is	  necessary.	  	  
Systems	   theory	   in	   itself	   is	   binary,	   in	   that	   communication	   is	   either	   along	   the	  
legal/illegal	   divide	   or	   it	   is	   not.	   The	   theory	   put	   forward	   by	   Luhmann	   makes	   no	  
allowance	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   secondary	   rules,	   in	   that	   if	   the	   tests	   that	   he	   put	  
forward	   are	  met,	   of	   a	   functional	   specification	  of	   law	  with	   communication	   along	  
the	  binary	  divide,	  then	  at	  least	  in	  Luhmann’s	  initial	  theory,	  a	  system	  of	  law	  would	  
be	   established,	   regardless	   of	   subsequent	   secondary	   rules	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	  
identify	   and	   change	   primary	   rules.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   key	   element	   that	   can	   be	  
taken	   from	  Hart’s	   theory	   of	   secondary	   norms,	   is	   not	   a	   direct	   transposition	   into	  
systems	   theory,	   but	   to	   raise	   the	   question	   of	   the	   purpose	   that	   Hart	   sees	   for	  
secondary	  rules	  within	  a	  system,	  principally	  of	  identifying	  laws.	  
In	   terms	  of	  systems	  theory,	   the	   identification	  of	   the	  communication	  can	  only	  be	  
done	  by	  an	  actor	  within	  the	  system.	  This	  process	  cannot	  be	  externalised	  from	  the	  
system	   as	   if	   that	   was	   the	   case	   it	   could	   only	   engage	   with	   the	   system	   through	  
structural	  coupling,	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  require	  that	  the	  external	  communication	  
be	  interpreted	  through	  the	  internal	  language	  of	  the	  legal	  system,	  i.e.	  legal/illegal	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  Ibid.	  	  
37	  See	  Ibid.	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  Abbott,	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401,	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   and	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22.	  
	   131	  
binary	   code,	   and,	   therefore,	   fall	   foul	   of	   the	   situation	   that	   required	   it	   to	   be	  
externalised	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  
Instead	   this	   requirement	   of	   identifying	   communication	   must	   develop	   internally	  
within	  the	  system,	  whilst	  retaining	  a	  separation	  from	  both	  the	  body	  that	  creates	  
the	   norms	   and	   the	   subjects	   of	   the	   norms.	   This	   would	   allow	   a	   third	   party	   to	  
determine	   the	   incidence	   of	   communication,	   and	   by	   determining	   the	   incidence,	  
contribute	  to	  the	  propagation	  of	  communication	  within	  the	  system.	  One	  avenue	  
to	   create	   this	   third	   party	   that	   identifies	   what	   is	   and	   what	   is	   not	   a	   law	   is	   the	  
creation	  of	  an	  independent	  dispute	  settlement	  body.	  This	  provides	  an	  intellectual	  
basis	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   development	   of	   a	   Court	   or	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   is	   a	   crucial	  
element	   in	   the	   shift	   from	  a	  normative	   system	   into	  a	   legal	   system.	  This	  area	   is	   a	  
potential	  source	  of	  debate	  and	  is	  examined	  below.	  
3.4.2	  The	  Requirements	  for	  an	  Evolution	  into	  a	  Legal	  System	  
Hart’s	   work	   moves	   the	   debate	   forward	   when	   considering	   what	   elements	   are	  
required	   for	   a	   legal	   system,	   yet	  does	  not	  help	  when	   considering	  what	   elements	  
are	   required	   to	   form	   a	   legal	   system.	   The	   distinction	   is	   narrow,	   but	   it	   is	   the	  
difference	  between	  identification	  and	  evolution.	  Whilst	  the	  elements	  required	  for	  
a	  legal	  system	  gives	  an	  indication	  to	  the	  elements	  required	  to	  form	  a	  legal	  system,	  
it	   does	  not	   allow	   for	   the	   identification	  of	   the	   key	  elements	   that	  move	  a	   system	  
from	  one	  stage	  of	  normative	  to	  a	  second	  stage	  of	  legal.	  
When	   trying	   to	   seek	  how	  a	  normative	   system	  develops	   into	  a	   legal	   system,	   it	   is	  
logical	  to	  make	  the	  assumption	  that	  all	  currently	  accepted	  legal	  systems	  must	  at	  
some	   point	   have	   evolved	   into	   themselves	   and,	   therefore,	   must	   have	   been	   a	  
normative	   system	   prior	   to	   the	   evolution	   (for	   this	   purpose	   ignoring	   arguments	  
surrounding	   the	  creation	  of	  natural	   law).	   If	  an	  accurate	  history	  can	  be	   traced	   to	  
the	   start	   of	   these	   currently	   accepted	   systems,	   the	   fundamental	   elements	   that	  
were	  required	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  system	  should	  be	  in	  place	  and	  the	  potential	  
to	  identify	  what	  elements	  actually	  drove	  the	  evolutionally	  process.	  The	  clear	  place	  
to	  start	  is	  on	  the	  systems	  of	  law	  that	  are	  universally	  accepted:	  the	  system	  of	  state	  
law.	   Underpinning	   both	   Hart’s	   work	   and	   systems	   theory	   are,	   according	   to	  
Tamanaha,	  two	  myths	  regarding	  the	  development	  of	   law:	  the	  evolutionary	  myth	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and	  the	  social	  contract	  myth.39	  If	  the	  recognised	  theories	  behind	  the	  creation	  and	  
evolution	  of	   law	  generally	  provide	  criteria	  that	  can	  be	   identified	  for	  the	  creation	  
of	  a	   legal	   system,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   there	  are	  elements	   that	  can	  be	   identified	   in	  
the	  history	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	   that	  would	  point	   towards	   the	  development	  of	   its	  
own	  legal	  system	  and,	  therefore,	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  the	  actions	  that	  the	  Bank	  has	  
undertaken.	  	  
Tamanaha	  discusses	  the	  evolutionary	  myth	  that	  is	  purported	  in	  Western	  discourse	  
regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   law.	   Law	   is	   postulated	   to	   have	   developed	   out	   of	   a	  
“primordial	   soup”,	   before	   law	   was	   chaos	   and	   disorder	   ruled	   solely	   by	   custom,	  
after	   law	  there	   is	  order.	  The	   logical	  conclusion	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  myth,	  that	  
Tamanaha	  alleges	  underlies	  all	  major	  theories	  behind	  the	  existence	  of	  law,	  is	  that	  
law	  is	  required	  to	  take	  a	  society	  to	  an	  ordered	  form	  of	  existence.	  Law	  is	  not	  only	  
wanted	  by	  a	  society	  but	  is	  in	  fact	  required.40	  An	  important	  point	  of	  this	  myth	  that	  
needs	   to	   be	   highlighted	   and	  will	   be	   returned	   to	   later	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	   that	   the	  
development	   from	   custom	   to	   law	   allows	   the	   development	   of	   custom	   alongside	  
law.	  Both	  have	  a	  legitimate	  place	  within	  a	  society.	  
A	  problem	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  this	  concept	  is	  that	  law	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  inevitable	  
conclusion	   in	   the	  evolution	  of	  a	   system.	  Law	   is	   the	  highest	  pinnacle	   that	   can	  be	  
achieved	  and	  is	  in	  fact	  required	  to	  ‘offset	  the	  deficits	  arising	  with	  the	  collapse	  of	  
the	   traditional	   ethical	   life’.41	   Also	   with	   this	   conception	   of	   the	   creation	   of	   legal	  
systems	   there	   is	  no	  single	  point	   that	  can	  be	  pointed	   too	  where	  “law”	   is	   created	  
and	  society	  ascends	  to	  a	  higher	  plane.	  The	  development	  from	  custom	  to	  law	  is	  an	  
evolutionary	  process	  that	  has	  all	  the	  benefits	  and	  drawbacks	  of	  such.	  It	  progresses	  
on	  an	  inconsistent	  and	  ad	  hoc	  basis	  with	  back-­‐steps	  and	  even	  side-­‐steps.	  	  
This	  is	  an	  important	  element	  for	  systems	  theory	  when	  attempting	  to	  discern	  when	  
a	   normative	   system	   develops	   into	   a	   legal	   system.	   Systems	   theory,	   at	   least	   as	  
outlined	   by	   Luhmann,	   assumes	   that	   to	   become	   an	   operationally	   closed	   legal	  
system,	  a	  distinction	  between	  legal	  and	  illegal	  conduct	  must	  occur	  recursively	  and	  
pretend	   that	   this	   has	   always	   been	   the	   case.	   This	   evolutionary	   process	   from	   the	  
evolutionary	   myth	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   signs	   of	   a	   “system”,	   in	   whatever	   form	   it	   is,	  
tightening	  on	  its	  path	  to	  becoming	  operationally	  closed.	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The	  social	  contract	  myth	  is	  perhaps	  better	  known	  within	  Western	  academia	  as	  it	  
stems	   from	   the	   work	   of	   Hobbes,	   Locke	   and	   Rousseau.42	   This	   is	   the	   proposition	  
that	   law,	  and	   the	  State,	  developed	   through	   the	  combined	  will	  of	   the	  population	  
who	  contracted	  together	  as	   individuals.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  contact	  and	  the	  creation	  
of	   the	   law	  was	  mutual	   self-­‐preservation.43	   This	   involved	   a	   deliberate	   act	   by	   the	  
citizens	  of	   the	   state	   that	   all	   consented	   to	  be	   governed	  by	   a	   legal	   authority,44	   in	  
contrast	   to	   the	   evolutionary	   myth	   where	   there	   is	   no	   conscious	   moment	   of	  
decision.	  
Again	   the	   law,	   and	   the	   state,	   are	   seen	   as	   a	   natural	   consequence	   of	   the	  
development	   of	   a	   society.	   The	   law	   protects	   society	   from	   disorder	   and	   violence	  
that	   would	   naturally	   occur	   without	   it.	   In	   terms	   of	   systems	   theory,	   this	   would	  
suggest	  that	  a	  system	  is	  created	  by	  a	  conscious	  act	  by	  the	  demos	  of	  the	  system,	  
whoever	   they	   may	   be	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   stave	   off	   the	   disorder	   that	   would	   exist	  
without	  legal	  rules.	  
There	   are	  many	   criticisms	   to	   be	  made	   regarding	   these	  myths	   but	   as	   Tamanaha	  
points	   out,	   they	   underlie	   the	  most	   prominent	   general	   jurisprudence	   present	   in	  
Western	  academia.45	  Important	  elements	  from	  these	  two	  theories	  can,	  however,	  
be	  picked	  out	  to	  be	  viewed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  systems	  theory	  and	  allow	  for	  the	  
identification	   of	   elements	   that	   may	   lead	   to	   the	   development	   of	   a	   normative	  
system	  into	  a	  legal	  system:	  
1) Both	  myths	  ignore	  the	  social	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  required	  for	  a	  society	  
to	   develop:	   the	   same	   as	   Luhmann’s	   tests	   for	   systems	   theory.	   The	  
evolutionary	  myth	  focuses	  upon	  the	  evolution	  from	  customary	  norms	  to	  
legal	   norms,	   yet	   this	   cannot	   always	   be	   the	   case	   or	   every	   normative	  
system	   would	   eventually	   evolve	   into	   a	   legal	   system,	   something	   that	  
history	   has	   readily	   shown	  not	   to	   be	   the	   case.	   The	   social	   contract	  myth	  
focuses	   upon	   the	   collective	   decision	   of	   a	   society	   regardless	   of	   any	  
elements	  within	  the	  society.	  Both	  myths	  in	  turn	  still	  run	  into	  the	  problem	  
that	  a	  general	  jurisprudence	  tries	  to	  avoid,	  the	  issue	  of	  separating	  norms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Christopher	  Morris	  (ed.),	  The	  Social	  Contract	  Theorists:	  Critical	  Essays	  on	  Hobbes,	  Locke	  
and	  Rousseau,	  (Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  1999)	  
43	  Janet	  Coleman,	  A	  History	  of	  Political	  Thought,	  From	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  to	  the	  Renaissance	  
(Blackwell	  Publishers	  2000)	  pg.	  36	  
44	  Supra	  Note.	  39,	  pg.	  57	  
45	  Ibid.	  Chapter	  2	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from	   laws	   and	   being	   able	   to	   identify	   the	   elements	   that	   trigger	   a	   shift	  
from	   one	   form	   of	   system	   into	   another.	   Various	   mechanisms	   within	   a	  
society	   can	   satisfy	   the	   function	   of	   law	   but	   that	   does	   not	   mean	   they	  
should	  be	  regarded	  as	  “laws”	  and	  leaves	  the	  question	  open	  of	  having	  to	  
identify	  law	  from	  other	  norms.46	  
2) Both	  myths	  do,	  however,	  envision	  law	  as	  a	  specialised	  area	  of	  society	  in	  a	  
similar	  fashion	  to	  the	  systems	  theory	  view	  of	  society	  which	  views	  society	  
as	  being	  split	  up	  into	  various	  sectors	  with	  law	  as	  an	  autonomous	  section	  
of	   the	  overarching	   society.	   Law	  becomes	   the	  purview	  of	   lawyers.47	   The	  
legal	  system	  is	  still	  a	  part	  of	  society	  but,	  as	  seen	  in	  Hart’s	  account,	  it	  has	  a	  
special	  function	  that	  can	  only	  be	  fulfilled	  through	  lawyers.	  Although	  this	  
would	  suggest	  a	  shift	  in	  approach	  from	  an	  essentialist	  to	  a	  functionalist,	  
as	   seen	  when	   ignoring	   the	   social	  mechanisms,	   various	  mechanisms	   can	  
fulfil	   the	   function	   of	   law.	   Systems	   theory	   asserts	   that	   all	   outside	  
communication	  must	  be	  interpreted	  through	  the	  internal	  language	  of	  the	  
system.	   This,	   therefore,	   leads	   to	   a	   specialisation	   of	   lawyers	   as	   people	  
who	  can	  understand	   the	   internal	   language	  and	  points	   to	  a	   requirement	  
for	  the	  development	  of	  a	   legal	  system	  as	  needing	  actors	  or	  people	  who	  
view	  communication	  in	  terms	  of	  legal/illegal.	  
3) One	   element	   from	   the	   evolutionary	   myth	   that	   is	   important	   is	   the	  
development	   from	   custom	   into	   law.	   Crucially	   not	   all	   customs	   develop	  
into	   law	   and	   law	   can	   exist	   alongside	   customs.	   Evidence	   of	   this	   can	   be	  
seen	   today	   in	  modern	  domestic	   constitutions.48	   If	   a	   legal	   system	  under	  
systems	   theory	   develops	   from	   a	   normative	   system,	   potentially	   norms	  
may	   exist	   that	   are	   outside	   law	   (as	   they	   are	   not	   viewed	   as	   legal/illegal	  
under	   the	   binary	   code)	   yet	   are	   still	   norms	   that	   guide	   behaviour	  within	  
the	  system.	  Customs	  and	  conventions	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this.	  
Although	  not	  law,	  they	  are	  norms	  as	  they	  guide	  behaviour	  and	  are	  more	  
than	   best	   practice.	   However,	   this	   should	   be	   distinguished	   from	  
“customs”	   that	   have	   developed	   into	   laws	   as	   they	   now	   rely	   upon	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Ibid.	  pg.	  137	  
47	  Alan	  Watson,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Law	  (John	  Hopkins	  University	  Press	  1985)	  pg.	  118	  
48	   See	   Geoffrey	   Marshall,	   ‘What	   are	   Constitutional	   Conventions?’	   (1985)	   38(1)	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communication	   along	   a	   legal/illegal	   divide	   such	   as	   customary	  
international	  law.49	  
4) The	   crucial	   element	   regarding	   both	  myths	   in	   reference	   to	   State	   law	   is	  
that	   societies	   are	   generally	   ignorant	   of	   their	   own	   births.	   Locke	  
acknowledged	  this	  in	  his	  work	  on	  social	  contract	  theory	  stating	  that	  ‘for	  
it	  is	  with	  common-­‐wealths	  as	  with	  particular	  persons,	  they	  are	  generally	  
ignorant	  of	  their	  own	  births	  and	  infancies.’50	  As	  these	  two	  myths	  point	  to	  
a	  time	  before	  records	  began	  they	  are	  based	  purely	  on	  conjecture	  rather	  
than	   facts.	   In	   recent	   times	   facts	   that	   have	   arisen	   have	   directly	  
contradicted	  evolutionary	   theory.51	  The	  evolutionary	  myth	  cannot	  point	  
to	   a	   specific	   point	   where	   a	   social	   system	   changes	   from	   a	   normative	  
system	  into	  a	  legal	  system	  and	  the	  social	  contract	  myth	  cannot	  point	  to	  a	  
time	  when	   society	   gathered	   together	   as	   a	   whole	   and	   consented	   to	   be	  
bound	   by	   a	   legal	   authority.52	   This	   ignorance	   is	   similar	   to	   the	  
deparadoxification	   technique	   of	   externalization	   that	   a	   system	  must	   go	  
through	  under	  Teubner’s	  system	  theory	  so	  that	  a	  legal	  system	  acts	  as	  if	  it	  
has	  always	  been	  a	  legal	  system.	  
	  
This	   ignorance	   regarding	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   system	  would	   suggest	   a	   simple	   rule	  
would	  hold	  true:	  	  
A	  system	  would	  amount	  to	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system	  only	  when	  
it	  fulfils	  the	  criteria	  of	  being	  one	  and	  acts	  like	  it	  has	  always	  been.	  
If	  Hart’s	  conceptualisation	  of	  law	  can	  be	  simplified	  to	  and	  as	  wide	  as	  ‘a	  normative	  
order	  that	  lawyers	  recognise	  as	  law’,	  perhaps	  a	  legal	  system	  can	  be	  simplified	  to	  ‘a	  
system	  that	   recognises	   itself	  as	  a	   legal	   system’.	  Yet	   the	  essentialist	  analysis	   that	  
previously	  occurred	  had	  suggested	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  Court-­‐like	  structure	  has	  to	  
be	  present,	  or	  an	  assessment	  of	  actions	  against	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide,	  a	  concept	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  The	  requirements	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  recognise	  this	  distinction	  in	  requiring	  
that	  the	  States	  see	  the	  “custom”	  as	  being	  required	  as	  law.	  
50	  John	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise	  of	  Government,	  C.B.	  Macpherson	  (ed.),	  (Hackett	  Publishing	  
Co.	  1980)	  s.101	  emphasis	  added.	  
51	  Peter	  Manicas,	  A	  History	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Social	  Sciences	  (Basil	  Blackwell	  1987)	  pg.	  
71-­‐2	  
52	   Even	   examples	   such	   as	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Constitution,	   which	   were	  
written	   for	   the	   population	   as	   a	  whole,	   involved	   a	   tiny	   fraction	   of	   the	   population	   in	   the	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not	   included	   within	   the	   above	   understanding.	   Whilst	   both	   myths	   provide	  
illumination	  on	  various	  parts	  of	  systems	  theory,	  as	  of	  this	  ignorance	  of	  their	  own	  
birth,	  neither	   can	  answer	   the	   fundamental	  question	  of	  how	  a	  normative	   system	  
develops	  into	  a	  legal	  system	  and	  what	  elements	  are	  required.	  
	  
3.4.3	  International	  Law	  Theories	  Contribution	  
Whilst	   theories	   grounded	   in	   state	   law	   provide	   one	   consideration	   to	   help	   to	  
determine	   the	  elements	  of	  a	   system,	  a	   consideration	  of	  public	   international	   law	  
and	   the	   specific	   viewpoint	   of	   “fragments”,	   or	   systems,	   can	   be	   considered	   to	  
determine	  whether	   there	  are	  particular	  elements	  present	   that	  may	  be	  of	  use	   in	  
identifying	   the	   requirements	   of	   a	   system	   within	   international	   law.	   Within	   the	  
context	   of	   the	   World	   Bank,	   as	   a	   body	   at	   least	   created	   by	   international	   law,	  
elements	   from	   accepted	   international	   law	   theories	   and	   systems	   may	   provide	  
illumination	  on	  the	  criteria	  that	  the	  Bank	  must	  fulfil	  for	  it	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  a	  legal	  
system.	  	  
There	   is	   currently	   considerable	   academic	   debate	   occurring	   regarding	   whether	  
international	   law	   is	   becoming	   constitutionalised,53	   which	   has	   moved	   forward	  
from,	   but	   also	   alongside,	   the	   debate	   on	  whether	   international	   law	   has	   become	  
specialised	  or	  fragmented.54	  
Systems	  theory	  provides	  that	  law	  becomes	  an	  autonomous	  system	  but	  is	  within	  a	  
wider	  society.	  One	  possible	  consequence	  of	  systems	  theory	   is	  a	  specialisation	  or	  
fragmentation	   of	   the	   traditional	   domain	   covered	   by	   international	   law.	   Public	  
international	   law	   itself	   is	   part	   of	   wider	   society,	   but	   the	   fractionalisation	   of	   this	  
legal	  system	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  autonomous	  systems	  within	  the	  wider	  
legal	   system	   is	   a	   possible	   consequence	   of	   systems	   theory.	   If	   each	   autonomous	  
legal	  system	  develops	  the	  necessary	  characteristics	  of	  a	  system,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  
possible	  for	  these	  autonomous	  legal	  systems	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  legal	  system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  See	  for	  example,	  Jan	  Klabbers,	  Anne	  Peters	  &	  Geir	  Ulfstein,	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	  
International	  Law	  (OUP	  2009)	  and	  Jürgen	  Habermas,	  ‘The	  Crisis	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  
the	  Light	  of	  a	  Constitutionalization	  of	  International	  Law’	  (2012)	  23(2)	  EJIL	  335	  
54	   See	   for	   example,	   Martti	   Koskenniemi	   &	   Päivi	   Leino,	   ‘Fragmentation	   of	   International	  
Law?	  Postmodern	  Anxieties’	   (2002)	  15(3)	   Leiden	   Journal	  of	   International	   Law	  553	  &	   Jan	  
Klabbers	   &	   Silke	   Trommer,	   ‘Peaceful	   Coexistence:	   Normative	   Pluralism	   in	   International	  
Law’	  in	  Jan	  Klabbers	  &	  Touko	  Piiparinen	  (eds.),	  Normative	  Pluralism	  and	  International	  Law	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and	  part	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  issue	  is	  itself	  naturally	  linked	  to	  the	  questions	  
surrounding	  pluralism.	  
In	   this	   area	   of	   fragmentation,	   one	   area,	   which	   has	   already	   been	   examined	   in	  
Chapter	  Two,	   is	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  constitutionalisation	  of	  public	   international	   law.	  
One	  variant	  of	  the	  constitutionalisation	  theory	  argues	  that	  specific	  parts	  of	  public	  
international	   law	   have	   become	   or	   are	   in	   the	   process	   of	   becoming	  
constitutionalised.	  The	  constitutionalisation	  of	  international	  law	  argument	  begins	  
from	  a	  point	  immediately	  recognised	  from	  systems	  theory:	  more	  actors	  than	  just	  
the	  State	  are	  creating	  law.55	  Delbrück	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  ‘the	  monopoly	  of	  
the	   state	   as	   a	   political	   actor	   in	   the	   international	   system	   has	   been	   entirely	  
broken.’56	   It	   is	  doubtful	  States	  would	  agree	  yet	   if	  either	  the	  constitutionalisation	  
theory	  or	  systems	  theory	  were	  successfully	  applied	  to	  public	  international	  law,	  the	  
consequence	   would	   be	   the	   removal	   of	   the	   State	   as	   the	   sole	   law	   creator.	  
Arguments	  develop	  upon	  this	  to	  posit	  that	  various	   international	  organisations	  or	  
specific	  sectors	  of	   international	   law	  are	  acting	  as	   lawmakers	  within	   international	  
law	   and	   have	   developed	   a	   constitutional	   structure.	   	   The	   basis	   of	   the	   argument,	  
again	   similar	   to	   systems	   theory,	   is	   that	   these	   organisations	   and	   sectors	   have	  
developed	  an	  autonomy	  from	  States57	  and	  are,	  therefore,	  not	  under	  their	  control.	  
Supporting	  evidence	  for	  the	  autonomy	  of	  certain	  organisations	  comes	  from	  case	  
law.	  The	  ECJ	  has	  ruled	  in	  the	  infamous	  Van	  Gend	  &	  Loos	  case	  that	  ‘the	  Community	  
constitutes	   a	   new	   legal	   order	   of	   international	   law’58	   whilst	   the	   ICJ	   has	  
acknowledged	   that	   the	   charter	   of	   an	   organisation	   as	   innocuous	   as	   the	   World	  
Health	  Organization	  created	  a	  legal	  subject	  ‘endowed	  with	  a	  certain	  autonomy’.59	  
Yet	  crucially,	  Anne	  Peters	  in	  her	  work	  establishes	  a	  break	  between	  autonomy	  and	  
constitutionalisation	   by	   highlighting	   that	   there	   are	   various	   factors	   that	   put	  
constitutionalisation	   on	   a	   scale	   rather	   than	   a	   simple	   ‘constitutionalised	   or	   not’	  
argument.	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The	   argument	   revolving	   around	   constitutionalisation	   of	   international	   law	   is	  
distinct	   from	   the	   argument	   of	   an	   autonomous	   system.	   Although	   a	  
constitutionalised	   body	   could	   be	   considered	   an	   autonomous	   system,	   an	  
autonomous	   system	  does	  not	  necessarily	   entail	   a	   constitutionalised	  body.	   If	   the	  
argument	   developed	   from	   Hart’s	   work	   demonstrated	   the	   need	   for	   an	  
independent	   third	   party	   within	   an	   autonomous	   system	   that	   can	   determine	   the	  
incidence	  and	  control	   the	  operation	  of	  primary	   rules,	   this	  would	   seem	   to	  mimic	  
the	   constitutional	   structure	  of	   the	  domestic	   legal	   system	  yet	   it	   should	  be	  noted	  
that	   this	   simply	   means	   that	   the	   dispute	   resolution	   body	   is	   exercising	  
constitutional	  functions,	  not	  that	  the	  system	  has	  developed	  a	  constitution.60	  
This	   application	  of	   a	   scale	   is	   important	   and	  highlights	   a	   fundamental	   distinction	  
between	   systems	   theory	   and	   constitutionalisation.	   Under	   systems	   theory	   as	  
articulated	   by	   Luhmann,	   a	   system	   is	   either	   a	   normative	   system	   only	   or	   a	   legal	  
system	   (which	   entails	   it	   is	   a	   normative	   system	   as	   well).	   As	   soon	   as	   a	   system	  
becomes	   a	   legal	   system,	   it	   acts	   as	   if	   it	   has	   always	   been	   and,	   therefore,	   there	  
cannot	   exist	   a	   scale	   along	   which	   a	   legal	   system	   can	   lie	   until	   it	   is	   fully	   fledged.	  
Constitutionalisation	   arguments	   in	   contrast	   focus	   upon	   the	   ECJ	   and	   the	   WTO	  
simply	   as	   they	   are	   the	   most	   constitutionalised	   organisations.61	   They	   contain	  
elements	  of	  a	  constitutionalised	  body	  yet	  may	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  full	  constitution	  as	  
of	   yet.62	   If	   full	   constitutionalisation	   is	   the	   final	   destination,	   organisations	   can	  be	  
pointed	  to	  on	  a	  scale	  between	  autonomy	  and	  full	  constitutionalisation	  	  
Although	   there	   can	   be	   no	   direct	   ports	   from	   one	   legal	   theory	   to	   another,	   the	  
concept	  of	  viewing	  the	  development	  of	  a	   legal	  system	  as	  a	  development	  along	  a	  
line,	  rather	  than	  the	  binary	  distinction	  that	  Luhmann’s	  systems	  theory	  provides,	  is	  
an	  element	  that	  should	  be	  considered.	  If	  systems	  theory	  allows	  the	  identification	  
of	   completed	   systems	   of	   law	   through	   the	   application	   of	   the	   binary	   legal/illegal	  
code	  to	  communications,	  constitutionalisation	  focused	  far	  more	  specifically	  upon	  
the	  shift	  from	  one	  societal	  construct	  (an	  international	  organisation)	   into	  another	  
(a	   constitutional	   body).	   This	   focus	   upon	   the	   shift	   is	   useful	   and	   allows	   the	  
answering	  of	  the	  question	  that	  Luhmann’s	  version	  of	  systems	  theory	  cannot.	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‘The	  acts	  of	   the	  organization	   itself	  must	  be	  subject	   to	   judicial	  or	  
to	   a	   functionally	   similar	   review	   which	   controls	   whether	   the	  
constitutional	   principles	   are	   observed	   and	   sees	   that	   the	  
constitutional	  limits	  are	  respected	  by	  the	  organization	  itself.’63	  
‘In	   institutional	   terms,	   it	   matters	   that	   the	   EU	   possess	   a	   full-­‐
fledged	   compulsory	   judicial	   system	   and	   that	   the	   WTO	   has	  
progressively	   entrenched	   quasi-­‐compulsory	   and	   quasi-­‐judicial	  
proceedings	  which	  lead	  to	  judgment-­‐like	  reports.’64	  
	  
Under	  the	  constitutionalisation	  theory,	  a	  Court,	  or	  Court-­‐like	  body,	  is	  required	  to	  
shift	  from	  an	  international	  organisation	  into	  a	  fully	  autonomous	  legal	  unit.	  This	  is	  
different	   to	   the	   intellectual	   basis	   established	   earlier	  within	   systems	   theory	   that	  
required	   a	   Court	   for	   a	   system	   to	   be	   fully	   autonomous.	   If	   this	   application	   from	  
constitutionalisation	   theory	  was	   to	  hold	   true	   for	   systems	   theory,	   it	   is	  not	  only	  a	  
Court-­‐like	  body	  that	  is	  required	  for	  a	  system,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  very	  process	  of	  a	  Court-­‐
like	   body	   judging	   behaviour	   against	   norms	   that	   would	   be	   the	   shift	   from	   a	  
normative	  system	  to	  a	  legal	  system.	  
	  
3.5	  The	  Importance	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  Body	  for	  the	  Development	  of	  an	  
Autonomous	  Legal	  System	  under	  Systems	  Theory	  
If	  systems	  theory	  requires	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  to	  be	  a	  fully	  autonomous	  system,	  as	  
the	  body	   internal	   to	   the	   legal	  system	  that	  rules	  upon	  the	   legal/illegal	  divide	  and	  
allows	   for	   the	   stabilisation	  of	  normative	  expectations,	   it	   can	  be	  examined	   if	   the	  
presence	  of	  this	  Court-­‐like	  body	  is	  the	  trigger	  that	  shifts	  a	  normative	  system	  into	  a	  
legal	  system.	  
As	   discussed	   previously,	   the	   two	   tests	   proposed	   by	   Luhmann	   to	   discern	   the	  
validity	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  are	  the	  ‘functional	  specification	  of	  law’,	  that	  the	  system	  
and	   its	   laws	  are	  focused	  upon	  a	  specific	  problem	  within	  the	  overarching	  societal	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system;	  and	   that	   the	   system	   is	   involved	   in	  a	  binary	  distinction	  between	  positive	  
conduct	  (‘legal’)	  and	  negative	  conduct	  (‘illegal’).	  
Although	   Luhmann	   does	   not	   highlight	   it	   as	   one	   of	   the	   key	   tests	   for	   the	  
establishment	   of	   a	   legal	   system,	   elsewhere	   in	   his	   work	   he	   does	   highlight	   the	  
importance	  of	  dispute	  resolution	  bodies	  for	  a	  system.65	  As	  law	  is	  a	  mechanism	  to	  
allow	  its	  subjects	  to	  guide	  their	  behaviour	  by	  basing	  their	  actions	  on	  expectations	  
(both	  on	  the	  expectations	   themselves	  and	  on	  the	  result	  of	   failing	   to	  meet	   those	  
expectations),	  sanctions	  and	  a	  dispute	  resolution	  body	  enforce	  those	  expectations	  
both	  by	  providing	  a	  punishment	  and	  a	  clarification	  over	  the	  expectation.	  
Teubner	   develops	   this	   argument	   in	   his	   work	   and	   asserts	   that	   the	   presence	   of	  
norms	   invoking	   the	   binary	   code	   of	   legal/illegal	   is	   insufficient	   to	   change	   a	  
normative	  system	  into	  a	  legal	  system.66	  Instead	  Teubner	  asserts	  that:	  
‘Autonomous	   law	   (with	   or	   without	   a	   state)	   only	   exists	   when	  
institutions	  have	  been	  established	  which	  systemically	  assess	  all	  first	  
order	   observations	   that	   use	   the	   code	   legal/illegal	   by	   means	   of	  
second	  order	  observations	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  code	  of	  law.’67	  
Under	   the	   understanding	   that	   law	   is	   an	   autonomous	   social	   system	   to	   guide	  
expectations,	  a	  Court	  then	  moves	  from	  the	  periphery	  of	  a	  system	  to	  a	  central	  role	  
as	  it	  ‘allows	  for	  the	  development	  of	  legal	  arguments	  and	  determination	  of	  content	  
of	  law	  norms	  that	  other	  actors	  can	  rely	  on	  to	  structure	  their	  affairs’.68	  As	  law	  has	  
shifted	   from	   the	  positivist	   understanding,	  with	   a	   basis	   upon	   sovereign	  will,	   to	   a	  
systems	   theory	  understanding,	  with	   a	  basis	   upon	  a	   legal/illegal	   binary	   code	  and	  
relying	  upon	  an	  institution	  that	  assess	  all	  first	  order	  observations	  of	  the	  code	  (i.e.	  
a	  Court-­‐like	  body),	  the	  body	  that	  establishes	  the	  norms	  that	  has	  traditionally	  been	  
seen	  as	  central	  to	  a	  legal	  system	  has	  now	  been	  shifted	  to	  the	  periphery	  and	  been	  
replaced	  by	  a	  Court.69	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  Legitimacy	  of	  International	  Law	  (Hart	  2010)	  pg.	  285	  
69	  Gunther	  Teubner,	   ‘Breaking	  Frames:	   the	  Global	   Interplay	  of	   Legal	   and	  Social	   Systems’	  
(1997)	  45	  American	  Journal	  of	  Constitutional	  Law	  149,	  158	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As	  examined,	  systems	  theory	   interprets	   law	   in	  a	  decentralized	  fashion.	  This	   is	   to	  
say	   that	   the	   source	   of	   the	   communication	   does	   not	   matter,	   it	   is	   simply	   if	   the	  
communication	  is	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  legal/illegal.	  The	  law/politics	  distinction	  can	  
easily	  be	  divided	  in	  this	  system	  using	  this	  fashion	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  examine	  norm	  
creation	  that	  occurs	  outside	  the	  political	  field.	  This	  changes	  the	  structure	  in	  which	  
we	  examine	  national	  law.	  Parliamentary	  bodies	  (or	  legitimate	  law	  creating	  bodies)	  
are	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  centralist	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  law.	  Whilst	  acknowledging	  that	  
they	  still	  exist	  and	  are	  an	   important	  part	  of	   the	  system,	  other	  bodies	  can	  create	  
‘law’,	  and	  this	  places	  the	  Court	  as	  the	  centralist	  body	  in	  a	  system	  as	  ultimately	  it	  is	  
the	  Court	  that	  rules	  on	  what	  is	  law	  as	  it	  is	  a	  Court	  that	  decides	  whether	  an	  action	  
is	  legal	  or	  illegal.70	  When	  this	  model	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  international	  law	  stage,	  the	  
decentralised	   norm	   creation	   process	   and	   the	   increasing	   proliferation	   of	   norm	  
making	  bodies	  would	  suggest	  that	  Court-­‐like	  bodies	  would	  be	  required	  to	  assess	  
whether	  actions	  associated	  with	  these	  norms	  are	  legal/illegal.	  The	  criteria	  given	  in	  
Article	   38	   of	   the	   ICJ	   Statute,	   whilst	   still	   important,	   are	   not	   the	   only	   sources	   of	  
“law”	  anymore.	  If	  in	  the	  fragmented	  world	  of	  international	  law,	  each	  fragment	  is	  
to	   develop	   into	   an	   autonomous	   systems,	   a	   Court	   (or	   dispute-­‐settling	   body)	   is	  
central	  to	  the	  system	  in	  having	  the	  role	  of	  deciding	  the	  legal/illegal	  distinction.	  
Politics	  and	  the	  norm	  creation	  that	  occurs	  is	  still	  within	  the	  system	  but	  Teubner’s	  
work	   classes	   it	   as	   periphery	   and	   highlights	   that	   this	   breaking	   of	   the	   traditional	  
hierarchal	  model	  allows	  actors	  to:	  
‘recognize	  other	  types	  of	  social	  rule	  production	  as	   law	  production,	  
but	   only	   under	   the	   condition	   that	   they	   are	   produced	   in	   the	  
periphery	   of	   the	   legal	   system	   in	   structural	   coupling	   with	   external	  
social	  processes	  of	  rule-­‐formation.’71	  
This	   allows	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   various	   norm	   creating	   features	  
outside	   of	   a	   system	   that	   exist	   and	   have	   an	   effect	   upon	   a	   system.	   ‘(T)echnical	  
standardization,	   professional	   rule	   production,	   human	   rights,	   intra-­‐organizational	  
regulation,	  and	  contracting’72	  all	  become	  legal	  systems	  in	  their	  own	  right	  and	  have	  
an	  effect	  upon	  other	  systems.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Ibid.	  
71	  Ibid.	  	  
72	  Ibid.	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The	   role	   a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  plays	   is	   crucial	   in	   establishing	   ‘what	   is	   law?’	  within	   a	  
system	   by	   providing	   a	   mechanism	   for	   self-­‐referencing.	   Through	   arbitration	   a	  
Court-­‐like	  body	  in	  an	  international	  organisation	  has	  not	  only	  to	  consider	  the	  rules	  
that	   are	   given	   to	   it	   from	   its	   founding	   document	   (the	   internal	   processes	   of	   the	  
system)	  and	  internal	  norms	  that	  have	  developed,	  it	  also	  must	  consider	  the	  effect	  
of	   wider	   international	   law	   upon	   the	   system	   through	   structural	   coupling,	  
information	  that	   it	  can	   interpret	  along	   its	  own	   internal	  processes.	  The	  Court-­‐like	  
body,	   through	   its	   case	   law,	   is	   the	   body	   that	   provides	   the	   clear	   demarcation	  
between	  what	  is	  included	  in	  a	  system	  and	  what	  is	  excluded,	  as	  well	  as	  interpreting	  
the	  actual	  norms	  that	  are	  included	  and	  allowing	  for	  the	  self-­‐referencing	  process	  to	  
occur.	  
Yet,	   as	  well	   as	   being	   central	   to	   the	   existence	  of	   an	  operating	   autonomous	   legal	  
system,	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  is	  central	  to	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  normative	  system	  into	  a	  
legal	   system.	   If	   law	   is	   a	   system	   of	   communications	   marked	   by	   a	   binary	   code	  
legal/illegal,	   an	   entity	   needs	   to	   classify	   communication	   as	   either	   legal	   or	   illegal.	  
This	   happens	  when	   conflicts	   regarding	   norms	   are	   to	   be	   decided	   and,	   therefore,	  
contributes	   to	   the	   stabilization	   of	   normative	   expectations	   by	   remembering	   and	  
forgetting.	  	  
‘The	  departure	  point	   for	   the	  evolution	  of	   law	   is	   the	   initially	  barely	  
marked	   distinction	   between	   uncontested	   and	   contested	   cases	   of	  
disappointment.	  Only	   if	  conflicts	  can	  be	  verbalized…	  can	  a	  second-­‐
order	  observation	  arise,	  because	  only	  then	  is	  one	  obliged	  to	  decide	  
who	  is	  in	  a	  legal	  position	  and	  who	  is	  in	  an	  illegal	  position.’73	  
The	   creation	   of	   a	   third	   party	   dispute	   settler	   is	   the	   most	   obvious	   and	   common	  
mechanism	   via	   which	   conflicts	   can	   be	   verbalised	   and,	   therefore,	   a	   decision	  
reached	  on	  whether	  an	  action	  is	  legal	  or	  illegal.	  An	  alternative	  mechanism	  would	  
be	   for	   consensus	   to	  be	   reached	  among	  actors	  within	  a	   system	  on	   if	   an	  action	   is	  
legal	   or	   illegal;	   such	   as	   can	   be	   witnessed	   in	   some	   elements	   of	   customary	  
international	  law.74	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  Law	  as	  a	  Social	  System	  (OUP	  2004)	  pg.	  246	  
74	  For	  example	  see	  the	  Caroline	  Case	  (1837)	  that	  established	  the	  legal	  groundings	  for	  the	  
modern	  understanding	  of	  anticipatory	  self-­‐defence	  where	  the	  dispute	  was	  settled	  by	  the	  
consensus	  of	  the	  parties.	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A	   Court-­‐like	   body	   acting	   as	   a	   third	   party	   dispute	   settler	   is	   preferable	   for	   the	  
process	   of	   remembering	   and	   forgetting	   that	   must	   occur	   to	   stabilise	   normative	  
expectations.	  Calliess	  and	  Renner	  point	  to	  precedent	  in	  common	  law	  jurisdictions	  
as	   an	   example	   of	   fulfilling	   this	   criterion	   of	   remembering	   and	   forgetting	   to	  
establish	   which	   norms	   are	   relevant	   for	   legal/illegal	   communications.75	   These	  
points	   of	   references	   between	   past	   and	   future	   legal	   communications	   to	   stabilise	  
normative	   expectations	   can	   occur	   through	   the	   publication	   of	   legal	   disputes	   to	  
allow	   future	   communications	   a	   certainty,	   and,	   therefore,	   stabilising	   normative	  
expectations.	  
The	   presence	   of	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   for	   the	   evolution	   into	   a	   legal	   system	  
accompanies	  Calliess’s	  and	  Renner’s	  argument	  that	  an	  enabling	  condition	  for	  the	  
evolution	  of	   a	   legal	   system	   is	   a	  mechanism	   that	  allows	   for	   the	   ‘interlinkage	  and	  
mutual	   referencing	   of	   legal	   communications’.76	   They	   site	   the	   development	   of	  
precedent	   from	   a	   Court	   as	   the	  most	   likely	   example	   of	   this	  mechanism	   but	   also	  
point	  to	  a	  doctrinal	  elaboration	  of	  legal	  principles,	  which	  would	  also	  be	  provided	  
by	  a	  Court,	  as	  another	  example.77	  
The	   evolution	   of	   a	   normative	   system	   into	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system	   would,	  
therefore,	   require	   at	   least	   two	   conditions;	   the	   verbalisation	   of	   conflicts	   with	   a	  
determination	  whether	  an	  action	  is	   legal	  or	   illegal	  (most	  often	  manifested	  in	  the	  
creation	   of	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body)	   and	   the	   publication	   of	   legal	   communications	   to	  
guide	  and	  stabilise	  future	  normative	  expectations.	  Without	  this	  verbalisation	  and	  
stabilisation	  through	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  or	  consensus	  of	  actors,	  a	  system	  of	  norms	  
cannot	  evolve	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  
This	  understanding	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  for	  a	  system	  of	  law	  to	  exist	  under	  
systems	  theory,	  a	  dispute	  settlement	  body	  must	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  system,	  
invoking	   legal	   language,	   settling	   disputes	   on	   the	   legal/illegal	   binary	   code,	  which	  
publishes	  its	  judgments	  for	  all	  of	  the	  actors	  within	  a	  system	  to	  scrutinise.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Gralf-­‐Peter	  Calliess	  and	  Moritz	  Renner,	  ‘From	  Soft	  Law	  to	  Hard	  Code:	  the	  Juridification	  
of	  Global	  Governance’	  22(2)	  Ratio	  Juris	  260,	  272	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  Ibid.	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The	   fundamental	   test	   of	   systems	   theory	   elaborated	   by	   Luhmann	   and	   Teubner,	  
therefore,	   remains	   unchanged	   (as	   point	   1)	   but	   a	   secondary	   question	   is	   now	  
required:	  
1) Are	  communications	  identified	  through	  the	  binary	  coding	  legal/illegal?	  
2) Is	  there	  a	  dispute	  settlement	  body	  that	  assesses	  conduct	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
coding	  legal/illegal?	  	  
	  
If	   both	   answers	   are	   yes,	   a	   legal	   system	   exists.	   The	   questions	   themselves	   are	  
intrinsically	  linked	  as	  the	  easiest	  way	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  answer	  to	  question	  1	  is	  
to	  prove	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  dispute	  settlement	  body	  for	  question	  2.	  
3.5.1	  The	  Structure	  of	  the	  Court-­‐like	  Body	  within	  a	  Legal	  System	  
The	  essentialist	  analysis	  over	  what	  form	  of	  structure	  is	  needed	  to	  develop	  from	  a	  
normative	   system	   to	   a	   legal	   system	   has	   identified	   the	   required	   presence	   of	   a	  
Court-­‐like	  body	  ruling	  upon	  the	  legal/illegal	  binary	  code.	  To	  achieve	  its	  purpose	  of	  
stabilising	  normative	  expectations,	   the	   results	  of	  disputes	  should	  be	  available	   to	  
the	  actors	  affected	  by	  judgments.	  	  
This	  in	  turn	  suggests	  that	  all	  that	  is	  required	  is	  a	  body	  that	  assesses	  conduct	  on	  a	  
legal/illegal	  binary	  code	  that	  makes	  available	  its	  findings	  to	  the	  actors	  that	  within	  
a	  system,	  which	  in	  turn	  implies	  that	  the	  form	  of	  the	  body	  is	  irrelevant.	  However,	  
although	  the	  form	  of	  the	  body	  may	  not	  dictate	  whether	  it	  achieves	  its	  purpose	  of	  
settling	  disputes	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide,	  there	  may	  be	  identifiable	  elements	  
that	  would	  better	  achieve	  that	  purpose	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  systems	  theory.	  
Geir	   Ulfstein,	   in	   his	   work	   on	   constitutionalisation,	   has	   highlighted	   a	   variety	   of	  
criteria	  that	  are	  required	  for	  a	  body	  to	  be	  classed	  as	  a	  Court.78	  These	  criteria	  are	  
pulled	   from	   various	   international	   human	   rights	   treaties79	   yet	   Ulfstein	   cites	   the	  
International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	   for	   the	  Former	  Yugoslavia	   from	  the	  Tadic	   case	   in	  
stating	  that	  an	  international	  criminal	  Court	  ‘ought	  to	  be	  rooted	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Jan	  Klabbers,	  Anne	  Peters	  &	  Geir	  Ulfstein,	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	  International	  Law	  
(OUP	  2009)	  pg.	  126-­‐152	  
79	   Article	   14	   of	   the	   International	   Covenant	   of	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Rights;	   Article	   6	   of	   the	  
European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights;	   and	   Article	   8	   of	   the	   American	   Convention	   on	  
Human	  Rights.	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and	  offer	  all	  guarantees	  embodied	  in	  the	  relevant	  international	  instruments’80	  and	  
that	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   in	   turn	   requires	   that	   the	   Court	   must	   be	   established	   ‘in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   proper	   international	   standards;	   it	   must	   provide	   all	   the	  
guarantees	   of	   fairness,	   justice,	   and	   even-­‐handedness,	   in	   full	   conformity	   with	  
internationally	  recognized	  human	  rights	  instruments.’81	  
The	  requirements	  that	  Ulfstein	  identifies	  are:	  
1) Expertise	  –	  the	  judges	  should	  possess	  the	  necessary	  legal	  qualifications	  to	  
hear	  the	  case.82	  
2) Independence	  –	  the	  Court	  should	  be	  independent	  both	  from	  state	  control	  
and	  from	  the	  international	  organisation	  itself.83	  
3) Equal	  access	  –	  the	  demos	  should	  have	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  court.84	  
4) Fair	   hearing	   –	   parties	   to	   the	   dispute	   should	   be	   allowed	   to	   properly	  
present	  their	  case,	  the	  judges	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  law	  in	  the	  relevant	  
area	  and	  the	  proceedings	  are	  conducted	  in	  a	  transparent	  manner.85	  
5) Need	   for	   consistency	   –	   specifically,	   the	   Court	   should	   follow	   its	   own	  
decisions	   on	   the	   relevant	   law.	   Generally,	   the	   Court	   should	   take	   the	  
decisions	   of	   other	   relevant	   courts	   into	   account	   (this	   is	   of	   particular	  
relevance	   to	   international	   law	   where	   it	   is	   generally	   acknowledged	   that	  
there	  is	  no	  concept	  of	  binding	  precedent).86	  
6) Democratic	   control	   –	   Ulfstein’s	   final	   requirement	   is	   that	   international	  
Courts	   balance	   their	   activism	   against	   the	   democratic	   law	   making	  
procedures	  of	  the	  organisation.87	  The	  stronger	  the	  democratic	  law	  making	  
powers,	   the	   more	   active	   the	   Court	   can	   be.	   As	   this	   final	   requirement	   is	  
specifically	   related	   to	   the	   constitutionalisation	   of	   an	   international	  
organisation	  and	  the	  separation	  of	  powers	  that	  it	  enjoys,	  this	  requirement	  
can	  be	  excluded	  from	  a	  systems	  theory	  based	  analysis.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Prosecutor	  v	  Dusko	  Tadic,	  Decisions	  on	  the	  Defence	  Motion	  for	  Interlocutory	  Appeal	  on	  
Jurisdiction	  Case	  IT-­‐94-­‐1-­‐AR72	  Appeals	  Chamber	  of	  2	  October	  1995,	  para	  42	  
81	  Ibid.	  para	  45	  
82	  Supra	  Note.	  78,	  pg.	  128	  
83	  Ibid.	  pg.	  130	  
84	  Ibid.	  pg.	  132	  
85	  Ibid.	  pg.	  133	  
86	  Ibid.	  pg.	  139	  
87	  Ibid.	  pg.	  147-­‐150	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Systems	  theory,	  stricto	  sensu,	  only	  requires	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  to	  
stabilise	   normative	   expectations.	   	   Nonetheless,	   the	   requirements	   that	   Ulfstein	  
identifies	  are	  useful	   for	  assessing	  the	  development	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  within	  a	  
legal	   system,	   by	   assessing	   how	   well	   any	   body	   achieves	   the	   purpose	   that	   is	  
required	   for	   under	   systems	   theory.	   The	   presence	   of	   the	   initial	   five	   of	   Ulfstein’s	  
requirements	   all	   contribute	   towards	   the	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	   expectations	  
within	   a	   system,	   by	   furthering	   the	   stabilisation.	   Without	   judicial	   expertise,	  
independence	  from	  other	  organs	  within	  the	  system,	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  demos	  of	  
the	   system,	   a	   fair	   hearing	   and	   a	   consistent	   approach	   by	   the	   dispute	   settlement	  
body;	  the	  laws	  that	  the	  body	  would	  try	  to	  uphold	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  
guide	  actors’	  expectations.	  
	  
3.6	  How	  Systems	  Theory	  Views	  the	  World	  
A	  systems	  theory	  view	  of	  the	  world	  makes	  for	  quite	  a	  different	  sight	  to	  one	  based	  
upon	   the	   positive	   theory.	   Fragmentation,	   global	   legal	   pluralism,	   the	   wealth	   of	  
Courts,	   quasi-­‐Courts	   and	   other	   conflict-­‐resolving	   bodies,88	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
autonomy	  of	  certain	  international	  institutions	  all	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  
model.	   If	   it	   is	  accepted	  that	  the	  fragmentation	  of	   international	   law	  has	  occurred	  
(always	   running	   counter	   to	   the	  notion	   that	   international	   law	  was	   ‘whole’	   in	   the	  
first	  place),	   then	  systems	  theory	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  to	  see	  the	  fragmented	  
areas	   of	   the	   field	   as	   distinct	   autonomous	   units.	   For	   example,	   and	   making	   no	  
assumption	   that	   these	   areas	   are	   either	   fragmented	   or	   have	   amounted	   to	  
autonomous	   systems,	   human	   rights	   law	   with	   its	   own	   Court	   system,	   laws	   and	  
framing	   its	   communication	   in	   terms	   of	   human	   rights	   could	   be	   seen	   as	  
autonomous;	   international	   trade	   law	   with	   its	   own	   dispute	   bodies,	   laws	   and	  
framing	   its	   communication	   in	   terms	   of	   international	   trade	   could	   be	   seen	   as	  
autonomous;	  any	  area	  that	  has	  been	  fragmented,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  
autonomous.	   If	  both	  could	  ever	  be	  acknowledged	  as	  autonomous	   legal	   systems,	  
whilst	  communication	  would	  occur	  between	  these	  two	  areas	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  
international	  trade,	  both	  would	   interpret	  the	  communication	  to	  give	  meaning	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  In	  2004,	  the	  Project	  on	  International	  Courts	  and	  Tribunals	  found	  a	  total	  of	  125	  dispute-­‐
resolution	   bodies	   existed	   on	   the	   international	   plane.	   http://www.pict-­‐
pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop_c4.pdf	  accessed	  July	  2013.	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their	   respective	   normative	   values.	   This	   is	   perhaps	   why	   there	   has	   been	   great	  
difficulty	  amalgamating	  the	  two	  areas	  of	  law.89	  
Simma	   and	   Pulkowski,	   in	   their	   work	   concerning	   self-­‐contained	   regimes	   in	  
international	   law,	   dispute	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   regimes	   that	   exist	   are	   fully	  
autonomous	  but	  instead	  argue	  that	  as	  the	  individual	  legal	  systems	  do	  not	  live	  in	  a	  
vacuum	  they	  cannot	  ever	  amount	  to	  be	  fully	  autonomous	  as	  they	  rely	  upon	  other	  
areas	  of	   international	   law.90	  As	  evidence	  for	   this,	   they	  sites	  cases	   from	  the	  WTO	  
Appellate	  Body	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  where	  both	  acknowledge	  that	  
general	  international	  law	  has	  a	  bearing	  on	  their	  jurisdictions.91	  Yet	  systems	  theory	  
allows	   this	   acknowledgement	   of	   other	   systems	   through	   structural	   coupling.	   If	   it	  
could	  be	  argued	   that	  both	   the	  WTO	  and	   the	  European	  Union	  were	  autonomous	  
units,	   this	   is	  not	   to	  say	   that	  each	  area	   is	  closed	  off	   to	   the	  outside	   legal	  world.	   It	  
instead	  creates	  a	  situation	  where	  other	  systems	  of	  law	  (general	  international	  law	  
for	   example)	   are	   interpreted	   via	   the	   internal	   mechanisms	   of	   the	   respective	  
systems.	   General	   international	   law	   as	   a	   source	   of	   information,	   and	   other	  
communication	  from	  outside	  the	  specific	  system,	  will,	  therefore,	  always	  apply	  but	  
be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  system.	  
Teubner	   argues	   that	   globalisation	   has	   led	   to	   a	   vast	   increase	   in	   international	  
relations	  in	  subject	  areas	  outside	  the	  traditional	  global	  work	  of	  politics.92	  
‘Not	  only	  the	  economy,	  but	  also	  science,	  transport,	  communication	  
media	  and	  tourism	  are	  nowadays	  self-­‐reproducing	  world	  systems.’93	  
	  
For	   Teubner,	   this	   presence	   of	   a	   plethora	   of	   self-­‐reproducing	   world	   systems	  
dismisses	   the	   positivist	   theories	   of	   international	   law	   in	   understanding	   legal	  
globalization	  as	  they	  are	  constantly	  based	  around	  the	  State	  and	  its	  consent	  as	  well	  
as	  circumventing	  theories	  of	  “power	  politics”	  as	  they	  will	  ignore	  the	  legal	  systems	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Peter	  Hilpold,	  ‘WTO	  Law	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  Bringing	  Together	  two	  Autopoietic	  Orders’	  
(2011)	  10(2)	  Chinese	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  323	  
90	  Bruno	  Simma	  &	  Dirk	  Pulkowski,	  ‘Of	  Planets	  and	  the	  Universe:	  Self-­‐contained	  Regimes	  in	  
International	  Law’	  (2006)	  17(3)	  EJIL	  483,	  492	  
91	  US	   –	   Standards	   for	  Reformulated	   and	  Conventional	  Gasoline,	   Report	   of	   the	  Appellate	  
Body,	  29	  Apr.	  1996	  WT/DS2/AB/R	  at	  17	  &	  Opinion	  1/91,	  EEA1,	  14	  Dec.	  [1991]	  ECR,	  I-­‐6079,	  
at	  paras	  39	  and	  40	  respectively.	  
92	  Gunther	  Teubner,	  Global	  Law	  Without	  a	  State	  (Dartmouth	  1997)	  pg.	  5	  
93	  Ibid.	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that	  are	  being	  produced	  in	  the	  above	  areas.94	  Instead	  he	  focuses	  upon	  society	  as	  
the	   driver	   for	   change	   with	   the	   political	   centres	   of	   nation	   States	   being	   pushed	  
aside	  in	  preference	  of	  ‘fragmented	  social	  systems’.95	  This	  systems	  theory	  view	  of	  
the	  world	  causes	   some	   issues	   that	   can	   readily	  be	  witnessed	   in	   international	   law	  
today:	  
1) Boundaries:	   Rather	   than	   international	   law	   being	   based	   upon	   territorial	  
boundaries,	  law	  has	  shifted	  to	  be	  based	  upon	  invisible	  boundaries	  defined	  
by	  the	  subject	  matter.	  
2) Sources	  of	  law:	  International	  law	  will	  no	  longer	  emanate	  exclusively	  from	  
centralised	  legislative	  bodies	  but	  from	  highly	  specialised	  systems.	  
3) Independence:	   The	   argument	   that	   global	   law	   has	   little	   of	   the	   judicial	  
independence	   witnessed	   in	   national	   law.	   Instead	   the	   law	   is	   dependent	  
upon	  the	  social	  field	  that	  it	  is	  legislating	  upon.96	  
	  
The	  issue	  of	  global	  law	  emanating	  from	  outside	  of	  State	  control	  is	  not	  a	  new	  area	  
of	   research.	   The	   legal	   area	   and	   effects	   of	   lex	  mercatoria	   have	   been	   prevalent	  
within	   international	   legal	   research	   for	   decades.	   Systems	   theory,	   however,	   views	  
this	   area	   like	   any	   other	   and	   views	   it	   as	   ‘a	   self-­‐reproducing,	   worldwide	   legal	  
discourse	  which	  closes	  its	  meaning	  that	  boundaries	  by	  the	  use	  of	  the	  legal/illegal	  
binary	   code	   and	   reproduces	   itself	   by	   processing	   a	   symbol	   of	   global…validity’.97	  
Therefore,	   it	  matches	   all	   of	   the	   criteria	   lain	   out	   by	   systems	   theory	   to	   have	   the	  
potential	  to	  amount	  to	  a	  fully	  autonomous	  system.	  
Yet	   the	   debate	   around	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   lex	  mercatoria	   highlights	   the	   difficulty	  
systems	  theory	  has	  in	  being	  accepted	  as	  a	  legitimate	  theory	  of	  international	  law.	  
Many	  authors	  outright	  reject	  the	  premise	  that	   lex	  mercatoria	  can	  exist	  as	  a	  legal	  
field	  as	  in	  their	  view	  international	  law	  cannot	  be	  created	  without	  State	  consent.98	  
These	  arguments	  are	  generally	  positivistic	  with	  a	  traditional	  view	  of	  law	  that	  law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Ibid.	  	  
95	  Ibid.	  pg.	  6	  
96	  Ibid.	  pg.	  7	  for	  all	  of	  these	  points.	  
97	  Ibid.	  
98	   See	   for	   example;	   George	   Delaume,	   ‘Comparative	   Analysis	   as	   a	   Basis	   of	   Law	   in	   State	  
Contracts:	   the	   Myth	   of	   the	   Lex	   Mercatoria’	   (1989)	   63	   Tulane	   Law	   Review	   575;	   Keith	  
Highet,	  ‘The	  Enigma	  of	  the	  Lex	  Mercatoria’	  (1989)	  63	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emanates	   only	   from	   sovereign	   States.	   Nevertheless,	   model-­‐dependent	   realism	  
should	  be	  utilised	  and	  inform	  that	  for	  a	  theory	  to	  be	  accepted	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  
the	  positivist	  theory,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  of	  link	  to	  sovereign	  
States	  any	  more	  than	  positivism	  has	   to	  answer	   the	  question	  of	  why	   it	  no	   longer	  
applies	  in	  every	  circumstance.	  If	  systems	  theory	  can	  accurately	  model	  and	  explain	  
the	   events	   witnessed	   currently	   on	   the	   international	   stage	   in	   a	   particular	  
circumstance	  and	  make	  predictions	  for	  the	  future,	  then	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘true’	  
model.	  This	  shifts	  the	  debate	  away	  from	  ideological	  preferences	  to	  disputing	  facts	  
and	  the	  applicability	  of	  a	  theory.	  
The	   difficulties	   that	   fragmentation	   presents	   also	   become	   more	   apparent	   in	   a	  
systems	  theory	  view	  of	  the	  world	  when	  considering	  the	  boundaries	  that	  Teubner	  
discusses.	   Systems	   theory	   assumes	   that	   autonomous	   systems	  act	   in	   conjunction	  
on	   the	   same	   level.	   This,	   therefore,	   presumes	   that	   no	   system	   is	   subordinate	   to	  
another	  simply	  because	  if	  it	  were	  so,	  the	  system	  could	  not	  be	  an	  autonomous	  unit	  
without	  including	  the	  superior	  system	  within	  the	  original	  frame.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  
closed	  environment	  where	  only	  a	  Magistrate’s	  Court	  and	  a	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  exist,	  
the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  must	  be	  within	   the	   same	  system	  as	   the	  Magistrate’s	  Court.	  
This	   leads	   to	   conflict	   resolution	   between	   laws	   not	   occurring	   in	   the	   traditional	  
fashion	   of	   international	   laws	   versus	   national	   laws,	   but	   conflict	   between	   various	  
systems	  acting	  on	  the	  same	  level	  of	  international	  law.	  If	  fragmentation	  has	  led	  to	  
an	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  autonomous	  units	  acting	  on	  the	  international	  stage,	  
then	  the	  potential	  for	  conflict	  has	  correspondingly	  increased.	  
There	  is	  no	  easy	  solution	  to	  this	  issue	  with	  the	  wealth	  of	  suggestions	  with	  no	  clear	  
answer	  acting	  as	  testament	  to	  that.	  Oellers-­‐Frahm	  argues	  that	  the	  ICJ	  should	  act	  
as	   a	  Court	  of	  Appeal	   in	   all	   circumstances	  when	  a	  new	   tribunal	   is	   created.99	   This	  
argument	   would	   cause	   issues	   from	   a	   systems	   theory	   perspective	   as	   a	   tribunal	  
might	   not	   see	   itself	   as	   a	   Court	   or	   even	   as	   a	   quasi-­‐Court.	   Various	   authors	   have	  
argued	   that	   the	   ICJ’s	   Advisory	   Opinions	   should	   be	   used	   in	   cases	   of	   conflict,100	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   and	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however,	   even	   using	   the	   Project	   on	   International	   Courts	   and	   Tribunals	  
conservative	  estimate	  of	  125	  dispute-­‐resolution	  bodies	  from	  2004,101	  the	  amount	  
of	   conflict	   would	   tie	   down	   the	   resources	   of	   the	   ICJ	   for	   years	   to	   come.	   Fisher-­‐
Lescano	  and	  Teubner	  suggest	  a	  ‘formalization’	  of	  the	  law	  to	  allow	  clear	  (or	  at	  least	  
clearer)	   boundaries	   between	   systems.102	   However,	   as	   in	   most	   cases	   the	   Court,	  
quasi-­‐Court	   or	   other	   body’s	   jurisdiction	   is	   non-­‐compulsory,	   all	   of	   these	  
approaches	  run	  into	  issues	  that	  have	  been	  inadequately	  examined.	  States	  who	  are	  
in	   conflict	   with	   each	   other	   would	   be	   assumed	   to	   argue	   to	   have	   the	   dispute	  
examined	   in	   the	   ‘Court’	   that	   best	   supports	   their	   position.	   Fisher-­‐Lescano	   and	  
Teubener’s	   approach	   would	   solve	   this	   but	   the	   practicalities	   of	   sorting	   out	   the	  
jurisdiction	   of	   over	   125	   different	   bodies	   with	   various	   institutions	   being	   created	  
and	   dissolved	   on	   a	   continual	   basis	   would	   be	   extremely	   challenging	   if	   not	  
impossible.	  This	  approach	  would	  also	  assume	  a	  simplistic	  view	  of	  disputes	  where	  
only	   one	   issue	  was	   under	   contention	  which	   as	   seen	   is	   not	   always	   the	   situation.	  
The	   interesting	   phenomenon	   is	   not	   as	   has	   been	   suggested	  which	   ‘Court’	   out	   of	  
the	   many	   examines	   a	   case,	   it	   is	   when	   a	   Court	   has	   to	   examine	   areas	   of	  
international	  law	  that	  are	  outside	  its	  jurisdiction.	  
	  
3.7	  Global	  Legal	  Pluralism	  
If	   systems	   theory	   is	   used	   to	   define	   the	   boundaries	   of	   different	   areas	   of	  
competence	  within	  a	  society,	  legal	  pluralism	  defines	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
various	  systems.	  
The	  positivist	  approach	  to	  international	  law	  has	  focused	  upon	  the	  conflict	  that	  has	  
occurred	   in	   a	   top-­‐down	   fashion:	   international	   law,	   national	   law	   and	   indigenous	  
law.	  This	  is	  an	  acknowledgement	  of	  systems	  of	  law	  and	  the	  care	  to	  stress	  that	  this	  
view	   is	   not	   of	   a	   hierarchal	   structure.	   If	   the	   understanding	   of	   systems	   theory	   is	  
correct,	   however,	  we	  not	  only	  have	  multiple	   autonomous	   systems	  acting	  within	  
international	  law	  but	  multiple	  versions	  acting	  within	  national	  law	  as	  well.	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This	   area	   of	   law	   becomes	   increasingly	   complicated	   as	   it	   is	   never	   static	   and	  
continually	  evolving.	  As	  new	  tribunals	   (or	  alternative	  dispute	  settling	  bodies)	  are	  
created,	  new	  areas	  of	  law	  are	  created.	  Some	  previous	  autonomous	  systems	  might	  
be	  replaced	  and	  with	  each	  new	  system	  that	  is	  found	  to	  exist,	  a	  new	  examination	  
would	  have	  to	  take	  place	  defining	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  new	  system	  and	  
the	  various	  systems	  around	  it.	  
The	  creation	  of	  various	  autonomous	  systems	   fits	   satisfactorily	   into	   the	  accepted	  
view	  of	   fragmentation	  of	   international	   law.	  Despite	  the	  recent	  trend	  to	  examine	  
the	   subject,	   Wilfried	   Jenks,	   who	   saw	   it	   as	   an	   inevitable	   consequence	   of	   the	  
international	   legal	   structure,	   predicted	   fragmentation	   more	   than	   fifty	   years	  
ago.103	   The	   International	   Law	   Commission	   in	   their	   workings	   on	   the	   subject	  
acknowledged	  as	  much	  but	   fragmentation	  had	  become	  such	  an	   issue	   that	   it	   felt	  
that	   the	   subject	   was	   still	   worthy	   of	   an	   examination	   and	   full	   report.104	   If	  
fragmentation	   can	   be	   described	   as	   ‘the	   successive	   development	   of	   specialized	  
international	   and	   transnational	   regulatory	   orders	   with	   neither	   hierarchy,	   nor	  
stated	  relationship	  to	  each	  other’105	  this	  would	  appear	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  definition	  of	  
law	  via	  systems	  theory.	  
The	  distinction	  within	   systems	   theory	  and	   law	  of	   legal/illegal	  naturally	   creates	  a	  
multitude	   of	   possibilities	   for	   pluralism.	   However,	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   theory	   rests	  
upon	  the	  proposition	   that	   law	   is	  defined	  as	  communication	  and	  that	   there	   is	  no	  
hierarchal	  structure	  in	  systems.	  Instead	  a	  heterarchy	  is	  created.106	  This	  is	  a	  system	  
of	   organisation	   where	   the	   elements	   share	   a	   horizontal	   position	   of	   power	   and	  
allows	   us	   to	   view	   pluralism	   as	   ‘a	   multiplicity	   of	   communicative	   processes	   in	   a	  
given	   social	   field	   that	   observe	   social	   action	   under	   the	   binary	   code	   of	  
legal/illegal’.107	   This	   does	   not	   solve	   the	   conflict	   of	   regime	   collisions	   that	   global	  
legal	  pluralism	  has	  thrown	  up	  but	  allows	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  a	  solution.	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The	  structural	  coupling	  that	  systems	  theory	  provides	  for	  informs	  that	  systems	  are	  
continuously	  exchanging	  information	  with	  their	  external	  environments	  and	  other	  
systems.	   It	   is	   also	  argued	   that	   issues	   in	   today’s	   society	   cannot	  be	   readily	  placed	  
into	  only	  one	  category	  as	  they	  are	  too	  multi-­‐faceted	  (this	  problem	  is	  what	  causes	  
regime	   collisions	   in	   the	   first	   place).	   Rather	   than	   attempt	   to	   simplify	  matters	   by	  
fitting	   a	   multi-­‐faceted	   problem	   into	   a	   single-­‐issue	   system,	   for	   example	   forcing	  
human	  rights	   issues	  through	  the	  WTO,	  attempts	  should	  be	  made	  to	  increase	  the	  
flow	  of	  information	  and	  communication	  outside	  and	  between	  systems.	  This	  will	  in	  
turn	  provide	  the	   information	  to	  other	  systems	  and	  crucially	  those	  other	  systems	  
will	  interpret	  the	  information	  in	  their	  own	  internal	  language.	  
The	   structural	   coupling	   between	   competing	   systems	   that	   systems	   theory	  
presupposes	   could	   arguably	   have	   already	   been	   witnessed	   and	   demonstrated	  
within	  international	   law.	  Bjorklund	  and	  Nappert	  write	  on	  the	  borrowing	  that	  has	  
occurred	  in	  international	  investment	  law.108	  Their	  argument	  rests	  upon	  the	  denial	  
that	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organisation	   has	   become	   constitutionalised,	   directly	   in	  
conflict	  with	  current	  writings,109	  and	  that	  there	  therefore	  has	  to	  be	  an	  alternative	  
explanation	  that	  adequately	  describes	  the	  current	  circumstances.	  
They	   elaborate	   upon,	   what	   they	   describe	   as,	   an	   ‘inter-­‐nuclei	   communication	  
model’	   to	   explain	   international	   law,	   an	   evolution	   from	   their	   'nuclei	  model'.	   This	  
model	  differs	  from	  the	  traditional	  sovereignty	  model	  by	  stating	  that	  international	  
tribunals	  look	  to	  each	  others	  decisions	  for	  influence	  and	  guidance	  when	  ruling	  on	  
areas	  of	   international	   law	  that	   involve	  similar	  concepts.	   In	   this	  model,	   similar	   to	  
the	  ‘nuclei	  model’	  discussed	  earlier,	  traditional	   international	   law	  is	  envisioned	  at	  
the	  centre	  with	  the	  areas	  that	  have	  fragmented	  gravitating	  around	  it.	  Unlike	  their	  
earlier	   model,	   however,	   the	   fragmented	   areas	   are	   interconnected.	   This	  
connection	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  communication	  that	  occurs	  between	  them	  so	  that	  
tribunals	  can	  ‘borrow’	  judgments	  from	  other	  areas.	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  Supra	  Note.	  105	  
109	  For	  work	  on	  the	  WTO	  see;	  Deborah	  Cass,	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  
Organization	   (OUP	   2005)	  which	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   her	   earlier	  work	   in	  Deborah	  Cass,	   ‘The	  
“Constitutionalization”	  of	  International	  Trade	  Law:	  Judicial	  Norm-­‐Generation	  as	  the	  Engine	  
of	   Constitutional	   Development	   in	   International	   Trade’,	   12	   EJIL	   (2001)	   39	   and	   Markus	  
Krajewski,	  ‘Democratic	  Legitimacy	  and	  Constitutional	  Perspectives	  of	  WTO	  Law’	  (2001)	  35	  
J’nal	  of	  World	  Trade	  Law	  167.	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Bjorklund	  and	  Nappert	  highlight	   four	  cases	  as	  examples	  of	  where	   tribunals	  have	  
looked	   to	   other	   areas	   of	   international	   law	   in	   influencing	   their	   decisions.110	   The	  
importance,	   however,	   is	   that	   the	   various	   systems	   interpreted	   the	   decisions	   of	  
other	   tribunals	   within	   their	   own	   internal	  mechanisms	   and	   did	   not	   simply	   defer	  
jurisdiction	  to	  the	  other	  tribunal.	  
A	  debate	  that	  has	  drawn	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  academic	  debate	  has	  been	  the	  
furore	  surrounding	  the	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  trade.111	  One	  explanation,	  from	  
a	  systems	  theory	  perspective	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not,	  as	  has	  been	  suggested,	  that	  the	  WTO	  
ignores	  human	  rights,	  it	  simply	  interprets	  the	  information	  in	  a	  fashion	  inline	  with	  
its	   own	   internal	   structure	   and	   reaches	   conclusions	   within	   its	   own	   system.	   A	  
commentator	   might	   not	   be	   happy	   with	   the	   process	   that	   a	   system	   interprets	  
external	   communication,	   but	   it	   should	   not	   be	   denied	   that	   the	   information	   has	  
been	  taken	  into	  account.	  
This	   in	   turn	   shifts	   the	   responsibility	   away	   from	   international	   organisations	   to	  
compete	  for	  jurisdiction	  for	  an	  issue,	  back	  to	  States	  to	  have	  responsibility	  to	  select	  
which	  organisation	  they	  best	  feel	  is	  equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  This	  is	  an	  imperfect	  
solution	  as	  a	  State	  can	  contest	  which	  jurisdiction	  an	  issue	  would	  fall	   into	  to	  best	  
serve	   their	   purpose,112	   however,	   it	   can	   always	   be	   known	   that	   all	   issues	   are	  
considered.	  
	  
3.8	  Application	  of	  Framework	  
In	  terms	  of	  autonomous	  systems	  in	  international	  law,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  
has	   received	   insufficient	   scrutiny.	   The	   organisation	   drawing	   the	  most	   academic	  
debate	   in	   this	   area	   is	   the	   WTO113	   but	   in	   a	   non-­‐systems	   theory	   context.	   The	  
reasons	   put	   forward	   for	   the	   examination	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   as	   an	   autonomous	  
legal	  system	  are	  the	  same	  that	  are	  suggested	  for	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  examination	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  Supra	  Note.	  105	  
111	   See	   for	   example;	   Supra	   Note.	   89;	   Thomas	   Cottier,	   ‘Trade	   and	   Human	   Rights:	   A	  
Relationship	   to	   Discover’	   (2002)	   5(1)	   J.	   Int.	   Economic	   L.	   111	   &	   Drusilla	   Brown,	   Alan	  
Deardorff	   &	   Robert	   Stern,	   ‘Labor	   Standards	   and	   Human	   Rights:	   Implications	   for	  
International	  Trade	  and	  Investment’	  (2012)	  IPC	  Working	  Paper	  119	  
112	   Brian	   Tamanaha,	   ‘Understanding	   Legal	   Pluralism:	   Past	   to	   Present,	   Local	   to	   Global’	  
(2007)	  29(3)	  Sydney	  L.	  R.	  375	  
113	   See	   for	   example;	   Deborah	   Cass,	   The	   Constitutionalization	   of	   the	   World	   Trade	  
Organization	  (OUP	  2005)	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of	   fragmentation.	   Fragmentation	   has	   led	   to	   a	   web	   of	   actors	   participating	   and	  
acting	  on	  international	  law	  from	  a	  system	  that	  was	  never	  intended	  or	  designed	  to	  
accommodate	   them.	   Fragmentation	   could	   in	   fact	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   traditional	  
system	  realigning	  itself	  to	  accommodate	  these	  actors.	  Nevertheless,	  international	  
law	   is	   left	   with	   the	   relics	   of	   a	   system	   that	   was	   intended	   for	   the	   exclusive	  
jurisdiction	  of	   States	  and	  has	  been	  designed	  as	   such.	   The	  active	  participation	  of	  
non-­‐State	   actors,	   the	   standing	   of	   international	   organisations	   and	   the	   increasing	  
proliferation	   of	   tribunal	   verdicts	   have	   caused	   a	   re-­‐examination	   of	   international	  
law	  in	  the	  light	  of	  fragmentation.	  
The	  World	  Bank	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  a	  similar	  light.	  It	  is	  acting	  from	  a	  privileged	  place	  
within	  a	  system	  that	  was	  never	  designed	  to	  accommodate	  it.	  	  
However,	   having	   defined	   the	   intellectual	   framework	   that	   is	   available	   to	   use	   for	  
analysis,	  attention	  must	  turn	  to	  how	  the	  framework	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  World	  
Bank.	  
If	  systems	  theory	  defines	  law	  as	  a	  communication	  with	  a	  legal/non-­‐legal	  meaning,	  
the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  to	  be	  classed	  as	  an	  autonomous	  system,	  must	  then	  
be	   seen	   in	   terms	   of	   this.	   Also,	   as	   discussed	   if	   the	   role	   of	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   has	  
become	  crucial	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  system	  both	  develops	  and	  operates,	  
as	   it	   is	   the	  Court	   that	   is	   the	  most	   ready	  mechanism	  to	  apply	   the	   legal/non-­‐legal	  
meaning	  to	  communications,	  for	  systems	  theory	  to	  be	  successfully	  applied	  to	  the	  
World	  Bank	   to	  demonstrate	   the	  development	  of	  an	  autonomous	   legal	   system,	  a	  
body	  must	  exist	  within	  its	  structure	  that	  amounts	  to	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body.	  First	  must	  
be	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  normative	  system,	  then,	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  Court,	  
a	  normative	  system	  can	  develop	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  	  
	  
3.9	  Conclusion	  
The	   international	   agreements	   that	  occur	  between	   States	   are	   comprehensible	   as	  
they	  are	  governed	  by	  law;	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  their	  behaviour	  can	  be	  modelled.	  The	  
analytical	   tools	   examined	   and	   applied	   in	   Chapters	   One	   and	   Two	   have	   failed	   to	  
accurately	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	   in	   law.	  The	  tool	  put	   forward	   in	  
this	  chapter	  has	  sought	  to	  move	  understanding	  beyond	  the	  traditionally	  accepted	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tools	   based	  upon	   consent	   towards	   a	  new	  understanding	  of	   the	   law	  based	  upon	  
communication.	  Law	  is	  communication	  termed	  in	  a	  legal/non-­‐legal	  meaning.	  
The	   systems	   theory	   model	   requires	   a	   number	   of	   different	   elements:	   a	   self-­‐
reproducing,	   self-­‐referencing	   autonomous	   system	   that	   is	   characterised	   by	  
communication	   along	   a	   binary	   code	   legal/illegal	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   stabilising	  
normative	  expectations.	  The	  most	  obvious	  mechanism	  via	  which	  communication	  
is	   classed	   as	   legal/illegal	   to	   stabilise	   normative	   expectations	   is	   through	   the	  
introduction	   of	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body.	  Without	   this	   communication	   being	   classed	   as	  
legal/illegal,	  a	  normative	  system	  cannot	  develop	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  
The	  strength	  of	  any	  theory,	  however,	  is	  based	  upon	  how	  accurately	  it	  accounts	  for	  
current	   and	   previous	   events	   as	   well	   as	   making	   predictions	   for	   the	   future.	   As	  
examined	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  made	  remarkable	  strides	  forward	  
away	   from	   its	   treaty	   seemingly	   without	   State	   permission	   that	   would	   seem	   to	  
contradict	   the	   traditional	   sovereignty	   based	   model	   yet	   States	   accept	   these	  
actions.	  To	  examine	   if	  a	   legal	  system	  exists	  under	  systems	  theory	  firstly	  requires	  
establishing	   whether	   a	   normative	   system	   exists.	   The	   next	   chapter	   will	   apply	  
systems	  theory	  thinking	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  work	  of	  the	  
Bank	  has	   led	  to	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  normative	  system	  and	  then,	  subsequently,	   the	  
steps	   that	   the	   Bank	   has	   took	   to	   begin	   developing	   into	   an	   autonomous	   legal	  
system.	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Chapter	  Four:	  Development	  of	  a	  Normative	  System	  
4.1	  Introduction	  
The	   prevalent	   theories	   via	   which	   international	   lawyers	   have	   understood	   the	  
actions	  of	  international	  organisations	  have	  failed	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  
World	  Bank.	  The	  Bank	   itself	   is	  acting	  outside	  of	  the	  clear	  mandate	  given	  to	   it	  by	  
Member	   States	   in	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   is	   acting	   plainly	  
against	  this	  mandate.	  Systems	  theory	  is	  offered	  as	  an	  alternative	  tool	  to	  explain	  in	  
law	   how	   the	   World	   Bank	   is	   behaving	   and	   why	   its	   Member	   States	   allow	   it	   to	  
behave	  in	  such	  a	  fashion.	  
Systems	   theory	   describes	   the	   creation	   and	   working	   of	   an	   autonomous	   legal	  
system.	   The	   Bank	   behaving	   outside	   of	   its	   Articles,	   however,	   does	   not	   in	   itself	  
amount	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  legal	  system	  as	  required	  by	  systems	  theory;	  the	  
Bank	   has	   to	   be	   fundamentally	   and,	   as	   a	   first	   point,	   be	   involved	   in	   a	   normative	  
system	  of	   telling	   States	  what	   to	  do,	   as	  well	   as	  meeting	   the	  other	   tests	   required	  
under	  systems	  theory.	  When	  this	  communication	  within	  the	  system	  develops	  into	  
communication	   along	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide,	   a	   legal	   system	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	  
created.	  As	  interesting	  and	  challenging	  as	  explaining	  the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  
acting	  outside	  of	  its	  mandate	  is,	  this	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  create	  a	  normative	  system	  
and	   instead	   only	   demonstrates	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   Bank	   to	   act	   independently	  
without	   State	   consent,	   as	   well	   as	   demonstrating	   the	   problems	   that	   the	   most	  
prevalent	   theories	   have	   in	   explaining	   its	   actions.	   To	   develop	   into	   a	   normative	  
actor	  that	  affects	  the	  behaviour	  of	  participants	  under	  its	  control,	  the	  Bank	  has	  to	  
be	  telling	  States	  what	  to	  do,	  judging	  their	  actions	  against	  a	  model	  and	  enforcing	  a	  
model	   of	   behaviour	   onto	   them.	   Only	   through	   the	   development	   of	   a	   normative	  
system	  can	  a	  legal	  system	  develop	  under	  systems	  theory	  where	  communications	  
are	  defined	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide.	  
The	   Bank	   exercising	   a	   governance	   function	   and	   telling	   States	   what	   to	   do	   is	   a	  
concept	   that	   is	   often	   claimed,	   although	   not	   always	   in	   a	   legal	   context.1	   This	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   See	   for	   example;	   Joseph	   Stiglitz,	   ‘Democratizing	   the	   International	  Monetary	   Fund	   and	  
the	   World	   Bank:	   Governance	   and	   Accountability’	   (2003)	   16(1)	   Governance:	   An	  
International	   Journal	  of	  Policy,	  Administration,	  and	   Institutions	  111;	  Ngaire	  Woods,	   ‘The	  
Challenge	  of	  Good	  Governance	  for	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  Themselves’	  (2000)	  28(5)	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usually	  attributed	   to	   the	  conditionality	   that	   the	  World	  Bank	  puts	  upon	   its	   loans.	  
Conditionality	   is	   a	   concept	   that	   has	   plagued	   the	   history	   of	   the	   World	   Bank.	  
Although	   there	   is	   no	   formal	   definition	   of	   conditionality	   within	   the	   Bank’s	   legal	  
framework,2	   and	   various	   actors	   use	   the	   term	   in	   different	   ways,3	   conditionality	  
describes	   the	   conditions	   that	   the	   member	   State	   must	   fulfil	   to	   have	   access	   to	  
financing	  by	   the	  World	  Bank:	  both	   to	  have	  access	   to	   initial	  disbursements	  of	  an	  
agreed	  loan	  and	  the	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  on	  a	  continuing	  basis	  and	  in	  the	  
future	  to	  have	  access	  to	  subsequent	  disbursements	  of	  lending.	  Criticism	  over	  the	  
conditions	   imposed	  by	   the	  Bank	  has	  been	   far	  and	  wide	   from	  a	   range	  of	   sources	  
that	  would	  not	  usually	  be	  combined.	  Criticism	  has	  focused	  upon	  the	  effect	  upon	  
democracy,4	  the	  economic	  benefits	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  conditionality,5	  the	  range	  
and	  depth	  of	   issues	   that	  are	  covered	  by	  conditions6	  and	  whether	   the	  conditions	  
imposed	  go	  beyond	  economic	  concerns	  into	  politics7	  as	  well	  as	  many	  other	  areas.8	  	  
Stemming	   from	   the	   introduction	   of	   conditionality	   has	   been	   the	   Operations	  
Manual.9	  The	  Operations	  Manual	  contains	  the	  Operational	  Policies	  (OPs)	  and	  Bank	  
Procedures	   (BPs)	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   must	   follow	   when	   granting	   assistance.	  
These	  are	  officially	   internal	  policies	  and	  procedures	  that	  bind	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  
Bank	  staff	  and	  are	  seen	  by	  the	  Bank	  as	  instructions	  from	  the	  Bank	  Management	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
World	   Development	   823;	   and	   Benedict	   Kingsbury,	   Nico	   Krisch	   &	   Richard	   Stewart,	   ‘The	  
Emergence	  of	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’	  (2005)	  68	  Law	  and	  Contemporary	  Problems	  15,	  
27	  
2	   Review	   of	   World	   Bank	   Conditionality:	   Legal	   Aspects	   of	   Conditionality	   in	   Policy-­‐Based	  
Lending,	  Legal	  Vice	  Presidency	  World	  Bank,	  June	  29,	  2005,	  para.	  2	  
3	  Stefan	  Koeberle,	  Harold	  Bedoya,	  Peter	  Silarszky	  &	  Gero	  Verheyen	   (eds.),	  Conditionality	  
Revisited:	  Concepts,	  Experiences,	  and	  Lessons	  (World	  Bank	  2005),	  pg.	  5-­‐6	  
4	   Stephen	   Knack,	   ‘Does	   Foreign	   Aid	   Promote	   Democracy?’	   48(1)	   International	   Studies	  
Quarterly	  (2004)	  251,	  253-­‐4	  &	  262	  
5	   Joseph	   Stiglitz,	   ‘The	  World	   Bank	   at	   the	  Millennium’	   (1999)	   109	   The	   Economic	   Journal	  
F577,	  F591	  
6	   Ngaire	   Woods	   &	   Amrita	   Narlikar,	   ‘Governance	   and	   the	   Limits	   of	   Accountability:	   The	  
WTO,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank’	  53	  Int’l	  Social	  Science	  Journal	  (2001)	  569,	  570	  
7	   This	   has	   been	   a	   longstanding	   criticism	   of	   conditionality.	   See	   for	   example	   Heather	  
Marquette,	  ‘The	  Creeping	  Politicisation	  of	  the	  World	  Bank:	  The	  Case	  of	  Corruption’	  (2004)	  
52(3)	  Political	  Studies	  413	  
8	  See	  for	  example;	  Patricia	  Adams,	  ‘The	  World	  Bank’s	  Finances:	  An	  International	  S&I	  Crisis’	  
(1994)	  215	  Policy	  Analysis	  1,	  arguing	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  conditions	  has	  exposed	  the	  Bank	  to	  
risks;	  Bruce	  Rich,	  Mortgaging	  the	  Earth:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  Environmental	  Impoverishment,	  
and	  the	  Crisis	  of	  Development	  (Beacon	  Press	  1995),	  arguing	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  conditions	  is	  
wrong,	   and	   Henry	   Owen,	   ‘The	   World	   Bank:	   is	   50	   Years	   Enough?’	   (1994)	   73(5)	   Foreign	  
Affairs	  97,	  arguing	  the	  counter	  that	  the	  criticism	  of	  conditionality	  is	  misplaced.	  
9	  The	  World	  Bank	  Operations	  Manual,	  31	  July,	  2013	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its	   staff.10	   Rather	   than	   being	   conditions	   upon	   borrowing	  member	   States	   per	   se,	  
they	   are	   criteria	   that	   the	   staff	   must	   follow	   and	   meet	   when	   preparing	   and	  
maintaining	  a	  project.	  
The	  Bank	  has	   responded	   to	   this	   critique	  of	   conditionality	  by	   conducting	  a	  wide-­‐
ranging	   review	   of	   conditionality,	   mainly	   focused	   upon	   policy-­‐based	   lending	  
conditionality	   rather	   than	   investment	   lending.11	   Although	   incremental	   changes	  
had	   occurred	   to	   conditionality,	   through	   experience	   and	   reflecting	   the	   changing	  
nature	   of	   assistance	   lending,	   this	   review	   has	   established	   the	   model	   of	  
conditionality	  that	  the	  World	  Bank	  applies	  today.	  
This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  normative	  development	  of	  the	  Bank	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
conditionality	   and	   operational	   policies	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   construction	   of	   a	  
normative	   system.	   As	   examined	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   this	   normative	   system	  
must	  be	   in	  place	   for	   the	  possibility	  of	   a	   system	  developing	   into	   an	  autonomous	  
legal	   system	   under	   systems	   theory.	   The	   evolution	   in	   the	   Bank’s	   handling	   of	  
conditionality	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  Bank	  developed	  from	  the	  tradition	  positivist	  
theory	   of	   an	   international	   organisation	   acting	   within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	  
framework	  consented	  to	  by	  States	  to	  one	  where	  it	  is	  a	  normative	  regime	  ordering	  
States	   how	   they	   ought	   to	   behave.	   The	   final	   key	   requirement	   for	   a	   normative	  
system	   to	   develop	   into	   a	   legal	   system	   was	   the	   Court-­‐like	   structure	   elaborated	  
upon	   in	   Chapter	   Three;	   how	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   developed	   from	   an	   advisory	  
body	  to	  this	  Court-­‐like	  structure	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  Chapter	  Five.	  
The	  chapter	  begins	  by	  considering	   the	  Bank’s	  own	  view	  of	   the	   legal	   relationship	  
between	   itself	   and	   its	  members.	   In	  order	   for	   a	  normative	   framework	   to	  exist,	   a	  
hierarchal	   relationship	  must	  be	  present	  and	   the	  Bank’s	  own	  view	  would	  dispute	  
this.	   Section	   4.3	   then	   charts	   the	   requirements	   for	   a	   normative	   system	   under	  
systems	  theory	  before	  Section	  4.4	  considers	  how	  the	  Bank	  has	  used	  conditionality	  
as	  a	  governance	  mechanism	  and	  how	  the	  ad	  hoc	  use	  of	  conditions	  allows	  for	  the	  
creation	  of	   an	   incomplete	  normative	   framework.	   Section	  4.5	   then	   considers	   the	  
closing	   of	   this	   normative	   framework	   and	   evolution	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   Ibrahim	   Shihata,	   The	  World	   Bank	   Inspection	   Panel:	   In	   Practice	   (Second	   Edition,	   OUP	  
2000)	  pg.	  41	  
11	  See	  ‘Review	  of	  World	  Bank	  Conditionality’	  (World	  Bank	  2005);	  ‘Good	  Practice	  Principles	  
for	   the	   Application	   of	   Conditionality:	   A	   Progress	   Report’	   (World	   Bank	   2006);	  
‘Conditionality	  in	  Development	  Policy	  Lending’	  (World	  Bank	  2007);	  and	  Supra	  Note.	  3.	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the	   Bank	   and	   its	  membership	   by	   the	   introduction	   and	   use	   of	  OPs	   and	   BPs,	   and	  
their	  predecessors,	  before	  section	  4.6	  considers	  how	  the	  Bank	  has	  also	  sought	  to	  
extend	  its	  normative	  relationship	  beyond	  only	  borrowing	  member	  States,	  to	  non-­‐
borrowing	  States	  who	  are	  part	  of	  its	  membership.	  
	  
4.2	  The	  World	  Bank	  View	  on	  the	  ‘Legal’	  Relationship	  between	  the	  
Bank	  and	  its	  Membership	  
The	  traditionally	  seen	  legal	  relationship	  that	  exists	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  a	  
borrowing	  Member	  State	  incorporates	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and,	  in	  addition,	  
the	   specific	   lending	   documentation	   that	   the	   State	   and	   the	   Bank	   sign	   for	   each	  
project.	  This	  is	  the	  documentation	  that	  exists	  between	  the	  member	  State	  and	  the	  
Bank	   that	   governs	   the	   terms	   and	   conditions	   of	   any	   specific	   lending.	   These	  
agreements	  are	  seen	  as	   in	  and	  of	  themselves	  a	  consensual	  relationship	  between	  
the	  two	  actors;	  with	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  involving	  both	  the	  State	  requesting	  
membership	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  agreeing	  to	  it,12	  and	  the	  Bank	  and	  member	  State	  
agreeing	  to	  the	  specific	  lending	  project.	  
The	   Bank	   characterises	   the	   loan	   agreements	   between	   itself	   and	   its	   borrowing	  
member	  States	  as	  ‘international	  agreements	  governed	  by	  international	  law’.13	  The	  
Bank	   itself	   being	   a	   subject	   of	   international	   law,	   that	   enjoys	   treaty-­‐making	  
capacity,	  drove	  the	  international	  nature	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	  the	  assessment	  of	  
the	   General	   Counsel	   of	   the	   Bank	   that	   the	   agreements	   reached	   with	   member	  
States	   fell	  within	   that	   capacity.14	   The	   loan	   agreement	   is,	   therefore,	   seen	   by	   the	  
Bank	  and	  its	  membership	  as	  an	  international	  agreement	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  II	  Section	  1	  (b)	  
13	  Aron	  Broches,	  ‘International	  Legal	  Aspects	  of	  the	  Operations	  of	  the	  World	  Bank’	  (1959)	  
III	   Hague:	   Academie	   de	   droit	   International:	   Receuil	   des	   cours	   297	   and,	   for	   a	   modern	  
confirmation	  of	  this	  position,	  see	  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTICE/0,,contentMDK:2
2218822~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:445634,00.html#What_is_the_legal_st
atus_of_loan_agreements_made_by_the_World_Bank_?_	   accessed	   July	   2013.	   Aron	  
Broches	  was	  the	  General	  Counsel	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  at	  the	  time	  of	  publication.	  
14	  Ibid.	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and	   the	   borrowing	   member	   State	   and	   is	   registered	   at	   the	   United	   Nations	   as	  
such.15	  
The	  existence	  of	  legal	  lending	  documentation	  is	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  how	  the	  IMF	  
operates.	   All	   legal	   obligations	   towards	   the	   IMF	   from	   borrowing	  Members	   stem	  
from	  the	  application	  of	  the	  treaty	  and	  there	  is	  no	  subsequent	  legal	  agreement	  for	  
when	   a	   Member	   State	   avails	   itself	   of	   IMF	   resources.	   Instead,	   the	   program	   is	  
explicitly	   Member	   State	   “owned”	   where	   the	   State	   can	   stop	   a	   program	   of	  
assistance	   at	   any	   point	   and	   its	   only	   legal	   obligation	   to	   the	   IMF	   is	   to	   repay	   the	  
assistance,	   an	   obligation	   deriving	   from	   the	   IMF	   Articles	   of	   Agreement.	   The	  
relationship	  between	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  borrowing	  State	  is	  contained	  in,	  beyond	  the	  
IMF	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  a	  Letter	  of	  Intent,	  outlining	  the	  State’s	  request	  to	  use	  
IMF	   resources,	   and	   a	   decision	   of	   the	   Executive	   Board,	   that	   stipulates	   the	   IMF’s	  
acceptance	  that	  a	  State	  can	  use	  its	  resources.	  	  
These	  additional	  documents	  do	  not	  provide	  an	  additional	  legal	  relationship	  due	  to	  
the	   belief	   that	   if	   there	  was	   a	   legal	   document	   signed	   by	   both	   parties	   this	   could	  
force	   a	   borrowing	   State	   to	   continue	   borrowing	   or	   the	   IMF	   to	   continue	   lending	  
rather	  than	  both	  having	  the	  option	  to	  stop	  assistance	  at	  any	  time16:	  either	  as	  the	  
State	  no	  longer	  wants	  or	  needs	  the	  assistance	  or	  as	  the	  IMF	  believes	  the	  State	  has	  
not	  met	   the	   condition	   criteria.	   Legal	  obligations	   to	   repay	   instead	   stem	   from	   the	  
treaty	   rather	   than	   being	   stipulated	   in	   any	   documentation	   specific	   to	   that	  
assistance.	  
For	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  stipulation	  of	  an	  international	  agreement	  would	  suggest	  
a	   relationship	   of	   legal	   equals,	   and	   the	  position	  of	   containing	   the	   relationship	   of	  
each	  assistance	   in	  a	   legal	  document,	  counter	  to	  the	  IMF,	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  
Bank	  has	  purposefully	  sought	  this	  relationship	  to	  be	  framed	   in	  terms	  of	   law.	  For	  
States,	  regardless	  of	  their	  relative	  wealth,	  military	  power	  or	  other	  factors,	   in	   law	  
the	   ability	   to	   conclude	   international	   agreements	   is	   equal.	  Whether	   this	   equality	  
extends	  to	   international	  organisations,	  and	  the	  ability	   that	  they	  may	  be	  given	  to	  
conclude	  agreements,	  or	  whether	  there	  exists	  a	  hierarchical	  relationship	  between	  
States	   and	   international	   organisations	   should	   be	   examined.	   Although	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Supra	  Note.	  13	  and	  John	  Head,	  ‘Evolution	  of	  the	  Governing	  Law	  for	  Loan	  Agreements	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank	  and	  Other	  Multilateral	  Development	  Banks’	  (1996)	  90	  AJIL	  214,	  221	  	  
16	   Ross	   Leckow,	   ‘Conditionality	   in	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund’	   in	   Current	  
Developments	  in	  Monetary	  and	  Financial	  Law	  Volume	  3	  (IMF	  2005)	  pg.	  59	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international	  organisation	  can	  only	  create	  and	  sign	  treaties	  if	  it	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  
do	  so,17	  and	  on	  subject	  matters	  related	  to	  the	  authority	  that	  has	  been	  delegated	  
to	  it,	  it	  would	  be	  circular	  to	  say	  that	  States	  can	  delegate	  authority	  for	  a	  subject	  to	  
an	  international	  organisation	  but	  also	  not	  delegate	  full	  treaty	  making	  capacity	  to	  
the	  organisation	  as	  well	  if	  they	  clearly	  wish	  it	  to	  be	  so.	  This	  would	  be	  a	  limitation	  
of	   the	   delegation	   that	   could	   take	   place.	   As	   long	   as	   the	   treaty	   signed	   by	   the	  
organisation	   forwards	   and	   abides	   by	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   delegated	   authority,	  
which	  is	  a	  crucial	  element	  to	  prevent	  the	  international	  organisation	  acting	  outside	  
the	  mandate	  that	  has	  been	  given	  to	  it,	  a	  relationship	  of	  equals	  is	  created	  between	  
the	   international	   organisation	   and	   the	   sovereign	   States	  who	   sign	   the	   respective	  
treaty.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   relationship	  with	   borrowing	  member	   States	  
that	   is	   contained	   in	   an	   international	   agreement	   signed	   by	   the	   two,	   this	   would	  
appear	  to	  legal	  preclude	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  hierarchical	  relationship	  as	  needed	  
for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  normative	  system.	  
Many	   international	   organisations,	   including	   the	   Bank,	   have	   specific	   provisions	  
allowing	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   international	   agreements18	   and	   the	   practice	   of	  
organisations	  concluding	  treaties	  with	  States,	  both	  on	  a	  bilateral	  basis	  such	  as	  for	  
the	  World	  Bank	  loan	  agreements	  and	  on	  a	  multilateral	  basis	  such	  as	  signature	  of	  
the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	   the	  Law	  of	  Treaties	  between	  States	  and	   International	  
Organizations	   or	   between	   International	   Organizations,	   points	   to	   an	  
acknowledgement	   that,	   at	   a	  minimum,	  within	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   organisations	  
mandate,	  an	  organisation	  can	  conclude	  agreements	  on	  equal	  terms	  to	  a	  State.19	  
If	  this	  equality	  were	  true	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  this	  equal	  relationship	  would	  
preclude	   the	  development	  of	   a	  normative	   framework	  between	   the	  Bank	  and	   its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	   Vienna	   Convention	   on	   the	   Law	   of	   Treaties	   between	   States	   and	   International	  
Organizations	  or	  between	  International	  Organizations,	  Article	  6.	  For	  a	  fuller	  account	  of	  this	  
topic,	   see	   J.P.	   Dobbert,	   ‘Evolution	   of	   the	   Treaty-­‐Making	   Capacity	   of	   International	  
Organizations’	  in	  Essays	  in	  Memory	  of	  Jean	  Carroz:	  The	  Law	  and	  the	  Sea	  (FAO	  1987)	  
18	  See	  for	  example,	  World	  Bank:	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  V,	  Section	  8;	  IMF:	  IMF	  
Articles	   of	   Agreement	   Article	   X;	   European	   Union:	   Article	   216	   The	   Treaty	   on	   European	  
Union	   and	   ECJ,	   Case	   22/70	   Commission	   of	   the	   European	   Communities	   v.	   Council	   of	   the	  
European	  Communities	  [1971]	  ECR	  263;	  European	  Stability	  Mechanism:	  Treaty	  Establishing	  
the	  European	  Stability	  Mechanism,	  Article	  32.	  
19	  For	  further	  work	  on	  this	  subject	  including	  arguments	  on	  how	  international	  organisations	  
may	  have	  more	  powers	  than	  this	  minimum,	  see:	  José	  Alvarez,	  International	  Organizations	  
as	   Law-­‐makers	   (OUP	   2006),	   Rüdiger	   Wolfrum	   &	   Volker	   Röben,	   Developments	   of	  
International	  Law	  in	  Treaty	  Making	  (Max	  Planck	  2005)	  and	  Jan	  Wouters	  &	  Philip	  De	  Man,	  
‘International	  Organizations	  as	  Law-­‐Makers’	  (2009)	  Leuven	  Centre	  for	  Global	  Governance	  
Studies	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  21	  pg.	  22-­‐25	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member	  States.	  By	  its	  very	  nature,	  a	  normative	  framework	  requires	  a	  hierarchical	  
relationship	  via	  which	  one	  actor	  tells	  another	  actor	  what	  to	  do.	  In	  a	  legally	  equal	  
relationship,	  this	  would	  not	  be	  possible.	  
The	   key	   documents	   of	   the	   Bank	   that,	   therefore,	   require	   an	   assessment	   for	   the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   its	   members	   are	   the	   two	   documents	   that	  
govern	  the	  legal	  relationship	  between	  them:	  the	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  
the	  specific	  lending	  documentation	  for	  each	  project.	  It	  has	  already	  been	  examined	  
how	   the	   World	   Bank	   is	   acting	   outside	   of	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   and	   acting	  
outside	   of	   the	   consent	   that	   member	   States	   gave	   the	   Bank	   when	   joining	   the	  
international	   organisation.	   This,	   in	   and	   of	   itself,	   would	   suggest	   there	   is	   not	   an	  
equal	   relationship,	   as	   the	   Bank	   is	   taking	   authority	   and	   decisions	   that	   it	   is	   not	  
empowered	   to	  do.	  Yet,	   the	   specific	   lending	  documentation	  establishes	  a	   further	  
legal	  relationship	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  a	  member	  State.	  
The	  documentation	  governing	  any	  specific	  World	  Bank	  project	   is	  contained	   in	  at	  
least	   two	  main	  documents,	   the	  General	  Conditions20	   and	  a	  project-­‐specific	   Loan	  
Agreement.21	   The	   General	   Conditions	   are	   the	   backbone	   of	   every	   project	  
agreement	  and	  are	  incorporated	  by	  reference	  in	  each	  project	  assistance	  that	  the	  
IBRD	  makes.22	  	  The	  General	  Conditions	  outline	  specific	  elements	  that	  are	  common	  
to	  each	  project:	  withdrawal	  amounts,23	  loan	  terms,24	  arbitration,25	  termination	  of	  
the	  agreement,26	  etc..	  With	  a	  baseline	  established	  that	  applies	  in	  every	  assistance,	  
the	   project-­‐specific	   Loan	   Agreement	   contains	   the	   terms	   of	   direct	   relevance	   for	  
each	   individual	   project	   such	   as	   the	   actual	   loan	   amount.	   When	   there	   are	  
inconsistencies	   between	   the	   General	   Conditions	   and	   the	   Loan	   Agreement,	   the	  
Loan	  Agreement	  prevails.27	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  IBRD	  General	  Conditions	  for	  Loans,	  March	  12,	  2012	  
21	   For	   an	   example	   of	   a	   Loan	   Agreement,	   see	   Official	   Documents	   –	   Loan	   Agreement	   for	  
Loan	   8273-­‐PL	   (Closing	   Package)	   between	   Republic	   of	   Poland	   and	   IBRD,	   July	   2,	   2013.	   In	  
addition,	   the	   Bank	   has	   a	   number	   of	   specific	   legal	   documents	   that	   are	   incorporated	   by	  




accessed	  September	  2013.	  
23	  Article	  II	  
24	  Article	  III	  
25	  Article	  VIII	  
26	  Article	  IX	  
27	  Article	  I,	  Section	  1.02:	  Inconsistency	  with	  Legal	  Agreements	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In	   addition	   to	   containing	   the	   exact	   financial	   terms	  of	   the	   individual	   project,	   the	  
Loan	  Agreement	  contains	  the	  obligations	  of	  the	  borrower	  and	  the	  conditions	  that	  
must	  be	  met	   for	   the	  release	  of	  each	  tranche	  of	  assistance.	   It	   is	   these	  conditions	  
and	   obligations	   that	   have	   dictated	   the	   development	   of	   a	   normative	   system	  
between	  the	  Bank	  and	  its	  borrowing	  member	  States.	  
	  
4.3	  Normative	  System	  under	  Systems	  Theory	  
The	  work	  of	   systems	   theory	  has	   focused	  upon	   the	  movement	   from	  a	  normative	  
system	  to	  a	  legal	  system:	  either	  through	  elaborating	  upon	  the	  requirements	  that	  a	  
legal	  system	  must	  have,	  or	  through	  examining	  the	  shift	  itself.	  The	  development	  of	  
an	  original	  normative	  system	  has	  been	  inadequately	  examined.	  The	  work	  done	  in	  
a	   legal	   context	   focuses	   upon	   the	   development	   into	   a	   legal	   system,	   with	  
communication	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide:	  
‘When	   legal	   systems	   become	   differentiated	   as	   special	   functional	  
systems	  to	  society,	   this	  occurs	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  a	  special	  binary	  code,	  
by	  which	  the	  operations	  of	  this	  system	  are	  oriented.’28	  
This	   focus	   upon	   the	   dividing	   line,	   the	   legal/illegal	   binary	   code,	   is	   critical	   for	  
allowing	   for	   the	   shift	   from	   a	   normative	   system	   into	   a	   legal	   system,	   but	   the	  
requirements	  of	  a	  normative	  system	  are	  not	  examined.	  
Yet	   the	  usefulness	  of	   this	  definition	  beyond	  an	  already	   functioning	  autonomous	  
legal	  system	  has	  been	  questioned.29	  The	  work	  done	  focuses	  upon	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  
normative	   system	   into	   a	   legal	   system.	   For	   the	   normative	   system	   to	   develop,	   a	  
system	  to	  constrain	  the	  actions	  of	  participants,	  there	  must	  fundamentally	  be	  two	  
participants	  with	  communication	  of	  instruction	  within	  the	  normative	  system.	  Only	  
when	  this	  develops	  into	  a	  system	  where	  this	  communication	  develops	  into	  being	  
along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide	  does	  it	  become	  a	  legal	  system,	  but	  the	  development	  
of	  an	  initial	  normative	  discourse	  is	  unclear.	  
If	   a	  normative	   system	   is	  a	   communication	  of	  what	  an	  actor	  ought	   to	  do,	  a	   legal	  
system	   is	   when	   this	   is	   done	   along	   a	   legal/illegal	   divide.	   Furthermore,	   if	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	   ‘The	  Coding	  of	   the	  Legal	  System’,	   (1991/1992)	  European	  Yearbook	   in	  
the	  Sociology	  of	  Law	  145,	  146	  
29	  Simon	  Roberts,	  ‘Against	  a	  Systemic	  Legal	  History’	  1	  Rechtsgeschichte	  
	   164	  
purpose	   of	   the	   communication	   within	   a	   system	   of	   law	   is	   ‘the	   stabilization	   of	  
normative	  expectations’,30	  then	  normative	  expectations	  must	  be	  present	  within	  a	  
normative	  system,	  although	  perhaps	  not	  of	  such	  stable	  nature	  as	  those	  developed	  
in	  a	  legal	  system.	  	  	  
‘The	  legal	  system	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  system	  of	  actions,	  comprising	  not	  only	  
legal	   discourse	  about	  norms	  or	  organized	  action	   like	   court	  decisions	  
and	   legislation,	   but	   any	   human	   communication	  which	   has	   reference	  
to	  legal	  expectations.’31	  
That	  communication	  must	  occur	  in	  a	  normative	  system	  is	  clearly	  established,	  that	  
it	  must	  also	  not	  be	  along	  a	   legal/illegal	  divide	   is	  also	  established,	  as	  otherwise	   it	  
would	  already	  be	  a	  legal	  system.	  Yet	  this	  normative	  system	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  starter	  
point	   that	   is	   lost	   upon	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   legal	   system,	   but	   the	   norms,	   as	   the	  
constraint	   of	   what	   an	   actor	   ought	   to	   do,	   remain	   in	   place,	   but	   it	   is	   the	  
communication	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide	  that	  serves	  to	  guide	  the	  expectations	  
of	  actors	  within	  the	  legal	  system.	  
‘Decisions	   are	   legally	   valid	   only	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   normative	   rules	  
because	   normative	   rules	   are	   valid	   only	   when	   implemented	   by	  
decisions.’32	  
The	  circular	   logic	  outlined	  by	  Luhmann,	  of	  normative	  rules	  requiring	  decisions	  to	  
be	   valid,	   that	   are	   themselves	   only	   valid	   if	   normative	   rules	   are	   present,	   would	  
suggest	   that	   no	   normative	   system	   could	   exist	   without	   decisions	   being	   taken	   in	  
relation	  to	  them.	  Yet	  this	  communication	  of	  a	  decision	  cannot	  be	  legal/illegal	  or	  it	  
would	  already	  amount	  to	  a	  legal	  system.	  
The	   implication	   of	   this	   is	   that	   for	   the	   development	   into	   a	   legal	   system,	   and	   for	  
communication	  to	  occur	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide,	  a	  system	  must	  have	  in	  place	  
a	  set	  of	  normative	  rules:	  rules	  that	  are	  created	  by	  one	  actor	  to	  tell	  another	  actor	  
what	   they	  ought	   to	  do,	   and,	   therefore,	   constraining	   the	  actions	  of	   this	   actor.	   In	  
addition,	  decisions	  of	  implementation	  or	  applying	  these	  rules	  must	  be	  made.	  It	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Gralf-­‐Peter	  Calliess	  and	  Moritz	  Renner,	  ‘From	  Soft	  Law	  to	  Hard	  Code:	  the	  Juridification	  
of	  Global	  Governance’	  (2009)	  22	  (2)	  Ratio	  Juris	  260,	  263	  
31	  Gunther	  Teubner,	   ‘Autopoiesis	   in	  Law	  and	  Society:	  A	  Rejoinder	  to	  Blankenburg’	  (1984)	  
16(2)	  Law	  &	  Society	  Review	  291,	  294	  
32	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  ‘The	  Self	  Reproduction	  of	  Law	  and	  its	  Limits’	  in	  Gunther	  Teubner	  (ed.),	  
Dilemmas	  of	  Law	  in	  the	  Welfare	  State	  (Walter	  de	  Gruyter	  &	  Co.	  1984)	  pg.	  115	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not	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  that	  no	  one	  abides	  by;	  they	  must	  be	  enforced	  
against	   an	   actor	   and	   more	   than	   a	   mere	   suggestion	   with	   an	   actor’s	   behaviour	  
judged	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  rules.	  
In	   this	   context,	   of	   the	   development	   of	   a	   normative	   system	   via	  which	   one	   actor	  
directs	   and	   judges	   the	   behaviour	   of	   another	   actor,	   focus	   can	   turn	   to	   the	  World	  
Bank	   and	   the	   governance	   role	   that	   it	   plays,	   how	   this	   governance	   role	   has	  
coincided	   with	   the	   development	   of	   a	   normative	   system	   and	   how	   the	   Bank	   has	  
sought	  to	  make	  this	  system	  both	  wider,	  applying	  to	  more	  of	  its	  membership,	  and	  
deeper,	  in	  increasing	  the	  quantity	  and	  depth	  of	  norms	  that	  it	  has	  established.	  
	  
4.4	  World	  Bank	  Conditionality	  as	  a	  Governance	  Mechanism	  and	  its	  
Value	  within	  Systems	  Theory	  
The	   IBRD	   of	   today	   conducts	   two	   main	   forms	   of	   financial	   assistance	   to	   its	  
membership:	   investment	   project	   loans	   (to	   fund	   a	   specific	   project	   in	   order	   to	  
promote	  poverty	  reduction	  and	  development)33	  and	  development	  policy	  lending34	  
(‘to	  help	  a	  borrower	  achieve	  sustainable	  reductions	  in	  poverty	  through	  a	  program	  
of	   policy	   and	   institutional	   actions’).35	   In	   every	   loan	   that	   the	  World	   Bank	  makes	  
under	  either	  of	  these	  two	  forms	  of	  assistance,	  the	  Bank	  attaches	  conditions	  that	  
must	  be	  fulfilled	  for	  the	  release	  of	  funds.	  
These	  conditions	  have	  developed	  into	  norms	  that	  constrain	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  
Bank’s	  membership.	  They	  are	  instructions	  that	  the	  member	  States	  must	  follow	  if	  
they	   are	   to	   have	   access	   to	   the	   Bank’s	   funding.	   Within	   the	   area	   that	   the	   Bank	  
operates,	   i.e.	   countries	   that	   do	   not	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   raise	   the	   funding	  
themselves,	   there	   is	   no	   alternative	   for	   the	   member	   State.	   The	   Articles	   of	  
Agreement	  themselves	  dictate	  that	  the	  Bank	  can	  only	  lend	  if	  it	  is	  satisfied	  that	  the	  
member	  State	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  the	  loan	  elsewhere	  under	  reasonable	  
conditions.36	   States	   had	   come	   together	   in	   1944	   to	   create	   an	   organisation	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Operational	  Policy	  10.00,	  para.	  1	  
34	  The	  ability	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  conduct	  lending	  for	  non-­‐specific	  projects	  falls	  under	  the	  
“special	  circumstances”	  exception	  of	  Article	  III,	  Section	  4(vii):	  “Loans	  made	  or	  guaranteed	  
by	  the	  Bank	  shall,	  except	  in	  special	  circumstances,	  be	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  specific	  projects	  
of	  reconstruction	  or	  development”.	  
35	  Operational	  Policy	  8.60,	  para.	  2	  
36	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  Article	  III,	  Section	  4(ii)	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would	   lend	   to	   them	  when	   they	   had	   rebuilding	   and	   development	   needs,	   a	   State	  
centric	   system	   with	   the	   power	   resting	   with	   the	   State	   to	   request	   assistance.37	  
Instead,	  the	  Bank	  now	  operates	  on	  a	  basis	  of	  telling	  their	  States	  how	  to	  behave	  to	  
be	  eligible	  for	  this	  assistance.	  
At	   the	  negotiations	   for	   the	  World	  Bank	   the	   subject	  of	   conditionality	  was	   raised,	  
but	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  IMF	  and,	  however,	  no	  decision	  was	  taken	  over	  whether	  
the	   IMF	  assistance	  should	  come	  with	  conditions	  or	  not.38	  Although	  not	   raised	  at	  
Bretton	   Woods,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   Bank	   required	   that	   certain	   elements	   of	  
conditions	  on	  assistance	  needed	  to	  be	  in	  place.	  The	  World	  Bank	  funds	  its	  lending	  
by	   borrowing	   on	   the	   capital	   markets.39	   To	   best	   achieve	   its	   purposes,	   it	   has	   to	  
maintain	   the	   highest	   possible	   creditworthiness.	   As	   a	   practical	   matter,	   this	   is	  
essential	  as	   it	   is	   the	  difference	   in	  creditworthiness	  between	   the	  Bank	  and	   those	  
that	   it	   lends	   to	   that	   actually	   assists	   the	   member	   States.	   If	   the	   Bank’s	  
creditworthiness	  deteriorated,	  the	  funding	  cost	  for	  each	  borrower	  would	  increase	  
and,	  to	  an	  extent,	  defeat	  the	  purpose	  of	  Bank	  lending.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  essential	  for	  
its	  operations	   that	   the	  Bank	  ensures	   that	   the	  money	   that	   it	   lends	   for	  projects	   is	  
repaid.	   In	   addition,	   if	   the	   Bank	   did	   not	   pay	   due	   regard	   to	   the	   prospects	   of	  
repayment	  it	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  repay	  the	  money	  that	  it	  has	  borrowed	  itself	  on	  
the	   capital	   markets	   and	   would	   force	   member	   States	   as	   a	   whole	   to	   contribute	  
capital.40	  
However,	  this	  practical	  matter	   is	  somewhat	  counter	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  purposes.	  The	  
Bank	   lends	   to	   countries	   that	   cannot	   achieve	   the	   financing	   on	   reasonable	   terms	  
themselves,	  which	  occurs	  because	  the	  markets	  believe	  that	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  
State	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  pay	  it	  back.	   If	  the	  Bank	  simply	  replaced	  the	  State	  in	  the	  
borrowing,	   the	   World	   Bank	   would	   have	   a	   similar	   borrowing	   profile	   of	   those	  
member	   States	   that	   it	   lent	   to,	   and,	   therefore,	   only	   be	   able	   to	   lend	   at	   the	   high	  
yields	   that	   the	  member	   States	   themselves	  would	   turn	   to	   the	   Bank	   to	   avoid.	   To	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  The	  only	  criterion	  envisioned	  was	  an	  ability	  for	  the	  member	  State	  to	  repay,	  as	  evidenced	  
by	  the	  use	  of	  “loans”	  rather	  than	  grants.	  
38	   Alex	   Dreher,	   ‘The	   Development	   and	   Implementation	   of	   IMF	   and	   World	   Bank	  
Conditionality’	  (2002)	  HWWA	  Discussion	  Paper	  pg.	  8	  
39	  The	  IBRD	  has	  an	  authorized	  capital	  base	  of	  $278.4	  billion,	  with	  $13.4	  billion	  having	  been	  
paid-­‐in.	  This	  capital	  base	  assists	  the	  Bank	  in	  achieving	  the	  highest	  credit	  rating.	  See:	  IBRD	  
Financial	  Statements	  June	  30,	  2013	  pg.	  25	  
40	   See	   IBRD	   Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   Article	   III,	   Section	   4(v)	   that	   specifically	   requires	   the	  
Bank	  to	  “act	  prudently	  in	  the	  interests	  both	  of	  the	  particular	  member	  in	  whose	  territories	  
the	  project	  is	  located	  and	  of	  the	  members	  as	  a	  whole”.	  
	   167	  
assure	  markets	   that	   it	  will	   be	   repaid,	   the	  Bank	   can	  only	   lend	   to	  member	   States	  
that	  it	  can	  expect	  to	  be	  repaid	  from.	  This	  meant	  lending	  to	  member	  States	  where	  
certain	   macroeconomic	   conditions	   were	   met41	   but	   also	   to	   those	   countries	   that	  
would	  undertake	   reforms	   in	  order	   to	   improve	   their	  economy	  and,	   therefore,	  be	  
able	  to	  repay	  the	  assistance.42	  These	  reforms	  are	  designed	  to	  bring	  the	  member	  
State	   either	   back	   to	   or	   to	   a	   position	   of	   economic	   prosperity	   where	   it	   can	   be	  
assured	  that	  the	  Bank	  is	  repaid.	  
The	   legal	   bases	   for	   requesting	   these	   reforms	   are	   references	   in	   the	   Articles	   of	  
Agreement	   to	   “suitable	   conditions”43.	   However,	   it	   is	   acknowledged	   by	   the	   Bank	  
that	   ‘the	   concept	   of	   “conditionality”	   is	   not	   explicitly	   discussed	   in	   either	   IBRD	  or	  
IDA’s	  Articles.’44	  Unlike	  the	  Bank,	  in	  1969,	  via	  a	  formal	  amendment	  of	  the	  Articles	  
of	  Agreement,	  the	  IMF	  introduced	  conditionality	  into	  its	  legal	  system.45	  The	  Bank	  
has	   instead	   never	   moved	   to	   formally	   introduce	   conditionality,	   and	   instead	  
continues	  to	  rely	  on	  this	  “suitable	  conditions”	  provision.	  
The	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   its	   history	   of	   acting	  
outside	   of	   them	   and	   how	   this	   cannot	   be	   explained	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   prevalent	  
theories	  of	  public	  international	  law	  has	  been	  discussed	  previously	  in	  Chapters	  One	  
and	   Two.	   Whether	   the	   Bank	   is	   acting	   beyond	   its	   mandate	   in	   the	   use	   of	  
conditionality	   is	   an	   open	   question	   that	   may	   require	   a	   nuanced	   answer	   of	  
depending	  upon	  what	   the	   conditions	   are	   for.	   It	   is	   apparent	   that	   conditions	   that	  
ensure	   repayment	   may	   be	   possible	   under	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   but	  
conditions	   outside	   of	   this,	   that	   are	   unrelated	   to	   the	   repayment	   of	   the	   project,	  
have	  been	  argued	   to	  not	  be.46	  For	   the	  purposes	  of	  development	  of	  a	  normative	  
framework	   that	   guides	   the	   actions	   of	   its	   membership,	   this	   is	   a	   secondary	  
consideration.	  The	  primary	  consideration	   is	   that	   the	  establishment	  of	  conditions	  
that	  govern	  to	  whom	  and	  how	  the	  Bank	  will	  give	  financial	  assistance	  has	  led	  to	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Supra	  Note.	  38,	  pg.	  9	  
42	  This	  also	  explains	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  IDA	  that	  lends	  to	  the	  member	  States	  at	  the	  lower	  
end	  of	  the	  income	  scale.	  
43	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  Article	  I(ii)	  
44	   Review	   of	  World	   Bank	   Conditionality:	   Legal	   Aspects	   of	   Conditionality	   in	   Policy-­‐Based	  
Lending,	  Legal	  Vice	  Presidency	  World	  Bank,	  June	  29,	  2005,	  para.	  18	  
45	  IMF	  Board	  of	  Governors	  Resolution	  No.	  23-­‐5	  (1968)	  
46	  See	  for	  example;	  Ngaire	  Woods,	  ‘A	  Short	  Introduction	  to	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  World	  Bank’	  in	  
Routledge	  Encyclopedia	  (Routledge	  2002)	  pg.	  964-­‐966;	  Jonathan	  Fox	  &	  Dave	  Brown	  (eds.),	  
The	  Struggle	  for	  Accountability:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  NGOs,	  and	  Grassroots	  Movements	   (MIT	  
1998)	   pg.	   15;	   and	   Joel	   Oestreich,	   Power	   and	   Principle:	   Human	   Rights	   Programming	   in	  
international	  Organizations	  (Georgetown	  University	  Press	  2007)	  pg.	  68	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position	  where	   the	   Bank	   actively	   seeks	   to	   govern	   the	   behaviour	   of	   its	  member	  
States.	   Regardless	   of	   the	  motives,	   this	   development	   fundamentally	   changes	   the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  its	  borrowing	  member	  States	  to	  a	  hierarchical	  
relationship.	  
4.4.1	  Depth	  of	  the	  Conditionality	  Norms	  
Despite	  being	  a	  change	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  its	  membership,	  
it	   is	  not	  a	   total	   shift	   in	   relationship,	  as	   the	  use	  of	  conditions	  does	  not	  affect	   the	  
totality	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  membership.	  Conditions	  are	  ad	  hoc	  terms	  that	  only	  apply	  to	  
borrowing	   member	   States	   in	   an	   inconsistent	   and	   incomplete	   manner.	   The	  
conditions	   on	   any	   project	   are	   not	   contained	   within	   the	   General	   Conditions	   of	  
World	  Bank	  assistance,	  but	  are	  contained	  in	  the	  bespoke	  Loan	  Agreement.	  Within	  
this	  Loan	  Agreement	  though,	  there	  is	  controversy	  over	  what	  are	  “conditions”	  and	  
to	  what	  extent	  they	  may	  be	  norms.	  	  
The	  Bank	  view	  of	  conditionality	  is	  perceived	  as	  narrow.47	  The	  agreement	  between	  
the	   Bank	   and	   the	   respective	   member	   State	   for	   any	   given	   project	   contains	  
“triggers,	   outcomes	   and	   benchmarks”.	   The	   Bank	   does	   not	   classify	   these	   as	  
conditions,	  as	  they	  are	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  release	  of	  funds.	  Instead,	  these	  
are	  seen	  as	  non-­‐binding	  commitments	  that	  can	  either	  be	  met	  or	  not.	  The	  World	  
Bank	   classifies	   only	   requirements	   that	   are	   contained	   in	   the	   Bank’s	   Loan	  
Agreements	   that	   are	   directly	   linked	   as	   actions	   that	  must	   be	   undertaken	   for	   the	  
release	  of	  funds	  as	  “conditions”.48	  
For	  policy-­‐based	  assistance,	   the	  Bank	  has	   clarified	   that	   three	  essential	   elements	  
constitute	  the	  conditions:	  	  
‘(a)	  maintenance	   of	   an	   adequate	  macroeconomic	   policy	   framework;	  
(b)	  implementation	  of	  an	  overall	  program	  in	  a	  manner	  satisfactory	  to	  
the	   Bank;	   and	   (c)	   compliance	   with	   critical	   policy	   and	   institutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Benedicte	  Bull,	  Alf	   Jerve	  &	  Erlend	  Sigvaldsen,	   ‘The	  World	  Bank’s	  and	   the	   IMF’s	  use	  of	  
Conditionality	  to	  Encourage	  Privatization	  and	  Liberalization:	  Current	  Issues	  and	  Practices’	  
Report	   Prepared	   for	   the	  Norwegian	  Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	   as	   a	   Background	   for	   the	  
Oslo	   Conditionality	   Conference,	   November	   2006,	   pg.	   4.	   Criticism	   has	   been	   particularly	  
strong	   from	   NGOs;	   see	   A	   SEED	   (supported	   by	   OXFAM),	  World	   Bank	   &	   Conditionalities:	  
Poor	  Deal	   for	  Poor	  Countries	   (2008)	  pg.	  7	  and	  Actionaid	   International,	  What	  Progress?	  A	  
Shadow	  Review	  of	  World	  Bank	  Conditionality	  (2006)	  	  
48	  World	   Bank,	   Conditionality	   in	   Development	   Policy	   Lending,	  November	   15,	   2007	   para.	  
12-­‐13	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actions	  that	  are	  critical	   for	   the	   implementation	  and	  expected	  results	  
of	  the	  program.’49	  
These	   elements	   that	   constitute	   the	   conditionality,50	   for	   both	   policy-­‐based	  
assistance	   and	   investment	   project	   loans,	   can	   be	   implemented	   in	   a	   number	   of	  
different	  manners	  within	  the	  legal	  agreement	  with	  the	  member	  State.	  
‘Prior	  actions’	  are	  conditions	   that	  must	  be	  met	  before	   the	  World	  Bank	  Board	  of	  
Directors	  approves	  the	  loan	  or	  release	  of	  an	  individual	  tranche.	  These	  are	  usually	  
required	  by	  the	  Bank	  to	  be	  met	  before	  the	  project	  is	  presented	  to	  the	  Board.	  
‘Tranche-­‐release	  conditions’	  are	  distinct	   from	  prior	  actions	  as	   they	   firstly	  can	  be	  
met	  after	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors	  has	  approved	  the	  project	  but	  before	  subsequent	  
tranches	  are	  released.	  
The	  Bank	   does	   not,	   however,	   consider	   “triggers,	   outcomes	   and	   benchmarks”	   as	  
part	  of	  conditionality	  as	  they	  are	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  disbursement.51	   Instead,	  
‘triggers’	   assess	   the	   achievement	   of	   certain	   outcomes	   (although	   may	   become	  
future	   prior	   actions);	   ‘outcomes’	   are	   the	   expected	   results	   of	   the	   financing	   and	  
‘benchmarks’	  are	  standards	  against	  which	  the	  performance	  or	  achievements	  are	  
assessed.52	   None	   of	   which,	   if	   met	   or	   not,	   in	   theory	   affect	   whether	   a	   loan	   or	  
release	  of	  tranche	  is	  approved.	  
Critics,	   and	   conversely	   the	   IMF,	   use	   a	   wider	   definition	   of	   conditionality	   that	  
includes	   all	   of	   these	   additional	   elements	   that	   although	   not	   linked	   to	  
disbursements,	  form	  part	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  assistance.53	  
In	   terms	   of	   a	   normative	   relationship	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   borrowing	  
member	   State,	   the	   type	  of	   conditionality,	  whether	   if	   taken	   to	  have	   the	  broader	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	   Review	   of	  World	   Bank	   Conditionality:	   Legal	   Aspects	   of	   Conditionality	   in	   Policy-­‐Based	  
Lending,	  Legal	  Vice	  Presidency	  World	  Bank,	  June	  29,	  2005,	  para.	  9	  and	  Operational	  Policy	  
8.60	  para.	  13	  
50	   An	   important	   distinction	   is	   present	   between	   “conditions”	   and	   standard	   contractual	  
provisions.	   Standard	   provisions	   that	   govern	   the	   contract	   (e.g.	   when	   and	   to	   where	   the	  
money	   should	   be	   repaid,	   what	   is	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   assistance,	   etc.)	   are	   not	   seen	   as	  
“conditions”	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  are	  not	  imposed	  by	  the	  Bank	  to	  guide	  the	  behaviour	  
of	   the	  member	   State,	   but	   instead	   are	   a	  mutually	   agreeable	   part	   of	   the	   assistance	   that	  
dictate	  the	  terms	  like	  any	  other	  loan.	  
51	   Review	   of	  World	   Bank	   Conditionality:	   Legal	   Aspects	   of	   Conditionality	   in	   Policy-­‐Based	  
Lending,	  Legal	  Vice	  Presidency	  World	  Bank,	  June	  29,	  2005,	  para.	  15-­‐16	  
52	  Ibid.	  
53	  Supra	  Note.	  47,	  pg.	  5	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meaning	   assigned	   to	   it	   or	   with	   the	   Bank’s	   narrow	   definition,	   has	   certain	  
consequences.	   If	   a	   normative	   framework	   requires	   rules	   that	   are	   created	  by	  one	  
actor	  to	  tell	  another	  actor	  what	  to	  do	  and	  judge	  their	  actions	  against	  these	  norms,	  
that	  in	  addition	  require	  the	  norm	  creator	  to	  apply	  the	  norms	  against	  an	  actor	  so	  
as	   to	  be	  more	   than	  a	  mere	  suggestion,	   it	   is	  apparent	   that	   the	  different	   types	  of	  
conditions	   fall	   into	   different	   categories.	   Prior	   actions	   and	   tranche-­‐release	  
conditions	   fulfil	   both	   conditions	   of	   being	   rules	   that	   are	   applied,	   whilst	   triggers,	  
outcomes	  and	  benchmarks	  may	  be	  rules	  that	  guide	  the	  behaviour	  of	  an	  actor,	  but	  
as	  they	  are	  not	  enforced	  (i.e.	  the	  loan	  is	  disbursed	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  
met	   or	   not),	   they	   do	   not	   amount	   to	   norms	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   normative	  
framework.	  
4.4.2	  Width	  of	  the	  Conditionality	  Norms	  
Despite	   the	   ad	   hoc	   nature	   of	   the	   application	   of	   conditions	   against	   borrowing	  
member	   States,	   the	   amount	   of	   areas	   that	   have	   fallen	   under	   conditionality	   has	  
steadily	   increased	   over	   time.	   The	   presence	   of	   these	   norms	   and	   the	   widening	  
topics	  that	  they	  cover	  deserves	  an	  examination.	  
In	   1980,	   the	   World	   Bank	   introduced	   Structural	   Adjustment	   Lending.	   This	   was	  
lending	  with	  conditions	  that	  required	  ‘reforms	  of	  policies	  and	  institutions	  covering	  
micro-­‐economic	   (such	   as	   taxes	   and	   tariffs),	   macro-­‐economic	   (fiscal	   policy)	   and	  
institutional	  interventions’.54	  Unlike	  previous	  World	  Bank	  assistance,	  there	  was	  no	  
project	   as	   such,	   instead	   a	   wide	   goal	   of	   reform.	   The	   literature	   in	   this	   area	   is	  
extensive	   and	   well	   known	   with	   heavy	   criticism	   both	   initially	   externally	   but	  
subsequently	   internally	  from	  the	  Bank	  over	  the	  content,55	   lack	  of	  enforcement,56	  
effect	  on	  sovereignty57	  and	  amount	  of	  conditions.58	  
‘Structural	  adjustment	  goes	  beyond	  the	  simple	  imposition	  of	  a	  set	  of	  
macroeconomic	  policies	  at	  the	  domestic	  level.	  It	  represents	  a	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	   Structural	   Adjustment	   and	   Poverty:	   A	   Conceptual,	   Empirical	   and	   Policy	   Framework	  
(World	  Bank	  1990)	  pg.	  27	  
55	  Stefan	  Koeberle,	  ‘Conditionality:	  Under	  What	  Conditions?’	  (World	  Bank	  2004)	  
56	   See	   for	  example;	  Paul	  Mosley,	   Jane	  Harrigan	  &	   John	  Toye,	  Aid	  and	  Power:	   The	  World	  
Bank	   and	   Policy	   Based	   Lending	   in	   the	   1980s	   (Second	   Edition,	   Routledge	   1995)	   &	   Jakob	  
Svensson,	   ‘Why	   Conditionality	   Aid	   Does	   Not	   Work	   and	   What	   Can	   be	   Done	   About	   it?’	  
(2003)	  70	  Journal	  of	  Development	  Economics	  381,	  383	  
57	   See	   for	   example;	   Mary	   Tsai,	   ‘Globalization	   and	   Conditionality:	   Two	   Sides	   of	   the	  
Sovereignty	  Coin’	  (1999)	  31	  Law	  &	  Pol’y	  Int’l	  Bus.	  1317	  
58	  Angela	  Wood	  and	  Matthew	  Lockwood,	   ‘The	   ‘Perestroika	  of	  Aid’?	  New	  Perspectives	  on	  
Conditionality’	  (1999)	  Bretton	  Woods	  Project	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project,	   a	   conscious	   strategy	   of	   social	   transformation	   at	   the	   global	  
level.’59	  
This	  period	  of	   time,	  and	   the	  heavy	  criticism	   that	   it	  brought	   to	   the	  Bank,	   led	   the	  
World	  Bank	  to	  undertake	  reforms	  that	  have	  affected	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  norms.	  
Firstly,	   prior	   to	   the	   reforms,	   the	   subjects	   that	   conditionality	   covered	   was	  
increasingly	  widening60	  and,	  furthermore,	  the	  amount	  of	  conditions	  per	  loan	  was	  
increasing.	  Whilst	   initially	   conditionality	   only	   focused	   upon	   ensuring	   repayment	  
by	  the	  Bank,	  with	  a	  narrow	  focus	  on	  pure	  macroeconomic	  conditions,61	  the	  areas	  
covered	   by	   conditions	   rapidly	   expanded	   to	   encompass	   a	  wide	   variety	   of	   topics.	  
Recognising	  that	  the	  focus	  was	  too	  wide,	  the	  Bank	  refocused	  and	  has	  attempted	  
to	   limit	   the	  number	  of	  conditions62	  and	  the	  topics	   that	   they	  encapsulate.	  This	   in	  
turn	   affects	   the	   normative	   orders	   the	   Bank	   has	   in	   place.	   The	   individual	  
relationship	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  borrower	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  
norms	  between	  the	  two.	  The	  decrease	  in	  norms	  affects	  this	  relationship.	  
Secondly,	   it	  was	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  Bank	  that	  conditions	  were	  not	  being	  met,	  
and	  the	  Bank	  was	  taking	  no	  action.	  Disbursements	  occurred	  regardless	  of	  whether	  
conditions	  were	  met.63	  The	  Bank	  responded	  that	  the	  situation	  was	  improving	  and	  
that	   conditions	  were	   now	  being	   enforced.64	   In	   terms	  of	   development	   of	   norms,	  
having	  the	  rules	  actually	  being	  applied	  is	  a	  critical	  criterion.	  The	  presence	  of	  rules	  
that	   had	   no	   consequences	   if	   they	   were	   not	   followed	   would	   prevent	   the	   rules	  
amounting	   to	   norms,	   but	   the	   changes	   introduced	   by	   the	   Bank	   to	   enforce	   the	  
conditions	  that	  were	  in	  place	  points	  to	  the	  change	  from	  rules	  into	  norms.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights:	  Effects	  of	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Policies	  
on	   the	   Full	   Enjoyment	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   reported	   by	   independent	   expert	   Fantu	   Cheru,	  
E/CN.4/1999/50,	  24	  February	  1999	  
60	  Günther	  Handl,	   ‘The	   Legal	  Mandate	   of	  Multilateral	  Development	   Banks	   as	  Agents	   for	  
Change	  Towards	  Sustainable	  Development’	  (1998)	  92	  AJIL	  642,	  648	  
61	  Devesh	  Kapur,	  John	  Lewis	  &	  Richard	  Webb,	  The	  World	  Bank	  –	  Its	  First	  Half	  Century,	  Vol.	  
1	  (Brookings	  Institute	  Press	  1997)	  pg.	  480	  
62	  Stefan	  Koeberle,	  Harold	  Bedoya,	  Peter	  Silarszky	  &	  Gero	  Verheyen	  (eds.),	  Conditionality	  
Revisited:	  Concepts,	  Experiences,	  and	  Lessons	  (World	  Bank	  2005),	  pg.	  46-­‐48	  
63	  M	  Thomas,	  ‘Can	  the	  World	  Bank	  Enforce	  its	  Own	  Conditions?	  (2004)	  35(3)	  Development	  
and	   Change	   485	   and	   Tony	   Killick,	   Ramani	   Gunatilaka	   &	   Ana	  Marr,	  Aid	   and	   the	   Political	  
Economy	  of	  Policy	  Change	  (Taylor	  &	  Francis	  2003)	  
64	   Review	   of	   World	   Bank	   Conditionality:	   The	   Theory	   and	   Practice	   of	   Conditionality:	   A	  
Literature	  Review,	  Development	  Economics,	  World	  Bank,	  July	  6,	  2005	  para.	  33	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Alongside	   these	   reforms,	   the	   Bank	   acknowledged	   that	   imposing	   conditions	   that	  
were	  not	  wanted	  by	  a	  member	  State	  was	  not	  achieving	  the	  results	  that	  the	  Bank	  
had	   intended.	   To	   remedy	   this,	   the	   Bank	   introduced	   “country	   ownership”,	   with	  
borrowing	  member	  States	  taking	  strong	  ownership	  over	  the	  reforms,	  rather	  than	  
the	  Bank	  dictating	  standard	  terms	  to	  every	  borrower.65	  
The	   concept	   of	   country	   ownership	   can	   be	   contrasted	   with	   the	   counterfactual	  
situation	   of	   the	   Bank	   lending	  without	   conditions.	   If	   the	   conditions	   are	   “country	  
owned”	  and	  not	  imposed	  by	  the	  Bank	  as	  is	  claimed,	  then	  it	  can	  be	  questioned	  why	  
the	  conditions	  need	  to	  be	  placed	  into	  Bank	  lending	  documentation.	   If	  a	  member	  
State	  freely	  chose	  to	  undertake	  the	  conditions,	  without	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Bank,	  
then	  the	  member	  State	  would	  not	  need	  to	   include	  the	  conditions	   in	   the	   lending	  
documentation,	   and	   would	   instead	   simply	   undertake	   the	   conditions	   without	  
undertaking	  external	   legal	  obligations	   to	  do	   so.66	  The	  absence	  of	   this	   challenges	  
the	   Bank’s	   assertion	   that	   the	   conditions	   are	   country	   owned	   and	   would	   instead	  
reinforce	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  normative	  relationship,	  with	  the	  Bank	  instructing	  the	  
member	  State	  how	  to	  act	  and	  judging	  their	  actions	  against	  these	  norms.	  
Further	   reinforcement	   of	   this	   normative	   relationship	   has	   occurred	   with	   the	  
introduction	   of	   “good	   governance”	   by	   the	   Bank.67	   Definitions	   of	   this	   term	   are	  
controversial	   with	   different	   opinions	   contributing	   both	   to	   confusion	   and	  
misunderstandings	  over	  what	  the	  term	  encompasses.	  The	  Bank	  defines	  the	  term	  
“governance”	  as	  ‘the	  manner	  in	  which	  power	  is	  exercised	  in	  the	  management	  of	  a	  
country’s	   economic	   and	   social	   resources	   for	   development’68	   and	   “includes	   the	  
capacity	  to	  formulate	  and	  implement	  sound	  policies’69	  whilst	  ‘good	  governance	  is	  
epitomized	   by	   predictable,	   open	   and	   enlightened	   policymaking	   (that	   is,	  
transparent	   processes);	   a	   bureaucracy	   imbued	   with	   a	   professional	   ethos;	   an	  
executive	  arm	  of	  government	  accountable	  for	  its	  actions;	  and	  a	  strong	  civil	  society	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Supra	  Note.	  49	  pg.	  13-­‐14	  
66	   Stephen	   Coate	  &	   Stephen	  Morris,	   ‘Policy	   Conditionality’	   in	   James	   Vreeland	  &	   Gustav	  
Ranis	   (eds.),	  Globalization	  and	   the	  Nation	   State:	   the	   Impact	   of	   the	   IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  
(Routledge	  2005)	  pg.	  43	  
67	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  term	  are	  from	  a	  1989	  World	  Bank	  report,	  ‘Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa:	  From	  
Crisis	  to	  Sustainable	  Growth	  (World	  Bank	  1989),	  that	  stated	  the	  region	  was	  suffering	  from	  
a	  “crisis	  of	  governance”.	  
68	  Governance	  and	  Development	  (IBRD	  1992)	  pg.	  1	  
69	  The	  Quality	  of	  Growth	  (OUP	  2000)	  pg.	  137	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participating	   in	   public	   affairs;	   and	   all	   behaving	   under	   the	   rule	   of	   law.’70	   Setting	  
aside	   whether	   the	   issue	   of	   governance	   can	   be	   separated	   from	   the	   political	  
prohibition	   in	   the	   Bank’s	   Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   the	   ‘shift	   from	   the	   notion	   of	  
governance	  to	  good	  governance	  introduces	  a	  normative	  dimension	  addressing	  the	  
quality	   of	   governance.’71	   Conditions	   related	   to	   good	   governance	   are	   concerned	  
with	   meeting	   the	   Bank’s	   standards	   for	   how	   governance	   should	   be,	   with	   an	  
assessment	   of	   the	  member	   State’s	   governance	   regime	   against	   standards	   set	   by	  
the	  Bank.	  
As	   conditions	   have	   evolved,	   and	   particularly	   with	   the	   introduction	   of	   country	  
ownership,	  conditions	  have	  also	  become	  specific	  to	  a	  country	  rather	  than	  having	  a	  
particular	   model	   applied	   against	   all	   members.	   Conditions	   are,	   therefore,	   State	  
specific	   and	   apply	   only	   to	   one	   Member	   State.	   Although	   they	   constrain	   the	  
behaviour	   of	   that	   member,	   they	   form	   individual	   norms	   that	   apply	   only	   to	   that	  
State	   rather	   than	   a	   general	   normative	   framework	   that	   can	   be	   applied	   in	   all	  
different	   circumstances.	   This,	   therefore,	   prevents	   the	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	  
expectations	  as	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  each	  member	  State	  will	  be	  treated	  when	  a	  loan	  
is	  required.	  Despite	  the	  evolution	  of	  conditionality	  to	  move	  away	  from	  a	  one-­‐size	  
fits	   all	  model	   of	   application,	   there	   remains	   loose	   goals	   that	   conditions	   strive	   to	  
reach	   so	   there	   is	   significant	   cross	   over	   in	   the	   conditions.	   Yet	   in	   each	   specific	  
instance	  of	  borrowing,	  different	   formulations	  of	   the	  conditions	  are	   reached	  that	  
would	   prevent	   one	   generally	   applicable	   framework	   developing	   in	   the	   current	  
formulation.	  
Although	  the	  content	  of	  the	  conditions	  is	  a	  feature	  that	  has	  been	  examined,	  it	   is	  
the	   presence	   of	   conditions	   themselves	   that	   is	   the	   important	   criteria	   in	   the	  
development	   of	   the	   World	   Bank.	   These	   are	   not	   unilateral	   undertakings	   that	   a	  
sovereign	   State	   of	   its	   own	   volition	   undertakes	   for	   its	   citizens	   benefit,	   but	   are	   a	  
prescription	   of	   what	   must	   be	   done	   by	   an	   outside	   actor	   with	   the	   subsequent	  
actions	  of	  the	  State	  judged	  against	  these	  norms.	  The	  Bank	  tells	  its	  member	  States	  
what	   it	   ought	   to	  do,	  both	   to	   initially	   access	   the	   resources	   (prior	   actions)	   and	   to	  
continue	   to	   access	   the	   resources	   throughout	   the	   length	   of	   the	   programme.	   A	  
normative	   relationship	   is	   established,	   of	   the	  Bank	   instructing	   its	  member	   States	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Governance:	  The	  World	  Bank’s	  Experience	  (IBRD	  1994)	  pg.	  vii	  
71	   Carlos	   Santiso,	   ‘Good	   Governance	   and	   Aid	   Effectiveness:	   The	   World	   Bank	   and	  
Conditionality’	  (2001)	  7(1)	  The	  Georgetown	  Public	  Policy	  Review	  1,	  5	  
	   174	  
what	  they	  ought	  to	  do	  and	  then	  enforced	  if	  not	  met	  by	  withholding	  funds,	  which	  
although	  of	  importance	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  was	  not	  a	  relationship	  that	  member	  States	  
agreed	  to	  with	  the	  Bank	  taking	  upon	   itself	  a	  role	  that	  States	  did	  not	  delegate	  to	  
the	  World	  Bank	  to	  undertake.	  
Conditions	   though,	   although	   normative	   orders,	   can	   never	   be	   a	   normative	  
framework	  and	  instead	  are	  only	  norms.	  They	  direct	  and	  control	  the	  behaviour	  and	  
actions	  of	   the	  borrowing	  member	  States	  of	   the	  Bank	  but,	  despite	   the	  consistent	  
presence	  of	  certain	  criteria,	  are	  in	  principle	  country	  specific.	  They	  may	  amount	  to	  
normative	   orders	   and	   communication	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   a	   State,	   but	  
conditions	   can,	   therefore,	   never	   amount	   to	   a	   normative	   framework	   as	   they	   are	  
not	  applied	  against	  all	  borrowing	  member	  States	  equally,	  and	  instead	  are	  applied	  
on	   an	  ad	   hoc	   basis.	   There	   are	   no	   expectations	   that	   can	   be	   relied	   upon	   on	   how	  
they	  are	  applied.	  
	  
4.5	  Presence	  of	  a	  Fixed	  Normative	  Framework:	  Operational	  Policies	  
and	  Bank	  Procedures	  
Conditions	  are	  elements	   that	  directly	  affect	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	  World	  
Bank	   and	   borrowing	  member	   States.	   Although	   they	  may	   be	   norms,	   the	   ad	   hoc	  
nature	   would	   preclude	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   normative	   framework.	   However,	  
the	   relationship	   between	   the	  World	  Bank	   and	  borrowing	  member	   States	   is	   also	  
indirectly	  affected,	  not	  through	  the	  ad	  hoc	  norms,	  but	  through	  the	  rules	  that	  the	  
Bank	  has	  developed	  internally	  to	  govern	  to	  whom	  and	  how	  it	  can	  lend.	  These	  do	  
not,	   in	  the	  Bank’s	  view,	  legally	  bind	  a	  member	  State,	  as	  they	  are	  rules	  governing	  
World	  Bank	  employees,	  but	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  Bank	  staff	  to	  agree	  to	  and	  support	  
projects	  is	  bound	  by	  these	  internal	  Bank	  policies	  and	  procedures.	  
The	  Structural	  Adjustment	  Lending	  of	  the	  1980s	  led	  to	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  affect	  
of	  World	  Bank	  projects.	  This	  evaluation	  was	  driven	  both	  internally	  by	  the	  Bank	  but	  
also	   externally	   by	   NGOs	   and	   a	   limited	   number	   of	  member	   States.	   This	   drive	   to	  
assess	  the	  affects	  pushed	  the	  Bank	  to	  introduce	  “safeguards”,	  as	  means	  via	  which	  
to	   ensure	   that	   Bank	   lending	   did	   not	   have	   certain	   affects	   and	   that	   lending	   met	  
certain	  minimum	   standards	   dictated	   by	   the	   Bank.	   The	   Bank	   itself	   acknowledges	  
these	  safeguards	  as	  ‘the	  basis	  of	  a	  renewed	  partnership	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  its	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borrowers	   –	   a	   partnership	   rooted	   in	   a	   common	   commitment	   to	   environmental	  
and	  social	  sustainability’72.	  
These	  safeguards,	  or	  OPs	  and	  BPs73	  as	  formally	  known,	  are	  contained	  in	  the	  World	  
Bank	  Operations	  Manual.	  This	  is	  a	  manual	  for	  staff	  that	  covers	  all	  aspects	  of	  World	  
Bank	  lending	  and	  how	  each	  operation	  should	  be	  arranged.	  Formally	  the	  OPs	  and	  
BPs	  are	  directions	  from	  Management	  to	  Bank	  staff	  and,	  therefore,	  formally	  do	  not	  
require	  Board	  of	  Directors	  approval	  before	  creation.74	  Initially,	  the	  earlier	  versions	  
of	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  were	  passed	  as	  such,75	  yet	  since	  then	  a	  number	  of	  OPs	  and	  BPs,	  if	  
considered	  controversial,	  have	  been	  circulated	  amongst	  the	  Executive	  Directors.76	  
Although	   formally	   still	   instructions	   from	   Management	   to	   staff,	   the	   current	  
procedure	  is	  that	  ‘policy	  papers	  submitted	  to	  the	  Board	  for	  approval	  that	  address	  
difficult	  or	  controversial	  issues	  normally	  have	  the	  draft	  OP	  attached	  to	  them.’77	  
The	  OPs	  and	  BPs	   apply	   to	   all	   lending	  by	   the	  Bank.	   If	   a	  project	   falls	   into	   an	  area	  
covered	   by	   an	  OP	   or	   BP,	   the	   staff	   are	   required	   to	   ensure	   that	   project	   complies	  
with	  that	  specific	  OP	  or	  BP.	  The	  Operations	  Manual	  has	  evolved	  and	  grown	  over	  
time	   to	   incorporate	   a	  wide	   variety	   of	   subject	   areas.	   The	   current	   version	   of	   the	  
Operations	  Manual	  contains	  seventy	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  including	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  on:	  
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.0	  –	  Piloting	  the	  Use	  of	  Borrower	  
Systems	  to	  Address	  Environmental	  and	  Safeguard	  Issues	  in	  Bank-­‐
Supported	  Projects	  
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.01	  –	  Environmental	  Assessment	  
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.02	  –	  Environmental	  Action	  Plans 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.04	  –	  Natural	  Habitats 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.07	  –	  Water	  Resources	  Management 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.09	  –	  Pest	  Management 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	   http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTSAFEPOL/0,,	  
contentMDK:23277451~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:584435,00.html	  
accessed	  June	  2013.	  
73	  Operational	  Policies	  and	  Bank	  Procedures	  are	  the	  current	  names	  given	  to	  such	  internal	  
Bank	   rules.	   However,	   previously	   they	   were	   known	   as	   Operational	   Manual	   Statements,	  
Operations	  Policy	  Notes	  or	  Operational	  Directives.	  
74	   Ibrahim	   Shihata,	   The	  World	   Bank	   Inspection	   Panel:	   In	   Practice	   (Second	   Edition,	   OUP	  
2000)	  pg.	  42	  
75	  Ibid.	  pg.	  41	  
76	  Ibid.	  pg.	  41-­‐42	  
77	  Ibid.	  pg.	  44	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• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.10	  –	  Indigenous	  Peoples 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.11	  –	  Physical	  Cultural	  Resources 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.12	  –	  Involuntary	  Resettlement 
• Operational	  Policy/Bank	  Procedure	  4.20	  –	  Gender	  and	  Development 
 
These	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   establish	   rules	   that	   must	   be	   followed	   by	   the	   Bank’s	  
management.	  A	  number	  of	  these	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  refer	  directly	  to	  the	  responsibilities	  
of	   management	   and	   are	   addressed	   only	   to	   Bank	   staff.78	   Most	   OPs	   and	   BPs,	  
however,	   refer	  to	  the	   implementation	  of	  projects	  that	  rests	  upon	  other	  external	  
actors,	   in	  most	   cases	   the	  borrowing	  member	   State.	   Still	   in	   these	   circumstances,	  
the	  obligation	  does	  not	   fall	  directly	   fall	  on	   the	  borrowing	  member	  State,	  but	  on	  
management,	   and	   requires	   the	   actions	   that	   the	   Bank	   should	   seek	   from	   its	  
borrowers.79	   These	   actions	   may	   be	   recorded	   in	   the	   Loan	   Agreement	   or	   other	  
accompanying	  documentation.	  Failure	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Bank	  would	  be	  if	  the	  Bank	  
does	  not	  require	  the	  borrower	  to	  implement	  the	  actions	  under	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  or	  
does	  not	  properly	  ensure	  that	  the	  borrowing	  member	  State	  follows	  through	  on	  its	  
commitments.80	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	   See	   for	   example;	   BP	   4.04	   para	   1:	   “Early	   in	   the	   preparation	   of	   a	   project	   proposed	   for	  
Bank	  financing,	  the	  task	  team	  leader	  (TL)	  consults	  with	  the	  Regional	  environmental	  sector	  
unit	  (RESU)	  and,	  as	  necessary,	  with	  the	  Environment	  Department	  (ENV)	  and	  the	  Legal	  Vice	  
Presidency	   (LEG)	   to	   identify	   natural	   habitat	   issues	   likely	   to	   arise	   in	   the	  project.”	   and	  BP	  
4.10	   para	   12:	   “The	   Regional	   vice	   president,	   in	   coordination	   with	   the	   relevant	   country	  
director,	  ensures	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  for	  effective	  supervision	  of	  projects	  affecting	  
Indigenous	   Peoples.	   Throughout	   project	   implementation,	   the	   TTL	   ensures	   that	   Bank	  
supervision	   includes	   appropriate	   social	   science	   and	   legal	   expertise	   to	   carry	   out	   the	  
provisions	   of	   the	   Loan	   Agreement.	   The	   TT	   also	   ascertains	   whether	   the	   relevant	   legal	  
covenants	   related	   to	   the	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   and	   other	   instrument(s)	   are	   being	  
implemented.	  When	   the	   instruments	   are	   not	   being	   implemented	   as	   planned,	   the	   Bank	  
calls	   this	   to	   the	   attention	   of	   the	   borrower	   and	   agrees	  with	   the	   borrower	   on	   corrective	  
measures	  (see	  OP/BP	  13.05,	  Project	  Supervision).”	  
79	  See	  for	  example;	  OP	  4.01	  para	  15:	  “For	  meaningful	  consultations	  between	  the	  borrower	  
and	  project-­‐affected	  groups	  and	  local	  NGOs	  on	  all	  Category	  A	  and	  B	  projects	  proposed	  for	  
IBRD	  or	  IDA	  financing,	  the	  borrower	  provides	  relevant	  material	  in	  a	  timely	  manner	  prior	  to	  
consultation	   and	   in	   a	   form	  and	   language	   that	   are	   understandable	   and	   accessible	   to	   the	  
groups	   being	   consulted”;	   and	   OP	   4.12	   para	   14:	   “Upon	   identification	   of	   the	   need	   for	  
involuntary	   resettlement	   in	   a	   project,	   the	   borrower	   carries	   out	   a	   census	   to	   identify	   the	  
persons	  who	  will	  be	  affected	  by	   the	  project	   (see	   the	  Annex	  A,	  para.	  6(a)),	   to	  determine	  
who	   will	   be	   eligible	   for	   assistance,	   and	   to	   discourage	   inflow	   of	   people	   ineligible	   for	  
assistance.	   The	   borrower	   also	   develops	   a	   procedure,	   satisfactory	   to	   the	   Bank,	   for	  
establishing	   the	   criteria	   by	   which	   displaced	   persons	   will	   be	   deemed	   eligible	   for	  
compensation	  and	  other	  resettlement	  assistance.”	  
80	  Supra	  Note.	  74	  pg.	  47	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For	   the	   first	   time,	   the	   Bank	   has	   begun	   a	   comprehensive	   process	   of	   reviewing	   a	  
number	   of	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs,	   those	   that	   it	   considers	   as	   the	   environmental	   and	  
social	  safeguard	  policies,	  with	  an	  expected	  result	  by	  mid-­‐2014.81	  This	  followed	  an	  
Independent	  Evaluation	  Group	  report	  that	  concluded	  with	  five	  recommendations	  
that	  the	  Bank	  consolidate	  and	  improve	  the	  standard	  of	  the	  current	  OPs	  and	  BPs.82	  	  
The	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   are	   binding	   upon	   staff.83	   Deviation	   can	   only	   occur	   with	   the	  
approval	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  President.84	  OPs	  discussed	  by	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  
can	  only	  be	  deviated	  after	  consultation	  with	   the	  Board.85	  Earlier	  versions	  of	  OPs	  
and	   BPs	   raised	   questions	   over	   whether	   they	   were	   binding	   upon	   staff	   due	   to	  
problems	  in	  their	  implementation,86	  so	  when	  all	  internal	  policies	  were	  changed	  to	  
the	   current	   OPs	   and	   BPs,	   it	   was	   clearly	   established	   that	   these	   policies	   were	  
binding	  upon	  staff.87	  
All	   projects	   must	   meet	   these	   OPs	   and	   BPs,	   and	   when	   they	   do	   not,	   as	   will	   be	  
examined	   in	   the	   subsequent	   chapter,	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   may	   be	   asked	   to	  
investigate	  and	  provide	  recommendations	  on	  corrective	  action.	  
In	  terms	  of	  a	  normative	  framework,	  the	  World	  Bank	  Operations	  Manual	  provides	  
the	  norms	   in	   the	  World	  Bank	  normative	   system.	  The	  OPs	  and	  BPs	   constrain	   the	  
actions	  of	  the	  borrower	  via	  stipulating	  to	  staff	  what	  they	  require	  to	  allow	  lending.	  
If	   a	  member	   State	   does	   not	   conform,	   it	   is	   not	   eligible	   to	   receive	   Bank	   financial	  
assistance.	   These	   rules	   meet	   the	   two	   tests	   identified	   of	   norms	   under	   systems	  
theory,	  in	  that	  they	  provide	  an	  instruction	  on	  what	  an	  actor	  ought	  to	  do	  and	  are	  
enforced	   in	   that	   a	   member	   State	   is	   not	   eligible	   for	   assistance	   if	   they	   are	   not	  
followed.	  
Although	  already	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  One	  that	  a	  number	  of	  these	  policies	  cover	  areas	  
prohibited	   by	   the	   political	   prohibition	   provision	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   Articles,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	   The	  World	   Bank’s	   Safeguard	   Policies	   Proposed	   Review	   and	   Update:	   Approach	   Paper,	  
October	  10,	  2012	  
82	   IEG	   Study	   Series:	   Safeguards	   and	   Sustainability	   Policies	   in	   a	   Changing	   World:	   An	  
Independent	  Evaluation	  of	  World	  Bank	  Group	  Experience	  (IBRD	  2010)	  pg.	  xxi	  -­‐	  xxiii	  
83	  Supra	  Note.	  74	  pg.	  44	  
84	  Ibid.	  pg.	  42-­‐43	  
85	  Ibid.	  pg.	  43	  
86	  Ibid.	  pg.	  42	  
87	  Ibid.	  pg.	  44.	  The	  presence	  of	  Good	  Practices	  should,	  however,	  be	  noted.	  These	  are	  non-­‐
binding	   guidelines	   for	   how	   the	   Bank	   staff	   should	   implement	   projects,	   based	   upon	  
experience	  and	  outlining	  how	  situations	  have	  been	  handled	  on	  previous	  occasions.	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furthermore	   how	   these	   policies	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   expansion	   of	   the	   Bank’s	  
mission,88	   the	   introduction	   of	   these	   policies	   create	   a	   normative	   framework	   in	  
constraining	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   borrowers	   albeit	   indirectly	   by	   directly	  
binding	  the	  Bank’s	  staff.	  This	  leaves	  the	  borrowing	  State	  in	  a	  position	  where	  it	  can	  
no	  longer	  decide	  on	  how	  best	  to	  deal	  with	  domestic	  situations	  but	  must	  conform	  
to	   the	   Bank’s	   norms.	   Ironically,	   the	   Bank,	   whilst	   seeking	   to	   widen	   the	   remit	   of	  
development,	   now	   prevents	   some	   projects	   that	   a	   sovereign	   member	   State	   has	  
sought	  to	  undertake	  that	  would	  aid	  in	  the	  development,	  as	  the	  project	  is	  not	  done	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  Bank	  wishes.	  The	  member	  State	  definition	  of	  what	  amounts	  to	  
development	   and	   how	   best	   to	   achieve	   it	   is	   now	   secondary,	   behind	   what	   the	  
World	  Bank	  itself	  has	  established.	  
This	   normative	   framework	   although	   applying	   to	   the	   total	   of	   the	   Bank’s	  
membership,	   as	   all	  World	  Bank	  member	   States	   can	  ask	   the	  Bank	   for	   assistance,	  
only	   is	   enforced	   against	   those	   who	   request	   assistance.	   It	   is	   the	   request	   for	  
assistance	  that	  allows	  the	  enforcement	  of	  the	  norms	  against	  the	  State.	  	  
	  
4.6	  Development	  of	  a	  Wider	  Normative	  Framework	  
The	  evolution	  and	  use	  of	  conditions	  and	  the	  implementation	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  OPs	  
and	  BPs	  have	  provided	   the	  basis	   for	   a	  normative	   system	  yet	   are	   limited	   to	  only	  
those	   World	   Bank	   member	   States	   that	   avail	   themselves	   of	   Bank	   resources	   as	  
borrowers.	  If	  a	  member	  State	  does	  not	  borrow	  from	  the	  Bank,	  they	  do	  not	  need	  
to	   comply	  with	   any	  of	   these	  norms,	   as	   they	   cannot	  be	   applied	   against	   them.	   In	  
strict	   terms,	   there	   is	   no	   avenue	   of	   communication	   via	   which	   the	   Bank	   can	  
communicate	  on	  what	  a	  member	  State	  ought	  to	  do,	  as	  this	  communication	  occurs	  
only	   through	   the	   Loan	   Agreement.	   Rather	   than	   being	   a	   normative	   system	   that	  
encapsulates	  all	   197	  World	  Bank	  member	  States,	   the	  use	  of	  OPs	  and	  conditions	  
only	   truly	   constrains	   the	  behaviour	  of	   those	   that	  wish	   to	  borrow	   from	   the	  Bank	  
and,	  therefore,	  limits	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  normative	  framework.	  Conditions	  and	  OPs	  
are	  though	  not	  the	  only	  mechanism	  via	  which	  the	  World	  Bank	  seeks	  to	  extend	  its	  
influence.	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  varying	  annual	  reports	  the	  Bank	  seeks	  to	  influence	  
the	  totality	  of	  its	  membership.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  José	  Alvarez,	  ‘International	  Organizations:	  Then	  and	  Now’	  (2006)	  100	  AJIL	  324,	  328	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Reports	  contain	  work	  of	   the	  Bank	  examining	  a	  variety	  of	   issues	   that	  apply	   to	   its	  
membership.	   Each	   issue	   has	   an	   individual	   report	   that	   is	   published,	   usually	  
annually,	   and	   contains	   the	   Bank’s	   analysis	   of	   how	   it	   or	   its	  member	   States	   have	  
acted	  on	  certain	  issues.	  
Since	   1948,	   the	   World	   Bank	   has	   released	   an	   annual	   report	   summarising	   the	  
financial	   and	   lending	   activity	   of	   the	   Bank	   over	   the	   previous	   financial	   year.	  
However,	  reports	  have	  grown	  from	  an	  assessment	  of	  World	  Bank	  activities	  to	  an	  
assessment	  of	  member	  activities.	  
For	  example:	  
• The	   Global	   Monitoring	   Report,	   introduced	   in	   2004,	   monitors	   how	  
successful	  the	  Bank’s	  membership	  is	  in	  implementing	  policies	  and	  actions	  
for	  achieving	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals.	  
• The	  World	  Development	  Reports,	  introduced	  in	  1978,	  focuses	  on	  one	  
specific	  topic	  per	  year,	  chosen	  by	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  President,	  and	  
assesses	  the	  issue	  in	  respect	  of	  member	  States	  responses.	  Topics	  have	  
included	  climate	  change,89	  gender	  equality90	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  State.91	  
• The	  Global	  Economic	  Prospects,	   introduced	   in	  1998	  and	  published	   twice	  
yearly,	   examines	   growth	   trends	   for	   the	   global	   economy	   and	   how	   they	  
affect	  development	  countries.	  
• Policy	   Research	   Reports,	   introduced	   in	   1992,	   focus	   on	   a	  wide	   variety	   of	  
issues	   that	   the	   Bank	   conducts	   research	   into	   concerning	   development	  
policy.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  reports	  can	  be	  on	  Bank	  projects92	  or	  more	  general	  
to	  the	  entire	  membership.93	  
The	   assessment	   of	   non-­‐borrowing	   member	   States	   activities	   is	   a	   growth	   in	   the	  
ability	   of	   the	   Bank	   to	   assess	   the	   performance	   of	   its	   member	   States.	   Although	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  World	  Development	  Report	  2010:	  Development	  and	  Climate	  Change	  (World	  Bank	  2010)	  
90	  World	  Development	  Report	  2012:	  Gender	  Equality	  and	  Development	  (World	  Bank	  2012)	  
91	  World	  Development	  Report	  1997:	   The	  State	   in	  a	  Changing	  World	   (World	  Bank	  &	  OUP	  
1997)	  
92	   See	   for	   example	  Policy	   Research	   Report:	   Assessing	   Aid	   –	  What	  Works,	  What	  Doesn’t,	  
and	  Why	  (World	  Bank	  1998)	  
93	   See	   for	   example	   Policy	   Research	   Report:	   Reforming	   Infrastructure:	   Privatization,	  
Regulation,	  and	  Competition	  (World	  Bank	  2004)	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there	   is	   no	   enforcement	  mechanism	   behind	   the	   benchmarks	   these	   reports	   rely	  
upon,	  the	  reports	  assess	  member	  States’	  activities	  against	  benchmarks	  set	  by	  the	  
Bank.	  The	  reports	  involve	  the	  World	  Bank	  telling	  member	  States	  what	  they	  ought	  
to	  be	  doing,	  yet	  as	  of	  yet	  there	  is	  no	  way	  that	  this	  communication	  is	  enforced.	  
The	  constraints	  on	  State	  behaviour	  are,	   therefore,	  not	   compulsory	  as	  under	   the	  
conditions,	   OPs	   or	   BPs	   but	   still	   involve	   a	   judgment	   of	  Member	   State	   behaviour	  
against	   a	  benchmark.	   The	  process	  of	   creation	  and	   judgment	  against	   rules	   is	   still	  
evolving	  and	  widening	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  introduction	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  the	  Global	  
Financial	  Development	  Report	  in	  2012.	  	  
The	   widening	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   attempts	   to	   apply	   rules	   from	   only	   applying	   to	  
borrowing	  Member	  States	  to	  the	  entire	  membership	  is	  evidence	  of	  an	  important	  
step	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Bank.	  The	  Bank	  is	  attempting	  to	  constrain	  the	  actions	  
of	   its	  membership	   by	   inducing	   the	  members	   to	   behave	   in	   a	  manner	   consistent	  
with	   the	  Bank’s	  own	  established	  policies,	   regardless	  of	  whether	  a	  State	   requires	  
assistance	  or	  not.	  The	  continuing	  evolution	  and	  use	  of	  norms	  created	  by	  the	  Bank	  
demonstrates	  the	  continuing	  expansion	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  framework.	  
However,	  even	  as	  the	  framework	  gets	  wider	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  norms	  actions	  are	  
assessed	  against,	  it	  is	  not	  getting	  deeper	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  assessment.	  The	  Bank	  
seeks	   to	   constrain	   and	   influence	   the	   actions	   of	   its	   membership	   through	   the	  
release	  of	  these	  reports	  yet	   it	   is	  clear	  that	   it	  has	  been	  far	  from	  successful	   in	  this	  
attempt.	   Member	   States	   to	   varying	   degrees	   are	   still	   acting	   in	   a	   fashion	  
inconsistent	  with	   the	   rules	   and	   the	  Bank	  has	  no	  means	   via	  which	   it	   can	   compel	  
member	  States	  to	  obey	  to	  truly	  constrain	  their	  actions.	  This	  is	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  
the	  conditions	  and	  OPs/BPs	  that	  truly	  constrain	  the	  actions	  of	  borrowing	  member	  
States	  as	  they	  are	  compulsory	  to	  achieve	  World	  Bank	  assistance.	  
	  
4.7	  Conclusion	  
The	   development	   into	   a	   normative	   system	   has	   been	   a	   continuing	   evolutionary	  
process	  of	   the	  Bank.	  Whilst	   there	  exists	  no	  defining	  moment	  which	  marked	   the	  
shift	   in	   the	   relationship	   towards	   a	   position	   of	   normative	   control	   when	  
communication	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  its	  membership	  occurred	  along	  an	  ‘ought’	  
line,	   the	   evolutionary	   process	   has	   left	   the	   Bank	   in	   a	   position	   where	   it	   can	   be	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classified	  as	  acting	  in	  a	  normative	  fashion	  in	  its	  current	  work.	  World	  Bank	  norms	  
are	   currently	   applied	   to	   the	   membership	   of	   the	   Bank	   in	   two	   forms,	   both	   to	  
borrowing	   member	   States;	   firstly,	   through	   the	   use	   of	   conditionality,	   the	   Bank	  
creates	  ad	  hoc	  norms	  that	  each	  borrower	  must	  abide	  by;	  secondly,	   the	  OPs	  and	  
BPs	  establish	  a	  normative	  framework	  that	  apply	  to	  borrowing	  member	  States.	  It	  is	  
the	  presence	  of	   this	  normative	   framework,	  where	  actions	  of	  member	  States	  are	  
constrained	  by	  the	  Bank	  and	  enforced	  against	  the	  borrowing	  State,	  which	  creates	  
the	   possibility	   for	   the	   Bank	   to	   have	   evolved	   into	   a	   legal	   system.	   Although	   it	   is	  
directly	  the	  staff’s	  actions	  that	  are	  assessed	  against	  the	  standard,	  it	  is	  the	  member	  
States	  indirectly	  who	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  norms.	  
More	  widely,	  the	  Bank	  has	  moved	  to	  judge	  all	  member	  States’	  actions	  through	  the	  
use	  of	  annual	  reports	  against	  standards	  that	  it	  has	  developed	  itself,	  although	  as	  of	  
yet	  the	  Bank	  has	  no	  mechanism	  via	  which	  it	  can	  ensure	  that	  these	  standards	  are	  
met.	  
The	  competing	  theories	  of	  international	  law	  examined	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  make	  
sense	  in	  law	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  World	  Bank	  is	  carrying	  out	  its	  work.	  Yet	  for	  
systems	  theory	  to	  offer	  solutions	  requires	  more	  than	  a	  normative	  system:	  a	  legal	  
system	  must	  develop.	  The	  development	  of	  a	   legal	   system	  under	   systems	   theory	  
requires	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  including	  a	  normative	  system,	  but	  crucially	  requires	  
the	  presence	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  that	  defines	  actions	  as	  legal/non-­‐legal.	  
The	  Inspection	  Panel	  is	  asserted	  to	  be	  that	  Court-­‐like	  body	  for	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
is	   the	   critical	   juncture	   through	   which	   the	   World	   Bank	   has	   changed	   from	   a	  
normative	   system	   to	   a	   legal	   system.	   This	   issue	   is	   examined	   in	   the	   following	  
chapter.	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Chapter	  Five:	  Development	  into	  an	  Autonomous	  Legal	  System	  
through	  the	  Work	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  
	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
The	  development	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  ruling	  upon	  the	  legal/illegal	  binary	  code	  is	  
seen,	  via	   systems	   theory,	   to	  be	  a	   crucial	   stage	   in	   the	  development	  and	  use	  of	  a	  
legal	   system.	   This	   is	   as	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   body	   that	   rules	   upon	   the	   legal/illegal	  
binary	   code	   allows	   for	   the	   verbalisation	   and	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	  
expectations.	   This	   chapter	   charters	   the	   development	   of	   such	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	  
within	  the	  normative	  system	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  an	  evolution	  that	  has	  pushed	  the	  
World	  Bank	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  	  
With	   little	   fuss	   and	   to	   general	   acclaim	   from	   the	   international	   community,	   the	  
World	   Bank	   on	   22	   September	   1993	   passed	   Resolutions	   93-­‐10	   and	   93-­‐61	   and	  
changed	   the	   way	   that	   citizens	   interact	   with	   international	   organisations.	   The	  
creation	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   heralded	   in	   a	   new	   era	   of	   accountability	   for	  
international	   organizations;	   not	   only	   now	   were	   international	   organizations	  
accountable	   to	   their	   member	   States,	   as	   has	   been	   the	   traditional	   position	   since	  
Westphalia,	   but	   the	   Panel	   establishes	   the	   precedent	   of	   an	   international	  
organization	  being	  directly	  accountable	  to	  the	  citizens	  of	  those	  States.2	  
The	  World	  Bank	  Inspection	  Panel	  investigates	  whether	  the	  World	  Bank	  itself,	  in	  its	  
lending	   to	  member	  States,	  has	   complied	  with	   the	  Operational	  Policies	  and	  Bank	  
Procedures	   that	   bind	   the	   staff	   of	   the	   Bank.	   The	   Board	   of	   Directors	   then	   decide	  
upon	  the	  remedial	  action	  needed	  to	  be	  taken,	  which	  can	   include	  changes	  to	  the	  
conditionality	  up	  to	  and	  including	  stopping	  disbursements	  of	  the	  loan.	  
As	  a	  unique	  element	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	  system,	  a	  sui	  generis	  mechanism	  within	  
international	   organisations	   when	   it	   was	   introduced,	   the	   resolution	   establishing	  
the	   Panel	   is	   analysed	   to	   provide	   how	   the	   Panel	   was	   intended	   to	   work,	   how	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Resolution	  No.	  IBRD	  93-­‐10:	  The	  World	  Bank	  Inspection	  Panel	  (22	  September	  1993)	  and	  
Resolution	  No.	  IDA	  93-­‐6:	  The	  World	  Bank	  Inspection	  Panel	  (22	  September	  1993);	  
hereinafter,	  “Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution”.	  
2	   A	   precedent	   that	   has	   been	   followed	   by	   other	   international	   banks	   such	   as	   the	   Inter-­‐
American	  Development	  Bank	  and	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank.	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procedure	  of	  complaint	   is	  examined	  but	  also	  why	  the	  Panel	  was	  introduced.	  The	  
chapter	  will	  then	  consider	  how	  the	  Panel	  has	  evolved	  into	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body,	  that	  
in	  turn	  has	  allowed	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Bank	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  into	  a	  
legal	   system.	   This	   analysis	   will	   consider	   a	   variety	   of	   cases	   that	   the	   Panel	   has	  
considered	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Panel	  allows	  for	  the	  verbalisation	  
of	   conflicts	   with	   a	   determination	   whether	   an	   action	   is	   legal	   or	   illegal	   and	   the	  
publication	   of	   legal	   communications	   to	   guide	   and	   stabilise	   future	   normative	  
expectations.	   These	   are	   the	   elements	   that	   have	   triggered	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	  
World	  Bank	  into	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system.	  
Although	   the	   chapter	  will	   chart	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   into	   a	  
Court-­‐like	   body	   as	   required	   by	   systems	   theory	   for	   the	   development	   of	   an	  
autonomous	   system,	   the	   assertion	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   under	  
systems	   theory	   is	   not	   the	   same	   assertion	   as	   stipulating	   that	   the	   Panel	   has	  
developed	  into	  a	  Court	  as	  identified	  in	  traditional	  legal	  thinking.	  A	  Court-­‐like	  body	  
for	  systems	  theory	  is	  any	  mechanism	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  normative	  
expectations	   via	   providing	   communication	   on	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide,	   whilst	   a	  
“Court”,	   in	   the	   traditional	   sense	   of	   the	   word,	   has	   greater	   connotations	   and	   a	  
greater	   role	   than	   this.	   As	   such,	   although	   this	   chapter	   will	   argue	   that	   the	  
development	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   meets	   the	   necessary	   criteria	   for	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  under	  systems	  theory,	  it	  will	  not	  argue	  that	  the	  
Panel	  has	  developed	  into	  a	  Court	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense.	  
	  
5.2	  The	  Creation	  of	  the	  Panel	  
It	  is	  widely	  perceived,	  or	  at	  least	  publicly	  presented	  by	  the	  Bank,	  that	  the	  creation	  
of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   was	   an	   outward	   sign	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   attempting	   to	  
make	  it	  self	  more	  accountable	  to	  the	  citizens	  that	  it	  most	  effected.	  The	  policies	  of	  
the	   Bank,	   as	   previously	   examined,	   radically	   expanded	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   to	  
have	  an	  affect	  on	  an	  increasingly	  large	  area	  of	  society.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  Bank	  having	  
a	  profound	   influence	  on	  an	   increasing	   large	  amount	  of	   citizens	  within	  any	  given	  
borrowing	  member	   State.	   The	   rapid	   expansion	   in	   the	   amount	   of	   loans	   given	   by	  
the	   Bank	   also	   multiplied	   the	   amount	   of	   citizens	   the	   Bank’s	   activities	   were	  
affecting.	   With	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   citizens	   coming	   into	   contact	   with	   the	  World	  
Bank	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Panel	   for	   those	   citizens	   to	   have	   a	   voice,	   the	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impression	   presented	   was	   that	   the	   Bank	   was	   actively	   attempting	   to	   bring	   its	  
decisions	  closer	  to	  those	  who	  it	  was	  affecting.	  	  
However,	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Panel	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  an	  internal	  event	  but	  also	  
to	   an	   external	   event,	   the	   Morse	   Commission	   Report3	   and	   the	   renewal	   of	   the	  
World	  Bank’s	  funding	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Congress	  respectively.	  
The	  Morse	  Commission	  Report	  arose	  due	  to	  issues	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  two	  
projects	   on	   the	   Narmada	   River	   in	   India.4	   The	   projects	   resulted	   in	   a	   negative	  
environmental	   impact	  and	  resulted	  in	  vastly	  more	  people	  having	  to	  be	  relocated	  
than	   originally	   foreseen.	   As	   worldwide	   press	   attention	   turned	   to	   the	   poor	  
implementation	   of	   these	   projects,	   the	   World	   Bank	   commissioned	   a	   report	   to	  
conduct	  an	  assessment	  as	   to	   the	  projects	   implementation	  of	   the	  Bank’s	  OPs,	  or	  
Operational	  Directives	  as	  they	  were	  then	  known,	  in	  relation	  to	  indigenous	  peoples	  
and	  environmental	  concerns.	  	  
The	   report	   concluded	   that	   the	   Bank	   had	   failed	   to	   adequately	   incorporate	   the	  
Bank’s	  policies	   into	   the	  project	  agreements	  and	   then	  had	  subsequently	   failed	   to	  
ensure	  that	  those	  policies	  that	  had	  been	  introduced	  had	  been	  implemented.5	  This	  
combined	  with	   an	   earlier	   internal	   report	   that	   had	  been	   leaked,	   the	  Wapenhans	  
Report,	   that	   argued	   the	   Bank	   had	   an	   approval	   culture	   where	   staff	   were	   less	  
concerned	  with	  having	  conditions	  met	  than	  with	  getting	  new	  loans	  approved,6	  to	  
create	  considerable	  internal	  debate	  within	  the	  Bank	  and	  a	  drive	  for	  change.	  
The	  two	  reports	  did,	  however,	  create	  external	  forces	  that	  would	  have	  an	  influence	  
on	  the	  Bank	  in	  creating	  the	  Panel.	  External	  pressure	  from	  both	  NGOs	  and	  member	  
States	   had	   been	   rising	   on	   the	   World	   Bank	   for	   the	   previous	   decade	   for	   a	   poor	  
environmental	   and	   social	   record.	   NGOs	   repeatedly	   pushed	   for	   better	  
mechanisms,	   both	   for	   investigation	   of	   the	   Bank	   and	   also	   for	   accountability	  
purposes,	   and	  when	   the	   Bank	   did	   not	   respond,	   the	  NGOs	   turned	   to	   the	  United	  
States	   Congress.	   Congress	   became	   frustrated	   with	   Bank	   efforts	   to	   remedy	  
situations	  after	  the	  problem	  had	  occurred	  rather	  than	  deal	  with	  issues	  up	  front.	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Bradford	  Morse	  &	  Thomas	  Berger,	  Sardar	  Sarovar:	  The	  Report	  of	  the	  Independent	  Review	  
(Resource	  Futures	  International	  1992)	  
4	  Narmada	  River	  Development	  (Gujarat)	  Sardar	  Sarovar	  Dam	  and	  Power	  Project,	  and	  the	  
Narmada	  River	  Development	  (Gujarat)	  Water	  Delivery	  and	  Drainage	  Project	  
5	  Supra	  Note.	  3,	  pg.	  353-­‐4	  
6	  Effective	  Implementation:	  Key	  to	  Development	  Impact	  (R92-­‐125),	  3	  November	  1992	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1990	   and	  1991,	   Congress	   imposed	   restrictions	   on	  money	   for	   the	  Bank.	   In	   1993,	  
Congress	  conditioned	  the	  appropriation	  of	  $30	  million	  upon	  the	   implementation	  
of	  public	  access	  to	  the	  Global	  Environmental	  Facility.	  When	  this	  did	  not	  happen,	  
Congress	   diverted	   funds	   to	   the	   Agency	   for	   International	   Development.	   After	  
lobbying	  by	  both	   the	  Bank	  and	  other	  member	  States,	  Congress	   finally	  made	   the	  
United	   States	   payment	   to	   replenish	   the	   IDA	   conditional	   on	   the	   creation	   of	   an	  
oversight	  system	  at	  the	  Bank.	  
At	   this	   point	   in	   time	  of	   the	  history	   of	   the	  World	  Bank,	   this	   thesis	   has	   identified	  
that	   the	   Bank	   had	   developed	   into	   a	   normative	   system	   by	   the	   introduction	   of	  
Operational	   Policies	   and	   Bank	   Procedures,	   but	   due	   to	   lacking	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	  
that	  allows	  for	  the	  verbalisation	  of	  conflicts	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide,	  had	  not	  
yet	   amounted	   to	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   outside	  
influences	   are	   not	   ones	   of	   structural	   couplings,	   as	   the	   system	   was	   not	  
operationally	  closed,	  but	  of	  direct	   influence	  on	  the	  Bank.	  As	  the	  system	  was	  not	  
closed,	   the	   changes	   do	   not	   need	   to	  manifest	   themselves	   from	  within	   the	   Bank	  
itself	  (although	  that	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  apparent	  internal	  push	  for	  change).	  
In	   response,	   to	  both	   the	   internal	   and	  external	   forces,	   the	  Executive	  Directors	  of	  
the	  IBRD	  and	  the	  IDA	  responded	  by	  passing	  Resolution	  No.	  93-­‐10	  and	  Resolution	  
No.	  93-­‐6	  respectively,	  creating	  the	  Inspection	  Panel.	  
	  
5.3	  Analysis	  of	  Resolutions	  93-­‐10	  and	  93-­‐6	  	  
The	  Panel	  governs	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  IBRD	  and	  the	  IDA	  and,	  upon	  requests	  from	  
citizens	  who	  are	  effected	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  investigates	  whether	  
the	  staff	  of	  the	  Bank	  have	  followed	  the	  Operational	  Policies	  and	  Bank	  Procedures	  
lain	   down	   in	   the	   World	   Bank	   Operations	   Manual.	   As	   the	   IBRD	   and	   IDA	   are	  
separate	   legal	   entities,	   separate	   resolutions	   had	   to	   be	   passed	   by	   the	   respective	  
bodies	   for	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   bodies	   to	   fall	   into	   the	   Panel’s	   jurisdiction.	   Two	  
subsequent	   clarifications	   of	   the	   original	   resolutions	   have	   been	   issued	   by	   the	  
Executive	  Directors.7	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Review	  of	  the	  Resolution	  Establishing	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  1996	  Clarification	  of	  Certain	  
Aspects	  of	   the	  Resolution	  (1996)	  and	  1999	  Clarification	  of	   the	  Board’s	  Second	  Review	  of	  
the	  Inspection	  Panel	  (1999)	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A	   brief	   analysis	   of	   these	   resolutions	   that	   established	   the	   Panel	   is	   necessary	   to	  
provide	   the	   context	   in	   which	   this	   Panel	   has	   developed	   into	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	  
under	  systems	  theory.	  
5.3.1	  The	  Powers	  Given	  to	  the	  Panel	  
The	  Inspection	  Panel	  does	  not	  follow	  the	  model	  of	  a	  traditional	  Court	  but	  instead	  
acts	   along	   a	   process	   similar	   to	   judicial	   review.	   The	   party	   who	   brings	   the	   case	  
before	   the	  Panel	  must	  demonstrate	   that	   its	   rights	  or	   interests	  have	  been	  or	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  directly	  affected	  by	  an	  action	  or	  omission	  of	  the	  Bank	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  
failure	  of	  the	  Bank	  to	  follow	  its	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  design,	  appraisal	  
and/or	  implementation	  of	  a	  project	  financed	  by	  the	  bank	  as	  long	  as	  the	  failure	  will	  
bring	  about	  a	  material	  adverse	  effect.8	  	  
This	  explicit	  power	  given	  to	  the	  Panel	  in	  the	  resolution	  limits	  the	  criteria	  in	  which	  
a	  case	  can	  come	  before	  the	  Panel.	  A	  person	  unhappy	  with	  the	  Bank’s	  decision	  to	  
give	  a	   loan	  cannot	  question	  the	  actual	  policies	  or	  procedures	  that	  the	  Bank	  staff	  
use	  when	  determining	  the	  viability	  of	  a	   loan,	  only	   if	   the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  
have	   been	   followed.9	   The	   complaining	   party	   must	   also	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  
failure	   to	   follow	   the	   policies	   and	   procedures	   directly	   affects	   their	   interests	   and	  
that	   the	   failure	   to	   follow	  them	  affected	   the	  decision.	  The	  Panel	   should	  seek	   the	  
advice	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  legal	  department	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  rights	  and	  
obligations	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  complaint.	  
The	  Executive	  Directors	  further	  sought	  to	  limit	  the	  requests	  that	  could	  go	  before	  
the	  Panel	  by	  excluding	  a	  number	  of	  forms	  of	  complaints:	  
1) Complaints	   regarding	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   borrowing	   State	   which	   do	   not	  
involve	  the	  action	  or	  omission	  of	  the	  Bank.10	  This	  is	  the	  Bank’s	  attempt	  to	  
not	   infringe	   upon	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   borrowing	   State	   by	   excluding	  
from	   the	   Panel’s	   jurisdiction	   any	   decision	   that	   is	   solely	   the	   borrowing	  
members.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Point	  12	  
9	   Further	   clarified	   in	   Review	   of	   the	   Resolution	   Establishing	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   1996	  
Clarification	  of	  Certain	  Aspects	  of	  the	  Resolution	  (1996)	  
10	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Point	  14	  (a)	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2) Complaints	  in	  relation	  to	  procurement	  decisions	  by	  Bank	  borrowers	  from	  
suppliers	   of	   goods	   or	   services	   that	   have	   been	   affected	   by	   Bank	   loans.11	  
The	  Bank	  already	  has	  procedures	  in	  place	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  complaints.	  
3) Requests	   for	   investigations	   that	  are	   filed	  either	  after	   the	   closing	  date	  of	  
the	  loan	  or	  after	  the	  loan	  has	  been	  substantially	  disbursed	  (classes	  as	  95%	  
disbursal).12	  This	  is	  to	  prevent	  frivolous	  regarding	  decisions	  that	  the	  Panel	  
or	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  can	  do	  little	  about	  as	  the	  loan	  has	  already	  been	  
disbursed.	  
4) Complaints	   that	   have	   already	   been	   dealt	   with	   by	   the	   Panel	   unless	   new	  
evidence	  has	  come	  to	  light.13	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  Panel	  must	  be	  satisfied	  that	  the	  Management	  of	  the	  Bank	  has	  already	  
heard	   the	   complaint	   in	   question	   and	   has	   failed	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   it	   has	  
followed,	   or	   is	   taking	   adequate	   steps	   to	   follow	   the	   Bank’s	   policies	   and	  
procedures.14	   This	   gives	   the	   Panel	   the	   equivalency	   of	   an	   appeals	   process	   rather	  
than	  the	  direct	  avenue	  for	  a	  complaint.	  	  
The	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  can	  receive	  these	  complaints	  is	  also	  of	  
huge	   significance.	   An	   affected	   party	   (two	   or	   more	   persons	   who	   share	   some	  
common	  interests	  or	  concerns)15	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  borrower	  is	  eligible	  to	  send	  
requests	   directly	   to	   the	   Panel;16	   either	   personally	   or	   through	   their	   local	  
representative.17	   For	   the	   first	   time	   in	   international	   law,	   the	   affected	   party	   does	  
not	  have	   to	   seek	  a	   remedy	   through	   their	  government	  or	   seek	  permission	  of	   the	  
government	  to	  speak	  to	  the	  Panel.	  	  
5.3.2	  Membership	  of	  the	  Panel	  
The	   Panel	   consists	   of	   three	   permanent	  members	   of	   different	   nationalities	   from	  
Bank	  member	  States18	  with	  each	  member	  holding	  a	  maximum	  term	  of	  five	  years.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Ibid.	  Point	  14	  (b)	  
12	  Ibid.	  Point	  14	  (c)	  
13	  Ibid.	  Point	  14	  (d)	  
14	  Ibid.	  Point	  13	  
15	  Supra	  Note.	  9	  
16	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Point	  12	  
17	   In	   the	   exceptional	   cases	   where	   a	   local	   representative	   is	   not	   available,	   another	  
representative	  can	  be	  used	  with	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  approval.	  
18	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Point	  2	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A	  member	  can	  never	  be	  re-­‐elected	  after	  a	  term	  expires	  and	  the	  terms	  expire	  on	  a	  
rotation	  so	  that	  only	  one	  vacancy	  needs	  filling	  at	  a	  time.19	  
A	   set	   of	   criteria	   is	   examined	   in	   the	   search	   for	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Panel.	   ‘(T)heir	  
ability	   to	   deal	   thoroughly	   and	   fairly	   with	   the	   requests	   brought	   to	   them,	   their	  
integrity	   and	   their	   independence	   from	   the	   Bank’s	   Management,	   and	   their	  
exposure	  to	  developmental	  issues	  and	  to	  living	  conditions	  in	  developing	  countries.	  
Knowledge	  and	  experience	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  operations	  will	  also	  be	  desirable.’20	  The	  
first	  members	   originally	   chosen	   for	   the	   Panel	   all	   came	   from	   a	   background	   that	  
heavily	   fulfilled	   these	   criteria	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   controversy	   with	   one	   being	   a	  
former	   President	   of	   the	   European	   Investment	   Bank,21	   another	   being	   a	   former	  
head	  of	   policy	   at	   the	  U.S.	   Agency	   for	   International	  Development22	   and	   the	   final	  
member	  being	  a	  former	  Minister	  of	  Natural	  Resources	  for	  Costa	  Rica.23	  
Certain	   provisos	   are	   in	   place	   to	   attempt	   to	   prevent	   a	   bias	   being	   present	   in	   the	  
Panel	   towards	   the	   Bank.	   All	   staff	   members,	   interpreted	   in	   the	   widest	   possible	  
means,	   are	   ineligible	   to	   serve	   on	   the	   Panel	   for	   a	   two	   year	   period	   following	  
employment	  with	  the	  Bank.24	  This	   is	  an	  interesting	  area	  in	  that	   it	   is	  desirable	  for	  
members	   of	   the	   Panel	   to	   have	   inner	   working	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Bank’s	  
operations,25	  which	  would	  be	  best	   learnt	   through	  actually	  working	   for	   the	  Bank,	  
but	  the	  appearance	  and	  dangers	  of	  possible	  bias	  have	  outweighed	  this	  and	  a	  time	  
frame	  of	  ineligibility	  has	  been	  introduced.	  	  
Some	  further	  steps	  to	  avoid	  the	  appearance	  of	  bias	  are	  present	  in	  the	  resolutions.	  
A	   Panel	   member	   shall	   be	   disqualified	   in	   participating	   in	   the	   hearing	   and	  
investigation	  of	  a	  request	  that	  he	  has	  a	  personal	  interest	  in	  or	  has	  had	  significant	  
involvement	  in	  any	  capacity.26	  Also	  members	  of	  the	  Panel	  can	  only	  be	  removed	  by	  
a	   decision	   of	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   for	   cause	   and	   not	   for	   any	   other	   reason.27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Ibid.	  Point	  3	  
20	  Ibid.	  Point	  4	  
21	  Mr.	  Ernst	  Gunther	  Bröder	  
22	  Mr.	  Richard	  E.	  Bissell	  
23	   Mr.	   Alvaro	   Umaña-­‐Quesada.	   Information	   on	   all	   of	   the	   former	   members	   of	   the	  
Inspection	   Panel	   can	   be	   found	   at	   http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/	  
EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:20205101~menuPK:434360~pagePK:64129751~piP
K:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html	  accessed	  September	  2013.	  
24	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Point	  5	  
25	  Ibid.	  Point	  4	  
26	  Ibid.	  Point	  6	  
27	  Ibid.	  Point	  8	  
	   189	  
However,	   the	   most	   comprehensive	   provision	   in	   the	   resolutions	   to	   avoid	   the	  
appearance	  of	  bias	  by	  the	  Panel	  is	  that	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Panel	  can	  never	  again	  be	  
employed	  by	  the	  Bank	  following	  the	  end	  of	  their	  term.28	  This	  again	  broaches	  the	  
dichotomy	   between	   competence	   and	   avoiding	   the	   appearance	   of	   bias	   but	   the	  
result	   is	   the	   only	   logical	   result	   available.	   Although	   this	   provision	  might	   exclude	  
certain	   people	  who	  might	   be	   best	   for	   the	   job	   of	   a	   Panel	  member,	   anyone	  who	  
ever	   has	   intentions	   to	   work	   for	   the	   Bank	   again,	   a	   decision	   to	   side	   with	   Bank’s	  
management	  would	  always	  be	  questioned	  if	  a	  Panel	  member	  took	  a	  position	  with	  
the	  Bank	  after	  his	  term	  had	  ended.	  
The	   final	   provision	   related	   to	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   members	   of	   the	   Panel	   is	  
related	   to	   the	   Chairperson	   of	   the	   Panel.	   The	   members	   themselves	   elect	   a	  
chairperson	   of	   the	   Panel	   for	   a	   period	   of	   one	   year29	   and	   he	   is	   the	   only	   full	   time	  
member	  with	  the	  others	  only	  working	  when	  a	  case	  is	  before	  the	  Panel.	  However	  
once	   a	   case	   is	   before	   the	   Panel	   the	   Chairperson’s	   role	   is	   largely	   procedural	   in	  
relation	  to	  the	  handling	  of	  complaints	  and	  will	  be	  examined	  further	  on.	  
5.3.3	  Procedure	  of	  a	  Complaint	  
The	  resolutions	  explain	  how	  a	  complaint	  should	  be	  set	  out	  and	  the	  procedure	  the	  
Panel	  should	  take	  upon	  receipt	  of	  a	  complaint.	  The	  request	  should	  be	  in	  writing,	  
include	  all	  relevant	  facts	  and	  express	  the	  harm	  either	  suffered	  or	  that	  is	  going	  to	  
be	  suffered	  by	  the	  parties.30	  The	  request	  for	  inspection	  must	  also	  detail	  the	  steps	  
the	  requesting	  party	  has	  taken	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  with	  the	  Bank’s	  management	  
and	  their	  response	  to	  these	  overtures.31	  	  
The	   Bank	   makes	   all	   of	   the	   reports	   issued	   by	   either	   the	   Panel	   or	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   complaint	   public	   after	   the	   respective	   stage	   of	   the	  
complaint	   is	   complete.32	   This	   is	   an	   attempt	   by	   the	   Bank	   to	   increase	   the	  
transparency	   of	   its	   operations.	  Not	   only	   now	  do	   people	   have	   an	   insight	   and	   an	  
avenue	  for	  complaint	  against	  the	  Bank	  (even	  only	  in	  limited	  circumstances),	  they	  
can	  be	  sure	  to	  know	  the	  true	  results	  of	  the	  investigations.	  However,	  the	  true	  value	  
of	  this	  provision	  comes	  into	  light	  when	  there	  are	  disagreements	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Ibid.	  Point	  10	  
29	  Ibid.	  Point	  7	  
30	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Point	  16	  
31	  Ibid.	  
32	  Ibid.	  Point	  25	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complaint	   between	   the	   various	  branches	  of	   the	  Bank.	   If	   the	   Executive	  Directors	  
disagree	  with	  the	  Panel’s	  recommendations,	  a	  report	  has	  to	  be	  released	  detailing	  
the	   reasons	  why.	  Also	   any	   reports	  made	  by	   the	  General	   Counsel	   of	   the	  Bank	   in	  
relation	  to	  a	  claim	  must	  be	  made	  public	  “promptly”.33	  The	  Panel	  must	  also	  publish	  
a	  yearly	  report	  concerning	  its	  activities.34	  	  
These	   publications	   of	   reports	   are	   crucial	   when	   a	   systems	   theory	   perspective	  
considers	  the	  Panel.	  If	  one	  of	  the	  requirements	  for	  a	  Court	  under	  systems	  theory	  
is	   that	   it	   provides	   for	   the	   publication	   of	   legal	   communications	   to	   guide	   and	  
stabilise	  future	  normative	  expectations,	  it	  is	  essential,	  if	  the	  Panel	  is	  seen	  to	  fulfil	  
this	  function,	  for	  the	  decisions	  that	  it	  issues	  to	  be	  public,	  which	  these	  provisions	  of	  
publication	  ensure.	  
Once	   a	   complaint	   has	  been	   received,	   the	  Chairperson	  of	   the	  Panel	  must	   inform	  
the	   Executive	   Directors	   and	   the	   President	   of	   the	   Bank	   “promptly”35	   and	   the	  
Management	  of	  the	  Bank	  should	  provide	  the	  Panel	  their	  response	  to	  the	  request	  
within	   21	   days	   of	   the	   complaint36	   except	   for	   reasons	   of	   force	   majeure.	   The	  
Management	  should	  provide	  evidence	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  either:	  
a) It	   has	   complied	   with	   the	   policies	   or	   procedures	   that	   have	   been	  
questioned.	  
b) It	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  are	  ‘serious	  failures	  attributable	  exclusively	  to	  
its	  own	  actions	  or	  omissions	  in	  complying’	  but	  that	  it	  will	  comply	  with	  the	  
relevant	  policies	  or	  procedures	  before	  continuing	  any	  further.	  
c) Any	   failures	   that	  may	  exist	  are	   ‘exclusively	  attributable	   to	   the	  borrower’	  
or	  that	  other	  external	  factors	  to	  the	  Bank	  have	  caused	  the	  failures.	  
d) The	  serious	  failures	  that	  may	  exist	  are	  attributable	  to	  both	  the	  Bank	  and	  
the	  borrower	  or	  other	  external	  factors.37	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Supra	  Note.	  9.	  However,	  the	  Board	  can	  decide	  to	  withhold	  General	  Council	  opinions	  in	  
specific	  cases.	  
34	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Point	  26	  
35	  Ibid.	  Point	  17	  
36	  Ibid.	  Point	  18	  
37	  1999	  Clarification	  of	  the	  Board’s	  Second	  Review	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  (1999)	  Point	  3
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In	   the	   case	   of	   (b)	   or	   (d),	  Management	  must	   provide	   in	   their	   response	   evidence	  
that	  intends	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  under	  examination.38	  The	  Panel	  must	  
then	  satisfy	  itself	  whether	  this	  evidence	  is	  adequate.39	  
The	   Panel	   should	   then	  within	   a	   further	   21	   days	   of	   the	  Management’s	   response	  
make	  a	  recommendation	  to	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  on	  whether	  an	  investigation	  is	  
warranted	  and	  come	  to	  an	  assessment	  over	  whether	  they	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  
Management’s	   position	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   apportioning	   of	   blame.40	   The	   Panel	  
should	  take	  into	  account	  all	  of	  the	  criteria	  already	  mentioned	  in	  deciding	  whether	  
to	   recommend	   a	   course	   of	   action.41	   In	   making	   their	   decision	   over	   whether	   an	  
investigation	   should	   take	  place,	   the	   Executive	  Directors	   should	  not	   consider	   the	  
relative	  merits	  of	   the	  claim	  but	   instead	   focus	  upon	  whether	   the	  claim	  fulfils	   the	  
technical	   requirements	   needed	   for	   a	   claim	   examined	   earlier.	   If	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	  deem	  that	  an	  investigation	  is	  due,	  the	  Chairperson	  of	  the	  Panel	  should	  
designate	  one	  or	  more	  of	   the	  members	  of	   the	  Panel	   to	  be	   the	   lead	   inspector	   in	  
the	  case	  and	  set	  a	  time	  period	  for	  when	  the	  report	  of	  the	  inspector	  is	  due.42	  
The	  inspector	  for	  the	  Panel	  has	  been	  given	  wide	  powers	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  dealings	  
with	   the	   Bank’s	   staff.	   They	   have	   access	   to	   ‘all	   staff	   who	   may	   contribute	  
information	   and	   to	   all	   pertinent	   Bank	   record’	   as	   well	   as	   access	   to	   the	   Director	  
General,	  Operations	  Evaluation	  Department	  and	  the	  Internal	  Auditor	  if	  required.43	  
This	  is	  a	  move	  by	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  to	  give	  the	  appearance	  of	  transparency	  
in	  the	  Panel’s	  investigation:	  if	  they	  can	  access	  all	  of	  the	  information	  required	  they	  
should	  be	  able	  to	  come	  to	  the	  correct	  decision.	  This	  is,	  however,	  undermined,	  as	  
in	  relation	  to	  the	  dealings	  the	  Panel	  can	  have	  with	  the	  respective	  member	  State,	  
the	  powers	  given	  to	  the	  Panel	  to	  investigate	  complaints	  are	  far	  more	  limited.	  	  
The	  borrowing	  State,	  and	  the	  Executive	  Director	  representing	  that	  country	  for	  the	  
loan,	   should	   be	   consulted	   on	   the	   investigation,	   both	   before	   the	   Panel	  makes	   a	  
recommendation	   for	   an	   investigation	  and	  during	   the	   course	  of	   the	   investigation	  
itself.	  However,	  an	  inspection	  within	  the	  borrowing	  State	  itself	  can	  only	  take	  place	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  Point	  5	  
40	  Ibid.	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  Panel	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  Point	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  Ibid.	  Point	  20	  
43	  Ibid.	  Point	  21	  
	   192	  
with	   the	   borrowing	   State’s	   permission.44	   	   This	   is	   a	   conflict	   of	   interest	   for	   the	  
borrowing	   country.	   The	   Panel	   has	   the	   power	   to	   recommend	   to	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  loan	  if	  it	  is	  deemed	  that	  the	  Bank	  did	  not	  follow	  
its	  own	  policies	  and	  procedures	  and	   the	  borrowing	  State	  knows	   this.	  Asking	   the	  
State	  for	  its	  permission	  is	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  attempt	  to	  preserve	  the	  consent	  
of	  the	  borrowing	  State.	  	  
After	  an	  investigation	  is	  complete,	  the	  Panel	  should	  reach	  a	  consensus	  on	  a	  course	  
of	  action	  and	  make	  a	  recommendation	  to	  the	  Executive	  Directors.	  If	  a	  consensus	  
cannot	  be	  reached	  than	  the	  recommendation	  should	  contain	  both	  a	  majority	  and	  
a	   minority	   opinion.45	   The	   report	   to	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   and	   the	   President	  
should	  include	  all	  relevant	  facts	  and	  include	  with	  the	  Panel’s	  findings	  on	  whether	  
the	  Bank	   staff	   had	   complied	  with	   all	   the	   relevant	  OPs	   and	  BPs	   that	  were	  under	  
consideration.46	  The	  report	  focuses	  only	  open	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  a	  ‘serious	  
failure’	  by	  the	  Bank	  to	  observe	  the	  OPs	  or	  BPs	  under	  question	  by	  the	  requesters	  
and	   not	   any	   other	   failures	   there	  might	   have	   been	   with	   the	   loan.47	   As	   with	   the	  
initial	  decision	  to	  decide	  if	  an	  investigation	  is	  warranted,	  the	  Panel	  should	  look	  at	  
whether	  any	  failures	  are	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Bank	  only,	  the	  borrowing	  State,	  
or	   a	   combination	   of	   both48	   and	   only	   comment	   upon	   failures	   that	   are	   the	  
responsibility	   of	   the	   Bank.	   Any	   failures	   that	   are	   either	   partially	   or	   fully	   the	  
responsibility	   of	   the	  borrowing	   State	   should	  be	   acknowledged	   in	   the	   report	   but	  
‘without	  entering	  into	  analysis	  of	  the	  material	  adverse	  effect	  itself	  or	  its	  causes.’49	  
In	   practice,	   the	   Panel	   has	   found	   it	   difficult	   to	   separate	   and	  distinguish	   between	  
apportioning	   the	   blame	   and	   although	   in	   theory	   this	   process	   would	   seem	   to	  
preserve	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  State	  in	  this	  context,	  in	  practice	  it	  has	  been	  more	  
difficult	  to	  apply.	  	  
In	   the	   report	   to	   the	   Board,	   the	   Panel	   must	   examine	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	  
failure	  to	  follow	  the	  correct	  procedures	  or	  policies.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  “material	  adverse	  
effect”	  on	  the	  citizens	  bringing	  the	  claim	  then	  this	  is	  of	  greater	  significance	  than	  if	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there	  has	  been	  no	  effect.	  The	  criteria	  the	  Bank	  has	  laid	  down	  for	  examining	  what	  
is	  a	  “material	  adverse	  effect”	  is	  of	  interest.	  
The	   base	   line	   used	   for	   comparison	   is	   the	   “without-­‐project	   situation”:50	   the	  
situation	  the	  claimants	  were	  in	  before	  the	  loan	  was	  taken.	  This	  though	  seems	  to	  
involve	  the	  Panel	  making	  an	  assessment	  on	  the	  general	  worth	  of	  the	  project.	  To	  
see	   the	   position	   of	   the	   affected	   party	   before	   and	   after	   the	   loan	   was	   approved	  
naturally	   involves	  seeking	   the	  difference	   in	  circumstances	  as	  of	   the	  result	  of	   the	  
loan.	  Combined	  with	  assessing	   if	   the	  effect	   is	  “material”	   this	  gives	  the	  Panel	   the	  
power	  to	  determine	  the	  loans	  general	  worth	  for	  the	  people	  involved	  and	  make	  a	  
recommendation	   to	   the	   Board	   over	   whether	   the	   loan	   should	   continue	   to	   be	  
disbursed.	  A	  clear	  exercise	  of	  a	  governance	  function	  being	  executed	  by	  the	  Panel.	  
If	   the	  Bank	   truly	  has	   the	  aim	  of	  making	   itself	  more	  accountable	  and	   to	   force	   its	  
staff	   to	  correctly	   follow	   its	  procedures,	   then	  the	  assessment	  over	  whether	  there	  
has	  been	  a	  “material	  adverse	  effect”	  on	  the	  citizens	  bringing	  the	  claim	  should	  be	  
of	   little	  consequence	  to	  the	  Bank.	   Instead	  the	  Panel	  should	  make	  an	  assessment	  
on	  what	  would	  have	  happened	  if	  the	  policies	  had	  been	  followed	  by	  Management	  
and	  make	  this	  clear	  to	  the	  Board	  and	  the	  borrowing	  State.	  
The	   Bank	   itself	   seems	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   difficulty	   of	   the	   “material	   adverse	  
effect”	   approach	   in	   its	   clarification	  of	   the	   resolution	  with	   the	  acknowledgement	  
that	   little	   information	  might	  be	  available	  and	  assessing	   the	  effect	  of	  a	  breach	   in	  
the	  complexity	  of	  a	  project	  is	  difficult.51	  It	  has,	  however,	  persisted	  with	  it.	  
Subsequently,	   the	   Management	   has	   a	   further	   six	   weeks	   to	   respond	   to	   the	  
recommendations	   of	   the	   Panel	   by	   issuing	   a	   report	   to	   the	   Executive	   Directors	  
detailing	   its	   recommendations	   for	  actions	  that	  should	  be	  taken	   in	  response.52	  At	  
this	  stage	  the	  Board	  makes	  a	  decision	  on	  what	  actions	  should	  be	  taken	  in	  respect	  
of	  the	  complaint	  and	  informs	  the	  affected	  party	  of	  the	  result	  of	  the	  investigation	  
and	   the	   action	   taken,	   if	   any.53	   Here	   one	   of	   the	   weaknesses	   or	   strengths	  
(depending	   on	   how	   you	   look	   at	   it)	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   as	   it	   was	   intended	  
becomes	  apparent.	  The	  Panel	  can	  only	  make	  recommendations	  to	  the	  Executive	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Directors:	  their	  decisions	  are	  non-­‐binding.	   It	   is	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  who	  must	  
make	  a	  decision	  on	  if	  an	  investigation	  should	  take	  place	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (after	  the	  
Panel’s	   recommendation)	   and	   if	   there	   should	   be	   any	   consequences	   after	   an	  
investigation	  is	  complete	  (after	  the	  Panel’s	  recommendation).	  
The	   Inspection	   Panel	   and	   the	   way	   it	   works	   are	   a	   revolutionary	   step	   in	   the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  borrowing	  State	  
have	   a	   voice	   within	   the	   Bank	   to	   air	   their	   concerns,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   only	   in	   limited	  
circumstances.	   Although	   it	   can	   only	   provide	   recommendations	   to	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	  on	  a	  course	  of	  action	   in	  a	  claim,	  these	  “recommendations”	  have	  had	  a	  
great	   effect	   on	   the	   Board’s	   actions	   and	   carry	   a	   weight	   that	   is	   more	   than	  
persuasive.	  
	  
5.4	  Systems	  Theory	  and	  the	  Panel	  
Systems	  theory	  has	  been	  proposed	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  understanding	  to	  frame	  in	  law	  the	  
actions	   of	   the	   World	   Bank.	   The	   essentialist	   analysis	   conducted	   identified	   the	  
requirement	  of	   a	  Court-­‐like	  body	   ruling	  upon	   the	   legal/illegal	  divide	  as	  a	   critical	  
component	  to	  drive	  the	  evolution	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  
The	   Inspection	   Panel	   is	   proposed	   as	   this	   Court-­‐like	   body	   for	   the	   World	   Bank.	  
Systems	   theory	   itself	   will	   be	   utilised	   upon	   the	  World	   Bank	   and	   specifically	   the	  
Inspection	   Panel	   to	   determine	   if	   the	   World	   Bank	   has	   developed	   into	   an	  
autonomous	   legal	   system	   under	   systems	   theory.	   As	   the	   operative	   language	  
(communication	  along	  a	  legal/illegal	  divide)	  and	  the	  operative	  structure	  (a	  Court-­‐
like	  body	  ruling	  upon	  this	  divide)	  must	  be	  present,	  this	  examination	  will	  involve	  a	  
case	   analysis	   charting	   the	   development	   of	   the	   language	   used	   by	   the	   Inspection	  
Panel	   in	   its	   findings	   as	  well	   as	   examining	   the	   outside	   systems	   that	   have	  had	   an	  
effect	   upon	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Panel	   to	   make	   the	   World	   Bank	   system	  
operationally	  closed.	  
For	  a	  legal	  system	  to	  exist,	  normative	  procedures	  must	  be	  in	  place	  to	  guide	  actors’	  
behaviour.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  system,	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  
these	  norms.	  It	  is	  these	  internal	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  that	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  rules	  upon	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to	   determine	   whether	   management	   has	   abided	   by	   them.54	   These	   operational	  
policies	  and	  procedures	  are	  contained	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  Operational	  Manual.	  
The	   resolution	   creating	   the	   Panel	   itself	   clearly	   establishes	   the	   meaning	   of	  
“operational	   policies	   and	   procedures”	   and	   defines	   them	   as	   ‘the	   Bank’s	  
Operational	   Policies,	   Bank	   Procedures	   and	   Operational	   Directives,	   and	   similar	  
documents	   issued	   before	   these	   series	   were	   started’55	   and	   explicitly	   excludes	  
‘Guidelines	  and	  Best	  Practices	  and	  similar	  documents	  or	  statements.’56	  	  
The	   exclusion	   of	   ‘guidelines	   and	   best	   practice’	   from	   being	   under	   the	   Panel’s	  
purview	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  terminology	  in	  relation	  to	  conduct	  under	  
systems	   theory.	   It	   is	   not	   enough	   that	   conduct	   is	   ‘unwise’	   or	   ‘not	   in	   accordance	  
with	  best	  practice’.	  The	  conduct	  needs	  to	  be	  framed	  in	  ‘either	  ‘legal’	  or	  ‘illegal’	  or	  
some	   equivalent	   (judgmental)	   terminology’57	   under	   systems	   theory.	   It	   also	   is	  
equivalent	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  custom	  from	  the	  purview	  of	  law	  in	  systems	  theory.	  
Whilst	   custom	   can	   exist	   alongside	   a	   legal	   system,	   communication	   along	   the	  
legal/illegal	  divide	  is	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  customs.	  
The	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   have	   amounted	   to	   a	   normative	   system.	   These	   policies	   and	  
procedures	  are	  providing	  a	  reference	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  Bank	  (and	  borrowing	  
member	  States)	  and	  seek	  to	  provide	  a	  prescription	  of	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  done	  that	  
is	  then	  enforced.	  Clear	  norms	  have	  been	  set	  and	  must	  be	  abided	  by.	  However,	  to	  
amount	   to	   ‘law’,	   these	   norms	   as	   communication	   must	   be	   framed	   in	   the	  
legal/illegal	   binary	   coding	   that	   is	   required	   from	   systems	   theory.	   The	  manner	   in	  
which	  the	  Bank	  defines	  its	  policies	  would	  seem	  to	  preclude	  them	  becoming	  “law”:	  
‘The	   Bank’s	   policies	   and	   procedures	   provide	   the	   Bank’s	   Management	   and	   staff	  
members	   with	   guidance	   on	   how	   to	   prepare	   and	   supervise	   projects.’58	   Yet,	   the	  
Bank	  itself	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  ‘provide	  certain	  rights	  
for	  local	  affected	  people’59	  and	  alleges	  they	  are	  binding	  upon	  staff.	  The	  provision	  
of	   rights	   is	   communication	   that	   belongs	   to	   the	   legal	   domain,	   yet,	   the	   policies	  
themselves,	   as	  well	   as	   providing	   rights	   to	   affected	   individuals,	   also	  place	   a	  duty	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Section	  12	  
55	  Ibid.	  
56	  Ibid.	  
57	  Steven	  Wheatley,	  The	  Democratic	  Legitimacy	  of	  International	  Law	  (Hart	  2010)	  pg.	  283	  
58	   Accountability	   at	   the	   World	   Bank:	   The	   Inspection	   Panel	   10	   Years	   On	   (2003)	   pg.	   7	  
available	   at	   http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/	  
TenYear8_07.pdf	  accessed	  August	  2013.	  
59	  Ibid.	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upon	  Bank’s	  management	  to	  comply.	  Management	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  policies	  
lain	  down	  and	  before	  a	  project	   is	  approved,	  Management	  must	  confirm	  that	  the	  
policies	  and	  procedures	  of	  the	  Bank	  are	  met.60.	  
As	   the	   Bank’s	   reach	   and	   loans	   have	   expanded,	   so	   have	   the	   procedures	   and	  
policies	   that	   the	  Management	  must	   follow	   in	   order	   for	   a	   loan	   to	   be	   approved.	  
There	  are	  now	  policies	  and	  procedures	  governing	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  loan	  process	  
that	  must	  be	  complied	  with	  from	  pre-­‐loan	  assessments	  (environmental,61	  water,62	  
pest,63	   etc.)	   to	   loan	   specific	   (dams,64	   dealings	   with	   de	   facto	   governments,65	  
international	  waterways,66	  etc.)	  to	  policies	  and	  procedures	  for	  loans	  governing	  the	  
technical	   aspects	  of	   the	   loan	  agreements	   (disbursement,67	   project	   supervision,68	  
closing	  dates,69	  etc.).	  	  
The	  wealth	   of	   policies	   and	  procedures	   that	   create	   rights	   for	   the	   individuals	   and	  
duties	   for	   the	  Management	   definitively	   create	   a	   normative	   system	   to	   guide	   the	  
behaviour	  of	  Management	  and,	   in	   turn,	   requesting	  member	  States.	  However,	   to	  
definitively	  separate	  a	   legal	  system	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  the	  two	  tests	   from	  
systems	   theory	   must	   be	   met.	   As	   the	   first	   test	   (are	   communications	   identified	  
through	  the	  binary	  coding	  legal/illegal?)	  is	  satisfied	  most	  easily	  through	  satisfying	  
the	   second	   test	   (is	   there	   a	   dispute	   settlement	   body	   that	   assesses	   conduct	   in	  
relation	   to	   the	   coding	   legal/illegal?),	   and	   now	   that	   the	   norms	   in	   question	   have	  
been	  identified,	  focus	  will	  now	  turn	  to	  answering	  the	  second	  test.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Ibid.	  
61	   World	   Bank	   Operational	   Manual	   OP	   4.01	   –	   Environmental	   Assessment,	   BP	   4.01	   –	  
Environmental	  Assessment	  
62	  World	  Bank	  Operational	  Manual	  OP	  4.07	  –	  Water	  Resources	  Management	  
63	  World	  Bank	  Operational	  Manual	  OP	  4.09	  –	  Pest	  Management	  
64	  World	  Bank	  Operational	  Manual	  OP	  4.37	  –	  Safety	  of	  Damns,	  BP	  4.37	  –	  Safety	  of	  Damns	  
65	  World	   Bank	   Operational	  Manual	   OP	   7.30	   –	   Dealings	  with	   De	   Facto	   Governments,	   BP	  
7.30	  –	  Dealings	  with	  De	  Facto	  Governments	  
66	  World	  Bank	  Operational	  Manual	  OP	  7.50	  –	  Projects	  on	  International	  Waterways,	  BP	  7.50	  
–	  Projects	  on	  International	  Waterways	  
67	  World	  Bank	  Operational	  Manual	  OP	  12.00	  –	  Disbursement,	  BP	  12.00	  -­‐	  Disbursement	  
68	   World	   Bank	   Operational	   Manual	   OP	   13.05	   –	   Project	   Supervision,	   BP	   13.05	   –	   Project	  
Supervision	  
69	  World	  Bank	  Operational	  Manual	  OP	  13.30	  –	  Closing	  Dates,	  BP	  13.30	  –	  Closing	  Dates	  
	   197	  
5.5	  Inspection	  Panel	  Cases	  
The	   Bank’s	   Executive	   Directors	   created	   the	  World	   Bank	   Inspection	   Panel	   on	   22	  
September	  1993	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  improve	  the	  Bank’s	  compliance	  with	  the	  social	  
and	  environmental	  policies	  and	  procedures.70.	  The	  Panel	   reviews	  Management’s	  
compliance	  with	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  for	   loans	  that	  are	   lain	  down	  by	  the	  
Executive	   Directors.	   Since	   its	   inception,	   the	   Panel	   has	   received	   89	   requests	   for	  
inspection71	  on	  subjects	  ranging	  across	  the	   loans	  of	  the	   IBRD	  and	  IDA.	   In	  theory,	  
after	   receiving	   a	   request	   for	   inspection,	   the	   Panel	   reviews	   the	   request	   and	  
ascertains	  whether	  it	  meets	  the	  requirements	  for	  inspection	  and	  recommends	  to	  
the	   Executive	   Directors	   whether	   a	   full	   investigation	   should	   take	   place.	  
Management	   formulates	   their	   own	   response	   to	   the	   request	   and	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	  then	  make	  the	  decision,	   from	  Management’s	  response	  and	  the	  Panel’s	  
recommendation,	   on	   whether	   a	   full	   investigation	   should	   take	   place.	   If	   a	   full	  
investigation	   is	   authorised,	   the	   Bank	   proceeds	   to	   scrutinize	   the	   conduct	   of	  
Management	  during	  the	  loan	  process	  to	  see	  if	  they	  have	  matched	  the	  standards	  
required	  by	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures.	  The	  Panel	  will	  then	  publish	  a	  decision	  on	  
the	  results	  of	  their	   investigation	  asserting	  whether	  Management	  has	  fulfilled	  the	  
standards	  expected	  of	  the	  Bank.	  	  
The	   Inspection	  Panel	  was	   viewed	  as	  a	   sui	  generis	   body	  when	   it	  was	   introduced.	  
The	  development	  of	  it,	  the	  unprecedented	  access	  for	  individuals	  to	  organisations	  
and	  even	   its	   function	  were	  one	  off	  events	   in	   international	   law.	  Yet	   it	   is	  precisely	  
this	  unique	  position	  that	  it	  holds	  that	  requires	  it	  is	  subject	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  
scrutiny	   than	   other	   international	   bodies.	   The	   following	   cases	   will	   argue	   and	  
demonstrate	   a	   clear	   emergence	   of	   a	   dispute	   settlement	   body,	   a	   Court	   like	  
structure,	   that	   has	   moved	   beyond	   the	   mandate	   provided	   in	   its	   founding	  
resolution	   and	   is	   now	   operating	   and	   making	   decisions	   upon	   the	   legal/illegal	  
divide.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Sabine	  Schlemmer-­‐Schulte,	  ‘Introductory	  Note	  to	  the	  Conclusions	  of	  the	  Second	  Review	  
of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Inspection	  Panel’	  (2000)	  39(1)	  International	  Legal	  Materials	  39	  	  
71	   As	   of	   September	   2013.	   A	   full	   list	   of	   Inspection	   Panel	   cases	   can	   be	   found	   at	  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:202
21606~menuPK:64129250~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html	  
accessed	  September	  2013.	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5.6	  Case	  1:	  Establishment	  of	  a	  Baseline	  
The	  first	  case	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  examined	  is	  the	  first	  case	  that	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  
examined.	  This	  will	  allow	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  baseline	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  language	  the	  Panel	  have	  used	  in	  their	  findings.	  The	  normative	  
framework	  that	  has	  developed	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  may	  only	  evolve	  into	  a	  legal	  
system	   if	   the	   communication	   inherent	   within	   the	   system	   occurs	   along	   the	  
legal/illegal	   divide.	   The	   case	   will	   also	   serve	   to	   highlight	   how	   the	   Panel	   initially	  
operated:	  in	  deference	  to	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  will	  as	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Resolution	  
establishing	  the	  Inspection	  Panel.72	  Although	  not	  an	  IBRD	  case	  in	  that	  it	  concerns	  
the	   IDA,	   the	   case	   establishes	   the	   structure	   for	   application	   against	   the	   IBRD	   in	  
future	  cases.	  
5.6.1	  The	  Case	  
The	  Proposed	  Arun	  III	  Hydroelectric	  Project73	  (hereafter	  Arun	  III)	  was	  the	  first	  case	  
that	  was	  both	   submitted	  and	  examined	  by	   the	  Panel.74	   The	  management	  of	   the	  
IDA	   were	   planning	   approval	   for	   a	   Special	   Drawing	   Rights	   (SDR)	   99.5	   million	  
development	   loan	   to	   the	  Kingdom	  of	  Nepal	   and	   the	   restructuring	  of	   an	  existing	  
credit	   of	   SDR	   24.4million	   to	   finance	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   proposed	   Arun	   III	  
Hydroelectric	   Project,	   a	   damn.	   Although	   the	   finance	   was	   not	   directly	   for	   the	  
creation	   of	   the	   damn	   itself,	   it	   was	   designed	   to	   put	   in	   place	   the	   necessary	  
infrastructure	  for	  the	  future	  development	  of	  the	  damn	  by	  providing	  a	  road	  along	  
which	   construction	   equipment	   for	   the	   damn	   could	   be	   transported.	   These	   SDR	  
loans	   would	   amount	   to	   a	   $170.4	   million	   loan.	   On	   October	   24	   1994	   the	   Panel	  
received	   a	   request	   from	   two	   citizens	   from	  within	  Nepal	  who	   claimed	   that	   their	  
rights	   and	   interests	   had	   been,	   or	   were	   likely	   to	   be,	   materially	   and	   adversely	  
affected	   by	   the	   acts	   or	   omissions	   of	   the	   IDA	  during	   the	   design	   and	   appraisal	   of	  
Arun	  III.	  The	  requesters	  cited	  six	  policies	  and	  procedures	  that	  the	  management	  of	  
the	  Bank	  had	  violated	   in	  their	  work.75	  Management	  responded	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  
73	  Full	  details	  of	  the	  case	  can	  be	  obtained	  from	  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:225
15755~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html	  accessed	  September	  
2013.	  
74	   http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:	  
20221606~menuPK:64129250~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.ht
ml	  accessed	  August	  2013.	  
75	   Operational	   Policy/Bank	   Procedure	   10.04:	   Economic	   Evaluation	   of	   Investment	  
Operations;	  The	  World	   Bank	   Policy	   on	  Disclosure	   of	   Information,	   September	   1994,	   Bank	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their	   response	   ‘clearly	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   Bank	   has	   followed	   its	   operational	  
policies	  and	  procedures	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  design	  and	  appraisal	  of	  the	  proposed	  
project’76	  and	  rejected	  all	  inferences	  of	  wrong	  doing.	  
The	   Panel,	   despite	   finding	   the	   request	   did	   not	  match	   the	   eligibility	   criteria	   lain	  
down	   in	   the	   resolution	   establishing	   the	   Panel,	   found	   in	   their	   initial	   report	   that	  
‘adverse	   effects	   appear	   to	   be	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   omissions	   by	   IDA	   during	  
preparation	  and	  appraisal	  of	   the	  project	  and	  appear	   to	  be	  a	   serious	  violation	  of	  
IDA’s	   resettlement	   policies.’77	   The	   Executive	   Directors,	   in	   turn,	   approved	   a	   full	  
investigation	  by	  the	  Panel	   into	  the	  management’s	  actions	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Arun	  
III	  project.	  
After	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   approved	   a	   full	   investigation,	   management	  
reassessed	  and	  implemented	  changes	  to	  the	  project	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  comply	  with	  
all	   of	   the	   procedures	   in	   question.	   This	   was	   before	   the	   Panel	   investigation	   was	  
complete.	   In	   the	   full	   report,	   the	   Panel	   outlined	   their	   findings:	   both	   highlighting	  
where	  management	  had	  brought	   the	  project	  back	  within	   the	  guidelines	  by	   their	  
actions,	   and	   where	   the	   project	   was	   still	   inadequate.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  
analysis,	   the	  work	  will	   focus	  upon	   the	  wording	   the	  Panel	  used	   in	   its	   findings,	   as	  
communication	  is	  the	  key	  element	  under	  systems	  theory,	  both	  where	  they	  found	  
the	   managements	   conduct	   inline	   with	   policies,	   and	   where	   they	   found	   it	   was	  
outside	   of	   policies.	   For	   the	   Panel	   to	   be	   the	   Court-­‐like	   body	   required	   for	   the	  
evolution	   of	   the	   normative	   system,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   judging	   actions	   of	   the	  
legal/illegal	  divide	  to	  stabilise	  expectations	  of	  actors.	  
5.6.2	  The	  Decision	  
A	   number	   of	   important	   points	   can	   be	   developed	   from	   this	   case.	   Firstly,	   in	   this	  
initial	  request	  before	  the	  Panel,	  the	  Panel	  took	  the	  step	  of	  rejecting	  some	  of	  the	  
criteria	   lain	   down	   in	   the	   Resolution	   establishing	   the	   Panel	   in	   regard	   to	   the	  
eligibility	   of	   a	   request.	   The	   Panel	   introduced	   a	   proportionality	   criterion	   to	   their	  
assessment	  of	  eligibility	  when	  they	  stated	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Procedures	   17.50	   and	   10.00,	   Annex	   A;	   Operational	   Directive	   4.01:	   Environmental	  
Assessment;	   Operational	   Directive	   4.30:	   Involuntary	   Resettlement;	   and	   Operational	  
Directive	  4.20:	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  
76	  Arun	  III	  Management	  Response	  (1994),	  Chapter	  4,	  Section	  1	  
77	  Arun	  III	  Eligibility	  Report	  (1994),	  Section	  84	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‘The	  Panel	  judged	  that	  the	  serious	  nature	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  
Request	   as	   a	   whole	   and	   its	   timing	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   project	  
process	   outweighed	   outright	   rejection	   of	   the	   Request	   on	   the	  
grounds	   of	   doubts	   on	   the	   standing	   of	   the	   Requesters	   and	  
incomplete	  compliance	  with	  formal	  procedures.’78	  
The	  Panel	  was,	  therefore,	  making	  a	  subjective	  judgment	  call	  as	  to	  the	  importance	  
of	  a	  case,	  over	  the	  written	  rules	  that	  had	  been	  lain	  down	  for	   its	  workings	  by	  the	  
Executive	  Directors;	  a	  sign	  of	  independence	  from	  the	  onset.	  
The	  Panel	  also	  took	  the	  step	  of	  analysing	  the	  wording	  of	  one	  of	  the	  internal	  rules	  
and	  procedures	  and	  provided	  Management	  with	  their	  interpretation:	  Operational	  
Manual	  Statement	  2.33.	  	  
‘When	  development	  projects	  require	  people	  to	  be	  relocated,	   the	  
Bank’s	  general	  policy	  is	  to	  help	  the	  borrower	  to	  ensure	  that,	  after	  
a	   reasonable	   transition	   period,	   the	   displaced	   people	   regain	   at	  
least	  their	  previous	  standard	  of	  living	  and	  that,	  so	  far	  as	  possible,	  
they	   be	   economically	   and	   socially	   integrated	   into	   the	   host	  
communities.	   Planning	  and	   financing	   the	   resettlement	   should	  be	  
an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	  project,	   and	   the	  measures	   to	   be	   taken	   in	  
this	   regard	   should	   be	   clarified	   before,	   and	   agreed	   upon	   during	  
loan	  negotiations.’79	  
The	  Panel	  proceeded	  to	  develop	  a	  series	  of	  tests	  that	  they	  deemed	  must	  be	  met	  
for	  compliance:	  
• ‘Does	  the	  project	  adequately	  recognise	  the	  range	  of	  economic,	  social	  and	  
environmental	  problems	  that	  will	  affect	  people	  displaced	  by	  the	  project?	  
• Does	   the	   project	   deal	   with	   the	   “long-­‐term”	   nature	   of	   the	   hardship	   and	  
damage	  it	  may	  cause?	  
• Are	  the	  measures	  appropriate?	  
• Are	  the	  measures	  carefully	  planned	  and	  likely	  to	  be	  carried	  out?’80	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Arun	  III	  Eligibility	  Report	  (1994),	  Section	  6	  
79	  OMS	  2.33	  
80	  Arun	  III	  Investigation	  Report	  (1994),	  Section	  1,	  para.	  15	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This	   development	   of	   a	   series	   of	   tests	   upon	   one	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   policies	   is	   a	   clear	  
demonstration	   of	   the	   Panel’s	   view	   that	   the	   policies	   and	   procedures	   are	  
requirements	  that	  the	  Management	  must	  meet	  and	  an	   indication	  that	  the	  Panel	  
would	   interpret	   the	  policies	  as	  a	   set	  of	  binding	   constraints.	   They	  are	  more	   than	  
mere	  suggestions	  or	  recommendations	  and	  are	  norms	  to	  guide	  the	  behaviour	  of	  
Management.	  This	  development	  of	  a	  test	  enforced	  upon	  Management	  the	  newly	  
founded	  Panel’s	  requirement	  that	  policies	  be	  met,	  and	  met	   in	  a	  fashion	  that	  the	  
Panel	  deemed	  appropriate.	  
Yet,	   systems	   theory	   requires	   that	   communication	   is	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   legal/illegal	  
binary	  coding	  (or	  equivalents).	  
The	  Investigation	  Report	  concludes	  with	  a	  section	  on	  the	  Panel’s	  “Findings”81	  and	  
is	  within	  this	  section	  that	  the	  Panel	  enters	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  legal	  communication.	  
Consistently	  throughout	  their	  findings	  Management	  is	  found	  to	  have	  not	  met	  the	  
requirements	  as	  lain	  down	  by	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  of	  the	  Bank.	  
“The	   Panel	   finds	   that	   the	   IDA	   failed	   to	   observe	   in	   substance	   the	  
policy	   requirements	   for	   supervision	   of	   resettlement	   components	  
and	   consequently	   failed	   to	   enforce	   covenants	   in	   the	   Credit	  
Agreement.”82	  
“The	  Panel	   finds	  that	  appropriate	  mechanisms	  for	  their	  protection	  
have	  not	  been	  included	  under	  the	  RAP.”83	  
“The	  Panel	  found	  inadequate	  capacity	  for	  sustained	  coordination	  of	  
all	  these	  different	  aspects.”84	  
In	   each	   case,	   Managements	   actions	   have	   been	   judged	   against	   a	   standard	   and	  
found	  wanting.	  Although	  the	  language	  is	  not	  classing	  their	  actions	  as	  ‘illegal’,	  they	  
are	  judging	  actions	  against	  a	  standard	  and	  are	  either	  supporting	  them85	  or	  are,	  in	  
most	   circumstances	   under	   this	   investigation,	   finding	   them	   wanting.	   A	   clear	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Arun	  III	  Investigation	  Report	  (1994)	  Section	  7	  
82	  Arun	  III	  Investigation	  Report	  (1994)	  Section	  7,	  para.	  9	  emphasis	  added	  
83	  Arun	  III	  Investigation	  Report	  (1994)	  Section	  7,	  para.	  18	  emphasis	  added	  
84	  Arun	  III	  Investigation	  Report	  (1994)	  Section	  7,	  para.	  19	  emphasis	  added	  
85	  In	  situations	  of	  support,	  they	  have	  generally	  occurred	  due	  to	  Management	  introducing	  a	  
Plan	   of	   Action	   after	   an	   investigation	   was	   authorised.	   The	   Panel	   is,	   therefore,	   not	  
supporting	  Management’s	  original	  actions,	  it	  is	  supporting	  the	  remedial	  action	  suggested	  
or	  already	  taken.	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judgment	   is,	   therefore,	   occurring	   under	   the	   investigation	   by	   the	   Panel	   and	   is	  
occurring	  using	  equivalent	  judgmental	  terminology	  to	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide	  used	  
under	   systems	   theory.86	   The	   extent	   and	   terms	   used	   are	   in	   a	   formative	   stage	   of	  
legal	  communication	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide,	  but	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  initial	  
fundamental	   steps	   that	   the	   Panel	   had	   taken	   to	   interpret	   the	   actions	   of	  
Management.	  
However,	  analysis	  provided	  on	  systems	  theory	  stipulated	  that	  ad	  hoc	  uses	  of	  legal	  
language	  are	  insufficient	  to	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  legal	  system.	  Continuous	  usage	  
is	   required	   and,	   therefore,	   other	   cases	   must	   be	   analysed.	   This	   case	   provides	   a	  
fundamental	   baseline	   for	   the	   wording	   used	   by	   the	   Panel	   and	   helps	   to	  
demonstrate	  the	  paralysis	  that	  affected	  the	  Panel	  for	  the	  next	  five	  years.	  
	  
5.7	  Case	  2:	  Compulsory	  Enforcement?	  
The	  resolution	  establishing	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  would	  seem	  to	  exclude	  the	  Panel	  
from	  being	  fully	  independent	  of	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  as	  all	  of	  its	  decisions	  must	  
be	  ratified	  by	  the	  Executive	  Directors,	  as	  they	  are	  mere	  recommendations.87	  This	  
is	   in	   stark	   contrast	   to	   most	   international	   tribunals	   whose	   decisions	   cannot	   be	  
overruled	  by	  any	  political	  or	  executive	  body.88	  
The	  background	  of	  this	  case	  is	  different	  to	  all	  the	  other	  cases	  that	  will	  be	  analysed	  
as	  it	  is	  involves	  viewing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  as	  a	  whole.	  
After	  Arun	  III,	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  entered	  a	  period	  of	  paralysis	  due	  to	  a	  conflict	  
within	   the	  Executive	  Directors.	  Directors	   representing	  borrowing	  member	  States	  
felt	  that	  the	  Panel	  was	  being	  used	  to	  investigate	  the	  borrower	  rather	  than	  dealing	  
with	  Management’s	   compliance	  with	   policies	   and	   procedures.89	   On	   the	   back	   of	  
numerous	   rejections	   of	   Panel	   recommendations90	   serious	   questions	   arose	  
regarding	  the	  Inspection	  Panel’s	  role,	   its	   independence	  and	  on	  whether	   it	  would	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  Steven	  Wheatley,	  The	  Democratic	  Legitimacy	  of	  International	  Law	  (Hart	  2010)	  pg.	  283	  
87	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution	  Section	  19	  &	  23	  
88	   Jan	  Klabbers,	  Anne	  Peters,	  and	  Geir	  Ulfstein,	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	   International	  
Law	  (OUP	  2009)	  pg.	  130	  
89	   Ibrahim	   Shihata,	   The	  World	   Bank	   Inspection	   Panel:	   In	   Practice	   (Second	   Edition,	   OUP	  
2000)	  pg.	  155-­‐201	  
90	  Andria	  Fourie,	  The	  World	  Bank	  Inspection	  Panel	  and	  Quasi-­‐Judicial	  Oversight:	  In	  Search	  
of	  the	  ‘Judicial	  Spirit’	  in	  Public	  International	  Law	  (Eleven	  International	  Publishing	  2009)	  pg.	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be	  able	  to	  function	  in	  the	  future.	  When	  the	  Panel	  was	  authorised	  by	  the	  Executive	  
Directors	   to	   commence	   an	   investigation,	   Management	   would	   attempt	   to	  
circumvent	   the	   process	   by	   developing	   and	   implementing	   Action	   Plans	   to	   rectify	  
any	  mistakes.	  By	   the	   time	   the	  Panel	  was	  publishing	  a	  decision	   it	  was,	   therefore,	  
redundant	  as	  the	  requesters	  concerns	  had	  already	  been	  met.	  
In	   an	   effort	   to	   “save”	   the	   Inspection	   Panel,	   the	   1999	   Board	   Review	   of	   the	  
Inspection	   Panel	   took	   place.	   A	   range	   of	   actors	  was	   invited	   to	   participate	   in	   the	  
process	   including	  both	  States	  and	  NGOs.91	  Two	  crucial	  changes	  occurred	  to	  save	  
the	   Panel	   process	   and	   reassert	   the	   Panel’s	   independence.	   Firstly,	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	  agreed	  not	   to	  assess	   the	  merits	  of	  a	  case	  at	   the	   initial	   request	  stage,92	  
this	  would	  only	  occur	  after	  a	   full	  Panel	   investigation	  has	  occurred.	  Secondly,	   the	  
Board	   changed	   the	   procedure	   concerning	   Action	   Plans.	   The	   review	   explicitly	  
stated	   that	   the	   plans	   were	   ‘outside	   the	   purview	   of	   the	   Resolution,	   its	   1996	  
clarification,	  and	  these	  clarifications.’93	  Although	  the	  Panel	  could	  submit	  a	  report	  
on	   the	   adequacy	   of	   the	   consultations	   that	   took	   place	   to	   formulate	   the	   Action	  
Plans,	   they	   could	   not	   express	   an	   opinion	   on	   other	   aspects	   of	   the	   plans94	   and,	  
therefore,	   Management	   had	   no	   need	   to	   refer	   the	   plan	   to	   the	   Panel	   and	  
circumvent	   the	   whole	   process.	   This	   is	   of	   express	   importance	   as	   it	   limited	   the	  
functionality	   of	   the	  Panel.	  Although	   they	   could	   investigate	  previous	  breaches	  of	  
the	   OPs,	   BPs	   and	  Management’s	   recommendations,	   the	   recommendations	   that	  
the	   Panel	   made	   after	   the	   investigation	   for	   rectifying	   the	   problems	   were	   mere	  
recommendations	  to	  the	  Executive	  Directors.	  The	  power	  of	  decision	  still	  remained	  
with	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  and	  not	  with	  the	  Panel.	   In	  terms	  of	  systems	  theory,	  
this	  would	   create	   difficulties	   in	   placing	   the	   Court-­‐like	   body	   in	   the	   centre	   of	   the	  
system.	  
The	   Board	   review	   of	   the	   Panel’s	   function	   ended	   in	   April	   1999	   and	   two	  months	  
later	  the	  China	  Western	  Poverty	  Reduction	  request	  was	  received.	  The	  objective	  of	  
the	   project	   was	   to	   ‘reduce	   the	   incidence	   of	   absolute	   poverty	   in	   remote	   and	  
inaccessible	   villages	   of	   three	   provinces	   of	   China’.95	   The	   request	   was	   for	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  Daniel	  Bradlow,	   ‘Precedent-­‐Setting	  NGO	  Campaign	  Saves	   the	  World	  Bank’s	   Inspection	  
Panel’	  (1999)	  6(3)	  Human	  Rights	  Brief	  7	  	  
92	  1999	  Clarification	  of	  the	  Board’s	  Second	  Review	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  (1999)	  Point	  9	  
93	  Ibid.	  Point	  15	  
94	  Ibid.	  Point	  16	  
95	  China:	  Western	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Project	  Investigation	  Report	  (2000)	  pg.	  2	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investigation	   into	   the	  conduct	  of	   the	  Bank	   in	   relation	   to	  one	  of	   these	  provinces,	  
Qinghai.	  The	  project	  would	  voluntarily	  relocate	  57,775	  farmers	  from	  one	  area	  to	  
another.	  The	  requesters96	  claimed	  that	  the	  resettlement	  would	  ‘impact	  4000	  local	  
people,	  and	  will	  have	  indirect	  impacts	  on	  the	  entire	  county’	  whilst	  it	  would	  ‘raise	  
serious	   questions	   about	   the	   recognized	   risk	   of	   escalation	   of	   ethnic	   tension	   and	  
resource	   conflicts;	   and	   the	   long-­‐term	   development	   implications	   for	   the	   area.’97	  
The	  main	  source	  of	  this	  harm	  was	  alleged	  to	  be	  caused	  by	  Management’s	  failure	  
to	   abide	  by	  policies	   and	  procedures	   concerning	   Indigenous	  Peoples,	   Involuntary	  
Resettlement,	  and	  Environmental	  Assessment.98	  
The	  Panel	   investigation	  uncovered	  several	   instances	  of	  Management’s	   failings	  to	  
match	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs.	   Importantly,	   the	   Panel	   sought	   to	  
underline	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   policies	   and	   procedures	   to	   the	   World	   Bank	  
system	   and	   elaborate	   upon	   the	   standards	   required	   of	   Management.	   When	  
referring	   to	   the	   compliance	   procedures	   of	   the	   Bank,	   the	   Panel	  made	   clear	   that	  
some	   members	   of	   Management	   felt	   that	   ‘even	   a	   one-­‐page	   environmental	  
assessment	  of	  a	  major	  project	  could	  be	  in	  compliance	  if	  it	  passed	  the	  desk	  of,	  and	  
was	   checked	   off	   by,	   the	   appropriate	   persons	   at	   the	   appropriate	   times	   in	   the	  
decision	  process.’99	  The	  Panel	   fundamentally	   rejected	  this	  approach	  and	   insisted	  
that	  professional	  standards	  be	  met.	  
The	  Panel	  also	  elaborated	  upon	  Management’s	  interpretation	  of	  various	  OPs	  and	  
BPs	   where	   Management	   argued	   that	   they	   were	   flexible	   rather	   than	   binding.	  
Decisions	  were	  a	  ‘judgement	  at	  Management’s	  sole	  discretion’.100	  The	  Panel	  again	  
rejected	  this	  approach.	  
‘Read	   in	   their	   entirety,	   the	   Panel	   feels	   that	   the	   directives	   cannot	  
possibly	   be	   taken	   to	   authorize	   a	   level	   of	   “interpretation”	   and	  
“flexibility”	   that	   would	   permit	   those	   who	   must	   follow	   those	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	   The	   request	   actually	   came	   from	   an	   international	   NGO	   based	   outside	   the	   country,	   a	  
process	  that	  required	  Board	  approval.	  
97	  China:	  Western	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Project	  Request	  for	  Inspection	  (1999)	  pg.	  1	  
98	  Ibid.	  pg.	  2	  
99	  China:	  Western	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Project	  Investigation	  Report	  (2000),	  pg.	  20,	  para.	  39	  
100	  Ibid.	  para,	  36	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directives	  to	  simply	  override	  the	  portions	  of	  the	  directives	  that	  are	  
clearly	  binding.’101	  
The	  language	  the	  Panel	  used	  in	  its	  communication	  to	  Management	  is	  of	  particular	  
importance	  to	  an	  understanding	  under	  systems	  theory	  and	  the	  legal/illegal	  binary	  
coding	   of	   communication.	   Management	   “must	   follow”	   the	   policies	   and	  
procedures	   with	   the	   directives	   (OPs	   and	   BPs)	   being	   “clearly	   binding”.	   This	   is	   a	  
development	   from	   the	   language	   used	   in	  Arun	   III	   and	   other	   earlier	   cases,	  which	  
was	  one	  of	   ‘failure’	  to	  comply	  and	  ‘inadequacy’,	  to	  a	   language	  that	  more	  closely	  
follows	   an	   understanding	   of	   law	   by	   acknowledging	   the	   “binding”	   nature	   of	   the	  
obligation.	  This	  hardened	  the	   internal	  normative	  status	  of	   the	  OPs	  and	  BPs,	  and	  
clarified	   to	  Management	   that	   these	  were	   not	   best	   practice,	   advice	   or	   guidance	  
that	   could	   be	   taken	   or	   left,	   but	   norms	   that	   had	   to	   be	   followed	   in	   execution	   of	  
World	  Bank	  loan	  agreements.	  
China	   reacted	   harshly	   to	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   report:	   “[t]he	   Panel	   takes	   on	   the	  
role	  of	  a	  critic	  of	   the	  Chinese	  government	  and	   the	  social	  and	  political	   system	  of	  
China,	  rather	  than	  carry	  out	  a	  review	  of	  Bank	  staff	  and	  Management’s	  compliance	  
with	  Bank	  policies.”102	  The	  Panel	  is	  explicitly	  excluded,	  via	  the	  World	  Bank	  Articles	  
of	  Agreement,	  from	  interfering	  in	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  its	  members.103	  With	  the	  
Executive	   Directors	   deadlocked	   on	   how	   to	   proceed	   following	   the	   Panel	  
investigation	  report,	  China	  withdrew	  their	  application	  for	  funding.	  
After	   the	   Board	   review	   in	   1999,	   there	   was	   significant	   doubt	   over	   whether	   the	  
Inspection	  Panel	  would	  ever	  amount	  to	  an	  independent	  structure	  within	  the	  Bank	  
and	   whether	   the	   paralysis	   of	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   would	   continue.	   China:	  
Western	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Project	  clearly	  demonstrated	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  
Panel,	  both	  from	  Management	  and,	  crucially,	  from	  the	  Executive	  Directors.	  Since	  
the	   Second	   Panel	   Review	   and	   China:	  Western	   Poverty	   Reduction	   Project,	   not	   a	  
single	  Panel	  recommendation	  for	  an	  investigation	  has	  been	  rejected.104	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  Ibid.	  para.	  37	  emphasis	  added	  
102	  Chinese	  Government’s	  Statement	  on	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  Investigation	  Report	  for	  the	  
China:	  Western	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Project	  (Quinghai	  Component)	  of	  6	  July	  2001,	  1	  
103	  World	  Bank	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  Article	  IV,	  Section	  10	  
104	   Supra	   Note.	   90,	   pg.	   178.	   The	   Lebannon:	   Greater	   Beirut	   Water	   Supply	   Project	   did	  
involve,	  after	  a	  Board	  discussion	  and	  commissioning	  by	  Management	  of	   specific	   studies,	  
the	  Board	  requesting	  the	  Panel	  to	  review	  its	  decision	  to	  ask	  for	  an	  investigation.	  The	  Panel	  
decided	  to	  await	  further	  developments.	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5.7.1	  Structural	  Coupling	  and	  the	  Internationalisation	  of	  External	  
Communication	  
All	  normative	  and	   legal	  systems	  are	  open	  to	  the	   influence	  of	  other	  systems,	  and	  
this	  case	  clearly	  demonstrates	  that	  this	  is	  so.	  
The	   process	   of	   the	   Second	   Panel	   Review	   clearly	   demonstrated	   the	   influence	   of	  
other	   systems	   upon	   the	   World	   Bank	   system.	   As	   discussed,	   NGOs	   and	   various	  
States	   exerted	   pressure	   to	   break	   the	   deadlock	   that	   had	   occurred	   within	   the	  
Executive	  Directors.	  A	  system	  of	  law	  exists	  within	  the	  wider	  system	  of	  society.	  The	  
system	   and	   the	   outside	   environment	   constantly	   cause	   minor	   changes	   to	   each	  
other,	   but	   it	   is	   the	   structure	   of	   both	   the	   external	   environment	   and	   the	   internal	  
system	   that	   define	   what	   these	   changes	   are.	   This	   constant	   interaction	   between	  
systems	   is	   defined	   as	   ‘structural	   coupling’.	   The	   important	   element	   for	   the	  
development	   of	   a	   World	   Bank	   autonomous	   legal	   system	   is	   not	   that	   it	   was	  
influenced	   via	   other	   systems;	   it	   is	   that	   it	   took	   the	   communication	   from	   these	  
other	  systems	  and	   interpreted	   it	   in	   its	  own	  fashion.	  The	  change	   in	  the	  Executive	  
Directors	   approach	   to	   uniformly	   approve	   Panel	   recommendations	   for	  
investigation	  is	  an	  important	  step	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Panel	  as	  it	  reaffirms	  its	  
independence	  from	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  and	  control	  over	  Management.	  
There	   has	   been	   no	   formal	   change	   to	   the	   language	   of	   either	   the	   World	   Bank	  
Articles	  of	  Agreement	  (where	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	   is	  still	  not	  even	  referred	  too),	  
to	   the	   regulations	   establishing	   the	   Inspection	   Panel105	   or	   to	   the	   internal	  
procedures	  of	  the	  Bank	  that	  alludes	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  cases	  passed	  by	  the	  Panel	  
must	   be	   accepted	   by	   the	   Executive	   Directors.	   Although	   referenced	   in	   the	   1999	  
Board	  Review	   that	   the	  Executive	  Directors	  would	  only	   reject	  a	   recommendation	  
by	  the	  Panel	  based	  upon	  the	  eligibility	  of	  the	  request,	  even	  when	  the	  eligibility	  of	  
the	   claimants	   has	   not	   been	   satisfied	   or	   where	   requirements	   have	   explicitly	   not	  
been	  met,	   the	  Executive	  Directors	  have	   still	   ratified	  all	   Panel	   recommendations.	  
However,	  as	  seen	  in	  domestic	  constitutions	  and	  legal	  systems,	  changes	  can	  occur	  
through	  formal	  written	  documents	  or,	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  by	  practice.	  The	  consistent	  
and	  uniform	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  since	  this	  case	  has	  been	  to	  
approve	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  Panel.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105	   The	   1999	   Board	   Review	   did	   state	   in	   Point	   9	   that	   “the	   Board	   will	   authorize	   an	  
investigation	  without	  making	  a	  judgment	  on	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  claimants’	  request”.	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China’s	  decision	  to	  withdraw	  their	  funding	  request	  is	  also	  an	  example	  of	  structural	  
coupling	   occurring.	   The	   Chinese	   domestic	   legal	   system	   interpreted	   the	  
information	  the	  Bank	  was	  presenting	  it	   in	   its	  own	  fashion,	  and	  concluded	  that	  in	  
its	  own	  interests	  it	  would	  fund	  the	  project	  itself.	  	  
	  
5.8	  Case	  3:	  Incorporating	  Other	  Legal	  Norms	  
In	   the	   Chad-­‐Cameroon	   Petroleum	   and	   Pipeline	   Project,106	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	  
sought	  to	  introduce	  a	  new	  concept	  to	  World	  Bank	  law.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  solely	  
upon	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  of	  the	  Bank,	  they	  incorporated	  human	  rights,	  a	  
distinct	  system	  of	  law	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  into	  the	  Bank’s	  workings.	  
The	  Panel	  received	  a	  request	  for	  inspection	  on	  22	  March	  2001107	  concerning	  three	  
closely	  related	  projects	  within	  Chad	  and	  Cameroon.	  The	  requested	  funding	  was	  to	  
contribute	   towards	   developing	   the	   oil	   fields	   in	   Chad	   and	   provide	   subsequent	  
infrastructure	   for	   the	   transport	   through	   Cameroon.	   However,	   as	   the	   request	   to	  
the	  Panel	  was	  made	  by	  citizens	  of	  Chad,	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  chose	  to	  only	  focus	  
on	  areas	  of	  the	  project	  that	  were	  contained	  within	  Chad’s	  borders.108	  The	  specific	  
objective	   of	   the	   project	   was	   to	   develop	   Chad’s	   natural	   resources	   ‘in	   an	  
environmentally	  and	   socially	   sound	  manner	  and	   thereby,	   inter	  alia,	   increase	   the	  
Borrower’s	  resources	  and	  expenditures	  for	  poverty	  alleviation’.109	  The	  World	  Bank	  
in	   this	   case	   had	   sought	   a	   first	   of	   its	   kind	   program	   where	   the	   Chad	   Parliament	  
passed	   a	   law	   outlining	   the	   government’s	   poverty	   reduction	   objectives	   and	  
detailed	  how	  money	  raised	  via	  the	  development	  of	   the	  oil	   fields	  would	  be	  used.	  
World	   Bank	   funding	   was	   contingent	   upon	   these	   assurances.110	   The	  World	   Bank	  
contribution	  to	  the	  project	  was	  relatively	  modest,	  only	  4%	  of	  total	  costs,	  but	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	   (Loan	  No.	  4558-­‐CD);	  Petroleum	  Sector	  
Management	   Capacity	   Building	   Project	   (Credit	   No.	   3373-­‐CD);	   and	   Management	   of	   the	  
Petroleum	  Economy	  (Credit	  No.	  3316-­‐CD)	  
107	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  Eligibility	  Report,	  Para.	  1	  
108	  Ibid.	  Para.	  3	  
109	  IBRD	  Loan	  Number	  4558-­‐	  CD,	  Schedule	  2	  
110	  Accountability	  at	  the	  World	  Bank:	  The	  Inspection	  Panel	  10	  Years	  On	  (IBRD	  2003)	  pg.	  90	  
available	   at	   http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/	  
TenYear8_07.pdf	  accessed	  August	  2013.	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private	   companies	   made	   World	   Bank	   involvement	   a	   necessary	   component	   for	  
their	  own	  investment.111	  
The	   requester	   was	   the	   head	   of	   the	   national	   opposition	   party,	   a	   Member	   of	  
Parliament	  in	  Chad’s	  National	  Assembly	  on	  behalf	  of	  more	  than	  100	  residents	  who	  
currently	  lived	  within	  the	  fields	  that	  were	  to	  be	  developed.	  The	  requesters	  alleged	  
that	  ‘the	  Pipeline	  Project	  constituted	  a	  threat	  to	  local	  communities,	  their	  cultural	  
property	  and	  the	  environment	  and	  that	  people	   in	  the	  oil	   field	  region	  were	  being	  
harmed,	  or	  were	  likely	  to	  be	  harmed,	  because	  of	  the	  absence,	  or	   inadequacy,	  of	  
environmental	  assessment	  and	  compensation;	  and	  that	  proper	  consultation	  with	  
and	  disclosure	  of	  information	  to	  the	  local	  communities	  had	  not	  taken	  place.’112	  In	  
total,	  twelve	  policies	  were	  alleged	  to	  have	  been	  broken	  by	  Management	  in	  setting	  
up	  the	  loans.113	  Crucially,	  however,	  the	  requesters	  alleged	  that	  a	  ‘violation	  of	  our	  
human	  rights’	  had	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  action.114	  
In	   the	   background	   to	   the	   request,	   various	   other	   events	   occurred.	   The	   private	  
investors	  had	  given	  a	  $25	  million	  welcome	  bonus	  to	  the	  Chad	  government	  and	  it	  
was	  widely	  reported	  that	  $5	  million	  was	  spent	  on	  the	  acquisition	  of	  arms115	  which	  
resulted	   in	   the	   immediate	   freezing	  of	   the	   loan	  until	   all	   government	  expenditure	  
was	   more	   transparent.	   Also	   the	   leader	   of	   the	   opposition	   party	   (the	   future	  
requester)	  was	  imprisoned	  and	  reportedly	  tortured	  after	  he	  spoke	  out	  against	  the	  
project.	  World	  Bank	  President	  James	  Wolfensohn	  personally	  called	  the	  President	  
of	  Chad	  to	  secure	  the	  opposition	  leaders	  release116.	  
After	  receiving	  Board	  approval,	  the	  Panel	  began	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  alleged	  
breaches.	  Whilst	   the	  Panel’s	   findings	   of	   breach	  or	   non-­‐breach	   are	   interesting	   in	  
their	   own	   right,	   the	   relevant	   point	   that	   needs	   to	   be	   extracted	   from	   this	   case	  
concerns	  the	  Panel’s	  view	  regarding	  the	  alleged	  violation	  of	  human	  rights.	  
The	   Panel	   stipulated	   that	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   their	   analysis	   that	   there	   was	   an	  
obligation	   to	   examine	   human	   rights.	   Specifically	   ‘whether	   the	   issues	   of	   proper	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Supra	  Note.	  90,	  Pg.	  201	  
112	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  Investigation	  Report,	  ix,	  Para.	  3	  
113	  Ibid.	  Para.	  4	  
114	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  Request,	  Para.	  5	  
115	  Hernandez	  Uriz,	   ‘To	   Lend	  or	  Not	   to	   Lend:	  Oil,	  Humand	  Rights,	   and	   the	  World	  Bank’s	  
Internal	  Contradictions’	  (2001)	  14	  Harvard	  Human	  Rights	  Journal	  197,	  225.	  Also	  see	  supra	  
Note.	  110	  pg.	  92	  
116	  Supra	  Note.	  110,	  pg.	  92	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governance	   or	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	   Chad	   were	   such	   as	   to	   impede	   the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  Project	  in	  a	  manner	  compatible	  with	  the	  Bank’s	  policies.’117	  
The	  Panel,	  therefore,	  managed	  to	  link	  human	  rights	  to	  its	  mandate	  of	  examining	  
compliance	   with	   the	   Bank’s	   policies	   and	   procedures.	   However,	   this	   approach	  
seemingly	   runs	   counter	   to	   the	  position	  of	   the	  Articles	   of	  Agreement	   that	   states	  
that	   the	   Bank	   should	   not	   interfere	   with	   the	   political	   affairs	   of	   its	   members.	  
Management	   took	   this	   position	   but	   in	   a	   strong	   argument	   before	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	  the	  Panel’s	  Chairman	  argued	  that:	  
‘Given	   the	   world-­‐wide	   attention	   to	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	  
Chad…	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  was	  an	  issue	  raised	  in	  the	  Request	  for	  
Inspection	   by	   a	   Requester	   who	   alleged	   that	   there	   were	   human	  
rights	  violations	   in	   the	  country,	  and	   that	  he	  was	   tortured	  because	  
of	   his	   opposition	   to	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   project,	   the	   Panel	   was	  
obliged	  to	  examine	  the	  situation	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  governance	  in	  
the	  light	  of	  Bank	  policies.’118	  
The	  Panel’s	  Chairman	  then	  further	  elaborated	  that:	  
‘The	   Panel…believes	   that	   the	   human	   rights	   situation	   in	   Chad	  
exemplifies	   the	   need	   for	   the	   Bank	   to	   be	  more	   forthcoming	   about	  
articulating	   its	   role	   in	   promoting	   rights	   within	   the	   countries	   in	  
which	  it	  operates.’	  
From	  a	  systems	  theory	  perspective	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  being	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  
unit	   this	   is	   a	   significant	   development.	   Structural	   coupling	   had	   occurred	   but	   the	  
manner	  in	  which	  it	  has	  happened	  has	  important	  ramifications	  for	  the	  World	  Bank	  
system.	  The	  Inspection	  Panel	  has	  applied	  relevant	  concepts	  from	  another	  body	  of	  
law,	  something	  allowed	  for	  in	  systems	  theory	  by	  structural	  coupling,	  yet	  the	  way	  
they	   have	   done	   so	   demonstrates	   the	   fundamental	   changes	   to	   the	  World	   Bank	  
system	  that	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  has	  had	  as	  a	  unit	  within	  the	  Bank.	  	  
In	  1990	  and	  1995	  the	  position	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  respect	  to	  human	  rights	  was	  
clearly	  set	  out	  by	  two	  legal	  opinions	  by	  the	  Bank’s	  general	  counsel	  and	  the	  senior	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  Investigation	  Report,	  xvi,	  Para.	  35	  
118	   E.S.	   Ayensu,	   ‘Remarks	   of	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   to	   the	   Board	   of	  
Executive	  Directors	  on	  the	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Pipeline	  Projects’	  September	  12,	  2002	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vice	   president	   respectively.119	   Both	   positions	   highlighted	   the	   prohibition	   of	  
political	  activities	  in	  the	  Bank’s	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  placed	  the	  Bank’s	  legal	  
position	   as	   unable	   to	   deal	   with	   political	   human	   rights	   as	   long	   as	   they	   had	   no	  
demonstrable	  effect	  on	   the	   country’s	  economy.	  Yet,	   the	   Inspection	  Panel	   in	   the	  
Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	   rejected	  this	  accepted	  approach,	  
the	   approach	   required	   by	   the	   Bank’s	   Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   incorporated	   their	  
own	  approach	  that	  human	  rights	  were	  inherently	  held	  within	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  of	  
the	   Bank,	   and	   the	   whole	   Bank’s	   position	   changed.	   Now	   the	   Bank	   states	   ‘the	  
Articles	  of	  Agreement	  permit,	   and	   in	   some	  cases	   require,	   the	  Bank	   to	   recognize	  
the	  human	  rights	  dimensions	  of	   its	  development	  policies	  and	  activities	  since	   it	   is	  
now	  evident	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  mission.’120	  Not	  
only	  is	  the	  examination	  of	  human	  rights	  now	  acceptable	  in	  limited	  circumstances,	  
it	   is	   now,	   according	   to	   the	   Bank,	   required	   by	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   and	  
intrinsic	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  mission.	  This	  is	  in	  spite	  of	  no	  change	  to	  the	  Articles.	  
The	   Panel’s	   role	   in	   reinterpreting	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   in	   Chad-­‐Cameroon	  
Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  cannot	  be	  overstated.	  They	  changed	  the	  position	  
of	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  relation	  to	  another	  system	  of	  law	  from	  outright	  rejection	  to	  
complete	   acceptance.	   Crucially,	   to	   maintain	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	  
legal	  system,	  human	  rights	  law	  is	  interpreted	  through	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank	  (the	  World	  Bank	  OPs	  and	  BPs)	  and	  human	  rights	  law	  is	  not	  accepted	  en-­‐mass	  
as	  overriding	  World	  Bank	  ‘law’.	  The	  Panel	  has,	  therefore,	  situated	  itself	  as	  central	  
to	   the	  World	   Bank	   system	   of	   law	   as	   not	   only	   has	   it	   partially	   reinterpreted	   the	  
Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   by	   reading	   into	   the	  OPs	   and	   BPs	   a	   human	   rights	   aspect,	  
they	  have	  solidified	  their	  role	  of	  interpreters	  of	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  as	  ‘law’.	  	  
	  
5.9	  Case	  4:	  Increase	  in	  the	  Powers	  of	  the	  Panel	  
In	   the	   1999	   Board	   Review,	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   explicitly	   made	   clear	   to	   the	  
Panel	   that	   they	   were	   not	   to	   deal	   with	   Management’s	   Action	   Plans.121	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  Accountability	  at	  the	  World	  Bank:	  The	  Inspection	  Panel	  10	  Years	  On	  (2003)	  pg.	  96	  
120	  Roberto	  Dañino,	  Senior	  Vice	  President	  and	  General	  Counsel,	  ‘Legal	  Opinion	  on	  Human	  
Rights	  and	  the	  Work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank’,	  27	  January	  2006	  	  
	  
121	   Except	   as	   so	   far	   as	   to	   ensure	   that	   adequate	   consulting	   had	   taken	   place	   in	   the	  
formulation	   of	   the	   Action	   Plan.	   1999	   Clarification	   of	   the	   Board’s	   Second	   Review	   of	   the	  
Inspection	  Panel	  (1999),	  Paras.	  15	  &	  16	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decisions	  of	  the	  Panel,	  therefore,	  remained	  as	  recommendations	  to	  the	  Executive	  
Directors,	   to	   be	   weighed	   against	   the	   provisions	   put	   in	   place	   by	   Management’s	  
Action	  Plans.	  However	  in	  Paraguay	  –	  Argentina,122	  this	  process	  was	  reversed	  and	  
power	  was	  placed	  with	  the	  Inspection	  Panel.	  
The	  Yacyretá	  Hydroelectric	  Project	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  two	  individual	  requests	  for	  
inspection.	   The	   first	   occurred	   in	   1996	   but	   the	   Panel	   was	   refused	   the	   right	   to	  
investigate	   due	   to	   the	   paralysis	   of	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   that	   has	   previously	  
been	   mentioned.123	   Yet,	   in	   May	   2002	   the	   Panel	   received	   a	   second	   request	   for	  
inspection	  via	  a	  NGO	  based	  in	  Paraguay	  on	  behalf	  of	  more	  than	  4000	  families.124	  
The	   project	   was	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   65	   km	   dam	   in	   the	   main	   channel	   of	   the	  
Paraná	  River	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  ‘an	  adequate	  energy	  supply	  in	  the	  Buenos	  
Aires	   area	   for	   economic	   growth	   requirements.’125	   The	   request	   alleged	   that	   the	  
affected	   population	   were	   suffering	   ‘social	   and	   environmental	   consequences	  
because	  of	  the	  raising	  of	  the	  Yacyretá	  power	  plant’s	  reservoir	  to	  76	  metres	  above	  
sea	   level’126	   (or	   higher).	   The	   resettlement	   programs	   were	   alleged	   to	   be	  
insufficiently	   implemented	   leaving	   families	   with	   no	   or	   inadequate	  
compensation.127	  
Management	  in	  their	  response	  acknowledged	  that	  there	  had	  been	  issues	  with	  the	  
project	  but	  asserted	   that	   they	  had	   complied	  with	  all	   the	   relevant	  Bank	  OPs	  and	  
BPs.128	   Having	   met	   all	   the	   requirements	   for	   eligibility,	   the	   Board	   approved	   the	  
Panel’s	  recommendation	  to	  conduct	  an	  investigation.	  
The	   language	   used	   by	   the	   Panel	   in	   their	   Investigation	   Report	   is	   of	   ‘compliance’	  
and	  ‘requirements’.	  Although	  they	  found	  that	  ‘[m]any	  Bank	  staff	  and	  other	  people	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122	  Paraguay	   –	   Reform	   Project	   for	   the	  Water	   and	   Telecommunications	   Sector	   (Loan	   No.	  
3842-­‐PA);	  Argentina	  –	  SEGBA	  V	  Power	  Distribution	  Project	  (Loan	  2854-­‐AR)	  
123	  Yacyretá	  Hydroelectric	  Project	  Request	  (1996)	  
124	  Paraguay	   –	   Reform	   Project	   for	   the	  Water	   and	   Telecommunications	   Sector	   (Loan	   No.	  
3842-­‐PA);	  Argentina	  –	  SEGBA	  V	  Power	  Distribution	  Project	  (Loan	  2854-­‐AR)	  Request	  (2002)	  
125	  SEGBA	  V	  Power	  Distribution	  Project	  Overview	  available	  at	  
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK=73230&theSi
tePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P005968	  accessed	  September	  2013.	  
126	  Paraguay	   –	   Reform	   Project	   for	   the	  Water	   and	   Telecommunications	   Sector	   (Loan	   No.	  
3842-­‐PA);	  Argentina	   –	   SEGBA	  V	   Power	  Distribution	   Project	   (Loan	   2854-­‐AR)	   Investigation	  
Report,	  1.2.4	  
127	  Ibid.	  1.2.7	  
128	  Ibid.	  1.3.10	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concerned	   have	   put	   an	   inordinate	   amount	   of	   effort	   over	   the	   years	   ‘to	   get	   the	  
Project	  right’’129	  this	  had	  not	  resulted	  in	  a	  particularly	  successful	  project.	  
‘Management	  met	  requirements	  of	  OD	  4.01.’130	  
‘Environmental	   Assessment	   for	   the	   main	   works	   of	   Second	  
Yacyretá	  Hydroelectric	  Project	  is	  in	  compliance	  with	  OD	  4.01.’131	  
‘Resettlement	   plan	   as	   designed	   could	   not	   prevent	   influx	   of	  
ineligible	  population.	  Legal	  framework	  was	  inadequate.	  This	  does	  
not	  comply	  with	  OD	  4.30.’132	  
Although	   this	   continues	   the	   Bank’s	   policy	   of	   classing	   conduct	   as	   equivalents	   of	  
legal/illegal	  as	  under	  systems	  theory’s	  binary	  code,	  the	  real	  value	  of	  this	  case	  for	  
systems	   theory	   comes	   from	   the	   subsequent	   Board	   review.	   In	   the	   1999	   Board	  
Review	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   process,	   the	   Board	   had	   explicitly	   removed	   the	  
assessment	  of	  Management’s	  Action	  Plans	   from	   the	   Inspection	  Panel’s	   purview.	  
This	   could	   have	   questioned	   the	   role	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   Inspection	   Panel	   as	   a	  
centre	   point	   in	   the	   World	   Bank	   legal	   system	   as	   demanded	   by	   systems	   theory.	  
With	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  the	  Panel	  moved	  to	  put	  itself	  
at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  system	  but	  further	  evidence	  could	  be	  seen	  
by	  the	  Board’s	  decision	  in	  Paraguay	  –	  Argentina.	  Rather	  than	  sticking	  to	  the	  1999	  
Review,	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   instructed	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   to	   monitor	  
Management’s	  Action	  Plan,	  first	  by	  reviewing	  it	  to	  check	  its	  adequacy	  and	  then	  by	  
monitoring	   its	   implementation.133	   This	   reversal	   of	   the	   Board’s	   previous	   decision	  
placed	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  structure.	  	  
Now	  not	  only	  did	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  have	  authority	  to	  rule	  upon	  the	  conduct	  of	  
Management	  on	  the	  legal/illegal	  binary	  code,	  it	  now	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  monitor	  
Management’s	  compliance	  with	  its	  ‘recommendations’	  to	  the	  Executive	  Directors.	  
If	   Management	   do	   not	   comply,	   the	   Panel	   can	   report	   them	   to	   the	   Executive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Andria	  Fourie,	  The	  World	  Bank	  Inspection	  Panel	  and	  Quasi-­‐Judicial	  Oversight:	  In	  Search	  
of	  the	  ‘Judicial	  Spirit’	  in	  Public	  International	  Law	  (Eleven	  International	  Publishing	  2009)	  pg.	  
204	  
130	  Supra	  Note.	  126,	  Annex	  A,	  pg.	  128	  emphasis	  added	  
131	  Ibid.	  emphasis	  added	  
132	  Ibid.	  pg.	  133	  emphasis	  added	  
133	   Inspection	   Panel	   Review	   of	  Management	   Progress	   Report	   on	   Implementation	   of	   the	  
Management	   Recommendations	   and	   Action	   Plan,	   and	   Additional	   Implementation	  
Measures.	  INSP/SecM2005-­‐0001,	  February	  10	  2005	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Directors	   in	   their	   progress	   reports	   and	   have	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   force	  
Management	   to	   comply.	   This	   is	   further	   evidence	   that	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   has	  
located	  itself	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  system	  as	  dictated	  by	  systems	  
theory.	   This	   is	   another	   aspect	   of	   assurance	   of	   compliance	   by	   actors	   with	   the	  
norms	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  system.	  
	  
5.10	  Case	  5:	  Increase	  in	  the	  Effect	  of	  Panel	  Decisions	  
The	   reports	   of	   the	   Panel	   took	   on	   a	   new	   significance	   subsequent	   to	   the	   India:	  
Mumbai	  Urban	  Transport	  Project134case.	  	  
The	   Mumbai	   Urban	   Transport	   Project	   was	   an	   ambitious	   project	   of	   the	   Bank	  
involving	  an	  unprecedented	  move	   in	   India	   to	   relocate	  120,000	  people135	   so	   that	  
the	  project	  could	  ‘facilitate	  urban	  economic	  growth	  and	  improve	  quality	  of	  life	  by	  
fostering	   the	   development	   of	   an	   efficient	   and	   sustainable	   urban	   transport	  
system’.136	  In	  total,	  the	  Bank	  provided	  the	  equivalent	  of	  US	  $463	  million	  to	  finance	  
the	  project.137	  Whilst	  aiming	  to	  be	  unprecedented	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  relocation,	  
the	  project	  was	  also	  successful	  for	  the	  unprecedented	  scale	  of	  requests	  the	  Panel	  
received.	  Four	  separate	  requests	  were	  received	  concerning	  the	  project,	  although	  
all	  were	  dealt	  with	  by	  one	  Panel	  investigation.	  
All	  requests	  alleged	  that	  the	  Bank	  had	  failed	  to	  follow	  its	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  related	  to	  
resettlement	   and	   rehabilitation	   and	   that	   the	   requesters	   would	   suffer	   adverse	  
effects	  directly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  this.138	  Due	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  requests	  received,	  the	  
distinct	  areas	  involved	  in	  the	  complaints	  were	  incredibly	  varied	  and	  complicated.	  
Some	   requests	   mirrored	   certain	   topics	   with	   others	   yet	   in	   total	   there	   were	  
complaints	   concerning	   resettlement	   sites,	   housing	   and	   living	   conditions,	   income	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	   India:	  Mumbai	  Urban	  Transport	  Project	   (IBRD	  Loan	  No.	  4665-­‐IN;	   IDA	  Credit	  No.	  3662-­‐
IN)	  
135	  India:	  Mumbai	  Urban	  Transport	  Project	  Investigation	  Report	  pg.	  18,	  para.	  75	  
136	  Mumbai	  Urban	  Transport	  Project	  Overview	  available	  at	  
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P050668&theSitePK=40941
&piPK=64290415&pagePK=64283627&menuPK=64282134&Type=Overview	   accessed	  
August	  2013.	  
137	  India:	  Mumbai	  Urban	  Transport	  Project	  Investigation	  Report,	  xvi	  
138	  Ibid.	  xiii	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and	  living	  standard	  restoration,	  access	  to	  information,	  consultation	  and	  grievance	  
redress	  procedures.139	  
Management	   submitted	   two	   reports	   in	   response	   to	   the	   requests.	   In	   the	   first	  
report,	  Management	  explained	  their	  reasoning	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  in	  
question	   stating	   that	   they	   felt	   they	   had	   met	   the	   various	   requirements.140	  
However,	   in	   the	   second	   report,	   Management	   identified	   several	   serious	  
weaknesses	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  project.141	  
Although	   the	   Panel	   acknowledged	   in	   its	   investigation	   report	   that	   ‘[t]here	   is	   no	  
doubt	   that	   the	   Project	   is	   intended	   significantly	   to	   advance	   needed	   economic	  
development	  in	  Mumbai	  and	  that	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  will	  benefit	  from	  it’,142	  
when	   confronted	   with	   the	   information	   that	   the	   project	   would	   affect	   120,000	  
people	  rather	  than	  the	  80,000	  originally	  proposed	  ruled	  that	  ‘[t]his	  startling	  50%	  
increase	   was	   received	   by	   the	   Country	   Department	   without	   significant	  
management	   reaction	   on	   the	   record,	   without	   proper	   Board	   notification,	   and	  
without	   any	   decision	   to	   reconsider	   the	   entire	   component’s	   appraisal,	   cost,	   or	  
organizational	  support	  arrangements.	  The	  Panel	  found	  this	  surprising	  since	  it	  is	  far	  
from	  Bank	  expected	  and	  normal	  procedures.’143	  
As	  well	   as	   numerous	   failures	   to	  meet	   the	   policies	   and	   procedures,144	   the	   Panel	  
found	  that	   ‘incorrect	   information	  on	  several	  key	   issues	  was	  communicated’145	  to	  
the	  Board	  of	  Executive	  Directors.	  
Again	   the	   terminology	  used	   in	   the	   Investigation	  Report	  was	  one	  of	   ‘compliance’	  
and	  ‘requirements’	  meeting	  the	  equivalents	  required	  by	  systems	  theory	  for	  binary	  
coding	  legal/illegal:	  
‘This	  was	  not	  in	  compliance	  with	  OD	  4.30.’146	  
‘As	  a	   result,	   [the]	  Bank	   failed	   to	  comply	  with	  basic	  policies	  of	  OD	  4.30	  regarding	  
the	  preparation,	  appraisal	  and	  implementation	  of	  resettlement	  operations.’147	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‘Project	  EA	  did	  not	  meet	  all	  OP	  4.01’s	  requirements.’148	  
The	   relevant	   part	   though	   of	   India:	   Mumbai	   Urban	   Transport	   Project	   that	  
developed	  the	  Panel	   further	   is	  what	  happened	  with	  the	  Panel’s	   findings.	  For	  the	  
first	   time	  the	  Board	   took	   the	  action	  of	   suspending	  disbursements	  of	   the	   loan.149	  
This	   again	   was	   evidence	   of	   the	   growing	   influence	   of	   Inspection	   Panel	  
‘recommendations’	   to	   the	  Executive	  Directors	  and	   the	  effect	   that	   they	  can	  have	  
on	   Bank	   projects.	   Not	   only	   is	   the	   Inspection	   Panel	   ruling	   upon	   the	   conduct	   of	  
Management	   through	   coding	   their	   conduct	   as	   equivalents	   of	   legal/illegal,	   it	   is	  
centring	  its	  position	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  system.	  
	  
5.11	  Case	  6:	  Modern	  Work	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  	  
The	   historical	   analysis	   that	   has	   occurred	   throughout	   this	   chapter	   has	  
demonstrated	  a	  clear	  development	  in	  the	  legal	  language	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  has	  
used,	   the	   powers	   the	   Panel	   can	   use	   and	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   reports	   it	   issues.	   The	  
final	  case	  that	  will	  be	  analysed	  is	  one	  of	  the	  later	  cases	  that	  the	  Panel	  has	  issued	  
an	   investigation	   report	   on.	   Although	   there	   are	   many	   cases	   that	   are	   under	  
investigation	  by	  the	  Panel	  or	  have	   later	  been	  rejected	  on	  eligibility	  grounds,	  one	  
of	   the	   final	   investigation	   reports	   available	   is	   the	   Peru:	   Lima	   Urban	   Transport	  
Project.150	  
The	  project	  had	  the	  aim	  of	  constructing	  a	  bus	  system	  through	  the	  city	  of	  Lima	  in	  
Peru.	  This	  had	  the	  aim	  of	  ‘enhancing	  the	  economic	  productivity	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  
life	  within	  the	  Lima	  Metropolitan	  area’.151	  The	  project	  was	  partly	  financed	  by	  the	  
IBRD	  with	  a	  development	  loan	  of	  US	  $45,000,000.152	  The	  requesters	  were	  citizens	  
of	  Lima	  who	  were	  concerned	  with	  the	  adverse	  long-­‐term	  impacts	  of	  the	  creation	  
of	  the	  bus	  system.	  Traffic	  and	  pedestrian	  safety	  were	  the	  two	  concerns	  explicitly	  
raised.153	   The	   requesters	   alleged	   that	   Management	   had	   failed	   in	   its	   duty	   to	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  pg.	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  emphasis	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148	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  emphasis	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  World	  Bank	  Press	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  India’s	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include	   environmental	   management	   plans	   and	   that	   consultations	   about	   the	  
project	  were	  inadequate.154	  	  
Management	  acknowledged	  in	  their	  response	  that	  in	  some	  areas,	  environmental	  
assessment,	   policies	   were	   not	   fully	  met	   yet	   in	  most	   areas	   stated	   they	   believed	  
they	  had	  met	   the	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  The	   request	  was	   registered	  on	  14	  October	  2009	  
and	  the	  Board	  approved	  the	  Panel’s	  recommendation	  that	  an	  investigation	  should	  
take	  place	  on	  16	  December	  2009	  after	  the	  Panel	  found	  that	  the	  requesters	  met	  all	  
of	   the	   eligibility	   criteria.155	   In	   its	   Investigation	   Report,	   the	   Panel	   disagreed	  with	  
Management’s	   response	   and	   found	   on	   the	   Environmental	   Impact	   Studies,	   the	  
Analysis	  of	  Alternatives,	   the	  Consultation	  and	  Dissemination	  of	   Information,	  and	  
the	  assessments	  concerning	  Traffic	  and	  Cultural	  Property	   Issues	   in	  Barranco	  that	  
Management	  had	  failed	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  of	  the	  Bank.156	  
The	   Executive	   Directors	   reviewed	   the	   Panel’s	   findings	   but	   as	   the	   project	   had	  
already	  finished	  and	  Management	  had	  already	  began	  a	  new	  traffic	  management	  
study	   to	  comply	  with	   the	  Panel’s	   findings,	   focused	  upon	   the	   lessons	   learnt	   from	  
the	  project	  for	  future	  loans.	  
A	  number	  of	  elements	  can	  be	  pulled	  from	  this	  case	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  Panel	  
is	  still	  acting	  upon	  the	  legal/illegal	  binary	  code.	  
‘In	   this	   respect	   [the]	   reports	   comply	   with	   OP	   4.01	   on	  
Environmental	  Assessment.’157	  
‘Panel	   finds	   that	   dissemination	   of	   information	   and	   consultation	  
with	  affected	  people	  in	  Barranco	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  requirements	  
of	  OP	  4.01.’158	  
‘This	  did	  not	  happen	  and	  is	  not	  in	  compliance	  with	  OMS	  2.20.’159	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‘Panel	  finds,	  however,	  2005	  Traffic	  Study	  contains	  [a]	  number	  of	  
weaknesses	  in	  its	  analysis,	  and	  as	  [a]	  result	  falls	  short	  of	  meeting	  
[the]	  requirements	  of	  OP	  4.01.’160	  
The	   operative	   language	   used	   by	   the	   Panel	   in	   this	   case	   to	   discern	   if	   conduct	   is	  
legal/illegal	  is	  concerned	  with	  ‘compliance’	  and	  ‘requirements’.	  Again,	  although	  it	  
is	  not	  ‘legal’	  or	  ‘illegal’	  terminology,	  it	  is	  equivalents	  as	  assessing	  actions	  against	  a	  




5.12	  Ulfstein’s	  Requirements	  for	  a	  Court	  
It	  has	  been	  mentioned	  previously,	  that	  systems	  theory,	  stricto	  sensu,	  only	  requires	  
the	   presence	   of	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   to	   stabilise	   normative	   expectations.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  the	  requirements	  that	  Ulfstein	  identifies	  are	  useful	  for	  assessing	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  within	  a	  legal	  system,	  by	  assessing	  how	  well	  any	  
body	   achieves	   the	   purpose	   that	   is	   required	   for	   under	   systems	   theory.	   The	  
presence	  of	   the	   initial	   five	  of	  Ulfstein’s	   requirements	   all	   contribute	   towards	   the	  
stabilisation	   of	   normative	   expectations	   within	   a	   system,	   by	   furthering	   the	  
stabilisation.	  Without	   judicial	   expertise,	   independence	   from	  other	  organs	  within	  
the	   system,	   equal	   access	   to	   the	   demos	   of	   the	   system,	   a	   fair	   hearing	   and	   a	  
consistent	   approach	   by	   the	   dispute	   settlement	   body;	   the	   laws	   that	   the	   body	  
would	  try	  to	  uphold	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  guide	  actors’	  expectations.	  
With	   the	   language	   of	   the	   Panel	   clearly	   amounting	   to	   communication	   upon	   the	  
legal/illegal	  binary	  coding,	  and	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  acting	  as	  a	  dispute	  settlement	  
body	  under	  systems	  theory,	  attention	  can	  now	  turn	  to	  Ulfstein’s	  requirements	  for	  
a	  Court.	  
Expertise	   –	   The	   easiest	   criteria	   to	   satisfy	   is	   that	   the	   judges	   have	   the	   necessary	  
qualifications	   to	   hear	   the	   case.	   As	   examined,	   Section	   4	   of	   the	   Resolution	   deals	  
with	   the	   appointment	   of	   members	   to	   the	   Panel.	   They	   cannot	   be	   appointed	  
without	  ‘exposure	  to	  developmental	  issues	  and	  to	  living	  conditions	  in	  developing	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countries’	  and	  ‘[k]nowledge	  and	  experience	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  operations	  will	  also	  be	  
desirable’.	  The	  history	  of	  the	   judges	  that	  have	  been	  nominated	  for	  the	  positions	  
on	  the	  Panel	  demonstrates	  that	  they	  have	  clearly	  fulfilled	  these	  criteria	  lain	  down	  
(and	  more)	  and	  moves	  their	  expertise	  beyond	  disrepute.	  
Independence	   –	  Despite	   the	   requirements	   set	   out	   in	   the	   Resolution	   concerning	  
the	   independence	   of	   judges;161	   the	   cases	   examined	   above	   clearly	   demonstrate	  
that	   the	   Panel	   has	   been	   under	   pressure	   from	  Management	   since	   its	   inception.	  
This	   is	   unsurprising	   since	   its	  Management’s	   conduct	   that	   the	   Panel	   is	   reviewing	  
and	  they	  would	  seek	  to	  narrow	  the	  scope	  of	  Panel	  proceedings	  as	  far	  as	  possible.	  
Early	   efforts	   by	   Management	   involved	   not	   giving	   the	   Panel	   the	   information	  
requested162	  as	  in	  Chad	  Pipeline,163	  avoiding	  dealing	  with	  the	  requesters	  claims	  in	  
their	   response	   as	   in	  Brazil	   Rodonia	  Natural	   Resources	  Management	   Project	   and	  
via	   claiming	   that	   all	   harm	   suffered	   on	   projects	   was	   due	   to	   the	   borrower	   (and,	  
therefore,	   not	   under	   the	   Panel’s	   jurisdiction)	   as	   in	   Bangladesh	   Jute	   Sector	  
Adjustment	  Credit.164	   In	  all	  efforts	  the	  Panel	  has	  vigorously	  defended	   its	  position	  
and	  forced	  Management	  to	  comply.	  
The	  Panel	  also	  continuously	  proves	  its	  independence	  from	  the	  Executive	  Directors	  
with	  the	  acceptance	  of	  all	  Panel	  calls	  for	  inspection	  and	  by	  the	  shift	  in	  powers	  for	  
the	   Panel	   to	  monitor	   the	   implementation	  of	   action	  plans	   to	   remedy	   its	   findings	  
(something	  that	  is	  not	  in	  its	  mandate).	  
Equal	   Access	   –	   The	   barriers	   to	   entry	   required	   by	   the	   Executive	  Directors	   in	   the	  
Resolution	  were	  that	  the	  requesters	  must	  be	  ‘an	  affected	  party	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  
the	   borrower	   which	   is	   not	   a	   single	   individual’165	   and	   that	   ‘[t]he	   affected	   party	  
must	  demonstrate	  that	  its	  rights	  or	  interests	  have	  been	  or	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  directly	  
affected	   by	   an	   action	   or	   omission	   of	   the	   Bank	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   failure	   of	   the	  
Bank’.166	   The	   Panel,	   as	   demonstrated	   in	   Arun	   III,	   have,	   however,	   consistently	  
ignored	  elements	  of	  the	  procedural	  requirements	  in	  order	  to	  accept	  requests	  for	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  ‘Judicial	  Spirit’	  in	  Public	  International	  Law	  (Eleven	  International	  Publishing	  2009)	  pg.	  
194	  
163	  Inspection	  Panel	  Chairman’s	  Board	  address	  in	  the	  2001	  Chad	  Petroleum	  Development	  &	  
Pipeline	  Project,	  para.	  6	  
164	  1996	  Bangladesh	  Jute	  Sector	  Adjustment	  Credit	  Project,	  ER,	  Box	  1	  at	  7	  
165	  Inspection	  Panel	  Resolution,	  section	  12	  
166	  Ibid.	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inspection.	  As	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  of	  the	  Bank	  provide	  individuals	  rights,	  
the	   barrier	   for	   entry	   is	   correspondingly	   low	   and	   equal	   to	   all	   who	   meet	   the	  
minimum	   requirements.	   This	   ensures	   a	   further	   stabilisation	   by	   increasing	   the	  
amount	  of	  actors	  who	  can	  rely	  upon	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  
Fair	   Hearing	   –	   The	   requirement	   that	   parties	   are	   allowed	   to	   present	   their	   case	  
properly	   and	   that	   the	   proceedings	   are	   conducted	   in	   a	   transparent	   manner	   are	  
without	   doubt	  met	   by	   the	   Panel.	   All	  workings	   of	   the	   Panel	   are	   published,	   from	  
first	   examination	   of	   the	   request	   to	   final	   conclusions,	   ensuring	   a	   transparent	  
process	   for	  both	  Management	  and	   the	   requesters.	   This,	   in	  particular,	   allows	   for	  
the	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	   expectations	   by	   providing	   communication	  
specifically	  on	  the	  legal/illegal	  nature	  of	  actions	  relative	  to	  the	  norms.	  The	  Panel	  
has,	   however,	   had	   to	   work	   harder	   to	   meet	   the	   requirement	   that	   it	   is	   well-­‐
informed	   regarding	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   case.	  Management	   has	   previously	  withheld	  
information	  (as	  in	  Chad	  Pipeline)167	  and	  have	  had	  to	  delay	  fact-­‐finding	  missions	  on	  
other	  occasions.	  Yet	  the	  Panel	  has	  consistently	  rejected	  Management	  delays	  and	  
sought	  extra	  information	  when	  they	  felt	  it	  was	  required.	  This	  consistent	  rejection	  
of	   lack	   of	   information	   has	   led	   the	   Panel	   to	   a	   point	   where	   it	   can	   acquire	  
information	  as	  it	  sees	  fit	  to	  decide	  upon	  a	  case.	  
Need	   for	  Consistency	   –	  Normative	  expectations	   can	  only	   stabilise	   and	  be	   relied	  
upon	   if	   it	   is	  ensured	  that	  the	  norms	  are	  applicable	  consistently.	  The	  work	  of	  the	  
Panel	   to	   achieve	   this	   has	   involved	   two	   approaches.	   Specifically,	   although	   no	  
precedent	   exists	   from	   the	   cases,	   the	   Panel	   has	   consistently	   applied	   the	   same	  
approach	   and	   interpretation	   to	   the	   policies	   and	   procedures	   that	   it	   rules	   upon,	  
even	  referring	  to	  previous	  cases.168	  The	  work	  that	  Calliess	  and	  Renner	  provided	  on	  
systems	   theory	   regarding	   the	   ‘interlinkage	   and	   mutual	   referencing	   of	   legal	  
communications’169	   for	   the	   development	   of	   a	   legal	   system	   is	   also	   of	   relevance.	  
Although	  no	  formal	  precedent	  exists,	  Calliess	  and	  Renner	  cited	  the	  example	  of	  a	  
doctrinal	   elaboration	   of	   legal	   principles	   as	   capable	   of	   fulfilling	   this.	   The	   Panel’s	  
work	  on	  interpreting	  the	  various	  policies	  and	  procedures	  and	  the	  tests	  they	  have	  
provided	   for	   them,	   satisfy	   this	   criteria.	  Also	   in	   terms	  of	   specific	   consistency,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167	  Supra	  Note.	  163	  
168	  Papua	  New	  Guinea	  Smallholder	  Agriculture	  Development	  Project	  Investigation	  Report,	  
Paras.	  527	  &	  530;	  and	  Peru	  Lima	  Urban	  Transport	  Project	  Investigation	  Report,	  Para.	  216	  
169	  Gralf-­‐Peter	  Calliess	  &	  Moritz	  Renner,	  ‘From	  Soft	  Law	  to	  Hard	  Code:	  the	  Juridification	  of	  
Global	  Governance’	  (2009)	  22(2)	  Ratio	  Juris	  260	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Panel	   has	   rejected	   Management	   claims	   that	   loans	   are	   country	   specific	   and,	  
therefore,	   a	   ‘country	   precedent’	   could	   be	   set	  where	   a	   countries	   past	   behaviour	  
would	  affect	  the	  future	  decisions	  of	  the	  Bank170	  as	  seen	  in	  China:	  Western	  Poverty	  
Reduction	  Project.	  This	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  consistent	  approach	  across	  all	  loans	  offered	  
by	  the	  Bank.	  
The	  second	  element	  of	  the	  ‘need	  for	  consistency’	  is	  to	  apply	  the	  decisions	  of	  other	  
Courts	   on	   relevant	   areas	  of	   law.	  Although	  not	  directly	   applicable,	   the	  Panel	   has	  
sought	   to	   include	   human	   rights	   concerns	   in	   its	   interpretation,	   as	   witnessed	   in	  
Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  and	  has	  sought	  to	  expand	  that	  to	  
be	   relevant	   to	   all	   Bank	   work.	   The	   use	   by	   the	   Panel	   of	   other	   legal	   norms,	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  system	  through	  structural	  coupling	  did	  not	  
only	   occur	   in	   the	   Chad-­‐Cameroon	   Petroleum	   and	   Pipeline	   Project	   with	   the	  
introduction	   of	   human	   rights.	   It	   has	   continued	   in	   other	   cases	   of	   the	   Inspection	  
Panel.171	  This	  is	  further	  evidence	  of	  structural	  coupling	  under	  systems	  theory.	  
Although	  the	   Inspection	  Panel	  meets	  the	  strict	  test	   lain	  down	  by	  systems	  theory	  
of	  allowing	  for	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  normative	  expectations	  by	  the	  verbalisation	  of	  
conflicts	   with	   a	   determination	   whether	   an	   action	   is	   legal	   or	   illegal	   and	   the	  
publication	   of	   legal	   communications	   to	   guide	   and	   stabilise	   future	   normative	  
expectations,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  it	  is	  also	  maximising	  its	  ability	  to	  conform	  to	  this	  
role	  by	  the	  actions	  that	  it	  has	  taken	  in	  its	  work.	  
	  
5.13	  Conclusion	  
The	  two	  tests	  that	  guide	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  under	  systems	  theory	  were	  
that	   there	   exist	   a	   body	   of	   norms	   that	   were	   involved	   within	   the	   distinction	   of	  
legal/illegal	  conduct	  and	  that	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  existed	  to	  oversee	  this	  legal/illegal	  
conduct.	   The	   Court-­‐like	   body	   was	   the	   instrument	   that	   triggers	   the	   change	  
between	  a	  normative	  system	  and	  a	  legal	  system.	  	  
Throughout	   the	   history	   of	   the	   Panel,	   the	   actions	   of	   Management	   have	   been	  
judged	  against	  the	  internal	  rules	  and	  procedures	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  This	  is	  a	  clear	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  Supra	  Note.	  162,	  pg.	  280	  
171	  Honduras:	   Land	   Administration	   Project	   Investigation	   Report	   (2007)	   Para.	   258,	   where	  
the	  Panel	  expressed	  its	  concern	  that	  the	  Management	  had	  not	  adequately	  considered	  an	  
ILO	  Convention.	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normative	   system.	   The	   test	   put	   forward	   via	   systems	   theory	   to	   judge	  whether	   a	  
normative	   system	  was	   also	   a	   legal	   system	  was	   that	   the	   system	   is	   involved	   in	   a	  
binary	   distinction	   between	   positive	   conduct	   (‘legal’)	   and	   negative	   conduct	  
(‘illegal’).	   The	   case	   analysis	   has	   shown	   that	   this	   binary	   distinction	   between	  
conduct	   is	  occurring	   through	   the	  work	  of	   the	   Inspection	  Panel.	   The	   terminology	  
might	   change	   from	   case	   to	   case,	   evolving	   to	   appearing	   to	   closely	   match	   legal	  
language	   (rights	   and	   binding	   obligations),	   yet	   the	   fundamental	   actions	   of	   the	  
Panel	   do	   not:	   the	   Panel	   is	   judging	   the	   conduct	   of	  Management	   against	   a	   clear	  
standard	  and	   is	   finding	   the	  conduct	  either	  positive	  or	  negative.	  The	   terminology	  
used	  by	  the	  Panel	  is	  of	  little	  relevance	  as	  long	  as	  it	  judges	  and	  communicates	  the	  
conduct	  either	  way.	  
In	  every	  case	  that	  the	  Panel	  has	  issued	  an	  investigation	  report	  on,	  it	  has	  found	  the	  
Management’s	   actions	   in	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs.	   Although	   this	  
would	  point	   towards	  a	  constant	   illegal	   conduct	  of	   the	  Management,	   the	   reports	  
have	  generally	  differentiated	  between	  conduct	   that	   the	  Panel	  has	  assessed	   is	   in	  
compliance	  (legal)	  and	  in	  non-­‐compliance	  (illegal).	  
Both	   the	   initial	   case	   before	   the	   Panel	   and	   a	   recent	   case	   have	   been	   analysed	   to	  
demonstrate	   that	   this	   is	   not	   an	   ad	   hoc	   use	   of	   legal	   terminology.	   Sixteen	   years	  
separate	  the	  cases	  and	  yet	  the	  Panel	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  same	  distinction	  of	  conduct	  
today	  as	   it	  was	  on	  the	  day	  it	  was	  created.	  The	  powers	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  Panel’s	  
reports	   have	   changed	   and	   developed	   yet	   the	   fundamental	   role	   of	   providing	   a	  
binary	  distinction	  over	  conduct	  has	  not.	  Under	   systems	   theory,	   the	  World	  Bank,	  
by	   creating	   the	   Inspection	   Panel,	   has	   now	   clearly	   evolved	   into	   an	   autonomous	  
legal	  system	  by	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  system.	  
The	   development	   of	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   from	   within	   the	   World	   Bank,	   to	   initially	  
create	  a	  normative	  framework,	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel,	  from	  a	  
sui	  generis	  body	   that	   simply	  made	  recommendations	   to	   the	  Executive	  Directors,	  
to	  a	  court-­‐like	  institution	  that	  is	  operating	  and	  overseeing	  the	  legal/illegal	  binary	  
conduct	   of	   management,	   has	   pushed	   the	   Bank	   into	   a	   position	   of	   being	   a	   fully	  
autonomous	   legal	  system	  whose	  actions	  need	  to	  be	  analysed	  and	  understood	   in	  
terms	  of	  law.	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What	  this	  means	   for	   international	   law,	  what	  this	  means	   for	   the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
what	  this	  means	   for	  an	  analysis	  of	   the	  World	  Bank’s	  actions	  will	  be	  examined	   in	  
the	  following	  chapter.	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Chapter	  Six:	  Conclusions	  and	  Implications	  of	  The	  World	  Bank	  
Acting	  as	  an	  Autonomous	  Legal	  System	  
	  
6.1	  Introduction	  
This	  thesis	  has	  sought	  to	  explain	  a	  very	  particular	   issue	  within	  the	  field	  of	  public	  
international	   law,	  namely,	  how	   the	  actions	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	   can	  be	   framed	   in	  
terms	  of	   law.	  The	  Bank	  has	  taken	  upon	   itself	  a	  governance	  role	   in	  relation	  to	   its	  
membership	   and	   although	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Bank	   have	   arisen	   interest	   in	   the	  
fields	  of	  political	  science	  and	  international	  relations,	  it	  is	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  
its	   ability	   to	   explain	   these	   actions	   in	   terms	   of	   law	   that	   has	   concerned	   the	  
undertaken	   of	   this	   thesis.	   This	   work	   has	   particularly	   focused	   around	   the	  
governance	   role	   that	   the	  World	   Bank	   has	   taken	   upon	   itself	   and	   has	   sought	   to	  
explain	  the	   legal	  relationship	  that	  has	  evolved	  and	  developed	  between	  the	  Bank	  
and	  its	  constituent	  member	  States.	  
The	  application	  of	  systems	  theory	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  
Bank	   of	   2014	   is	   a	   very	   different	   organisation	   to	   the	   one	   that	   its	   founders	  
envisioned	   in	  1944.	  Over	   the	   intervening	   years	   since	   its	   inception,	   the	  Bank	  has	  
evolved	   and	   expanded	   upon	   its	   mandate	   to	   a	   point	   where	   its	   actions	   can	   no	  
longer	  be	  readily	  traced	  to	  its	  founding	  treaty	  and,	  instead,	  systems	  theory	  can	  be	  
utilised	  to	  explain	  in	  terms	  of	  law	  how	  the	  Bank	  operates.	  
This	   chapter	   summarises	   the	   conclusions	   that	   have	   been	  drawn	   throughout	   the	  
proceeding	  chapters,	  before	  considering	  the	  implications	  of	  these	  conclusions	  by	  
analysing	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   Bank	   acting	   as	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system.	  
Examination	   of	   the	   implications	   is	   done	   by,	   firstly,	   examining	   the	   boundaries	   of	  
the	  Bank’s	  legal	  system	  and	  establishing	  both	  where	  the	  Bank	  is	  today	  and	  where	  
it	  may	  develop	  to	  in	  the	  future.	  Secondly,	  the	  chapter	  will	  conclude	  by	  considering	  
the	  effects	  of	  this	  shift	  to	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system	  and	  how	  it	  will	  affect	  the	  
Bank	   itself,	   the	   relationship	  with	  member	  States	  and,	   in	  a	  wider	  sense,	  consider	  
the	  effect	  that	  such	  breakages	  may	  have	  on	  public	  international	  law	  generally.	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6.2	  Conclusions	  
In	  seeking	  to	  frame	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  terms	  of	  law,	  this	  thesis	  has	  
considered	   a	   number	   of	   alternative	   legal	   analytical	   tools	   before	   utilising	   the	  
conceptual	  tool	  of	  systems	  theory,	  as	  the	  most	  appropriate	  mechanism	  via	  which	  
the	  Bank’s	  behaviour	  can	  be	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  law.	  	  
	  
6.2.1	  The	  Positive	  International	  Law	  Theorem	  and	  its	  Application	  to	  the	  
World	  Bank	  
As	  a	  body	  of	  public	   international	   law,	   in	  seeking	   to	  explain	   in	   law	  the	  actions	  of	  
the	  World	   Bank	   and	   the	   governance	   role	   that	   it	   has	   occupied,	   this	  work	   began	  
from	   the	   most	   prevalent	   theory	   used	   within	   the	   legal	   sphere	   of	   public	  
international	  law,	  the	  positive	  theory.	  	  
The	   positive	   theory	   applied	   to	   international	   law	   developed	   from	   its	   original	  
application	  to	  national	  law,	  with	  its	  focus	  upon	  an	  expression	  of	  sovereign	  will.	  No	  
law	  was	  seen	  as	  valid	  without	  an	  express	  link	  to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  national	  sovereign.	  
When	   applied	   to	   international	   law,	   primarily	   through	   the	   work	   of	   Vattel,	   three	  
central	  tenants	  of	  the	  positive	  theory	  were	  necessary:	  the	  existence	  of	  sovereigns	  
who	   had	   exclusive	   jurisdiction	   within	   States,	   that	   international	   law	   was	   only	  
created	  by	  sovereign	  consent	  and	  the	  equality	  of	  all	  States	  in	  law.	  Stemming	  from	  
the	   application	   of	   these	   three	   tenants,	   sources	   become	   central	   to	   the	   positivist	  
theory,	  in	  that	  if	  law	  is	  the	  will	  of	  States,	  only	  through	  evidence	  of	  an	  expression	  
of	  sovereign	  will,	  can	  a	   law	  be	  created.	   In	  the	  application	  of	  this	  to	   international	  
organisations,	   this	  has	   traditionally	   required	   that	  all	   actions	  of	   the	  organisations	  
be	  grounded	  in	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  formulating	  treaty.	  
Treaty	  interpretation,	  therefore,	  becomes	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  in	  assessing	  
the	  limits	  of	  sovereign	  consent	  and	  the	  limits	  that	  international	  organisations	  can	  
act	  within.	   In	   the	   application	   of	   treaty	   interpretation	   to	   the	   Bank,	   a	   number	   of	  
different	   interpretations	  are	  of	   relevance:	   the	  Vienna	  Convention	  on	   the	   Law	  of	  
Treaties,	   customary	   international	   law,	   implied	   powers	   and	   the	   evolutionary	  
approach	  were	   all	   examined	   and	   contrasted	  with	   the	   Bank’s	   own	   approach.	   All	  
such	   approaches	   stay	   within	   the	   positive	   theory	   by	   providing	   methods	   to	   best	  
ascertain	  the	  exact	  will	  of	  the	  sovereigns	  when	  creating	  a	  treaty.	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However,	  when	  considering	  the	  history	  and	  development	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  since	  
its	   inception	   in	   1944	   to	   the	   present	   day,	   all	   of	   these	  methods	   of	   interpretation	  
that	  are	  available	  under	  the	  positive	  theory	  fail	  to	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank.	  
This	   is	   namely	   as	   the	   Bank	   was	   not	   only	   seeking	   to	   expand	   its	   mandate	   as	   it	  
evolved	  and	  interpret	  provisions	  such	  as	  “development”	  in	  a	  wider	  manner,	  but	  to	  
go	   expressly	   against	   the	   consent	   of	   its	   membership	   by	   taking	   into	   account	  
considerations	   in	   lending	   that	   were	   non-­‐economic.	   Any	   interpretative	   method	  
under	   the	   positive	   theory	   must	   allow	   for	   the	   constraint	   of	   actions	   of	   the	  
respective	   international	   organisation	   by	   its	   founding	   treaty,	   and	   whilst	   various	  
methods	  could	  be	  used	  to	  expand	  beyond	  the	  textual	  words	  to	  seek	  the	  exact	  will	  
of	  the	  membership	  of	  sovereigns,	  going	  expressly	  against	  provisions	  of	  the	  treaty	  
is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  positive	  theory.	  
As	  the	  Bank	  was	  taking	  actions	  inconsistent	  with	  its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  the	  
consent	   of	   sovereign	   States,	   its	   actions	   cannot	   be	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   law	   by	  
reference	   to	   the	   positive	   theory.	   Although	   States	   have	   repeatedly	   and	   often	  
asserted	   their	   sovereignty	   in	   other	   contexts,	   the	   member	   States	   of	   the	   World	  
Bank	   were	   willing	   to	   allow	   the	   Bank	   to	   behave	   in	   such	   a	   manner.	   As	   such,	  
alternative	  tools	  to	  the	  positive	  theory	  are	  required	  to	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  
Bank.	  
	  
6.2.2.	  Alternative	  Theories	  
Having	   rejected	   the	   application	   of	   positive	   theory	   to	   model	   the	   actions	   of	   the	  
World	  Bank,	  a	  number	  of	  alternative	   theories	  were	  examined	  as	   to	   the	  benefits	  
that	   they	   could	   bring	   in	   understanding	   the	   operations	   of	   the	   World	   Bank.	  
Although	   the	   positive	   theory,	   as	   the	   most	   prevalent	   theory	   within	   public	  
international	   law,	   could	   not	   model	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   in	   law,	   the	  
positive	   theory	   is	   not	   the	   only	   available	   tool	   of	   analysis	   that	   lawyers	   have	  
available.	  In	  seeking	  to	  frame	  in	  law	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank,	  four	  alternative	  legal	  
theories	  were	  examined,	  as	  four	  theories	  that	  have	  either	  been	  used	  to	  explain	  in	  
law	  the	  works	  of	  other	   international	  organisations	  or	  as	  developing	  areas	  of	   law	  
that	  could	  seek	  to	  accurately	  model	  the	  Bank’s	  work.	  
Progressive	   positive	   theory,	   a	   term	   coined	   for	   this	   thesis,	   was	   examined	   as	   an	  
emerging	   area	   of	   public	   international	   law	   that	   seeks	   to	   bind	   international	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organisations	  to	  the	  application	  of	  customary	  international	  law.	  This	  theory	  rests	  
upon	   the	  work	   of	   the	   International	   Law	  Commission	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	  
Articles	  on	  the	  Responsibility	  of	   International	  Organisations.	  As	  a	  mechanism	  for	  
understanding	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Bank,	   the	   theory	   could	   usefully	   be	   utilised	   to	  
explain	   how	   the	   Bank	   could	   take	   into	   account	   areas	   outside	   the	   strict	   consent	  
given	   by	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   and	   consider	   areas	   of	   law	   such	   as	  
environmental,	   indigenous	  and	  resettlement	  rights,	  however,	  due	  to	  the	  specific	  
provisions	   contained	   within	   the	   Bank’s	   treaty,	   the	   theory	   could	   not	   be	   fully	  
utilised	  as	  it	  could	  not	  explain	  the	  Bank	  expressly	  ignoring	  provisions	  of	  its	  Articles	  
of	   Agreement	   such	   as	   the	   no	   political	   interference	   clause	   in	   order	   to	   take	   into	  
these	  outside	  areas	  of	  consent.	  
An	   alternative	   model	   considered	   was	   the	   constitutionalisation	   of	   international	  
organisations	  theory.	  As	  a	  theory	  that	  rejects	  that	  international	  law	  is	  based	  upon	  
bilateral	  relations,	  whilst	  instead	  positing	  a	  verticalisation	  within	  the	  international	  
legal	  order,	  the	  theory	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  explain	  the	  governance	  role	  that	  the	  
World	  Bank	  has	  undertaken	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  member	  States.	  Yet,	  as	  a	  theory	  that	  
puts	  the	  “constitutional”	  document,	  which	   in	  this	  case	  would	  the	  Bank’s	  Articles	  
of	  Agreement,	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  created,	  the	  theory	  again	  ran	  into	  
difficulties	   explaining	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Bank	   if	   the	   Bank’s	   work	   was	   no	   longer	  
explainable	   by	   reference	   to	   its	   treaty.	   The	   theory	   offered	   insights	   into	   the	  
application	  of	  human	  rights	  norms	  within	  the	  Bank’s	  work,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  
Inspection	   Panel	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   legalise	   dispute	   settlement,	   as	   well	   as	   an	  
accountability	   mechanism,	   and	   the	   application	   of	   conditions,	   but	   could	   not	  
explain	  the	  de-­‐linking	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  work	  from	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  
Global	  administrative	  law,	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  positive	  theory,	  rests	  upon	  the	  
premise	  that	  there	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  global	  governance	  that	  the	  positive	  theory	  can	  
no	   longer	   explain.	   The	   theory	   claims	   that	   there	   exist	   a	   number	   of	   transnational	  
systems	  of	  regulation	  that	  address	  global	  issues	  that	  a	  single	  State	  cannot	  manage	  
alone	  and	   so,	   regulatory	   competence	   in	   these	  areas	  has	   shifted	   from	  a	  national	  
level	  to	  a	  global	  level.	  These	  areas	  of	  global	  competence	  can	  be	  characterised	  by	  
either	   the	   presence	   of	   administrative	   law	   ideals	   or,	   the	   assertion	   under	   the	  
theory,	  that	  these	  areas	  should	  consider	  such	  ideals.	  The	  World	  Bank	  though	  has	  
not	   adopted	   administrative	   ideals	   in	   the	   manner	   prescribed	   by	   the	   global	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administrative	  law	  theory	  and	  neither	  has	  it	  acted	  within	  the	  area	  of	  competence	  
assigned	  to	  it	  by	  its	  membership,	  its	  purposes	  within	  its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  
Finally,	  international	  institutional	  law	  was	  considered	  as	  of	  its	  application	  in	  other	  
similar	  circumstances	  of	  international	  organisations,	  yet,	  due	  to	  its	  focus	  upon	  the	  
institutional	  arrangements	  of	  the	  Bank,	  rather	  than	  seeking	  to	  explain	  in	  terms	  of	  
law	  the	  actions	  of	  Bank,	  was	  rejected.	  
As	  such,	  none	  of	  the	  prevalent	  theories	  chosen	  have	  been	  able	  to	  explain	   in	   law	  
the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  governance	  role	  that	  it	  has	  undertaken.	  
	  
6.2.3	  Systems	  Theory	  
Having	   examined	   both	   the	  most	   prevalent	   theory	   and	   alternative	   theories	   that	  
have	  been	  used	  in	  other	  international	  organisation’s	  context,	  systems	  theory	  was	  
posited	  as	  the	  theory	  that	  could	  best	  frame	  in	  terms	  of	  law	  the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank.	  
The	   model	   of	   systems	   theory,	   as	   developed	   by	   Luhmann,	   requires	   a	   self-­‐
reproducing,	   self-­‐referencing,	   autonomous	   system	   with	   the	   identification	   of	  
communication	  occurring	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide	  for	  a	  legal	  system	  to	  be	  in	  
place.	  Yet,	  whilst	  useful	   in	  assessing	  the	  existence	  of	  a	   legal	  system	  once	  fully	   in	  
place,	  to	  accurately	  model	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  Bank	  since	  its	  inception	  requires	  
not	   only	   a	   focus	   on	   if	   a	   legal	   system	   exists	   today,	   but	   the	   elements	   that	   are	  
necessary	   to	   shift	   into	  a	   legal	   system.	   From	  systems	   theory,	   this	   starts	  with	   the	  
fundamental	  presence	  of	  a	  normative	  system.	  
This	   thesis	   positions	   the	   development	   of	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   as	   central	   to	   the	  
evolution	   of	   a	   normative	   system	   into	   a	   legal	   system.	   Although	   systems	   theory	  
positions	  a	  body	   ruling	  upon	   the	   legal/illegal	  divide	  as	   central	   to	  a	   legal	   system,	  
the	  model	  of	  systems	  theory	  developed	  by	  this	  work	  has	  centred	  the	  presence	  of	  
such	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  not	  only	  as	  a	  necessary	  component	  of	  a	   legal	  system,	  but	  
as	  a	  catalyst	  which	  triggers	  the	  shift	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  
It	  is	  this	  Court-­‐like	  body	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  normative	  expectations	  
and	  closes	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  legal	  system.	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Put	  differently,	  as	  an	  autonomous	  system	  under	  systems	  theory	  must	  produce	  all	  
elements	  necessary	   for	  a	   system	   internal	   to	   the	   respective	   system	   itself,	   a	  body	  
internal	   to	   the	   system	   must	   allow	   for	   the	   necessary	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	  
expectations.	   This	   is	   done	   by	   the	   body	   internal	   to	   the	   system	   ruling	   upon	   the	  
legal/illegal	  divide	  and	  contributing	  to	  the	  propagation	  of	  legal	  communication.	  It	  
is	  the	  verbalisation	  of	  conflicts	  through	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  with	  a	  determination	  of	  
legal/illegal	  behaviour,	  combined	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  legal	  communications	  to	  
guide	  and	  stabilise	  future	  normative	  expectations,	  which	  triggers	  the	  fundamental	  
shift	  in	  systems	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  to	  a	  legal	  system.	  
As	  such,	  and	  given	  this	  development,	  two	  fundamental	  questions	  are	  posited	  for	  
the	  identification	  of	  a	  legal	  system:	  
1) Are	  communications	  identified	  through	  the	  binary	  coding	  legal/illegal?	  
2) Is	  there	  a	  dispute	  settlement	  body	  that	  assess	  conduct	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
coding	  legal/illegal?	  
	  
6.2.4	  Development	  of	  a	  Normative	  System	  
The	  application	  of	  systems	  theory	  as	  a	  model	  of	  understanding	  presupposes	  the	  
presence	  of	  a	  normative	  framework	  being	   in	  place.	  To	  explain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  
World	  Bank	  in	  terms	  of	  law	  through	  the	  application	  of	  systems	  theory,	  therefore,	  
requires	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  normative	  system	  with	  the	  Bank	  exercising	  a	  normative	  
role	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  membership.	  
Although	   the	   Bank	   views	   the	   relationship	   between	   itself	   and	   its	   borrowing	  
member	  States	  as	  a	  horizontal	  relationship,	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  normative	  system	  
within	  systems	  theory	  as	  a	  system	  that	  has	  in	  place	  a	  set	  of	  normative	  rules,	  that	  
are	   created	   by	   one	   actor	   to	   tell	   another	   actor	   what	   to	   do,	   and,	   therefore,	  
constrain	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  actor,	  allows	  for	  a	  redefining	  of	  this	  relationship.	  This	  
is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank	  to	  enforce	  these	  normative	  rules	  upon	  its	  
membership.	  
The	  primary	  mechanism	  via	  which	  the	  World	  Bank	  operates	  its	  normative	  rules	  is	  
through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Operations	  Manual,	  which	  provides	  a	  
fixed	   normative	   framework	   in	   relation	   to	   World	   Bank	   lending	   operations.	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Although	  the	  ad	  hoc	  norms	  provided	  by	  conditionality	  were	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  a	  
normative	  evolution	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  framework,	  it	   is	  the	  fixed	  nature	  of	  the	  norms	  
created	   by	   the	   Operations	   Manual	   that	   established	   a	   normative	   framework	  
applicable	  to	  borrowing	  member	  States.	  Conditionality	  is	  country	  specific	  and,	  at	  
least	   in	   theory,	   is	  meant	   to	   vary	   between	   borrowing	  member	   States	   depending	  
upon	   their	   specific	   situation.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   Operations	   Manual	   applies	   to	   all	  
member	  States	  whose	  borrowing	  touches	  upon	  one	  of	  the	  areas	  concerned.	  The	  
Operational	  Policies	  and	  Bank	  Procedures	  are	  instructions	  that	  the	  member	  States	  
must	  follow	  if	  they	  are	  to	  have	  access	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  funding,	  which	  are	  enforced	  
and	  followed	  up	  upon	  by	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  staff.	  
The	  enforcement	  of	  this	  normative	  framework	  may	  only	  occur	  against	  borrowing	  
member	  States	  and,	  as	  such,	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  narrow	  framework	  as,	  under	  
systems	   theory,	   no	   communication	   occurs	   to	   non-­‐borrowing	  member	   States	   on	  
what	   they	   ought	   to	   do	   through	   the	   application	   of	   the	   Operations	   Manual.	  
However,	   the	   Bank	   has	   sought	   to	   expand	   and	   develop	   the	   premise	   of	   a	   wider	  
normative	   framework	   by	   attempting	   to	   influence	   its	   entire	  membership	   by	   the	  
publication	   of	   annual	   reports.	   Although	   there	   is	   as	   of	   yet	   no	   enforcement	  
mechanism	   regarding	   these	   annual	   reports,	   the	   reports	   contain	   the	   Bank’s	  
analysis	  of	  its	  entire	  membership’s	  behaviour	  against	  standards	  established	  by	  the	  
Bank,	  therefore,	  seeking	  to	  influence	  member	  States	  behaviour	  on	  these	  subjects.	  
Although	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  annual	  reports	  is	  of	  importance	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  
explaining	  the	  Bank’s	  behaviour,	  it	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  fixed	  normative	  framework	  
that	  allows	  for	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  application	  of	  systems	  theory	  to	  explain	  in	  law	  
the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  
	  
6.2.5	  Development	  into	  an	  Autonomous	  Legal	  System	  through	  the	  Work	  
of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  
The	   presence	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   Operations	   Manual	   and	   its	   application	   to	  
borrowing	  member	  States	  created	  a	  fixed	  normative	  framework	  within	  the	  World	  
Bank	   system.	   However,	   whilst	   necessary	   for	   the	   initial	   application	   of	   systems	  
theory,	   the	   presence	  of	   a	   legal	   system	   requires	   that	   the	   two	   tests	   identified	   be	  
met:	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1) 	  Are	  communications	  identified	  through	  the	  binary	  coding	  legal/illegal?	  
2) Is	  there	  a	  dispute	  settlement	  body	  that	  assess	  conduct	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
coding	  legal/illegal?	  
The	  tests	  are	   intrinsically	   linked	  as	   if	  the	  second	  test	  can	  be	  met,	  the	  first	  test	   is	  
also	  met.	   Furthermore,	   this	   thesis	   has	   posited	   that	   the	  presence	  of	   a	   Court-­‐like	  
body,	   acting	   as	   the	   dispute	   settlement	   body,	   is	   the	   catalyst	   that	   triggers	   the	  
evolution	  of	  a	  normative	  system	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  
In	  September	  1993,	  the	  World	  Bank	  created	  the	  Inspection	  Panel,	  which	  receives	  
complaints	   from	   citizens	   and	   then	   investigates	   compliance	   with	   the	   Operations	  
Manual.	  The	  development	  of	  the	  Panel,	  and	  the	  framework	  that	   it	  works	  within,	  
has	   been	  moved	   forward	   by	   a	   number	   of	   key	   cases	   that	   have	   gone	   before	   the	  
Panel	  and,	  in	  particular,	  with	  how	  the	  Panel	  has	  dealt	  with	  those	  cases.	  The	  move	  
towards	  a	  model	  of	  compulsory	  enforcement,	  the	   incorporation	  of	  human	  rights	  
as	  evidence	  of	  structural	  coupling,	  combined	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  both	  the	  powers	  
and	   effects	   of	   Panel	   decisions	   have	   demonstrated	   the	   true	   nature	   of	   the	   Panel	  
under	   systems	   theory.	   When	   combined	   with	   the	   fundamental	   nature	   of	   Panel	  
decisions,	  of	  providing	  a	  differentiation	  between	  behaviour	  that	   is	   in	  compliance	  
with	   norms	   (legal)	   and	   in	   non-­‐compliance	   (illegal),	   all	   of	   these	   elements	   have	  
contributed	   towards	   a	   movement	   from	   the	   Panel	   towards	   the	   Court-­‐like	   body	  
required	  by	  systems	  theory.	  
The	  development	  of	   the	   Inspection	  Panel	   into	   such	   a	  Court-­‐like	  body	   allows	   for	  
the	  two	  tests	  of	  identification	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  under	  systems	  theory	  to	  be	  met,	  
demonstrating	  that	  the	  Bank	  today	  is	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system.	  
Since	   its	   inception,	   the	   Inspections	   Panel,	   although	   not	   a	   judicial	   Court	   in	   the	  
classically	  understood	  sense,	  has	  developed	  into	  the	  Court-­‐like	  body	  required	  by	  
systems	  theory,	  providing	  communication	  on	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide	  on	  the	  action	  
of	   the	   World	   Bank	   staff	   on	   compliance	   with	   the	   Operations	   Manual.	   This	  
development	  has	  triggered	  the	  shift	  for	  the	  World	  Bank	  from	  a	  normative	  system	  
into	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system.	  	  Unlike	  other	  theories	  that	  failed	  to	  adequately	  
model	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  law,	  the	  application	  of	  systems	  theory	  to	  
demonstrate	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   Bank	   from	   a	   normative	   system	   into	   a	   legal	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system	  allows	   for	   the	  actions	  of	   the	  Bank,	  and	   in	  particular	   the	  governance	  role	  
that	  it	  has	  come	  to	  occupy,	  to	  be	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  law.	  	  
This	  new	  framing	  of	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  actions	  have	  a	  number	  of	  implications	  that	  
need	   to	   be	   considered	   and	   offers	   an	   alternative	   perspective	   to	   the	   issues	   that	  
confront	  the	  modern	  World	  Bank.	  
	  
6.3	   Implications	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   Acting	   as	   an	   Autonomous	  
System	  
The	  World	  Bank	  has	  developed	  into	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system.	  The	  creation	  of	  
a	   normative	   framework	   and	   a	   Court-­‐like	   body	   ruling	   upon	  whether	   actions	   are	  
legal/illegal	   has	   moved	   the	   Bank	   away	   from	   its	   original	   conception	   to	   an	  
organisation	   that	   is	   best	   understood	   in	   law	   by	   the	   analytical	   tool	   of	   systems	  
theory.	  
The	  modern	  Bank	  is	  a	  self-­‐reproducing,	  self-­‐referencing	  autonomous	  system	  that	  
is	   characterised	   by	   communication	   along	   a	   binary	   code	   legal/illegal	   for	   the	  
purpose	   of	   stabilising	   normative	   expectations.	   The	   normative	   framework	   that	  
developed	  with	   the	   introduction	  and	  use	  of	  Operational	  Policies	   (OPs)	  and	  Bank	  
Procedures	  (BPs)	  has,	  through	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  into	  a	  Court-­‐
like	   body,	   allowed	   for	   the	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	   expectations	   via	  
communication	  along	   the	   legal/illegal	  divide.	  Actors	  affected	  by	   the	  work	  of	   the	  
World	  Bank	  now	  have	  a	  normative	  expectation	  on	  how	  the	  World	  Bank	  will	  act.	  
The	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  bind	  the	  Bank	  and	  allow	  for	  this	  stabilisation	  to	  occur.	  
In	   addition,	   the	   self-­‐reproduction	   and	   self-­‐referencing	   of	   the	   system	   occur	  
through	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Panel.	   The	   communication	   of	   the	   Panel	   and	   it	  
establishing	  the	   legal/illegal	  divide	  binary	  code,	  establishes	  the	  self-­‐reproduction	  
by	   constantly	   creating	   and	   providing	   understanding	   to	   the	   information	   that	   it	  
produces1	  whilst	  allowing	   for	  a	   constant	  process	  of	   remembering	  and	   forgetting	  
by	  the	  rulings	  that	  the	  Panel	  provides.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Panel	  offers	  an	  avenue	  for	  
the	   Bank	   to	   interpret	   information	   external	   to	   the	   Bank	   system	   in	   a	   fashion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  ‘The	  Autopoiesis	  of	  Social	  Systems’	   in	  Felix	  Geyer	  &	  Johannes	  Van	  
Der	  Zouwen	  (eds.),	  Sociocybernetic	  Paradoxes:	  Observation,	  Control	  and	  Evolution	  of	  Self-­‐
Steering	  Systems	  (Sage	  1986)	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consistent	   with	   the	   internal	   code	   of	   the	   Bank.2	   The	   Panel’s	   role	   cannot	   be	  
overemphasised	   when	   viewing	   the	   World	   Bank	   as	   a	   legal	   system.	   Its	  
establishment	   of	   rules	   on	   how	   to	   interpret	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
publishing	  of	  its	  findings,	  allows	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  inconsistencies	  by	  linking	  its	  
findings	   to	   future	   operations3	   (actors	   know	   how	   it	   will	   react	   on	   what	   is	  
legal/illegal).	  This	  allows	  for	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  normative	  expectations.	  
If	   the	   World	   Bank	   is	   viewed	   as	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system,	   systems	   theory	  
provides	   an	   analytical	   tool	   that	   allows	   observers	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   this	   legal	  
framework	   in	   ways	   that	   are	   not	   possible	   under	   either	   the	   positivist	   theory	   or	  
other	  commonly	  used	  analytical	  tools.	  
	  
6.4	  Boundaries	  and	  Limitations	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Autonomous	  
Legal	  System	  
The	  World	  Bank	  acting	  as	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system	  raises	  two	  questions	  that	  
can	   be	   asked	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   legal	   system:	   what	   are	   the	  
boundaries	  of	  the	   legal	  system	  and	  who	  does	  the	   legal	  system	  encapsulate?	  The	  
answers	   to	   these	   questions	   are	   a	   starting	   point	   that	   can	   be	   developed	   upon	   to	  
extrapolate	  the	  implications	  for	  both	  the	  Bank	  and	  other	  actors	  as	  to	  the	  effect	  of	  
the	  legal	  system.	  
6.4.1	  What	  are	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Legal	  System?	  
The	  norms	   that	   the	  World	  Bank	   legal	   system	  provides	  communication	  along	   the	  
legal/illegal	   divide	   are	   the	  OPs	   and	  BPs.	   The	  OPs	   and	  BPs	   are	   the	   internal	   rules	  
that	  govern	  the	  actions	  of	  World	  Bank	  staff,	  and,	  through	  them,	  the	  membership	  
of	  the	  Bank	  and	  are	  the	  “laws”	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  system.	  Although,	  as	  seen	  
in	   Chapter	   Four,	   there	   are	   two	   other	   avenues	   via	   which	   the	   Bank	   attempts	   to	  
influence	   its	  membership,	   conditionality	   and	   reports,	   the	   normative	   framework	  
that	  has	  allowed	  the	  Bank	  to	  develop	  into	  a	  legal	  system	  are	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  
In	  this	  sense,	  some	  conditions	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  in	  that	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  
Bank	   are	   required	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   are	   followed	   through	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  the	  Chad-­‐Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  Inspection	  Panel	  Case.	  
3	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  ‘Law	  as	  a	  Social	  System’	  (1989)	  83(1	  &	  2)	  Northwestern	  University	  Law	  
Review	  136,	  140	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imposition	   of	   conditions	   upon	   the	   borrower.	   However,	   in	   other	   areas	   the	  
conditions	   that	   are	   attached	   to	   the	   legal	   agreement	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   a	  
borrower	  are	  unrelated	  to	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  
Furthermore,	   the	   traditional	   legal	   documents	  of	   the	  World	  Bank,	   the	  Articles	  of	  
Agreement	  and	  Loan	  Agreements,	  are	  also	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  norms	  provided	  in	  
the	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   or,	   in	   theory,	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel.	   This	   can	  
subsequently	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   limitation	   via	   which	   the	   Bank	   legal	   system	  
communicates	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide.	  
In	   this	   sense,	   the	   legal	   system	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	   is	   somewhat	   constrained.	   It	   is	  
not	   the	   intention	   of	   this	   work	   to	   deny	   the	   legality	   of	   either	   the	   Articles	   of	  
Agreement	   or	   Loan	   Agreements,	   yet	   it	   is	   also	   apparent	   that	   in	   the	  World	   Bank	  
autonomous	  legal	  system,	  neither	  is	  encapsulated	  by	  the	  communication	  directly	  
from	  the	  Panel,	  as	  the	  Panel	   is	  not	  empowered	  to	  examine	  either	  outside	  of	  the	  
OPs	  and	  BPs.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  this	  argument,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  
can	  only	  occur	  within	  a	  framework	  established	  by	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  
Loan	  Agreements.	  Without	  either	  legal	  agreement	  being	  in	  place,	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  
would	  be	  ineffective	  and	  there	  would	  be	  no	  communication	  at	  all.	  
This	   paradox	  of	   the	   boundary	   of	   this	   legal	   system	   is	   only	   solved	  by	   viewing	   the	  
World	  Bank	  itself	  as	  a	  system,	  with	  the	   legal	  system	  within	   it	  constrained	  by	  the	  
limits	   of	   this	   system.	   As	   systems	   theory	   is	   based	   upon	   communication,	   the	  
boundaries	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  are	  not	  institutional	  (i.e.	  Courts,	  Parliament,	  etc.)	  but	  
operational,	   in	   that	   every	   communication	   that	   is	   along	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide	  
within	   a	   greater	   system	   is	   deemed	   part	   of	   the	   legal	   system.	   Whether	  
communication	  about	  the	  legality	  or	   illegality	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Bank	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   or	   Loan	   Agreements	   is	   part	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   legal	  
system	  depends	  upon	  its	  ability	  to	  be	  challenged	  before	  the	  Inspection	  Panel.	  If	  a	  
Court-­‐like	   structure	   is	   integral	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   a	   legal	   system	   as	   has	   been	  
posited,	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   Panel	   to	   provide	   a	   communication	   on	   the	  
legality/illegality	  of	  an	  action	  is	  the	  constraining	  factor	  on	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank	   system.	   In	   this	   respect,	   it	   is	   significant	   that	   the	   Panel	   has	   demonstrated	   a	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willingness	  to	  consider	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  Loan	  Agreements	  within	  its	  
remit	  when	  examining	  OPs	  and	  BPs.4	  
This	  is	  a	  non-­‐ideal	  solution,	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  Loan	  
Agreements	  falling	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  Panel	  depending	  upon	  their	  link	  to	  the	  
OPs	  and	  BPs.	  Whilst	  this	  would	  incorporate	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Loan	  Agreement,	  it	  
would	   also	   suggest	   an	   alternative	   mechanism	   be	   available	   for	   the	   settling	   of	  
disputes	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement.	   This	   is	   present	   although	   has	   never	  
been	  used.5	  In	  addition,	  the	  individual	  Loan	  Agreements	  contain,	  via	  reference	  to	  
the	  General	  Conditions,	  ad	  hoc	  dispute	  settlement	  procedures	  to	  provide	  a	  ruling	  
on	  the	  legality/illegality	  of	  actions	  taken	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  agreement.6	  
The	  limitation	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Panel	  being	  linked	  to	  OPs	  and	  BPs,	  whilst	  other	  
communication	   regarding	   the	  World	  Bank	  occurs	   along	   a	   legal/illegal	   divide	   but	  
unrelated	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Panel,	  leaves	  a	  non-­‐ideal	  situation	  when	  defining	  the	  
limits	   of	   the	   system.	   At	   a	   minimum,	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   the	   World	   Bank	   legal	  
system	  incorporates	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs,	  but	  the	  demonstrated	  ability	  of	  the	  Panel	  to	  
link	  this	  to	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  Loan	  Agreements	  and	  make	  rulings	  on	  
these,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   presence	   of	   alternative	   Court-­‐like	   bodies	   to	   provide	  
communication	  on	  the	   legal/illegal	  divide,	  points	  to	  a	  wider	   legal	  system.	   Ideally	  
this	  would	  be	  rectified	  by	  the	  consolidation	  of	   legal	  procedures	  within	  the	  Bank,	  
with	   one	   Court-­‐like	   body	   responsible	   for	   all	   communication	   on	   the	   legal/illegal	  
divide	  regarding	  all	  Bank	  activities.	  Moving	  forward	  with	  the	  Bank,	  if	  the	  Bank	  is	  to	  
accept	   its	  development	   into	  an	  autonomous	   legal	  system,	   this	   is	  an	  amendment	  
to	  the	  Bank’s	  structure	  that	  could	  be	  adopted.	  
The	   limits	   of	   the	   system	   are	   also	   temporal	   as	   well	   as	   spatial.	   By	   breaking	   the	  
intrinsic	   link	  with	   State	   consent	   that	   is	  present	   in	   the	  positivist	   theory,	   it	   allows	  
system	   theory	   to	   explain	   the	  work	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	   as	   it	   is	   acting	   today	   and	  
since	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  Panel.	  However,	  despite	   the	  analysis	   regarding	   the	  
creation	  of	  the	  normative	  system	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  the	  origins	  of	  a	  system	  of	   law	  
question	   the	   applicability	   of	   systems	   theory	   back	   beyond	   a	   point	   where	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	   For	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement,	   see	   for	   example:	   The	   Inspection	   Panel	   Investigation	  
Report:	   The	  Qinghai	   Project,	   China:	  Western	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Project	   (2000)	   para.	   78.	  
For	   the	   Loan	   Agreement,	   see	   for	   example:	   Red	   Sea-­‐Dead	   Sea	  Water	   Conveyance	   Study	  
Program	  Report	  No.	  66811-­‐MNA	  (2012)	  para.	  49.	  
5	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  IX	  
6	  IBRD	  General	  Conditions	  for	  Loans,	  March	  12,	  2012,	  Article	  VIII	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normative	   system	   began	   to	   develop.	   The	   period	   of	   time	   before	   this,	   when	   the	  
Bank	  was	  acting	  outside	  of	  its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  yet	  had	  not	  developed	  into	  a	  
normative	  system	  is	  an	  open	  question	  within	  the	  systems	  theory	  model.	  
Systems	   theory	   does,	   however,	   offer	   an	   opportunity	   to	   understand	   the	   Bank’s	  
actions	  related	  to	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  As	  the	  communication	  on	  this	  issue,	  
whether	   the	   Bank	   has	   been	   acting	   legally/illegally	   regarding	   its	   actions	   to	   the	  
Articles,	   develops	   internally	   and	   is	   interpreted	   by	   the	   internal	   structure	   of	   the	  
Bank,	  it	  is	  this	  internal	  structure	  that	  is	  continuously	  reproducing	  itself	  that	  assess	  
this	   Bank	   conduct.	   Issues,	   such	   as	   whether	   the	   political	   activity	   prohibition	   has	  
been	  respected,	  are	  assessed	  internally	  and	  develop	  an	  understanding	  internal	  to	  
the	   system.	   This	   evolution	   of	   understanding	   allows	   for	   an	   evolution	   of	   legal	  
meaning	   within	   the	   system.	   The	   norms	   that	   have	   developed	   have	   developed	  
internal	   to	   the	   Bank’s	   structure,	   and	   whether	   they	   comply	   with	   the	   Articles	   is,	  
therefore,	  internalised	  within	  the	  Bank’s	  system.	  
6.4.2	  Who	  does	  the	  World	  Bank	  Legal	  System	  Encapsulate?	  
The	  question	  of	  whom	  the	  Bank’s	  legal	  system	  encapsulates	  is	  linked	  to	  where	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  the	  Bank	  legal	  system	  are.	  It	  is	  also	  apparent	  that	  there	  are	  multiple	  
ways	   in	  which	  to	  view	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	   in	   law	  under	  systems	  
theory.	  
The	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  are	  directly	  binding	  upon	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  although	  in	  
Chapter	   Four	   it	   was	   demonstrated	   that	   they	   also	   indirectly	   bind	   the	   member	  
States	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  who	  request	  assistance	  as	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  outline	  rules	  
for	   how	   any	   project	   should	   be	   undertaken.	   This	   in	   turn	   implies	   three	   possible	  
scenarios	  for	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  system.	  	  
As	  a	  starting	  point,	  the	  direct	  applicability	  of	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  to	  the	  staff	  of	  the	  
Bank	   could	   limit	   the	   legal	   system	   to	   only	   allowing	   for	   communication	   from	   the	  
Panel	   to	   the	   staff.	   It	   is	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   staff’s	   actions	   that	   the	   Panel	   creates	  
communication	  relative	  to	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide.	  
Alternatively,	  as	  the	  indirect	  applicability	  includes	  the	  borrowing	  member	  States,	  
and	  the	  communication,	  although	  not	  directly	  on	  the	  member	  States	  behaviour,	  
has	  significant	  implications	  for	  the	  member	  State	  and	  is	  indirectly	  on	  the	  member	  
States	   behaviour.	   If	   the	   staff	   have	   failed	   in	   implementing	   the	   required	  OPs	   and	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BPs,	   it	   is	  because	   the	  member	  State	   itself	  has	  acted	  against	   them.	  Furthermore,	  
the	   finding	  of	   legal/illegal	  has	   implications	   for	   the	  member	  State	  as	  a	   finding	  of	  
illegal	   would	   require	   the	   Bank	   to	   take	   corrective	   action	   (i.e.	   imposing	   extra	  
conditions	  on	  the	  member	  State)	  or	  to	  stop	  funding	  the	  project.	  
Thirdly,	   the	   communication	   by	   the	   Panel,	   although	   directly	   related	   to	   a	   specific	  
project,	   serves	   the	   function	   of	   stabilising	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   entire	  
membership	   of	   the	   World	   Bank.	   All	   member	   States,	   via	   the	   publication	   and	  
decision	   taken,	   are	   given	   an	   expectation	   on	   how	   future	   requests	   for	   assistance	  
will	  be	  handled	  by	  the	  Bank	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  
The	   conditions	   of	   the	   legal	   system	   under	   systems	   theory,	   in	   allowing	   for	   the	  
stabilisation	   of	   normative	   expectations	   would	   point	   to	   the	   third	   scenario	   being	  
the	   most	   likely	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   World	   Bank’s	   autonomous	   legal	   system.	   The	  
normative	  framework	  of	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  is	  only	  enforced	  against	  those	  who	  are	  
borrowers,	   yet	   legally	  all	  member	  States	  have	   the	  potential	   to	  borrow	   from	   the	  
Bank,	  even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  economic	  criteria	  today.	  In	  that	  sense	  the	  legal	  
system	  has	  both	  a	  narrow	  and	  wide	  focus,	   in	  that	  it	  only	  is	  applied	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  borrowers,	  but	  as	  all	  member	  States	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  borrow	  from	  the	  Bank,	  
it	   serves	   to	   stabilise	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	   entire	  membership.	   Therefore,	   the	  
legal	  system	  under	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  applies	  to	  the	  entire	  membership	  of	  the	  Bank.	  
The	  answers	  to	  these	  questions	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  subsequent	  analysis	  on	  the	  
implications	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  acting	  as	  an	  autonomous	  system.	  	  
	  
6.5	  Implications	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Acting	  as	  a	  Legal	  System	  for	  the	  
World	  Bank	  Itself	  
The	   shift	   in	   understanding	   from	   an	   organisation	   that	   acts	   within	   a	   mandate	  
established	  by	  its	  member	  States	  to	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system	  has	  a	  number	  of	  
implications	  for	  the	  World	  Bank	  itself.	  
Systems	   theory	   views	   law	   as	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system.	   However,	   the	  
autonomy	  does	  not	  take	  law	  out	  of	  larger	  society,	  law	  remains	  part	  of	  the	  overall	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system	   of	   society	   but	   becomes	   a	   subsystem	   of	   the	   greater	   society	   system.7	  
Whether	  the	  boundary	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  is	  established	  as	  only	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  
or	   the	  wider	   legal	   framework	  of	   the	  Bank,	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   in	   some	   form	   the	  
Bank	   has	   differentiated	   itself	   from	   a	   wider	   system	   and	   achieved	   a	   functional	  
differentiation.	  
For	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  be	  an	  autonomous	  system,	  there	  are	  two	  consequences	  in	  
this	   respect.	   Firstly,	   as	   a	   system	   is	   not	   independent	   from	   but	   a	   part	   of	   a	  wider	  
society,	  the	  Bank	  as	  an	  autonomous	  system	  presupposes	  an	  overarching	  society,	  a	  
global	  society,	   that	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  differentiated	   itself	   from	  but	   is	  apart	  of.	  
This	  can	  be	  better	  explained	  and	  understood	  by	  viewing	  public	   international	   law	  
as	  an	  autonomous	  system	  of	   law	  within	  the	  global	  society,8	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  
has	  differentiated	  itself	  from	  this	  public	  international	  law	  system.9	  
Secondly,	   that	   despite	   the	   differentiation	   of	   the	   Bank	   from	   this	   global	   societal	  
system,	   the	   consequence	   of	   it	   remaining	   part	   of	   the	   wider	   system	   is	   that	   the	  
autonomous	  legal	  system	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  must	  serve	  a	  purpose	  for	  the	  wider	  
societal	  system.	   In	  the	  words	  of	  Luhmann,	   ‘the	   legal	  system	  fulfils	  a	   function	  for	  
society’.10	  In	  this	  respect	  it	  can	  be	  challenged	  what	  is	  the	  function	  that	  the	  Bank	  as	  
an	   autonomous	   system	   is	   providing	   to	   the	  wider	   global	   system?	   The	   answer	   as	  
such	  can	  only	  be	  what	  purpose	  the	  wider	  global	  system’s	  membership	  has	  given	  
the	  World	  Bank:	   i.e.	  the	  purposes	  within	   its	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	  Furthermore,	  
as	   part	   of	   wider	   society,	   the	   Bank’s	   legal	   system	   must	   contribute	   to	   the	  
construction	  of	  that	  wider	  system.	  
A	  number	  of	  important	  considerations	  arise	  out	  of	  this.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  ‘Law	  as	  a	  Social	  System’	  (1989)	  83(1	  &	  2)	  Northwestern	  University	  Law	  
Review	  136,	  138	  
8	   For	  analysis	  of	  public	   international	   law	  as	  an	  autonomous	   legal	   system	  within	   systems	  
theory,	   see	  Gunther	  Teubner,	   ‘Global	  Bukowina:	  Legal	  Pluralism	   in	   the	  World-­‐Society’	   in	  
Gunther	  Teubner	  (ed.),	  Global	  Law	  Without	  a	  State	  (Dartsmouth	  1996)	  pg.	  3	  and	  Andreas	  
Fischer-­‐Lescano	  &	  Gunther	  Teubner,	   ‘Regime	  Collissions:	  The	  Vain	  Search	  for	  Legal	  Unity	  
in	   the	   Fragmentation	  of	  Global	   Law’	   (2004)	   25(4)	  Michigan	   Journal	   of	   International	   Law	  
999	  
9	  The	  acceptance	  that	   the	  differentiation	  of	   the	  Bank	   from	  public	   international	   law	  does	  
not	   take	   the	   Bank	   out	   of	   the	   wider	   public	   international	   law	   system	   has	   important	  
implications,	   both	   for	   the	   Bank	   and	   for	   the	   public	   international	   law	   system.	   These	  
implications	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  a	  dedicated	  section	  further	  on.	  
10	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  ‘Law	  as	  a	  Social	  System’	  (1989)	  83(1	  &	  2)	  Northwestern	  University	  Law	  
Review	  136,	  138	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Firstly,	   are	   the	   Articles	   of	   Agreement	   that	   were	   signed	   in	   1944	   still	   adequately	  
reflective	  of	  the	  role	  that	  the	  wider	  society	  would	  wish	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  play?	  
Much	  has	  been	  written	  on	  the	  larger	  member	  States’	   influence	  upon	  the	  Bank,11	  
but	   it	   is	   the	  membership	   as	   a	   whole,	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   wider	   society,	   that	  
appears	   willing	   to	   allow	   the	   Bank	   to	   work	   outside	   of	   these	   purposes	   and	   the	  
mandate	   that	   they	   gave	   it.	   It	   has	   been	   demonstrated	   in	   Chapter	   One	   that	   the	  
Bank	  regularly	  has	  acted	  outside	  of	  and	  at	  times	  against	  its	  agreed	  mandate.	  The	  
OPs	   and	   BPs	   themselves	   also	   take	   into	   account	   considerations	   that	   the	   Bank	   is	  
prohibited	  from	  taking	  into	  account.12	  The	  consequences	  of	  these	  considerations	  
is	   to	   challenge	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   function	   of	   the	   Bank	   stipulated	   in	   the	  
Articles	  of	  Agreement	   is	   truly	   the	   role	   that	  wider	   society	   is	   seeking	   the	  Bank	   to	  
undertake.	  
This	  would	  imply	  two	  options	  that	  in	  either	  case	  would	  require	  that	  the	  Bank,	  as	  a	  
legal	  system,	  reflect	  upon	  its	  role.	  As	  one	  option,	  the	  Bank’s	  membership,	  as	  part	  
of	  both	  the	  legal	  system	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  part	  of	  the	  wider	  society	  system,	  need	  to	  
question	  whether	  the	  purposes	  given	  to	  the	  Bank	  are	  appropriate	  for	  the	  function	  
that	  the	  Bank	  has.	  Changes	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  legal	  system	  happen	  internally	  to	  
the	  system,	  and	  the	  ability	   to	  amend	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	   is	  a	  change	  that	  
can	  occur	  internally	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  system.13	  	  This	  reflection	  would	  give	  
the	  Bank	  an	  option	  to	  decide	  upon	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  legal	  system	  should	  reach;	  
whether	   it	   should	   apply	   in	   some	   form	   to	   the	   entire	   membership	   of	   the	   Bank	  
(through	   the	   use	   of	   the	   reports	   for	   example)	   or	   whether	   to	   retain	   the	   current	  
position	   of	   the	   application	   only	   to	   those	   who	   request	   assistance.	   Although	   the	  
normative	  expectation	   is	  provided	   for	  all	  of	   the	  membership,	   the	  applicability	   is	  
currently	  limited	  to	  the	  application	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  purposes,	  i.e.	  to	  the	  granting	  of	  
financial	  assistance.	  Although	  the	  Bank	  has	  sought	  to	  widen	  the	  applicability	  of	  a	  
normative	   framework	   by	   the	   use	   of	   reports	   to	   attempt	   to	   govern	   the	   entire	  
membership,	   the	   lack	   of	   requirement	   to	   follow	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	   Bank	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	   See	   for	   example;	   Robert	   Gilpin,	   “The	   Rise	   of	   American	   Hegemony”,	   in	   Patrick	   Karl	  
O’Brien	   &	   Armand	   Clesse	   (eds.),	   Two	   Hegemonies:	   Britain	   1846-­‐1914	   and	   the	   United	  
States	   1941-­‐2001	   (Ashgate	   Publishing,	   Ltd.	   2002)	   pg.	   165-­‐182;	   Robert	   Wade,	   “US	  
Hegemony	  and	  the	  World	  Bank:	  the	  Fight	  over	  People	  and	  Ideas”	  (2002)	  9(2)	  Rev.	  of	  Int’l	  
Political	   Economy	  201	   and	  Richard	   Peet,	  Unholy	   Trinity:	   The	   IMF,	  World	  Bank	   and	  WTO	  
(Zed	  Books	  Ltd.	  2003)	  
12	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  IV,	  Section	  10:	  Political	  Activity	  Prohibited	  
13	  IBRD	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  Article	  VIII	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regarding	  the	  behaviour	  of	   its	  member	  States	  prevents	  these	  reports	  amounting	  
to	  norms.	   In	  addition,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	  although	  the	   legal	   system	  of	   the	  Bank	  may	  
extend	  to	  the	  wider	  legal	  areas	  of	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  and	  Loan	  Agreement,	  
there	  is	  at	  present	  no	  justification	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  reports	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  
legal/illegal	   communication.	   A	   reassessment	   of	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   Bank	   may	  
allow	  this	  to	  adapt	  and	  change.	  	  
Alternatively	  and	  as	  a	  second	  option,	  the	  Bank	  can	  itself	  revert	  back	  to	  the	  original	  
function	   that	   it	   had	   for	   the	  wider	   society	   system,	   i.e.	   it	   constrains	   itself	   by	   the	  
purposes	   that	   it	   has	   within	   its	   Articles	   of	   Agreement.	   This	   would	   require	   a	  
withdrawal	   from	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   take	   into	   account	  
political	  concerns	  and	  a	  wider	  question	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  reports	  going	  forward.	  
Lending	   would	   have	   to	   occur	   only	   on	   the	   grounds	   stipulated	   by	   the	   Articles	   of	  
Agreement.	  
The	  desirability	  of	  either	  option	  is	  not	  a	  legal	  concern,	  and	  goes	  to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  
global	  society.	  The	  current	  acceptance	  by	  the	  wider	  societal	  system	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank	   taking	   upon	   itself	   the	   function	   that	   it	   has,	   wider	   than	   the	   one	   originally	  
granted	   to	   it,	   would	   point	  more	   towards	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   first	   option	   is	  
more	  appropriate.	  	  
This	  reflection	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Bank	  also	  is	   important	  for	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  
role	  of	  World	  Bank	  assistance.	  Currently,	   the	  Bank	  prioritises	   certain	  efforts,	   for	  
example	  the	  eradication	  of	  poverty,	  and	  to	  this	  end	  attempts	  to	  ensure	  through	  
the	  use	  of	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  that	  no	  matter	  what	  its	  lending,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  negative	  
effects	  upon	  wider	  elements	  of	  development	  that	  it	  has	  prioritised.	  The	  issue	  with	  
this	   purpose	   is	   that	   it	   removes	   the	   understanding	   of	  what	   is	   best	   in	   a	   situation	  
from	  a	  member	  State,	  and	  allows	   the	  World	  Bank	   to	  dictate	   to	  a	  member	  State	  
what	  policies	  it	  may	  not	  encroach	  upon.	  Whilst	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  this	  work	  
to	   undermine	   efforts	   to	   protect	   water	   supplies,	   environmental	   standards,	  
indigenous	  peoples	  rights	  or	  many	  other	  areas	  of	  legitimate	  concern,	  it	  should	  be	  
clarified	  to	  what	  extent	  these	  are	  legal	  obligations	  of	  the	  member	  States	  that	  the	  
Bank	   is	   enforcing,	   and	   to	  what	   these	   are	   standards	   that	   the	   Bank	   is	   developing	  
itself.	   Currently	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Bank	   can	   lead	   to	   obtuse	   results	   where	   a	  
member	  State	  details	  a	  legitimate	  development	  need	  but	  cannot	  move	  ahead	  as	  it	  
would	   conflict	   with	   World	   Bank	   OPs	   and	   BPs.	   To	   the	   extent	   that	   there	   is	   a	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weighing	   of	   priorities,	   the	   traditional	   position	   has	   been	   for	   member	   States	   as	  
sovereigns	   to	   take	   this	  decision	  although	   in	   these	   circumstances	   it	   is	   clearly	  not	  
the	  case.	  Whether	  this	  should	  continue	  should	  come	  as	  a	  secondary	  concern	  after	  
a	  reflection	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  purposes.	  
A	   second	   implication	   is	   also	   present	   considering	   the	   differentiation	   of	   the	   Bank	  
from	  the	  wider	  society;	  the	  actual	  contribution	  that	  the	  Bank	  as	  an	  autonomous	  
system	  makes	  to	  the	  wider	  system	  needs	  to	  be	  reflected	  upon.	  As	  the	  Bank	  should	  
contribute	   to	   the	   construction	  of	   the	  wider	   societal	   system,	   the	   communication	  
between	   the	   two	   areas	   should	   be	   enhanced.	   The	   Bank	   has	   already	   undertaken	  
measures	   to	   increase	   its	   transparency;	   therefore,	   contributing	   greater	  
communication	   between	   the	   two,	   but	   the	   communication	   can	   be	   enhanced	   in	  
both	  ways.	  The	  Bank	  can	  increase	  its	  contribution	  outwards	  and	  has	  done,	  but	  it	  
can	   also	   improve	   the	  mechanisms	   via	  which	   it	   incorporates	   the	   communication	  
that	  occurs	  outside	  of	  its	  system.	  
Finally,	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   as	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system	  
presents	  the	  Bank	  a	  choice.	  The	  differentiation	  of	  the	  Bank	  from	  the	  wider	  public	  
international	   law	   legal	   system	   rests	   upon	   the	   self-­‐referencing,	   self-­‐reproducing	  
process	  that	  the	  Bank	  continuously	  goes	  through	  via	  the	  communication	  along	  the	  
legal/illegal	  code	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  One	  element	  is	  that	  this	  process	  
of	  differentiation	  must	  be	  continuous.	  If	  at	  any	  point	  this	  differentiation	  were	  to	  
stop,	   the	   Bank’s	   legal	   system	   would	   be	   reabsorbed	   into	   the	   wider	   public	  
international	  law	  legal	  system.	  
Knowing	  this,	  the	  Bank	  as	  a	  system	  has	  a	  continuous	  choice.	  It	  must	  continuously	  
choose	  to	  be	  apart	  from	  the	  wider	  system.	  In	  practical	  terms,	  if	  the	  Bank	  were	  to	  
stop	   the	   process	   of	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   or	   stop	   the	   stabilisation	   of	   normative	  
expectations	   via	   communication	   along	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide	   by	   abolishing	   the	  
Inspection	  Panel,	  the	  autonomous	  legal	  system	  would	  dissolve,	  either	  back	  into	  a	  
normative	  system	  or	  potentially,	  depending	  upon	  how	  the	  stop	  occurred,	  back	  to	  
its	   original	   intention	   of	   being	   part	   of	   the	   wider	   public	   international	   law	   legal	  
system.	  
The	  following	  analysis	  assumes	  that	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  Bank	  as	  an	  autonomous	  
legal	   system	  does	   not	   cause	   the	   Bank	   to	  move	   back	   to	   a	   position	   of	  within	   the	  
wider	  public	  international	  law	  system.	  This	  assumption	  rests	  upon	  the	  acceptance	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by	  States	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  behaviour	   in	  acting	  outside	  of	  the	  areas	  of	  State	  consent	  
previously,	  and	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  this	  acceptance	  will	  continue.	  
	  
6.6	  Implications	  for	  the	  Relationship	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
Member	  States	  
The	   relationship	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   to	   its	   Member	   States	   can	   no	   longer	   be	  
understood	   in	   terms	   of	   sovereign	   consent.	   Although	   sovereign	   consent	  
established	   the	  World	   Bank,	   the	   Bank	   as	   a	   present	   day	   institution,	   through	   the	  
development	  into	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system,	  has	  moved	  beyond	  the	  sovereign	  
consent	   principle	   into	   acting	   as	   an	   autonomous	   unit.	   Sovereign	   consent	   is	   not	  
irrelevant,	   as	   it	   provides	   the	   starting	   point	   for	   operations,	   however,	   it	   can	   no	  
longer	  provide	  all	  answers	  to	  the	  Bank’s	  behaviour.	  	  
The	  autonomy	  of	  the	  Bank	  as	  a	  legal	  system	  has	  considerable	  implications	  for	  the	  
relationship	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   its	   member	   States,	   in	   particular	   given	   the	  
break	  that	  this	  has	  caused	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  State	  consent.	  
The	  legal	  system	  of	  the	  Bank	  revolves	  around	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs,	  yet	  the	  application	  
of	   these	   to	  member	  States	  occurs	  partially	   through	  conditionality	  on	  assistance.	  
Systems	   theory	  offers	   a	  mechanism	  via	  which	   to	   frame	   in	   law	  what	   is	  occurring	  
with	  the	  use	  of	  conditionality.	  
The	   Inspection	  Panel	   is	   judging	   the	   actions	  of	   Bank	   staff	   on	   the	   conditions	   they	  
place	  on	  loans	  (the	  action)	  against	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  (the	  law).	  It	  is	  not,	  according	  
to	   the	  Bank,	   judging	  whether	  a	   State	  has	   complied	  with	   conditions,	   it	   is	   judging	  
whether	   management	   has	   complied	   with	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs,	   although	   this	   is	  
somewhat	  undermined	  by	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  staff	  to	  effectively	  monitor	  the	  
application	   of	   the	   conditionality.	   In	   respect	   of	   Panel	   decisions	   if	   the	   action	   is	  
judged	   illegal,	   the	   Bank	   awards	   no	   damages	   to	   the	   individuals	   complaining	   and	  
instead	  the	  Bank	  has	  to	  either	  renegotiate	  loans	  or	  withdraw	  the	  finance	  from	  the	  
Bank.	  	  
This	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  State	  responsibility.	  As	  part	  of	  
the	   legal	   system	  of	   the	  World	  Bank,	   the	   applicability	   of	   the	  OPs	   and	  BPs	   to	   the	  
member	   State	   through	   conditionality	   may	   have	   repercussions	   for	   the	   member	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State’s	   wider	   legal	   responsibility.	   If	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   are	   in	   conflict	   with	   an	  
international	   legal	   obligation	   of	   the	   member	   State,	   there	   potentially	   may	   be	   a	  
conflict	  of	  responsibilities	  for	  the	  State	  concerned.	  	  
The	  World	  Bank	  as	  an	  autonomous	  legal	  system	  that	  interacts	  with	  States	  through	  
conditionality	   based	   on	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   also	   raises	   questions	   as	   to	   the	  
responsibility	   of	   the	   Bank.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   work	   of	   the	   International	   Law	  
Commission	   in	   attempting	   to	   clarify	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   international	  
organisations	   should	   be	   welcomed.14	   Yet,	   not	   every	   organisation	   is	   an	  
autonomous	   legal	   system,	   and	   the	   shift	   from	   a	   traditional	   international	  
organisation	   linked	   to	   State	   consent	   and	   an	   organisation	   amounting	   to	   an	  
autonomous	   legal	   system	   would	   suggest	   a	   different	   level	   of	   responsibility	   is	  
necessary	   depending	   upon	   the	   status	   of	   the	   organisation.	   It	   would	   be	   a	  
considerable	   feat	   to	   achieve	   such	   a	   legal	   framework	   in	   a	   constantly	   evolving	  
situation	  as	  international	  organisations	  develop	  and	  evolve.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  World	  
Bank,	   and	   potentially	   other	   autonomous	   international	   organisations,	   as	   an	  
autonomous	   legal	   system,	   it	   is	   evident	   that	   responsibility	   for	   its	   actions	   should	  
rest	   with	   the	   organisation.	   This	   has	   important	   implications	   for	   the	   effect	   of	   its	  
work,	  particularly	  for	  an	  evolution	  in	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  and	  the	  remedies	  that	  
applicants	  have.15	  
This	   consideration	   of	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   Bank	   also	   points	   to	   a	   possible	  
evolution	   in	   the	   governance	   arrangement	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   borrowing	  
member	  States.	  The	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  are	  directing	  binding	  upon	  staff,	  but	   indirectly	  
binding	  upon	  all	  borrowers	  from	  the	  Bank.	  The	  reality	  of	  the	  obligations	  that	  are	  
upon	   the	  Bank’s	  membership	   through	   the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	   should	  be	   reflected	   in	   a	  
shift	   in	   focus	  of	   the	   laws.	  Although	   the	  Panel,	  and	  at	   times	  States,	  have	  pushed	  
the	  applicability	  of	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  to	  member	  States,	  this	  should	  be	  reflected	  by	  
an	   explicit	   change	   in	   the	   binding	   nature	   of	   the	  World	   Bank	  Operations	  Manual,	  
from	  a	  manual	  binding	  upon	  staff,	  to	  a	  manual	  binding	  upon	  the	  access	  to	  World	  
Bank	  resources.	  
However,	  not	  all	  Member	  States	  are	  borrowers,	  which	  results	  in	  a	  two-­‐tier	  system	  
within	  the	  Bank.	  Members	  who	  borrow	  are	  bound	  by	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  in	  so	  far	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  ILC	  Draft	  Articles	  on	  the	  Responsibility	  of	  International	  Organisations	  (2011)	  
15	  See	  Section	  6.3.3	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that	   they	  cannot	  get	  assistance	  unless	   the	  policies	  are	   followed,	  whilst	  Member	  
States	  who	  do	  not	  borrow	  are	  not	   subject	   to	   the	   requirements	   set	  down	   in	   the	  
OPs	   and	  BPs.	   The	  Bank	   is,	   therefore,	   an	   autonomous	   system	  of	   law	   in	   so	   far	   as	  
that	  it	  is	  a	  normative	  actor	  where	  communication	  is	  divided	  by	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  
along	   the	   legal/illegal	  divide	  yet	   this	   law	  does	  not	  de	   facto	  apply	  equally	  among	  
the	  States	  who	  are	  members	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  Although	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  the	  
legal	  system	  encapsulates	  the	  entire	  membership,	  as	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  stabilisation	  
of	  normative	  expectations	  of	  all	  member	  States	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  lending	  by	  the	  Bank,	  the	  
stipulation	   that	   in	  practice	   it	  only	  applies	   to	  borrowers	   limits	   the	  applicability	  of	  
the	   law	   in	  a	  practical	   context.	   This,	   again,	   reaches	  back	   to	   the	  purpose	   that	   the	  
global	   society	   seeks	   for	   this	   system	   and	   what	   function	   the	   World	   Bank	   legal	  
system	   is	   seeking	   to	   fulfil.	   In	   contributing	   to	   the	   global	   society,	   the	   focus	   on	  
borrowers	   can	   be	   maintained	   or	   sought	   to	   be	   expanded	   in	   some	   form	   to	   the	  
wider	  membership.	  
6.6.1	  World	  Bank	  Law	  vs.	  National	  Law	  vs.	  Public	  International	  Law	  
Once	  a	   Loan	  Agreement	   is	   entered	   into	  by	   the	  Bank	  with	   the	  application	  of	   the	  
OPs	  and	  BPs	   contained	   therein,	   the	   judgment	  against	   these	  decisions	  under	   the	  
agreement	  is	  not	  governed	  by	  State	  law	  or	  public	  international	  law,	  it	  is	  governed	  
by	   “World	  Bank	   law”	   (i.e.	   the	  OPs)	   and	   the	   Inspection	  Panel	   is	   the	   “Court”	   that	  
decides	  if	  these	  conditions	  meet	  the	  standard	  required	  in	  the	  OPs.	  The	  application	  
of	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs	   through	   the	   tool	   of	   conditionality,	   therefore,	   becomes	   the	  
main	  mechanism	  via	  which	  the	  Bank	  exercises	  its	  authority	  over	  its	  subjects.	  This	  
relationship	   between	   systems	   of	   law	   is	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	   presence	   of	  
borrowing	  member	  States	   in	  at	   least	   three	   forms	  of	   legal	   systems:	  national	   law,	  
public	  international	  law	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  system.	  
The	   World	   Bank	   achieving	   the	   status	   of	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system	   has	  
implications	   for	   how	   this	   relationship	   is	   viewed.	  Whilst	   public	   international	   law	  
and	  State	  law	  are	  recognised	  legal	  systems,	  there	  now	  exists	  a	  system	  alongside	  in	  
“World	  Bank	  law”.	  The	  traditional	  relationship	  has	  always	  been	  to	  maintain	  a	  top-­‐
down	   approach	  with	   international	   law	   affecting	   States,	   with	   national	   law	   being	  
beyond	   the	   scope,	   although	   since	   the	   introduction	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   other	  
areas	  of	   international	   law	   in	   the	  21st	   century	   this	  presumption	  has	  already	  been	  
challengeable.	  Whilst	   an	   examination	   of	   pluralism	   and	   the	  work	   on	   this	   area	   is	  
beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis,	   the	   World	   Bank	   now	   clearly	   exercises	   a	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governance	   role	   in	   applying	   standards	   to,	  what	   it	   perceives	   are	   the	   benefits	   of,	  
subjects	  of	  national	  law,	  i.e.	  citizens.	  The	  structural	  coupling	  that	  occurs	  between	  
these	  systems	  allows	  each	  system	  to	  influence	  each	  other,	  but	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	   the	   communication	   from	   each	   system	   is	   interpreted	   internally	   within	   the	  
others.	  
This	  development	   is	   crucial	   for	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  Bank	  should	   in	   the	  
future	  act	   in	   relation	   to	  other	   systems;	  be	   they	   fully	  autonomous	   legal	   systems,	  
such	   as	   national	   legal	   systems,	   or	   simply	   external	   communication.	   Rather	   than	  
rejecting	   the	   premise	   of	   the	   applicability	   of	   certain	   external	   forces	   upon	   the	  
World	   Bank,	   the	   Bank	   should	   seek	   to	   enhance	   the	   communication	   that	   occurs	  
between	   itself	   and	   others	   in	   order	   to	   better	   allow	   the	   Bank	   to	   internalise	   this	  
communication.	  
The	   recognition	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   as	   a	   system	   of	   law	   would	   allow	   it	   exclude	  
values	   from	   its	   work	   (political	   expediency,	   etc.),	   yet	   would	   allow	   it	   to	   include	  
through	   structural	   coupling	   other	   communication.	   This	   would	   be	   of	   particular	  
relevance	  for	  including	  within	  the	  Bank’s	  work	  other	  areas	  of	  public	  international	  
law	  which	  the	  Bank	  system	  is	  a	  part	  of.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  mandate	  and	  function	  
of	   the	  Bank	   could	  be	   clearly	   established	  by	   the	  wider	   societal	   system,	   the	  Bank	  
would	   be	   able	   to	   interpret	   communications	   from	   outside	   its	   own	   autonomous	  
system	   along	   its	   own	   internal	   communication	   framework.	   This	   would	   be	   of	  
particular	  use	  in	  two	  areas.	  	  
Firstly,	  in	  general	  relations	  with	  all	  of	  its	  member	  States,	  the	  Bank	  would	  be	  able	  
to	   consider	   and	   interpret	   customary	   international	   law.	   Customary	   international	  
law	  is	  the	  minimum	  standard	  of	  public	  international	  law	  encapsulating	  the	  Bank’s	  
membership.16	   As	   a	   system	   of	   law,	   the	   Bank	   could	   interpret	   customary	  
international	   law	   from	   the	   wider	   public	   international	   law	   system	   and	   apply	   it	  
along	   its	   own	   communication.	   This	   has	   demonstrably	   happened	   in	   the	   Chad-­‐
Cameroon	  Petroleum	  and	  Pipeline	  Project	  case	  of	  the	   Inspection	  Panel	  when	  the	  
Panel	   introduced	   human	   rights	   into	   the	   legal	   system	   of	   the	   Bank.	   It	   is	   also	  
apparent	  from	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  that	  certain	  areas	  of	  customary	  international	  law	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  Excluding	  persistent	  objectors.	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should	   be	   taken	   into	   account,17	   however,	   this	   is	   in	   an	   extremely	   limited	   area	  
rather	  than	  applicable	  as	  a	  general	  principle.	  
The	   acceptance	   of	   the	  wider	   application	   of	   customary	   international	   law	   and	   its	  
applicability	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  would	  not	  override	  the	  Bank’s	  own	  legal	  system.	  
Being	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system,	   the	   Bank	   would	   interpret	   it	   and	   apply	  
customary	   international	   law	   within	   its	   own	   framework.	   In	   practical	   terms,	   the	  
applicability	   of	   customary	   international	   law	   would	   only	   occur	   in	   relation	   to	  
lending	   decisions	   and	   to	   what	   extent	   the	   Bank	   would	   seek	   to	   incorporate	  
customary	  international	  law	  into	  its	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  
Secondly,	   on	   individual	   relations	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   its	   member	   States,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  application	  of	  loans	  from	  the	  Bank	  to	  the	  State,	  the	  Bank	  would	  
be	   able	   to	   incorporate	   wider	   legal	   norms	   within	   its	   work.	   For	   example,	   treaty	  
obligations	  of	  a	  respective	  member	  State	  should	  be	  considered	  when	  establishing	  
the	   Loan	   Agreements.	   This	   would	   not	   detract	   from	   the	   State’s	   responsibility	   to	  
meet	   its	   legal	   obligations	   outside	   of	   the	   Bank	   legal	   system,	   but	  would	   allow	   an	  
integration	  between	  the	  two	  as	  much	  as	  was	  necessary	  and	  required	  by	  the	  Bank.	  	  
6.6.2	  Erosion	  of	  State	  consent	  
The	   move	   away	   from	   State	   consent	   and	   the	   development	   of	   an	   autonomous	  
system	  has	  further	  implications	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  
its	  member	  States	  in	  terms	  of	  State	  consent.	  
The	  application	  of	  systems	  theory	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  reflects	  a	  reality;	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
application	  of	  systems	  theory	  that	  moves	  the	  Bank	  away	  from	  State	  consent,	  but	  
the	  application	  of	  systems	  theory	  allows	  this	  move	  away	  to	  be	  explained	   in	   law.	  
However,	  once	  this	  realisation	  is	  realised,	  the	  move	  away	  from	  State	  consent	  has	  
a	  number	  of	  consequences	  in	  law.	  
Firstly,	   for	   the	   Bank	   itself,	   it	   challenges	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   operations	   of	   the	  
Bank.	   If,	  as	  has	  been	  argued	  by	  some,	  consent	   is	  what	  gives	  public	   international	  
law	  its	  legitimacy,18	  then	  a	  move	  away	  from	  consent	  in	  the	  differentiation	  that	  the	  
Bank	  has	  made	   for	   itself	   from	  public	   international	   law	  would	  also	  signal	  a	  move	  
away	  from	  the	   legitimacy	  that	  consent	  brings.	  Over	  the	  proceeding	  decades,	  the	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  See	  for	  example,	  OP	  7.30	  
18	  See	  for	  example,	  Matthew	  Lister,	  ‘The	  Legitimating	  Role	  of	  Consent	  in	  International	  Law’	  
(2010)	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  Chicago	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legitimacy	   of	   international	   law	   generally	   has	   become	   a	   genuine	   and	   central	  
concern.19	  Governance	  by	  international	  organisations	  has	  been	  a	  central	  premise	  
in	  this	  with	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  their	  role	  being	  questioned,20	  particularly	  in	  a	  link	  to	  
the	  democratic	  accountability	  of	  such	  organisations.21	  
The	  World	  Bank	  as	  a	   legal	  system	  outside	  the	  control	  of	  sovereign	  States	  moves	  
this	  debate	  forward	  in	  two	  important	  respects.	  As	  an	  autonomous	  system	  of	  law,	  
the	   legitimacy	  of	  that	   law	  must	  materialise	  from	  within	  that	  system,	  rather	  than	  
be	  exerted	  through	  national	  law	  and	  structural	  coupling.	  In	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  OPs	  
and	  BPs	  bind	  States	  and	  have	  an	  effect	  upon	  citizens’	  lives,	  the	  Bank	  should	  have	  a	  
strong	  internal	  governance	  structure	  to	  give	  the	  legitimacy	  that	  is	  required.	  This	  is	  
particularly	  important	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  approval	  and	  review	  of	  the	  laws,	  the	  OPs	  
and	  BPs.	  Currently	  the	  process	  of	  sending	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  to	  the	  Executive	  Board	  
is	   inadequate	   in	   that	   it	   does	  not	   allow	   for	   the	   system	  as	   a	  whole	   to	   assess	   and	  
challenge	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs,	  and	  instead	  allows	  only	  a	  limited	  review	  by	  the	  blocks	  
of	  countries	  represented	  on	  the	  Executive	  Board.	  A	  more	  appropriate	  mechanism	  
would	  be	  for	  a	  review	  and	  passing	  by	  the	  Board	  of	  Governors.	  Even	  this,	  however,	  
creates	  concerns	  as	  to	  the	  ready	  ability	  of	  the	  Governor	  of	  a	  country	  to	  represent	  
his	  or	  her	  citizenship	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  system.	  
The	   second	   area	   in	   which	   the	   World	   Bank	   has	   moved	   the	   legitimacy	   debate	  
forward	   is	   the	   creation	   and	   use	   of	   the	   Inspection	   Panel.	   If	   legitimacy	   can	   be	  
defined	  as	  ‘a	  relationship	  between	  an	  actor	  and	  a	  forum,	  in	  which	  the	  actor	  has	  an	  
obligation	   to	   explain	   and	   to	   justify	   his	   or	   her	   conduct,	   the	   forum	   can	   pose	  
questions	  and	  pose	  judgement,	  and	  the	  actor	  may	  face	  consequences’,22	  then	  the	  
Inspection	   Panel	   provides	   an	   element	   of	   legitimacy	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   citizenship	   of	  
member	   States	   by	   giving	   those	   affected	   by	   Bank	   actions	   an	   opportunity	   to	  
challenge	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   Bank.	   The	   similar	   procedures	   introduced	   by	   the	  
Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  and	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  can	  only	  be	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  Kumm,	  ‘The	  Legitimacy	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   International	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Analysis’	  (2004)	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  Zaum	  (ed.),	  Legitimating	  International	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  (OUP	  2013)	  
21	   See	   for	   example,	   Joseph	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   ‘Globalization’s	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  Mark	  Bovens,	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  Accountability:	  A	  Conceptual	  Framework’	  (2007)	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seen	   as	   positive	   developments	   in	   legitimising	   the	   role	   of	   these	   organisations	  
However,	   this	   should	   in	   no	   way	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   complete	   solution	   to	   the	  
legitimacy	  issue	  due	  to	  the	  inability	  of	  citizens	  through	  the	  Panel	  to	  challenge	  the	  
actual	  OPs	  and	  BPs,	  only	  to	  challenge	  whether	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  followed	  these	  
laws.	  
Carrasco	  and	  Guernsey	  propose	  that	  the	  Inspection	  Panel	  be	  reformed	  into	  a	  true	  
arbitration	  function	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  true	  accountability	  for	  the	  World	  Bank.23	  
This	  would	  be	  achieved	  by	  making	  Panel	  decisions	  binding,	  conducting	  arbitration	  
along	  a	  framework	  established	  in	  international	  arbitration	  standards	  and	  allowing	  
for	   the	   award	   of	   damages	   to	   citizens.	   The	   Panel,	   as	   it	   stands,	   provides	   an	  
adequate	  mechanism	  via	  which	  the	  Bank	  can	  communicate	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  
divide	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Bank	  actions	  relative	  to	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  Through	  this	  it	  allows	  for	  
the	  stabilisation	  of	  normative	  expectations	  of	  actors	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  
system.	  Yet	  the	  proposal	  of	  Carrasco	  and	  Guernsey	  to	  strengthen	  the	  arbitration	  
nature	  of	  the	  Panel	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  its	  international	  
responsibility	  as	  well	  as	  allowing	  to	  break	  the	  de	  jure	  link	  between	  the	  Panel	  and	  
the	  Executive	  Directors.	  Such	  provisions	  could	  only	  be	  welcomed	  in	  strengthening	  
both	   the	   Panel’s	   position	   within	   the	   legal	   system	   and	   allowing	   for	   the	   Bank	   to	  
strengthen	  its	  claim	  to	  be	  internalising	  the	  legitimacy	  concerns	  that	  it	  faces.	  
A	   second	   consequence	   for	   the	   move	   away	   from	   State	   consent	   is	   that,	   for	   the	  
member	  States	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  it	  challenges	  the	  position	  of	  sovereigns	  as	  the	  
appropriate	   mechanism	   via	   which	   citizens	   can	   organise	   their	   dealings.	   If	   States	  
have	   been	   the	   traditional	   mechanism	   via	   which	   citizens	   have	   organised	  
themselves	  in	  order	  to	  best	  handle	  their	  affairs,	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  governance	  
regime	  outside	  of	  and	  independent	  from	  State	  control	  would	  appear	  to	  question	  
the	  applicability	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	   legal	   system	  against	   the	   State.	   The	   inclusive	  
(States	  are	  part	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  system)	  yet	  exclusive	  (the	  State	  legal	  system	  is	  
external	   to	  the	  World	  Bank	   legal	  system)	  nature	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	   legal	  system	  
presents	   a	   paradox	   as	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   States	   have	   an	   effect	   upon	   the	  World	  
Bank	  legal	  system.	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  need	  for	  appropriate	  mechanisms	  to	  ensure	  
democratic	  accountability	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  operations	  are	  only	  strengthened.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	   Enrique	   Carrasco	   &	   Alison	   Guernsey,	   ‘The	  World	   Bank’s	   Inspection	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6.7	  Reforms	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  
Throughout	  the	  history	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  there	  have	  been	  many	  calls	  to	  reform	  
its	  work,	   or	   even	   to	   abolish	   the	   Bank	   completely.	   The	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	  
Bank	  as	  an	  autonomous	   legal	  system	  has	  a	  number	  of	  consequences	  relevant	  to	  
the	  reform	  of	  the	  Bank.	  
6.7.1	  The	  Operational	  Policies	  and	  Bank	  Procedures	  	  
Luhmann	   argues	   that	   in	   observing	   and	   describing	   the	   legal	   system	   one	   must	  
presuppose	  the	  acceptability	  of	  the	  legal/illegal	  code.24	  The	  norms,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs,	  are	  presumed	  to	  be	  acceptable,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
legal/illegal	   communication	   regarding	   them.	   However,	   a	   second	   stage	   of	   the	  
analysis,	  once	  a	   full	   system	   is	  established,	  must	  be	  clarifying	  the	  acceptability	  of	  
the	  code,	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  it	   is	  accepted	  or	  not	  (which	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
World	  Bank	   it	  clearly	   is),	  but	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  norms	  desirability	  and	  whether	  the	  
code	   and	   the	   norms	   on	   which	   it	   is	   judging	   best	   serve	   the	   function	   the	   system	  
plays	  within	  society.	  
Furthermore,	   Luhmann	   also	   argues	   that	   once	   it	   is	   acknowledged	   that	   a	   legal	  
system	  has	  evolved,	   this	  develops	   the	  possibility	   for	   reflection.	  The	  combination	  
of	   these	   two	   would	   suggest	   that	   the	   Bank	   embark	   upon	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	  
desirability	   of	   the	   OPs	   and	   BPs.	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   Bank	   has	   already	   began	   a	  
consultation	  over	  the	  safeguard	  policies	  incorporated	  within	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  that	  
it	  expects	  to	  give	  a	  result	  by	  mid-­‐2014.25	  This	  review	  should	  be	  widened	  to	  include	  
all	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  but	  only	  be	  concluded	  upon	  once	  the	  function	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  
is	   established.	  Whilst	   the	   review	   at	   the	  moment	   allows	   a	   chance	   for	   the	  wider	  
system	   to	   communicate	   with	   the	   Bank	   what	   changes	   the	   wider	   system	   would	  
prefer,	  the	  reflection	  should	  be	  driven	  by	  what	  function	  the	  society	  requires	  from	  
the	  Bank.	  The	  legal	  nature	  of	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs	  would	  suggest	  that	  they	  are	  subject	  
to	  a	  scrutiny	  equal	  to	  this	  status.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  ‘Law	  as	  a	  Social	  System’	  (1989)	  83(1	  &	  2)	  Northwestern	  University	  Law	  
Review	  136,	  145	  
25	   The	  World	   Bank’s	   Safeguard	   Policies	   Proposed	   Review	   and	   Update:	   Approach	   Paper,	  
October	  10,	  2012	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6.7.2	  Accountability	  	  
It	  has	  been	  identified	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  reconceptualise	  the	  legitimacy	  debates	  in	  
terms	   of	   systems	   theory	   as	   the	   link	   between	   sovereign	   will	   and	   the	   Bank	   is	  
broken.	  The	  internal	  structure	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  to	  provide	  the	  legitimacy	  if	  is	  
an	  autonomous	   legal	  system	  which	   in	  turn	   implies	  that	  the	  accountability	  of	   the	  
World	  Bank	  needs	  to	  be	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  function	  that	  the	  global	  society	  is	  
seeking	  the	  Bank	  to	  have.	  
However,	  there	  is	  accountability	  in	  a	  wider	  sense	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  considered.	   If	  
the	  Bank	  were	  to	  recognise	  the	  existence	  of	  various	  systems	  in	  international	  law	  it	  
would	   allow	   the	   Bank	   to	   focus	   upon	   its	   core	   mission;	   reconstruction	   and	  
development,	  with	  acceptance	  that	  other	  areas	  of	   international	   law	  will	  develop	  
into	  specialist	  systems	  of	  law.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  World	  Bank	  as	  a	  legal	  
system	  cannot	   consider	  other	  areas	  of	   law,	   in	   fact	  any	  external	   communication,	  
including	  legal	  communication	  that	  develops	  in	  either	  wider	  society	  or	  other	  legal	  
systems,	   is	   interpreted	   along	   the	   internal	   structure	   of	   the	   Bank.	   However,	   in	  
terms	  of	  accountability	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  who	  is	  accountable	  for	  actions.	  
Whether	  this	  results	  in	  the	  World	  Bank,	  as	  an	  autonomous	  system,	  considering	  all	  
aspects	  of	  law	  or	  focusing	  upon	  its	  core	  mission,	  will,	  again,	  depend	  upon	  the	  role	  
that	  is	  chosen	  for	  the	  Bank	  by	  wider	  society.	  	  
6.7.3	  The	  Inspection	  Panel	  
The	  World	   Bank	   Inspection	   Panel	   is	   not	   officially	   a	   Court.	   Yet,	   the	   Panel	   hears	  
complaints	  and	  judges	  actions	  in	  accordance	  with	  standards	  termed	  in	  the	  fashion	  
of	  laws.	  The	  non-­‐compulsory	  official	  nature	  of	  its	  findings	  is	  contrasted	  with	  its	  de	  
facto	   status	   as	   arbitrator	   whose	   recommendations	   have,	   since	   its	   early	   work,	  
always	  been	  followed.	  This	  is	  of	  a	  similar	  nature	  to	  a	  domestic	  Court	  what	  cannot	  
enforce	   its	  decisions	  but	   relies	  upon	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  compliance	  of	  actors	  
that	  go	  before	  it	  to	  do	  so.	  
Currently,	   the	   Panel	   only	   formally	   makes	   recommendations	   to	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	   and	   the	   power	   to	   adopt	   binding	   decisions	   rests	   with	   the	   Executive	  
Directors.	   Although,	   as	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   the	   situation	   has	  
changed	  somewhat	  since	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  resolution	  establishing	  the	  Panel	  so	  
that	   in	   practice	   the	   Executive	   Directors	   now	   adopt	   every	   decision	   of	   the	   Panel,	  
this	  is	  not	  yet	  reflected	  in	  the	  resolution	  itself.	  It	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  for	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systems	   theory	   that	   this	  has	  not	   stopped	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body.	  This	  
can	  also	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  Courts	  in	  national	  legal	  systems.	  Although	  a	  
Court	   makes	   the	   binding	   decision,	   it	   relies	   upon	   others	   for	   enforcement	   and	  
requires	  their	  tacit	  approval	  and	  respect	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Court	  to	  decide	  
matters.	   A	   similar	   system	   has	   developed	   within	   the	   Bank	   with	   the	   Executive	  
Directors	  tacitly	  approving	  the	  Panel’s	  recommendations.	  	  
To	  better	  reflect	  this	  practice,	  the	  Bank	  should	  consider	  directly	  empowering	  the	  
Inspection	   Panel	   to	   make	   binding	   decisions.	   The	   practical	   effect	   would	   be	   the	  
same	  but	  would	  allow	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  role	  that	  the	  Panel	  has	  come	  to	  
occupy	  within	  the	  Bank’s	  system.	  Furthermore,	  it	  would	  enhance	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  
Inspection	   Panel	   to	   provide	   judgment	   along	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide	   by	   having	  
direct	  enforceability.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  evolution	  in	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  should	  dictate	  
a	  change	   in	  the	  remedies	  that	  are	  available	  to	  applicants	  of	  the	  Panel.	  Currently	  
remedies	  are	  limited	  to	  a	  change	  in	  the	  conditions	  attached	  to	  a	  loan,	  in	  order	  to	  
ensure	   that	   the	  member	   State	   follows	   the	   respective	  OPs	   and	  BPs,	   or	   the	  Bank	  
can	   stop	   funding	   the	   project.	   As	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system,	   responsibility	   for	  
actions	   should	   rest	  with	   the	  World	  Bank.	   If	   the	  Bank	   as	   an	   autonomous	   system	  
has	   failed	   to	   abide	   by	   its	   own	   legal	   framework,	   then	   responsibility	   should	   rest	  
with	   the	   Bank	   to	   place	   those	   that	   are	   damaged	   by	   its	   actions	   back	   into	   their	  
previous	   position.	   This	   would	   imply	   that	   the	   Bank	   should	   reflect	   upon	   the	  
remedies	   available	   and	   introduce	   the	   notion	   of	   damages	   when	   it	   has	   failed	   to	  
abide	  by	  the	  OPs	  and	  BPs.	  	  
6.7.4	  The	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  
Any	  change	  to	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  would,	  as	  a	  primary	  concern,	  reflect	  the	  
role	  that	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  seeks	  the	  Bank	  to	  have.	  Whether	  this	  
would	  require	  a	  change	  as	  such	  to	  the	  purposes	  would	  depend	  upon	  the	  outcome	  
of	  this	  reflection.	  Changes	  to	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement	  would	  also	  need	  to	  mirror	  
the	  decisions	  taken	  in	  other	  contexts	  of	  reform.	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6.7.5	  Voting	  
Over	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Bank,	  there	  have	  been	  numerous	  attempts	  to	  reform	  the	  
voting	  arrangements	  of	  the	  Bank.	  Within	  a	  system	  of	   law,	  systems	  theory	  places	  
the	  development	  of	  norms	  secondary	  to	  the	  communication	  and	  stabilisation	  that	  
revolves	  around	  the	  norms.	  Yet,	   the	  creation	  of	  norms	  within	   the	  World	  Bank	   is	  
subject,	   to	  a	  certain	  extent	  now	  and	  possibly	   to	  a	   larger	  extent	   in	   the	   future,	   to	  
the	   voting	   system	   that	   the	   Bank	  maintains.	   The	   link	   between	   voting	   rights	   and	  
contribution	   to	   the	   subscribed	   capital	   of	   the	   Bank	   ensures	   that	   those	   who	  
contribute	  most	  have	  the	  largest	  say,	  yet	  in	  a	  two-­‐tier	  system	  of	  the	  Bank	  where	  
the	   application	  of	   norms	   are	   only	   directly	   upon	   those	  who	  borrow,	   it	   questions	  
the	   link	   between	   those	   who	   establish	   the	   norms	   and	   the	   applicability	   to	  
borrowers.	  	  
The	  reform	  of	  voting	  procedures	  is	  a	  subject	  unto	  itself,	  but	  if	  the	  purpose	  of	  an	  
autonomous	  system	  is	  to	  serve	  the	  wider	  society,	  the	  rules	  of	  that	  internal	  system	  
should	   seek	   to	  maximise	   this	   benefit	   to	   wider	   society.	  Whether	   this	   involves	   a	  
wider	  interpretation	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  to	  incorporate	  and	  enforce	  
the	  particular	  model	  of	  development	  that	  it	  currently	  adopts	  or	  a	  narrowing	  of	  the	  
Bank	   focus	   to	   ensure	   development	   at	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   member	   States	   is	  
unclear.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  voting	  and	  ability	  of	  member	  States	   to	  affect	   the	  OPs	  
and	   BPs	   should	   reflect	   this	   issue.	   If	   the	   focus	   is	   upon	   ensuring	   a	   wider	   role	   of	  
development	  for	  those	  who	  borrow	  from	  the	  Bank,	  a	  greater	  role	  should	  be	  given	  
to	   the	  borrowers	   in	  order	   to	  reflect	   the	  concerns	   that	   they	  have	  as	   to	  what	   this	  
wider	   role	   of	   development	   should	   entail.	   On	   the	   other	   side,	   whilst	   taking	   no	  
position	   on	   the	   benefits	   or	   disadvantages	   of	   they	   current	   structure,	   leaving	   the	  
voting	   structure	   as	   it	   currently	   stands	   may	   be	   acceptable	   if	   the	   Bank’s	   role	   is	  
narrowed	   and	   a	   larger	   role	   given	   to	   the	   respective	   borrowing	   member	   State	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6.8	  Effect	  upon	  Public	  International	  Law	  
As	  referred	  to	  earlier,	  the	  autonomous	  system	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  presupposes	  an	  
acceptance	  that	   it	   is	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  societal	  system;	  the	  public	   international	   law	  
system	  that	  is	  itself	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  global	  society.	  
The	  effect	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  system	  upon	  international	  law	  is	  two	  fold:	  firstly,	  the	  
presence	   of	   the	   system	   itself	   alters	   the	   dynamic	   and	   understanding	   of	   existing	  
public	   international	   law;	   secondly,	   the	   introduction	   and	   use	   of	   the	   Inspection	  
Panel	   has	   changed	   the	   traditional	   dynamic	   between	   citizens	   and	   international	  
law.	  	  
6.8.1	  Dynamic	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  
Public	   international	   law	   has	   been	   labelled	   as	   fragmented	   or	   functionally	  
differentiated	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years.	  In	  the	  area	  of	  international	  organisations,	  as	  
organisations	   have	   become	   more	   powerful	   and	   began	   to	   exercise	   a	   global	  
governance	   function,	  a	  number	  of	   theories	  have	  developed	  and	  been	  applied	  to	  
understand	  in	  law	  this	  phenomena.	  	  	  
It	   is	  clear	  that	  one	  more	  is	  required	  to	  be	  added,	  systems	  theory,	  to	  the	  work	  of	  
the	  World	   Bank.	   The	   unique	   character	   of	   international	   organisations	   belays	   any	  
attempt	   to	   extrapolate	   directly	   this	  work	   to	   other	   organisations.	   As	   a	  model	   of	  
understanding,	   systems	   theory	   could	   offer	   a	   tool	   to	   better	   understand	   the	  
evolving	  nature	  of	   the	  work	  of	   international	  organisations	  yet	  each	  organisation	  
would	  require	  a	  specific	  examination	  rather	  than	  any	  general	  rule	  being	  applied.	  
Public	   international	   law	   however,	   is	   undergoing	   a	   theoretical	   movement	   away	  
from	   one	   central	   theory	   of	   understanding	   to	   numerous	   theories	   explaining	   the	  
work	   of	   different	   areas.	   General	   rules	   fall	   down	   when	   applied	   to	   specific	  
situations	   as	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   States	   are	  willing	   to	   allow	  different	   areas	   to	  
evolve	  at	  differing	  rates	  and	  in	  different	  directions.	  	  
The	   development	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   into	   an	   autonomous	   legal	   system	   does,	  
however,	  question	  the	  applicability	  of	  systems	  theory	  to	  public	   international	   law	  
as	   a	  whole	   and	  what	   the	   relationships	   between	   the	   different	   areas	   are.	   “Public	  
international	  law”,	  as	  a	  distinct	  legal	  system,	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  legal	  
system	   but	   the	   World	   Bank	   is	   part	   of	   this	   system,	   only	   differentiated	   from	   it.	  
Whilst	   when	   systems	   theory	   views	   society	   as	   a	   whole,	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	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communication	  along	  the	  legal/illegal	  divide	  belongs	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  legal	  
system	  (the	  same	  way	  that	  communication	  along	  other	  binary	  divides	  belongs	  in	  
other	   systems	   within	   the	   totality	   of	   society),	   when	   communication	   occurs	  
between	   two	   legal	   systems,	   both	   along	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	  
established	  how	  each	  is	  interpreted.	  	  
It	  is	  posited	  that	  this	  should	  be	  done	  along	  the	  normative	  system	  contained	  within	  
the	  autonomous	   legal	  system.	  The	  normative	  system	  as	  such	   is	  the	  one	  that	  the	  
communication	   is	   concerned	   with:	   the	   guiding	   of	   expectations	   of	   the	  
implementation	   of	   the	   norms.	   The	   communication	   between	   the	   Bank,	   national	  
law,	   international	   law	  and	  other	   legal	  systems,	  both	  potential	  and	  actual,	  should	  
be	   interpreted	   along	   the	   normative	   framework	   that	   the	   bank	   has	   established.	  
Structural	   coupling,	   when	   understood	   in	   this	   way,	   therefore,	   pushes	   the	  
communication	  from	  other	  systems	  along	  the	  Bank’s	  internal	  code.	  
Whilst	   the	   intention	   of	   this	   thesis	   has	   not	   been	   to	   demonstrate	   a	   position	   of	  
autonomous	   legal	   systems	   in	   any	   organisation	   except	   the	   World	   Bank,	   nor	   to	  
imply	   that	   any	   currently	   exist,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   Bank	   opens	   up	   the	   possibility	  
that	   other	   autonomous	   legal	   systems	   may	   or	   can	   in	   the	   future	   exist.	   There	   is	  
considerable	   work	   on	   the	   governance	   function	   being	   exercised	   by	   other	  
international	   organisations.26	   If	   other	   organisations	   develop	   into	   autonomous	  
legal	   systems,	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   international	   law	  will	   only	   increase.	   As	   the	  
newly	  autonomous	  legal	  systems	  differentiate	  and	  separate	  themselves	  from	  the	  
wider	  public	  international	  law	  system,	  it	  is	  not	  that	  this	  wider	  public	  international	  
law	   system	   is	   undermined	   or	   loses	   value,	   nor	   that	   it	   is	   applicable	   in	   a	   lesser	  
context.	   The	   fragmentation	   into	   autonomous	   legal	   systems	   only	   allows	   for	   a	  
specialisation	   to	   occur	   on	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide	   into	   the	   different	   areas	   that	  
fragments	  exist.	  Public	  international	  law	  is	  still	  applicable	  and	  will	  be	  interpreted	  
through	   structural	   coupling	   to	   be	   applicable,	   however,	   the	   generality	   of	   the	  
application	   is	   premised	   upon	   each	   specialist	   autonomous	   legal	   system	  
interpreting	  the	  general	  law	  in	  its	  own	  way.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  See	  IMF:	  Armin	  Schäfer,	  ‘A	  New	  Form	  of	  Governance?	  Comparing	  the	  Open	  Method	  of	  
Co-­‐ordination	  to	  Multilateral	  Surveillance	  by	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  OECD’	  (2006)	  13(1)	  Journal	  
of	  European	  Public	  Policy	  70;	  EU;	  Helen	  Wallace,	  William	  Wallace	  &	  Mark	  Pollack	   (eds.),	  
Policy-­‐Making	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   (OUP	   2010),	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   Guzman,	   ‘Global	  
Governance	   and	   the	   WTO’	   (2004)	   45(2)	   Harvard	   International	   Law	   Journal	   303,	   and	  
generally,	  Ngaire	  Woods,	  ‘Governance	  and	  the	  Limits	  of	  Accountability:	  The	  WTO,	  the	  IMF	  
and	  the	  World	  Bank’	  (2001)	  53(170)	  International	  Social	  Science	  Journal	  569	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The	   danger	   of	   such	   a	   response	   is	   that	   the	   applicability	   and	   content	   of	   public	  
international	  law	  can	  be	  interpreted	  differently	  in	  different	  forums.	  However,	  this	  
position	   is	   already	   apparent	   for	   public	   international	   law,	   even	   without	   a	  
fragmentation	   into	   different	   autonomous	   systems.	   By	   its	   very	   nature,	   public	  
international	  law	  broaches	  different	  national	  legal	  systems,	  each	  able	  to	  interpret	  
the	   obligations	   in	   different	   ways.	   Although	   on	   a	   dispute,	   the	   specifics	   of	   the	  
situation	   such	   as	   who	   and	   where	   it	   is	   being	   applied	   will	   dictate	   a	   result,	   the	  
interpretations	   across	   different	   jurisdictions	   does	   not	   defeat	   the	   stabilisation	   of	  
normative	  expectations	  that	  public	  international	  law	  brings.	  This	  stabilisation	  will	  
also	   apply	  within	   the	   fragmentation	   of	   a	  wider	   public	   international	   law.	   As	   this	  
thesis	  will	  only	  position	  itself	  relative	  to	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  application	  of	  public	  
international	   law	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Bank	   does	   not	   defeat	   or	   destabilise	   the	  
normative	  expectations	  that	  public	  international	  law	  brings,	  and	  in	  theory	  should	  
achieve	  the	  exact	  opposite.	  The	  application	  of	  the	  norms	  in	  a	  wider	  context	  allows	  
for	   a	   stability	   of	   normative	   implementation.	   In	   the	   example	   of	   human	   rights,	  
when	   applying	   the	   customary	   international	   law	   obligations	   of	   human	   rights,	  
whatever	  they	  may	  be,	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear	  why	  a	  customary	  international	  
law	  would	  be	  applied	   in	   some	   contexts	   and	   contradicted	   in	  others	   (i.e.	   by	  Bank	  
lending	  that	  did	  not	  have	  to	  take	  human	  rights	  into	  account).	  The	  subject	  of	  State	  
responsibility	   and	   customary	   international	   law	   has	   been	   broached	   previously	   in	  
this	  chapter	  but	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  note	  for	  the	  purposes	  here	  that	  the	  separation	  of	  
autonomous	  legal	  systems	  from	  the	  wider	  legal	  system	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  
the	   stability	   of	   normative	   expectations	   from	   the	   wider	   public	   international	   law	  
legal	  system.	  	  
The	   separation	   and	   move	   away	   from	   generality	   of	   international	   law	   would,	  
however,	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  not	  one	  ready	  response	  than	  can	  be	  used	  to	  address	  
the	   issue	  of	   fragmentation,	  and	   instead	  each	   fragment	  would	   require	  a	  bespoke	  
response	   with	   a	   differing	   relationship	   with	   States.	   The	   theories	   of	   public	  
international	   law	  would	   need	   to	   reflect	   this	   shift.	  Whether	   systems	   theory	   can	  
explain	   the	   work	   of	   other	   international	   organisations	   or,	   more	   generally,	   other	  
areas	  of	  public	   international	   law	   is	  an	  open	  question	   that	  would	   require	   further	  
scholarship.	   What,	   however,	   is	   apparent,	   is	   that	   legal	   scholarship	   is	   offering	  
different	  legal	  tools	  of	  analysis	  for	  different	  areas.	  Systems	  theory	  is	  only	  one	  tool	  
that	  is	  currently	  being	  used,	  and	  whilst	  work	  may	  continue	  to	  find	  an	  overarching	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legal	   tool	   that	   applies	   in	   every	   context,	   the	   specialisation	   and	   fragmentation	   of	  
international	  law	  would	  argue	  against	  the	  success	  of	  this	  endeavour.	  
6.8.2	  Citizens	  and	  Public	  International	  Law	  
The	   breaking	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   consent	   has	   important	   implications	   for	   the	  
relationship	   between	   public	   international	   law	   and	   citizens	   of	   States.	   The	  World	  
Bank	  has	  already	  taken	  a	  lead	  in	  this	  respect	  by	  introducing	  the	  Inspection	  Panel,	  
which	  allowed	  for	  the	  first	  time	  a	  citizen	  to	  bypass	  its	  State	  and	  appeal	  directly	  to	  
an	  international	  organisation.	  
Klabbers,	   Peters	   and	   Ulfstein	   highlight	   that	   the	   accountability	   forum	   for	  
international	  organisations	  should	  be	  the	  global	  citizenship	  and	  not	  the	  member	  
States	   that	  make	  up	   the	  membership	  of	   the	  organisations27.	   ‘In	  doctrinal	   terms,	  
the	   claim	   is	   that	   individuals	   should	   be	   full	   and	   active	   legal	   subjects	   of	   the	  
respective	  organization’s	   legal	   order.’28	   The	  work	  of	   the	   Inspection	  Panel	  within	  
the	  World	  Bank’s	  legal	  order	  moves	  the	  World	  Bank	  into	  a	  separate	  phase	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
the	   organisations	   that	   the	   authors	   point	   to.	  Whilst	   not	   allowing	   for	   a	   complete	  
transformation	  as	  of	  yet,	  due	  to	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  Panel	  only	  being	  related	  to	  the	  
conduct	   on	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide	   and	  not	   on	   the	  OPs	   and	  BPs	   themselves,	   the	  
Panel	   allows	   for	   an	   accountability	  mechanism	   for	   individuals	   that	   is	   not	   readily	  
present	  within	  other	  organisations.	  The	   systems	   theory	  perspective	  on	   this	   is	   to	  
allow	  to	   the	   findings	  of	   the	  Panel	   their	   true	  purpose;	   to	  communicate	  along	  the	  
legal/illegal	   divide	   to	   member	   States	   of	   acceptable	   behaviour,	   and,	   therefore,	  
reaching	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   concept	   of	   binding	   only	   on	   the	  World	   Bank	   to	  
provide	  an	  acceptable	  accountability	  mechanism	  via	  which,	  at	  least	  in	  World	  Bank	  
member	  States	  that	  take	  assistance,	  citizens	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  ‘full	  and	  active	  
legal	  subjects	  of	  the	  respective	  organization’s	  legal	  order’.	  The	  changes	  proposed	  
in	   relation	   to	   arbitration	   and	   remedies	  would	   only	   increase	   this	   role	   of	   citizens	  
within	  the	  Bank.	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   Jan	  Klabbers,	  Anne	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6.9	  Conclusion	  
This	  thesis	  has	  chartered	  the	  development	  of	  the	  World	  Bank.	  The	  Bank	  today	  is	  a	  
very	  different	  organisation	  to	   that	  which	  was	  created	   in	  1945	  and	  to	   that	  which	  
was	   envisioned	  by	   its	   creators.	   The	   overarching	   conclusion	   is	   one	   of	   a	   need	   for	  
reflection	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Bank.	  The	  Bank	  has	  demonstrated	  a	  remarkable	  trend	  
to	  act	  within	  its	  own	  interests	  and	  move	  itself	  beyond	  what	  is	  readily	  accepted	  in	  
terms	  of	  public	   international	   law	  and	  whilst	   in	  1945	  and	   for	   a	   significant	  period	  
afterwards,	   the	   positivist	   theory	   was	   an	   adequate	   and	   useful	   tool	   via	   which	   to	  
explain	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  workings,	  legal	  theory	  has	  moved	  on	  and	  needs	  to	  turn	  
its	  attention	  to	  and	  explain	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Bank.	  
The	  critics	  of	  the	  positivist	  tool	  have	  been	  growing	  for	  a	  significant	  period	  of	  time,	  
and	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  this	  work	  to	  add.	  The	  positivist	  tool	  of	  understanding	  
public	   international	   law	  may	   still	   be	   the	   most	   appropriate	   in	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	  
circumstances.	   It,	   however,	   is	   not	   the	  most	   appropriate	   in	   every	   circumstance,	  
and	  scholarship	  needs	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  tool	  being	  the	  one	  most	  readily	  used.	  
This	  work	  has	  been	  a	  reflection	  on	  the	  most	  appropriate	  legal	  tool	  to	  understand	  
how	  the	  Bank	  acts	  in	  terms	  of	  law.	  
The	  Bank	  itself	  still	  maintains	  and	  tries	  to	  work	  within	  the	  theory	  of	  positivism,	  by	  
linking	  all	  of	   its	  actions	  back	  to	  the	  Articles	  of	  Agreement.	   It	   is	  simply	  at	  a	  point,	  
however,	  where	   this	   is	   not	   the	  most	   appropriate	   tool	   of	   analysis	   to	  describe	   its	  
actions.	  Chapter	  One	  demonstrated	  an	  evolution	  of	  the	  Bank	  away	  from	  this	  tool	  
and	  argued	  that	  the	  tool,	  once	  described,	  no	  longer	  is	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  
work	   of	   the	   Bank.	   The	   analysis	   of	   the	   theory	   of	   positivism	   as	   applied	   in	   public	  
international	  law	  no	  longer	  applies	  in	  this	  one	  specific	  context,	  and	  so	  the	  concept	  
of	   model	   dependent	   realism	   was	   raised	   as	   justification	   to	   not	   dispute	   the	  
application	  of	  positivism	  generally.	  There	  may	  yet	  come	  a	  time	  when	  the	  theory	  of	  
positivism	  does	  not	  describe	  any	  actions	  under	  public	   international	   law,	  yet	   this	  
thesis	  has	  applied	  model	  dependent	  realism	  to	  determine	  that	  multiple	  theories	  
can	  be	  acceptable	  within	  public	  international	  law	  if	  they	  can	  all	  be	  given	  the	  seal	  
of	  ‘truth’,	  in	  that	  they	  accurately	  model	  behaviour	  of	  international	  law	  actors.	  
In	  other	   contexts,	  other	   tools	  have	  been	  successfully	  used	   to	  explain	  how	  other	  
organisations	  are	  acting	  in	  terms	  of	  law.	  This	  work	  only	  adds	  one	  more	  tool	  to	  the	  
list	  specifically	  for	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  makes	  no	  claim	  as	  to	  its	  wider	  applicability	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without	  further	  analysis.	  The	  main	  tools	  used	  in	  other	  contexts,	  both	  established	  
and	  emerging,	  also	  were	  not	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  in	  law	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  actions.	  This	  
is	   not	   a	   critique	   of	   these	   tools	   as	   such,	   as	   they	   have	   proven	   themselves	   to	   be	  
applicable	   in	  other	  circumstances,	  but	   is	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  having	  a	  
number	   of	   tools	   to	   describe	   different	   situations.	   Specifically	   the	   work	   of	  
progressive	  positivism	  was	  identified	  and	  applied	  to	  the	  Bank	  in	  order	  to	  attempt	  
to	  reach	  a	  non-­‐conventional	  understanding	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  actions.	  Although	  in	  this	  
context	   it	   failed,	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Draft	   Articles	   on	   the	   Responsibility	   of	  
International	  Organisations	  may	  have	  profound	  effects	   both	  on	   the	  World	  Bank	  
and	   other	   international	   organisations	   generally	   in	   the	   future.	   This	   is	   a	   topic	   of	  
analysis	  that	  will	  raise	  questionable	  results	  going	  forward,	  specifically	  for	  the	  Bank	  
in	   its	   actions	   of	   to	   what	   extent	   it	   should,	   in	   its	   role	   as	   an	   autonomous	   legal	  
system,	   incorporate	   the	   norms	   of	   customary	   international	   law	   into	   its	   legal	  
structure.	  
Reflecting	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  other	  tools	  of	  analysis	  to	  explain	  the	  World	  Bank	  in	  
law,	   systems	   theory	   has	   been	   offered	   as	   an	   alternative	   tool.	   The	   non-­‐
approachability	   and	   significant	   understanding	   hurdles	   of	   the	   tool	  may	   have	   led	  
scholars	  to	  avoid	  its	  use,	  although	  this	  has	  been	  changing.	  As	  an	  analytical	  tool,	  it	  
offers	   an	   explanation	   for	   the	   work	   of	   the	   Bank	   in	   a	   way	   that	   other	   tools	   have	  
failed.	  The	  essentialist	  analysis	  of	  the	  systems	  theory	  model	   identified	  a	  number	  
of	  different	  elements	  as	  necessary	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  legal	  system:	  a	  self-­‐
reproducing,	   self-­‐referencing	   autonomous	   system	   that	   is	   characterised	   by	  
communication	   along	   a	   binary	   code	   legal/illegal	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   stabilising	  
normative	   expectations.	   Where	   this	   thesis	   departed	   from	   Luhmann’s	   systems	  
theory	   and	   developed	   into	   a	   new	   direction	   was	   in	   identifying	   that	   the	   most	  
obvious	  mechanism	  via	  which	  communication	  is	  classed	  as	  legal/illegal	  to	  stabilise	  
normative	  expectations	  is	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  and	  that	  
without	   this	   communication	   being	   classed	   as	   legal/illegal,	   a	   normative	   system	  
cannot	  develop	  into	  a	  legal	  system.	  
Application	  of	   the	   tool	  began	  with	  a	   summation	  of	   the	  normative	   framework	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank.	  In	  a	  strict	  sense,	  the	  normative	  framework	  is	   limited	  to	  the	  OPs	  
and	  BPs.	  Yet,	  the	  Bank	  has	  demonstrated	  itself	  to	  be	  a	  norm	  creator	  in	  the	  area	  of	  
conditionality,	   if	   only	   on	   an	   ad	   hoc	  
	   258	  
borrowing	   member	   State	   differently.	   The	   Bank	   has	   also	   demonstrably	   moved	  
itself	   into	  a	  position	  of	   judging	  the	  actions	  of	   its	  entire	  membership	  through	  the	  
use	  of	  reports	  of	   their	  actions	  against	  standards	  set	  by	  the	  Bank.	  Although	  as	  of	  
yet	  these	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  norms,	  it	  is	  an	  area	  of	  the	  Bank	  that	  has	  been	  poorly	  
examined	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   governance	   and	   legal	   theory.	   The	   development	   of	  
these	  areas	  going	  forward	  depending	  upon	  the	  role	  that	  global	  society	  seeks	  the	  
Bank	   to	   undertake	   will	   have	   profound	   effects	   upon	   the	   progress	   of	   the	  World	  
Bank	  as	  a	  legal	  system.	  
The	  requirement	  of	  systems	  theory	  that	  a	  legal	  system	  requires	  a	  Court-­‐like	  body	  
that	   judges	   on	   the	   legal/illegal	   divide	   led	   to	   an	   examination	  of	   the	   introduction	  
and	  use	  of	  the	  Inspection	  Panel.	  The	  work	  of	  the	  Panel,	  and	  its	  development	  into	  
providing	   communication	   along	   the	   legal	   binary	   code	   specifically	   led	   to	   the	  
operational	   closure	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   legal	   system.	   The	   work	   of	   the	   Panel	  
continues	  and	  provides	  an	  opportunity	   for	   the	  Bank	  to	  continually	   reproduce	   its	  
constituent	   element	   of	   communication	   and	   stabilise	   normative	   expectations	   of	  
actors	  in	  the	  legal	  system.	  
Finally,	   the	   implications	  of	   the	  Bank	  acting	  as	  an	  autonomous	   legal	   system	  have	  
been	   analysed.	   A	   number	   of	   reforms	   are	   required,	   even	   if	   no	   change	   to	   the	  
purposes	  of	  the	  Bank	  takes	  place,	  but	  the	  principle	  conclusion	  from	  this	  work	  has	  
been	  the	  need	  for	  global	  society,	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  Bank,	  
to	   reflect	   upon	   what	   function	   the	   Bank	   is	   supposed	   to	   fulfil.	   The	   wide	   and	  
increasing	  areas	  that	  the	  Bank	  considers	  are	  at	  variance	  with	  the	  function	  that	  the	  
Bank	  was	   assigned	   in	   1945.	  Whilst	   this	   is	   not	   a	   negative,	   it	   leaves	   a	   disconnect	  
between	   how	   the	   Bank	   is	   presented	   and	  what	   the	   Bank	   does.	   Legal	   theory	   can	  
explain	  the	  work	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  via	  the	  use	  of	  systems	  theory	  yet	  it	  should	  be	  
clear	  to	  all	  actors;	  the	  Bank	  itself,	  the	  member	  States	  and	  the	  people	  whose	  lives	  
the	  work	  of	  the	  Bank	  affects,	  what	  exactly	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Bank.	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